Chapter 18 Mao Zedong took a fancy to Shanxi

Just when Wang Ming expressed his dissent to the guerrilla warfare strategies and policies formulated by the Chinese Communist Party, Evans Carlson, a military attache of a capitalist country in China and a counselor at the Naval Attaché Office of the U.S. Consulate General in China, in 1937 After visiting the North China base area and Yan'an in December and the end of April and beginning of May 1938, he strongly praised the strategy, tactics and policies of the Eighth Route Army.In his book "China's Twin Stars" published in 1940, he loudly appealed: "If China is to survive, it seems necessary to extend the resistance method that has proved so effective to all parts of the country."

In the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, although Mao Zedong in Yan'an was unable to carry out guerrilla warfare in all parts of China, he had been working hard to expand the space for guerrilla warfare. At first Mao Zedong proposed independent guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas, and this mountainous area, first of all, was Shanxi. Shanxi sounds like "thin mountains", but in fact, Shanxi's mountains are not only not "thin", but also have many mountains.Shanxi has Taihang Mountain in the east, Luliang Mountain in the west, Wangwu Mountain in the south, Guancen Mountain in the north, Wutai Mountain and Hengshan Mountain in the northeast, and Taiyue Mountain in the southwest.These mountains are famous for their overlapping peaks.Shanxi is a plateau in North China, overlooking the endless Hebei-Shandong Plain from a high position.

Mao Zedong took a fancy to Shanxi. First, Shanxi was the barrier of northern Shaanxi. Second, the Eighth Route Army must take advantage of the favorable terrain of Shanxi to carry out mountain guerrilla warfare and mobilize the masses in order to gain a firm foothold under the powerful Japanese attack and start the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. Establish a base area, create a forward strategic position, and then rely on it to gradually develop eastward and northward. When the Eighth Route Army was dispatched, the Party Central Committee in Yan'an suggested that all the Eighth Route Army be deployed at the junction of the four provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Jinsui and the center of the Hengshan Mountains.This deployment was made when the main attack direction of the Japanese army was not yet clear.By mid-September, the strategic situation for the Japanese army to attack Shanxi and North China became increasingly clear.The Japanese army attacked from the Pingsui, Tongpu, and Pinghan routes, and implemented a strategic detour in an attempt to capture Taiyuan, threaten the central army on the Pinghan line and finally defeat it. This will also put the Eighth Route Army entering this area in a state of initial movement.

In order to strategically deploy in a mobile position, that is, to deploy on the enemy's flanks, to contain the enemy's attack on Taiyuan and continue southward, to aid the Jinsui Army, and to support the North China War of Resistance, Mao Zedong changed the deployment in time and instructed the Eighth Route Army headquarters to deploy three divisions in Hengshan. The regional plan has been changed to a decentralized configuration: the 120th Division will be transferred to the northwest of Shanxi Province based on the Guancen Mountains; the 129th Division will enter the southwestern region of Shanxi Province based on the Luliang Mountains at an appropriate time; The division entered the southern section of the Hengshan Mountains, and was preparing to gradually move southward, spreading out in the Taihang and Taiyue Mountains.

The intention of this deployment is to deploy the Eighth Route Army in the four corners of Shanxi to prevent being in the enemy's strategic attack and encirclement, and to adopt a situation of encirclement on all sides towards the enemy-occupied communication lines and central cities.When the Japanese army attacked, they could cooperate with friendly forces to contain and attack the enemy from behind; and when the Kuomintang retreated to the south, they could rely on favorable terrain to carry out mountain guerrilla warfare and persist in the long-term war of resistance in North China.Mao Zedong was like a skilled chess player. After watching the six directions, proceeding from the overall situation, he decisively placed the chess pieces in the most important and safe positions to form the best layout.

According to the intention of Yan'an, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army quickly implemented a large-scale strategic deployment.Mao Zedong instructed the Eighth Route Army to actively attack and contain the Japanese army on the enemy's flanks and rear, and cooperate with friendly forces to defend Xinkou and Taiyuan; on the other hand, pay attention to the deployment of guerrilla warfare. At the end of October, Niangziguan, an important pass on Zhengtai Road, fell.The anti-Japanese situation in Shanxi took a turn for the worse, and Xinkou and Taiyuan fell one after another.The regular war with the Kuomintang army as the main body in the North China battlefield ended.

After the fall of Taiyuan, the Communist Party loudly stated: "The Eighth Route Army will live and die with North China!" Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China further clarified that the current central task is to take Shanxi as the main position to support the War of Resistance in North China, spread out in the four corners of Shanxi, and carry out independent development Guerrilla warfare, build bases. The division of troops in Mount Wutai was the first step in the strategic development of the 115th Division. In late October, Lin Biao led the 115th Division to support Niangziguan, and then turned to Luliang Mountain, opening up a strategic fulcrum in southwestern Shanxi.

