Chapter 28 4. Training troops on the Korean battlefield is better than running military schools

As early as the spring of 1951, after the Central Military Commission decided to adopt the policy of taking turns fighting in North Korea, Deng Hua suggested to Mr. Peng, the Central Military Commission, and Mao Zedong that "due to the protracted nature of the war, troops should be combined with shift rotation."Deng Hua pointed out that it is very good to adopt the policy of taking turns to fight and take turns to rest. However, if the troops suffer heavy casualties in combat in North Korea, and the physical exertion is very serious, especially the weakened troops will not be easy to recover after short-term rest. It is very difficult to persist for a long time. Difficult, moreover, "There is a lot of new experience (of fighting against this highly modernized enemy in North Korea), so the army and cadres from all over the country come to practice and study in turn. According to the development of the situation in the future and the construction of our army It is very necessary. At the same time, take care of the transportation situation, so it is suggested that the troops in the DPRK should be replaced once every ten months to one year depending on the situation, and the cadres should also do the same, so that it will be beneficial to all aspects.”

In June 1951, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to implement the policy of fighting while talking in North Korea. The Central Military Commission and the Volunteer Army also confirmed the policy of "combining rotation and shift change" in the use of troops.At that time, the Volunteer Army had only entered North Korea for eight months, which was not too long. In addition, the armistice negotiations began on July 10. Therefore, the Central Military Commission did not immediately make a plan for the rotation of troops. After the armistice negotiations began, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Kim Il Sung believed that the core issue of this negotiation was the question of the military demarcation line. In mid-July and late July 1951, when discussing the negotiating agenda, Kim Il-sung told Li Kenong that on the agenda, as long as the two sides agreed to cease fighting and withdraw troops at the 38th parallel, other concessions could be made.After obtaining the consent of Kim Il Sung, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram and sent it to Li Kenong in the name of Mao Zedong. first step".

When the negotiations on the military demarcation line were about to reach an agreement, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram to Stalin in the name of Mao Zedong in mid-November, pointing out: "The central issue of the negotiations is to determine the military demarcation line." There are debates, but probably not for long.For the negotiations on other agendas, we strive to reach an agreement within this year, but we also prepare for the enemy to delay or even break up. Therefore, we are preparing to "delay the Korean War for half a year or even a year."In view of this estimate and the lack of a large-scale battle like before the start of the armistice negotiations, the Central Military Commission did not make a plan for the rotation of troops at this time.

However, on November 27, 1951, after the negotiations on the military demarcation line reached an agreement and the negotiations on the other three agenda items started one after another, the representatives of the United States were still unreasonable, procrastinating in every possible way, showing signs of hegemonism and power politics from time to time. face.According to the intention of the U.S. authorities, the U.S. representatives actually interfered in North Korea’s internal affairs during the discussion on the third agenda item (about the specific arrangements for realizing the ceasefire and truce), restricting North Korea’s construction of an airport after the armistice; Arrangement issues), under the guise of protecting the human rights of prisoners of war, violated the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which was signed by the United States, to repatriate all prisoners of war after the end of the war, and proposed the so-called "voluntary repatriation", which is absurd He proposed the principle of "one-to-one" exchange of prisoners of war in an attempt to forcibly detain the captured personnel of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army.In the prisoner-of-war camps, they brutally and completely trampled on the human rights of the prisoners of war, and resorted to various fascist methods such as massacres, beatings, intimidation, forced tattooing, and insults to forcibly "screen" the prisoners of war and threaten them to give up their will to return home or return home.

