Chapter 26 2. The steel transportation line that cannot be smashed and bombed continuously

During the Korean War, the U.S. military has always used bombing to destroy the rear of the Chinese and North Korean troops as an important part of its strategy.In the early stage of the Volunteer Army's entry into North Korea to participate in the war, the U.S. military relied on its superior air force to bully the Volunteer Army. It had no air force and no anti-aircraft artillery units. Therefore, its aircraft activities were unscrupulous and very rampant. No matter day or night, groups were active in the sky over northern North Korea, frenzied everywhere. Bombing and strafing.The towns and cities in northern North Korea have almost turned into ruins. The main railway stations, railways, and road bridges have been basically destroyed, and the railways are often in a state of paralysis.The skies over northern North Korea once became a free world for U.S. pilots. They did whatever they wanted and had no scruples. They almost shot at moving targets, even a single vehicle or a single pedestrian. The flying altitude was so low that ground personnel could see The eyes and noses of the pilots often wiped the roofs, skimmed the treetops, and some even drilled bridge holes to chase ground targets.Some desperadoes crashed and died because of this.

After the start of the Korean armistice negotiations, in order to cooperate with the negotiations, Ridgway exerted military pressure on the Volunteer Army and the People’s Army. While ordering his ground forces to launch a summer offensive on August 18, 1951, he also ordered his air force (including naval aircraft) to launch a The large-scale "air blockade campaign" aimed at destroying North Korea's northern railway transportation system. All bombers and most of the fighter-bombers concentrated in the Far East. Under the cover of fighter interceptors, hundreds of sorties were dispatched every day. Thousands of sorties were carried out to carry out devastating bombings on the North Korean railway divisions and sections, and special patrol planes were sent to chase down the transport vehicles on the railways and roads at night.It is planned to destroy the railway system in northern North Korea within 90 days, "as far as possible to bring its railway transportation to a complete standstill", in an attempt to "suffocate" the frontline troops of the Volunteer Army and accept their unreasonable conditions during negotiations.The U.S. Air Force called this "air blockade campaign" a "strangulation battle."

From September to December, the U.S. Air Force concentrated bombing to destroy the railways south of the Qingchuan River and north of Pyongyang.On the map, the railway in this area is approximately triangular. Therefore, the railway in this area is called the "triangular railway" and is the throat of the North Korean railway.According to statistics from the China-North Korea Joint Railway Transportation Command, from September to November, the bombing of the Triangle Railway by the U.S. Air Force intensified month by month. In September, 3,027 sorties were dispatched, destroying 648 routes and stations, and 57 bridges; in October, 4,128 aircraft were dispatched, damaging 1,336 routes and stations, and 53 bridges; in November, 8,343 aircraft were dispatched, damaging routes and bridges. There were 1,937 times of damage to stations and 77 bridges; in December, 5,786 aircraft were dispatched, 1,697 times of damage to lines and stations, and 101 times of bridge damage.The total length of the triangular railway is 180 kilometers, which is only equivalent to nearly 1/5 of the 960 kilometers of railways available in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Volunteer Army and the People’s Army at that time, but the number of damaged areas accounted for more than 50% of the total number of areas damaged. In the past four months, the U.S. Air Force dropped 63,515 bombs in this area, or 31,755 tons, with an average of more than 350 bombs per kilometer, or more than 170 tons.

Originally, the Volunteers did not have air force cover and had weak transportation capabilities, so battlefield transportation was quite difficult.From the end of July to the end of August, North Korea had a rare catastrophic flood in 40 years, and 94 railway bridges were washed away. The main railway bridges on the Qingchuan River, Daedong River and Boiliu River in northern North Korea were all washed out and were completely unavailable to traffic. State, 50% of highway bridges were washed away.Under such circumstances, the U.S. Air Force launched a "strangulation battle", which undoubtedly made the transportation of the volunteers worse and caused great difficulties in the transportation of the volunteers. At the beginning of September, the frontline troops of the Volunteer Army were hungry, and the winter cold was approaching, and the cotton coats had not yet arrived. On September 7, Peng Dehuai had a paragraph in his telegram to Nie Rongzhen reflecting the difficulties ahead: "Sooner or later, the autumn wind hits people, the soldiers are alone, and the number of patients has increased significantly in the past ten days, the flood has rushed, enemy planes have bombed, bridges and roads have collapsed, and storage It is already empty, the food is difficult, how to get the winter clothes in a timely manner, it is really pressing, Marx is not working, hope brother can teach me." The sixth campaign planned at that time was repeatedly postponed, which was one of the important reasons.Whether it can overcome the U.S. air blockade, fundamentally solve the battlefield transportation problem, and reverse the passive state of transportation and supplies has become another major strategic issue for the Volunteer Army to persist in victorious operations.

