Chapter 29 1. The United States makes a fuss about prisoners of war

In April 1952, U.S. President Truman appointed Ridgway to replace Dwight Eisenhower, who announced his retirement from active service and ran for the 34th U.S. president, as the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Armed Forces. Commander-in-Chief of the "United Nations Army". In mid-May, Clark arrived in Tokyo to take over the role. Clark said in his memoirs: At this time, the policy of the United States regarding the Korean War, "is not to seek a decisive military victory, but the next best thing. The best way is to make the stalemate less cost-effective for the Communist Party than for us, and to attack their weakness. , trouble their minds, and force them to believe that the value of the armistice to them is increasing rather than decreasing." Clarke said:

I resolved to do so to the best of my ability, always bearing in mind the basic military and political conditions under which we fought in Korea, which affected my planned conduct. In the military, we are fighting against the Communist Party's second-rate partners. Their strength is manpower, and our technology is our superiority.I will not and cannot exchange the lives of the "United Nations Army" one by one for the lives of the Communists... Politically, I base myself on the basic condition of my mission, which is to be on the defensive.The government gave me neither the power nor the military resources to achieve victory, but ordered me to make every effort to bring about a truce as quickly as possible.

After Clark took office, he planned his actions in North Korea according to the instructions given to him by the government.He wrote in his memoirs: Militarily, within the powers I have, I find that I can: (1) Bomb the hydropower areas that have not been touched by the war, except for the Sufeng Dam and generators, which supply most of the electricity needed by the Communist Party in the three northeastern provinces for its war machine and maintain North Korea's remaining industries.Washington reserves the right to make the final decision to attack Suifeng.The dams and generators survived, first because we hoped to use them after we landed in Incheon and headed straight for North Korea, and later because the armistice negotiations seemed imminent.

(2) Bombing military targets in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, which has not been attacked for a year.We were told that the Communists filled the area with troops and stores of war supplies, and used it as their supreme headquarters and communications center. (3) Bomb the main supply line of the Communist Party, from Pyongyang to Kaesong, where the headquarters of the Communist Party's armistice negotiating delegation is located.On the first day of the armistice negotiations, we had agreed to refrain from aerial attack on properly marked convoys carrying personnel and supplies to the headquarters of the Communist armistice negotiating delegation, but in practice we have almost completely ceased bombing the road.

(4) Bombing countless small targets, these targets add up to a very considerable number, with all kinds of equipment, repaired locomotives, trucks and tanks, small evacuation of covered military equipment depots and concealed troops , and officer training schools, etc. There are four other challenging operations, not entirely military in nature, which I believe I may be able to obtain permission to carry out. (1) Release anti-communist prisoners of war, especially Koreans... (2) Should it become apparent that the armistice negotiations are not progressing and that the Communists are only using the negotiations as a propaganda forum, I would like an eye for an eye and the right to stop the meeting.

(3) To establish the Army of the Republic of Korea and make it a larger and more efficient fighting force. (4) Ask President Chiang to send two divisions of the army to South Korea to join the war and express our determination to the Communist Party. I am in full agreement with these eight measures, because I believe that only forceful action will get the Communists to agree to a truce that America considers an honor.And I don't really hope that these actions in themselves are enough to bring the Communist Party to its knees, but they at least make it clear to the Communist Party that we are ready to take strong action, because strong action is the only thing the Communist Party knows.

Among Clark’s eight measures, apart from inviting Chiang Kai-shek’s army to fight in North Korea, which was never approved, and strengthening the South Korean Army, which was approved later, the rest were quickly approved by the U.S. authorities and allowed him to bomb the Sufeng Power Plant . According to Clark's action measures approved by the US authorities, the US representatives refused to discuss any proposals other than their so-called "package" during the negotiations. On May 22, Major General William Harrison, the U.S. representative of the Army, succeeded Joey as the chief representative of the U.S. During the negotiations, he was even more of a rogue performance. At the meeting, he proposed to suspend the meeting for 3 days, and even left the meeting without waiting for a reply from the DPRK and China.In fact, more than 70,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war under the control of the American prisoner-of-war camps were willing to repatriate under the "screening" of the American fascist methods. The book "The Front Line of the Battle" stated that "at the end of June, the interrogation work in the last prisoner-of-war camp was completed, and a total of about 83,000 repatriates were separated".The U.S. Pentagon and the headquarters of the "United Nations Army" have many considerations about whether to announce this new number to the DPRK and China, but "the leaders in Washington will eventually agree to the repatriation of more prisoners of war in order to avoid being interrogated by neutral countries in the future." publish the figures".Therefore, on July 13, the U.S. informed the DPRK and China of this new number. Among the 83,000 people, there were 76,600 prisoners of war from the Korean People’s Army and 6,400 prisoners from the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Unchangeable plan.