Since the DPRK and China refuted and struggled with great patience and efforts in line with the desire to realize the Korean armistice at an early date, the negotiations were held on February 17 and May 2, 1952, successively on the third and fifth items ( Agreement was reached on the Agenda for Advising the Governments of the Parties Concerned.So far, of the five agenda items in the armistice negotiations, agreement has been reached on four of them.In the negotiations on the military demarcation line and the specific arrangements for the realization of the armistice, the United States failed to realize its unreasonable demands, while in the negotiations on the issue of prisoners of war, it made a big fuss.The United States stubbornly adheres to the so-called "voluntary repatriation" principle and attempts to forcibly detain North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. As a result, the negotiations on this issue have not made any significant progress in the past five months. At the negotiation meeting, the United States proposed a so-called "package" solution to the prisoners of war, that is, to repatriate only those prisoners who were "screened" and willing to repatriate after the armistice, and announced that among the 110,000 prisoners taken by the United States, only 70,000 were willing to repatriate.The U.S. representatives began to treat negotiations with a rogue attitude.As a result, negotiations have effectively stalled.Judging from the attitude of the United States in the negotiations, it is still difficult to determine when the truce will be realized, and the war may be dragged on for a long time.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has made preparations for the negotiations to be delayed until the end of 1952, and is determined to stick to the consolidated front-line positions, repair the second-line fortifications, and prepare for the enemy's new offensive in summer and autumn.

At this time, the Volunteer Army had been fighting in North Korea for 19 months, and the troops that entered North Korea late had been fighting in North Korea for nearly a year.These troops have lived a long-term hard and tense war life, and are very tired. They need a good rest and reorganization. At the same time, they also need to be reorganized according to the reorganization plan of the National Defense Forces.In China, the Central Military Commission's streamlined reorganization policy was implemented, and the troops that completed the reorganization and uniformly refitted Soviet equipment also needed to undergo the training of modern warfare and gain experience.

Under such circumstances, on May 15, the meeting of the Central Military Commission chaired by Zhou Enlai discussed issues that needed to be resolved when the war dragged on until the end of the year, including the issue of troop rotation. Then propose a plan. On the 16th, Acting Chief of General Staff Nie Rongzhen and Deputy Chief of General Staff Su Yu reported to Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Lin Biao.It is proposed that "in order to provide better rest and reorganization conditions for the troops participating in the war, and to give the domestic troops the opportunity to exercise in actual combat, in addition to the decisive transfer of the 26th Army back to Shandong for rest and reorganization, it is planned to transfer troops that have participated in the war for a long time to return to the country for rest and reorganization (every day) One or two armies at a time), and at the same time, domestically refitted troops can enter North Korea to replace them (due to limitations such as ammunition replenishment, the number should not be too large. Unmodified troops should not be rotated yet), and the specific plan will be determined by the General Staff and the volunteers. In order for the cadres of the domestic troops and agencies to obtain the experience of fighting in North Korea in a timely manner, in accordance with the instructions of the chairman, two groups of cadres from all over the country have been organized to visit North Korea. However, because the number of people is too small and many business units have not yet organized Therefore, in the future, according to President Peng's opinion, we plan to organize the main cadres above the regiment level and staff officers, logistics, political workers, and railway officials from all over the country to visit North Korea in a planned way, so that the experience of the Korean War can be spread to the whole army. In addition, the cadres in North Korea Due to long-term lack of rest, accommodation and nutrition and other conditions, many cadres are in poor health and cannot last long. They should be transferred back to China for rest and treatment. Therefore, it is necessary to organize the rotation of cadres. This matter should be formulated by the General Cadre Management Department and handed over to It will be implemented after review and approval by the Military Commission."

After the plan proposed by the General Staff was approved by the Military Commission, on June 29, the first phase of the troop rotation plan was formulated. The 23rd and 24th armies of the East China Military Region and the 46th Army of the South Central Military Region rotated the 20th and 27th armies in North Korea. , The 42nd Army, made clear regulations on the number of troops entering North Korea, the equipment of weapons, and the handover of troops entering North Korea and returning to China.This plan will start in early September. On July 22, Deng Hua, the Acting Commander of the Volunteer Army, called Peng Dehuai (at that time Peng had succeeded Zhou Enlai to preside over the daily work of the Military Commission) and forwarded it to Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, suggesting that if the war drags on, in order to enable all troops across the country to gain experience in the Korean War, Under the principle of not weakening combat effectiveness, the policy of achieving full rotation in stages should be adopted, which is beneficial to national defense construction.Deng Hua put forward three principles for rotation: (1) Take care of the battlefield situation, and combine the rotation with the first line of defense on the battlefield; (2) The combat effectiveness of the newly entered North Korea troops is not weaker than the troops returned by rotation; (3) The troops in North Korea , The order of returning to the country is based on the time of entry into the DPRK, and special circumstances will be considered separately. The replaced troops will stay as advisors.According to these three principles, Deng Hua also proposed a plan to rotate all the troops in North Korea in four phases from September 1952 to the end of 1953. During each phase of rotation, 3 to 4 troops will be sent to the front line for defense. The North Korean troops consisted of 4 armies, and the returning troops consisted of 4 armies.It also puts forward the idea of ​​rotation of each special forces, each command post of each special forces, commanders of each corps, and corps organs.The Central Military Commission agreed in principle to the idea of ​​all rotations.