Nie Rongzhen led the remaining 3,000 people to set up the anti-Japanese banner in Northeast Shanxi and established the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base. Nie Rongzhen was actually standing in the enemy's pocket.This is because Jinchaji is located between the four railways of Pinghan, Pingsui, Zhengtai and Tongpu, and is surrounded by important Japanese military strongholds such as Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, Shijiazhuang, and Taiyuan.But Nie Rongzhen was not nervous at all.His "one and only method" is to mobilize the masses, rely on the masses, and if you have the masses, you will not be afraid of anything, and everything will be easy to handle.He asked the troops to "do a good job in every ravine."The "Yesanpo" at the junction of Fangshan, Wanping, Laishui, and Laiyuan has been almost isolated from the world for a long time. King Yan never visited this place when he swept north, but the Eighth Route Army went deep and mobilized the masses.

In the Jinchaji border area, the army has established a good relationship with the masses. Nie Rongzhen named the army, called Zidibing. The words "children and soldiers" may seem ordinary, but they express the flesh-and-blood relationship between the army and the masses, making the masses truly realize that the Eighth Route Army led by the Communist Party of China is their own team. Relying on this good relationship, the 115th Division not only gained a firm foothold in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei mountainous area, but also continued to grow and develop in the encirclement of the enemy, expanding its base to the plains. The name "People's Soldiers" was also passed down and became the synonym for the People's Army.

Mao Zedong was very satisfied with Nie Rongzhen's approach. In March 1938, he gave a speech at the Northern Shaanxi Public School, praising the great achievements of Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei: "As Li Bai said, 'If I leave a big piece of paper, I can write a piece of paper'. Is it only a big piece of land that can be used as a piece of paper?...Nie Rongzhen, the deputy commander of the 115th Division, is now forming an anti-Japanese base in Wutai Mountain, singing between Ping-Han and Ping-Sui It's a play....We want to establish Wutai Mountain, Renshan Mountain, and various bases in various places."

The new situation in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area has attracted the influx of outstanding individuals from all over the country, especially the Pingjin area, and also attracted a large number of international friends.Carlson of the United States, who came here twice via the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, later wrote: "The development of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei in establishing social, economic and political order to enhance the welfare of the people and strengthen their resistance to aggression is outstanding. This isolated area has become a test tube for the new China..." The famous internationalist fighters Dr. Bethune and Dr. Kotnis all came to this land admiringly, and died here. Of course, in guerrilla warfare, the purpose of "swimming" is to "strike".The Eighth Route Army, which went deep into the enemy's rear in North China, used "typical guerrilla tactics" to severely attack the enemy.From February to March 1938 alone, the 129th Division fighting in Taihang Mountain won three battles and three victories. On February 21, the 129th Division fought fiercely with the enemy for 5 hours at Changshengkou, southwest of Jingxing, blowing up 5 enemy vehicles and killing more than 100 Japanese soldiers. In mid-March, Liu Bocheng searched for opportunities to wipe out the enemy on the front line from Dongyangguan to Lucheng. He ambushed on three sides at Shentouling, 10 kilometers northeast of Lucheng, "absorbing and attacking the enemy's aid" and mobilized the Lucheng enemy's 16th and 108th divisions. Lin Qing's team and Shangwei's team entered the ambush circle and wiped out more than 1,500 enemies. On March 31, Xu Xiangqian commanded the 129th Division to cremate Japanese army vehicles at a place called Xiangtangpu on the highway from Licheng to Shexian County, and wiped out more than 130 devils in the convoy. 40 years later, Xu Xiangqian recalled the battle still full of pride: The majestic Taihang rises from the beacon, and the bowstring is hidden in the pass of Lishe Road. The sound of dragons and tigers jumping and killing is loud, and wolves rush and hogs rush to the enemy's fear. Put out the fire dragon and devour the remnants, and the ground-moving army sings their triumphant return. Since the Eighth Route Army carried out guerrilla warfare extensively in the enemy's rear in North China, with high flexibility and mobility, it resolutely and decisively wiped out the enemy's vital forces, destroyed the enemy's transportation and supply lines on a large scale, disintegrated the enemy's morale, dispersed and contained the enemy's forces, and at the same time Divide troops to mobilize the masses, destroy the enemy's regime, widely establish anti-Japanese base areas, open up a vast battlefield for national liberation, effectively cooperate with the overall anti-Japanese war, and initially demonstrate the power and role of guerrilla warfare; especially in the frontal battlefield of the Kuomintang. With the army losing ground, it has become the main obstacle to the Japanese imperialists' attempt to destroy China in a "quick war" and the hope of the Chinese people's victory in the war of resistance. Mao Zedong once divided the entire area behind enemy lines into three categories: The first type is the anti-Japanese base areas controlled by the Eighth Route Army; the second type is the enemy-occupied areas occupied and controlled by the Japanese and puppet troops; The responsibility of our army is to try our best to expand base areas and guerrilla areas, strengthen the people's strength, try our best to reduce enemy-occupied areas, and weaken the enemy, so as to realize the changes in the strength of the enemy and ourselves, and lay the foundation for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.