Prior to this, in order to cooperate with the armistice negotiations, Clark carried out a series of large-scale bombings on North Korea according to the military action measures he formulated. On June 23 and 24, the U.S. military dispatched aircraft to carry out large-scale bombing of the Shuifeng Power Plant. On the 23rd alone, it dispatched 305 aircraft sorties and dropped 145 tons of bombs; (On August 29, more than 1,400 aircraft sorties were dispatched to conduct another day of crazy bombing on Pyongyang); during this period, dozens of targets such as other cities and factory areas, as well as the communication line from Pyongyang to Kaesong The bombing was carried out in an attempt to pressure North Korea and China to accept its proposal for the repatriation of prisoners of war.At the same time, the U.S. side also unilaterally released 27,000 North Korean civilians detained by the U.S. side without an agreement negotiated by the two sides. The DPRK and China strongly protested and condemned this.

Originally, in order to break the deadlock in the negotiations on the issue of prisoners of war, the DPRK and China put forward a new plan on the issue of prisoners of war on July 3, that is, "the foreign armed personnel captured by the two sides, that is, the "United Nations Army" or the captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers should be All North Korean armed personnel captured by the two sides, that is, captured personnel of the South Korean Army or the Korean People's Army, whose home is in the area that originally belonged to one side, shall all be repatriated home; to go home without deportation."The DPRK and China even considered that if the U.S. really wanted a truce, then of the 116,000 prisoners of war it admitted to take in, at least 90,000 should be repatriated. "Although this number is not all repatriated, it is already the vast majority." "We are ready to reach an agreement with them, and keep the remaining 20,000 people until after the armistice." Gu, actually used his air force superiority to exert military pressure on the DPRK and China, and put forward the so-called final plan.In the U.S. plan, the repatriation of the Korean People’s Army accounted for nearly 80% of the number of people who should be repatriated, while the number of repatriated volunteers only accounted for 32% of the number of people who should be repatriated.

After Li Kenong telegraphed the U.S. plan on the 13th to Mao Zedong and asked our countermeasures, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai deliberated for two days, and Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram to Kim Il Sung and Li Kenong in the name of Mao Zedong, pointing out: "The comrades here agree that At present, accepting the enemy's provocative and seductive plan that is not a real concession, and accepting it after the enemy's indiscriminate bombing, is obviously extremely detrimental to me." "So under the current situation, accepting the enemy's plan will inevitably take others Use your ambition to destroy your prestige." We cannot lose everything because of a single mistake.The telegram was sent on July 15.