On August 6, Su Yu, deputy chief of the general staff, comprehensively considered the situation of Korean operations, domestic defense, and reorganization, and proposed three plans for the rotation of infantry, and submitted them to Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission to study and choose: the first plan, the Israeli Army In order to rotate units, the Volunteer Army can return to China before the end of 1953, except for two armies that have no unit rotation for the time being.This plan is more suitable for the reorganization of domestic troops, but it is difficult to replenish the soldiers and weapons of the troops entering the DPRK. The method of leaving part of the weapons of the returning troops in North Korea can be used for replenishment.The second plan is to use the division as a unit to rotate, that is, the domestically reorganized divisions will enter the court one by one, and will be assigned to the commander of the replaced army first. The domestic military headquarters will generally enter the court with the second division, and after the third division enters the court , the command was transferred to the North Korean army.The implementation of this plan has no impact on North Korea's operations and domestic defense, and it is also suitable for the reorganization of domestic troops and returning troops. The disadvantage is that the subordinate relationship is chaotic, and the commander is not familiar with the situation of the troops, which is not conducive to combat command.The third plan is the plan proposed by Deng Hua. This plan is very specific. The Korean battlefield can control a strong reserve force, but it will have an impact on domestic reorganization and domestic defense.At the same time, suggestions were also put forward for the rotation of senior command organs and commanders.

On the 7th, Peng Dehuai forwarded Su Yu's report to Mao Zedong.Mao Zedong instructed on the 11th that the matter should be handled by Peng Dehuai, and that a meeting would be held to discuss it before making a decision. "With regard to the issue of rotation, it seems inappropriate to extend the entire time until the second half of next year. It seems that the rotation should be completed within 12 months starting from August this year. The rotation method seems to be based on the military as a unit." Peng Dehuai presided over the Military Commission meeting after the study , to visit the Soviet Union (Su Yu also visited the Soviet Union). On August 30, Nie Rongzhen, on behalf of the chief of staff, reported the rotation plan to Mao Zedong. The division was exchanged for the 50th Army in North Korea, which was also used as the first phase of the plan.During the second rotation, the 16th Army in China and the 60th Army in North Korea will each be organized into two divisions, and the two divisions of the 11th Army will be organized into the 16th and 60th Army respectively.In the second phase, 7 armies were rotated, that is, the 1st, 16th, and 45th armies in China (later the 44th and 45th armies were combined into the 54th army), the 23rd Corps (3 divisions), the 21st Corps ( 3 divisions), the 21st, and 41st armies entered North Korea, and were exchanged for the 38th, 39th, 40th, 63rd, 64th, 65th, and 47th armies in North Korea.In order to avoid the difficulty and waste of changing winter clothes, it is planned to start in March 1953 and rotate 2 armies every month, and the rotation will be completed by the end of June.In this way, the 16 armies in North Korea will be divided into two batches to rotate a total of 12, and the other 4 armies will enter North Korea later and will not be rotated for the time being.Since the 11th Army was incorporated into the 16th and 60th Army during the second rotation, there are actually 15 armies in North Korea.Mao Zedong issued instructions on September 2, agreeing to the plan, but "it seems too tight to change the seven armies within four months from March to June next year, and we need to extend the time, which can be decided at that time."

