Chapter 19 Please enter "The Knocker"

In the spring of 1938, Mao Zedong was planning a new strategic direction for the Eighth Route Army.At this time, most of the towns and communication lines in North China had fallen into the hands of the Japanese army. However, due to the elongated front of the enemy, the troops were more dispersed, and the gap behind the enemy widened. Can occupy a county.Accordingly, Mao Zedong saw an opportunity for guerrilla warfare to develop on the plains. At the beginning of 1938, Mao Zedong instructed the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Commission to try to carry out guerrilla warfare in the Hebei and Shandong plains between Pinghan Road and Jinpu Road, establish base areas, and expand the battlefield for national liberation.

On April 21, 1938, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Liu Shaoqi called Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and Xu Xiangqian of the 129th Division to instruct: "According to the experience since the War of Resistance, under the current conditions of persisting in the War of Resistance and going deep into the masses, the In the Hebei and Shandong plains, it is possible to develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare extensively and persist in guerrilla warfare in the plains. The Party and the Eighth Route Army units in the Hebei and Shandong plains should resolutely adopt the policy of developing guerrilla warfare as extensively as possible.” This is from the perspective of the overall strategy. Great emphasis was placed on the development of guerrilla warfare in the plains.

Subsequently, Mao Zedong called Xiang Ying, the main person in charge of the New Fourth Army, asking him to overcome difficulties, carry out guerrilla warfare in the vast Central China Plain, establish guerrilla bases, and expand the influence of the New Fourth Army. Under the repeated urging of Mao Zedong and others, in mid-May, the first detachment of the New Fourth Army entered southern Jiangsu; Guerrilla warfare was carried out in the vast Central China area from the Yangtze River to the Han River in the west and the seashore in the east. In late May, front-line commander Xu Xiangqian preliminarily solved the problem of how to conduct guerrilla warfare in the plains in his article on launching guerrilla warfare in Hebei.He said: From a tactical point of view, it is naturally more difficult for guerrillas to operate in the plains than in the mountains, but we cannot doubt the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare in the plains.The support of guerrilla activities is firstly the convenient conditions of the terrain and secondly the combination with the broad masses of the people, which is the most important.Xu Xiangqian put forward the idea of ​​creating a "mountain of people" in the plain: "If we can push the vast number of people to the anti-Japanese front in the plain area and form a mountain of people for the guerrillas, I don't think there is such a mountain no matter what kind of mountain it is." The mountain is good." A few months later, he went to Shandong Plain to practice his "human mountain" thought.

These show that the anti-Japanese guerrilla war has moved from the mountains to the plains, from Shanxi to the entire North China, and even the whole country.Therefore, China's anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare went beyond the scope of tactics to knock on the door of strategy, demanding that the problem of guerrilla warfare be examined from a strategic point of view. Mao Zedong not only earnestly discussed the modern and modern history of China and the "wordless scriptures" of China's revolutionary war, but also paid attention to the study of Chinese and foreign military theories.In order to study this issue, starting from the beginning of 1938, Mao Zedong extensively collected theoretical works on military affairs and studied military theory.At that time, there were very few such books in Yan'an.Xiao Jinguang, the commander of the Left Behind Corps of the Eighth Route Army, has two books, "Battle Problems" and "Battle Rules", which he regards as "baby bumps".He Zizhen visited Xiao Jinguang's house, found the two books by chance, and went back to tell Mao Zedong.Mao Zedong was overjoyed and came to borrow it early the next morning.Xiao Jinguang was very reluctant, but he also knew that the book borrowed by Mao Zedong would be of more important use, so he had to lend it to him.Decades later, Xiao Jinguang still has a "sorrow" about Mao Zedong's borrowing and not paying back.

In order to brainstorm, Mao Zedong also invited Xiao Jinguang, Luo Ruiqing, Liu Yalou, and Guo Huaruo, who were in Yan'an at that time, who had studied military theory, to have a discussion in his cave, and asked them to talk about their understanding of the strategic issues of the War Against Japan.The viewpoint that guerrilla warfare must have initiative, flexibility, and planning was summed up by Mao Zedong based on Xiao Jinguang's comments. In addition, Mao Zedong also carefully studied the famous Prussian bourgeois military theorist Clausewitz's "On War" in the 19th century.According to his reading diary, he started reading the first article on March 15, 1938.He not only read it by himself, but also organized other comrades to read it. He organized a research meeting on "Clausewitz" and "On War" in his residence in Phoenix Mountain, where he studied one night a week.Xiao Jinguang, Luo Ruiqing, Teng Daiyuan, Huang Wenhua, Ye Zilong and others participated in the seminar.

After full investigation, thinking, and research, in order to explain the important position of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War and unify the party's understanding, in January 1938, Mao Zedong invited the "knocker" in the office of Lijiayaoyuan, Fenghuangshan, Yan'an, and wrote at his desk. "Strategic Issues in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare". In this work, Mao Zedong first investigated the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War under the specific historical conditions of China, scientifically revealed its inevitable connection with the overall situation of the Anti-Japanese War, and spoke highly of its important strategic role.

Mao Zedong pointed out that, generally speaking, guerrilla warfare plays a complementary and auxiliary role in regular warfare, and it is only a matter of tactics, not strategy. However, China is a large and weak country in an era of progress, and all problems arise from here.The rise of China’s anti-Japanese guerrilla war to a strategic height was determined by the basic characteristics of both China and Japan and the era in which the war took place: First, the enemy is a small country, occupying a vast area, and inevitably lacks troops, leaving many empty areas in the occupied areas. Fight alone.

Second, since China is in a progressive era, that is to say, there is a strong army led by the Communist Party and the people supporting the war, the anti-Japanese guerrilla war must be large-scale rather than small-scale.It thus creates the problem of strategic defense and strategic offense. Third, the enemy is strong and we are weak, which stipulates the protracted and cruel nature of the war.This requires close integration of guerrilla warfare and base areas, creating base areas with guerrilla warfare, and supporting the long-term war of resistance against Japan with anti-Japanese base areas.

Fourth, guerrilla warfare cannot finally resolve the fate of the war. It must develop into mobile warfare. The guerrilla army must gradually become a regular army, and finally defeat the enemy thoroughly through regular warfare and win final victory. These show that the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is not just a tactical issue, but a strategic issue, and the important strategic role of guerrilla warfare cannot be underestimated in the slightest. In the article, Mao Zedong also proposed six specific strategic issues based on the characteristics of guerrilla warfare: First, carry out proactively, flexibly, and in a planned way offensive warfare in defensive warfare, quick-decision warfare in protracted warfare, and external-line warfare in internal-line warfare; secondly, cooperate with regular warfare; thirdly, establish base areas; fourthly , strategic defense and strategic offensive; fifth, the development of mobile warfare; sixth, the correct command relationship.

Mao Zedong elaborated on these issues one by one, pointing out: This is "a necessary way to preserve and develop oneself, destroy and expel the enemy, cooperate with regular warfare, and strive for final victory." Soon, Mao Zedong published "On Protracted War". In this 50,000-word military masterpiece, the Eighth Route Army's strategic policy was formally summarized as "basically guerrilla warfare, but mobile warfare under favorable conditions will not be relaxed."So far, the party's guerrilla strategic policy has fully matured.It not only armed the revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, but also aroused the keen interest of some insightful people in the Kuomintang army.