On the same day, Mao Zedong telegraphed his analysis of this issue to Stalin, and pointed out that the number of repatriated People's Army and Volunteer Army prisoners of war announced by the United States, "the proportion of the two is extremely disproportionate. The enemy is trying to provoke the fighting unity of the Chinese and North Korean people." "Under this situation, we believe that the enemy's provocative and seductive plan should never be accepted, and it is extremely detrimental to me to yield under the enemy's pressure." "If the enemy refuses to make concessions and continues to delay, we That is to expand propaganda, expose the enemy's attempt to sabotage the armistice negotiations, expand the conspiracy of the war of aggression, mobilize the public opinion of the world, and cooperate with our persistence on the Korean front to inflict continuous damage on the enemy in order to force the enemy to finally make concessions. If the enemy dares to break the negotiation, We are also prepared to expand the war. Because this issue is a political issue." On the 16th, Stalin replied that "your position in the peace negotiations is completely correct." During this period, the staffs of both sides drafted the draft of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which consisted of 5 articles and 63 clauses. As of August 5, except for the 51st clause, that is, "all prisoners of war taken by the parties when this armistice agreement takes effect shall be released as soon as possible and repatriation". Since the United States insisted on the so-called "voluntary repatriation" principle and tried to detain the captured personnel from North Korea and China, all the rest have been reached except for an agreement. From August 15 to September 22, Zhou Enlai led a Chinese government delegation to visit the Soviet Union, mainly discussing China's first five-year plan.During this period, the situation in North Korea was discussed with Stalin many times. At the beginning of September, Kim Il Sung, Pak Hyun-yong and Peng Dehuai also went to Moscow. The leaders of China, North Korea and the Soviet Union discussed the situation in North Korea and the armistice negotiations, and achieved great success. unanimous opinion. At the negotiating table in Panmunjom, starting from late July, the US representatives changed from proposing a 3-day adjournment for each meeting to proposing a one-week adjournment for each meeting.The Pentagon authorized Clark and Harrison to adjourn the meeting at any time if the two of them deem it necessary, as long as the time is right. In late September, Truman wrote a letter to Clark, in which he hoped that the proposal of the "United Nations Army" command must be "worded in the strongest terms without leaving any room for bargaining."If the Communist Party does not accept it, the representatives of the "United Nations Army" Command will adjourn indefinitely, and most importantly, "military pressure cannot be reduced." On September 28, Harrison made the final showdown at the negotiation meeting, announcing three options for the "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners of war approved by Truman: ①Send all prisoners of war to the demilitarized zone, and the ICRC and the joint military The delegation will repatriate them after reviewing them. If they are willing to go to the side where they are detained, they can be allowed. ②Exchange prisoners of war who are willing to repatriate; send prisoners of war who do not want to repatriate to the demilitarized zone in batches, and be interrogated by representatives of non-participating countries. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the joint military delegation may or may not participate in supervising this operation. ③ Exchange prisoners of war who are willing to repatriate; send all prisoners of war who do not want to repatriate to the demilitarized zone without screening, release them outside the scope of military jurisdiction, and let them freely choose where to go. This action can be carried out in military or non-military areas. carried out under the supervision of military observers.Harrison then suggested a 10-day adjournment. In fact, these three options proposed by the United States are pure deceit, because it is impossible for the prisoners of North Korea and China under the control of the United States to express their willingness to repatriate under the "screening" of the fascist means by the United States (this is the case for repatriation after the armistice). has been proved).At the meeting on October 8, Nanri exposed and refuted the three options of the so-called "voluntary repatriation" principle of the United States based on the outline of the speech drafted by Zhou Enlai and sent to the delegation in the name of Mao Zedong. The demilitarized zone is taken over by the other party, and then the prisoners of war are interviewed, classified and repatriated by nationality and region.But the U.S. representative ignored this effort. Harrison read out a prepared speech, imposing the responsibility for the stalemate in the negotiations on the DPRK and China, and then announced the indefinite deadline that Clark and Joey had advocated for in May. The meeting was adjourned, and the DPRK and China left the venue without waiting for a speech.Since then, the armistice negotiations have been suspended again. In this regard, on October 9, China's "People's Daily" published an editorial, condemning the United States for categorically refusing to negotiate, sabotaging the negotiations, and unilaterally announcing an indefinite adjournment.The Chinese and North Korean people will never be intimidated by any threat from US imperialism.We will continue to insist on negotiations and fight to the end to smash the US sabotage plot and realize the Korean armistice. On the 10th, Mao Zedong called Li Kenong and sued Jin and Peng, pointing out: It is necessary to expose the other party's "unreasonable adherence to the sinister principle of the so-called voluntary repatriation, which means forcibly detaining our prisoners of war, refusing to negotiate, suspending negotiations, and attempting to oppress them." The UN General Assembly, which is about to meet, endorses its plot to sabotage the negotiations and expand the war."At the same time, it states that our side will continue to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the armistice agreement that have been reached, "We will never give up the principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war by both sides. Suggestion, it adopted the other party’s opinion on sending all prisoners of war to the demilitarized zone for exchange.” Therefore, “the other party should bear full responsibility for refusing to negotiate and disrupting negotiations.”