Since then, the first phase will be carried out as planned in September, except that the 11th Army and the 50th Army have not rotated.The second phase of rotation, due to the preparations for anti-landing operations to prevent the United States from taking the final military adventure, was carried out in December 1952 ahead of schedule. By March 1953, the 1st, 16th, 21st, 54th and 5th armies The 33rd Division of the 11th Army successively entered the DPRK to undertake the task of preparing for the anti-landing operation. The 38th, 39th, and 40th Army, which was going to return home in rotation, postponed their return to China until the preparations for the anti-landing operation were completed. On July 27, 1953, the Korean armistice was realized, and the rotation plan was stopped. The Volunteer Air Force and various special forces also carried out rotations.Since the Air Force entered the war, it has been taking turns to fight in units of divisions. Artillery, armored forces, engineers, urban anti-aircraft artillery units, and public security units that serve as guards and air defense posts in the logistics system of the Volunteer Army are also planned by the General Staff. The regiments were rotated as units. On December 9 and 18, 1952, the General Staff Headquarters and the General Political Department respectively made plans to use cadres from domestic agencies to rotate the Volunteer Army Headquarters, the headquarters of each corps, and the Political Department. After approval by the Central Military Commission, it began to be implemented in early 1953.That is, the Volunteer Army Command and the Political Department are organized by the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, and the Political Department of the Northeast Military Region; the Command and Political Department of the Third Corps are organized by the Southwest Military Region Command and Political Department; Organize the rotation of the Ninth Corps Command and Political Department; organize the rotation of the 19th Corps Command and Political Department with the Central South Military Region Command, Political Department and the Northwest Military Region Political Department; organize the rotation of the 20th Corps Command with the North China Military Region Command and Political Department , Political Department. On April 18, 1953, Mao Zedong signed an order, "In order to popularize the experience of the whole army in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, some senior cadres in the domestic and volunteer army will be rotated."Li Da was transferred to replace Jie Fang as Chief of Staff of the Volunteer Army; Xu Shiyou replaced Wang Jinshan (Deputy Commander of the 3rd Corps) as Commander of the 3rd Corps; Huang Yongsheng succeeded Han Xianchu as Commander of the 19th Corps; Yang Yong replaced Zheng Weishan (Deputy Commander of the 20th Corps member) as the commander of the 20th Corps.The cadres going to North Korea are required to arrive at their posts in early May.Later, Wang Ping was appointed to replace Zhang Nansheng as the political commissar of the 20th Corps, and Zhang Nansheng was transferred to be the deputy director of the Political Department of the Volunteer Army.In September 1952, Wang Jian'an was appointed as the commander of the 9th Corps to replace Song Shilun, who had returned to China; in January 1953, Li Zhimin, political commissar of the 19th Corps, was appointed to replace Gan Siqi, who had returned to China, as the director of the Political Department of the Volunteer Army. The Volunteer Army Air Force, Artillery, Armored Forces, Engineering Command and main commanders have also undergone rotations. In October 1952, Nie Fengzhi succeeded Liu Zhen as acting commander of the Volunteer Army Air Force (later Commander); Gao Cunxin succeeded Kuang Yumin as the director of the Volunteer Artillery Command Post and Liu Heren as political commissar in early 1953; in June 1952, Zhao Jie replaced Huang Huxian as the Volunteer Armored Corps Director of the command post; Tan Shanhe succeeded Chen Zhengfeng as director of the engineering command post.The General Staff and the major military regions also organized people to serve in the volunteer army and to visit and learn. This rotation not only solved the problem of rest and reorganization of combat troops, but also enabled more troops and senior commanders to get tempered in the Korean War and accumulate experience in combat and command under modern conditions. On August 4, 1952, Mao Zedong pointed out in his speech at the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: "We have fought for more than 20 years in the past. We have never had an air force. Only others bombed us. Now there is an air force, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and tanks. Yes. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was a big school, and we conducted large-scale exercises there. This exercise is better than running a military school. If there is another year of fighting next year, the entire army can take turns to train once.” This method was used in the War to Resist U.S. Aid Korea a creation ofThis experience was also used for reference in the subsequent national defense operations.