The Central Military Commission has always considered whether the volunteers can have food or not as a major strategic issue of whether they can win the war, and they are extremely concerned about the logistical support of the volunteers.Zhou Enlai, Premier of the Government Administration Council and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission who presided over the daily work, personally asked and solved the battlefield transportation problems of the Volunteers.As Nie Rongzhen said in his memoirs, "The entire logistics work was carried out under the leadership and care of Comrade Zhou Enlai." As mentioned earlier in the book, with the Northeast Administrative Region as the general rear base, fully support the work of the general rear base, guide the Northeast Military Region to hold a volunteer army logistics work meeting in Shenyang to solve transportation problems, and establish a volunteer army rear service command to be responsible for battlefield logistics support In addition, before receiving Peng Dehuai's telegram to Nie Rongzhen on September 7, in late August, the Volunteer Army's rear service headquarters with Hong Xuezhi as the commander and Zhou Chunquan as the political commissar had He Jinnian as the commander and Zhang Mingyuan as the political commissar. The China-North Korea Joint Railway Transportation Headquarters immediately took emergency repair and transportation measures.At the same time, it is recommended to increase the air defense force and the railway repair force.At the same time, the Central Military Commission ordered the Volunteer Air Force to use the division as a unit and use the airport in the Andong area as a base to launch operations to cover the railway transportation and airport construction in North Korea beyond Pyongyang.

In September, the Central Military Commission had determined that the U.S. military was attempting a "strangulation war" (it was not known at the time that the U.S. military's large-scale bombing of North Korea's railway was called a "strangling war"), and pointed out: "The enemy's bombing of our railway is a strategic attempt to plan ", "to get a glimpse of its intentions, one is to cause me difficulties in protracted combat in the military; the other is to cooperate with the Kaesong negotiations to exert pressure on me." After receiving Peng Dehuai's telegram, the Central Military Commission made several more to solve the transportation problem. Important decisions were made, and Lu Zhengcao, the transportation commander of the Military Commission, was sent to Shenyang to preside over a transportation meeting to specifically study measures to solve battlefield transportation problems.

On September 15, Nie Rongzhen sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, informing him that, except that Lu Zhengcao had gone to the Northeast to participate in a transportation meeting, and was responsible for solving the problems of North Korea’s emergency repairs and emergency transportation, and the results would be telegraphed within one or two days, the Military Commission decided: 1. Enrich the railways The Corps has allocated 9,000 new recruits, and is temporarily attached to 5 recruit regiments; 2. Guarantee bridge materials, and has already transported 30 holes of the Yellow River Iron Bridge to North Korea. The bridge materials ordered from the Soviet Union will be available before September 20. More than 2,000 tons, and a batch will be available in early October for emergency repairs of North Korean railway bridges; 3. To strengthen the transport force, except for the postponement of the shift change of migrant workers in Northeast North Korea that have been negotiated, each ferry must make rafts on the spot; 4. Strengthen the railway As well as the Jiangqiao air defense force, the Air Force has been ordered to fight, and the Soviet Union has an anti-aircraft artillery division near Qingchuan Jiangqiao.

On September 24, the Central Military Commission called Peng Dehuai, deciding to divide four air defense zones in North Korea, and the antiaircraft artillery units designated by the Volunteer Army in North Korea would be responsible for covering railway transportation. On September 26, Nie Rongzhen called Peng Dehuai to report various matters decided by the Shenyang Transportation Conference.In addition to the matters already decided by the Military Commission, according to Zhou Enlai's instructions, the meeting decided to delay the transport of special forces units waiting to enter the DPRK, and reduce the transportation of ammunition and miscellaneous goods, mainly to ensure the transportation of food, clothing and gasoline. Within one and a half months from the end of October to the end of October, no less than 10,000 wagons of materials needed by the Volunteers across the Qingchuan River in the fourth quarter should be compressed to no more than 7,000 wagons.The transportation meeting decided to increase the loading of all wagons by 1/10, use more large wagons of 40 tons, and improve the packaging method; for railway repairs, try to use local materials as much as possible, save transportation vehicles, and rush to transport urgently needed materials; it is recommended to unify the transportation command, and the joint transportation commander The Ministry of Transport uniformly issued transport orders, organized joint logistics, and uniformly allocated materials; Liu Juying, deputy commander of the Joint Transport Command and director of the General Administration of Railway Administration, made unified arrangements for implementation.

Since then, the rear units of the Volunteer Army have launched a full-scale struggle against the "strangling war". In December, according to the needs of the struggle against the "strangling war", after consultation and approval between China and the DPRK, the Front Railway Transportation Command was formed with Liu Juying as the commander and political commissar, which was subordinate to the Joint Railway Transportation Command with He Jinnian as the commander. Headquarters, unified command and coordination of the North Korean railway system repair, transportation and anti-aircraft artillery units.

On the railway front, the Volunteer Railway Corps, with Li Shouxuan as the deputy commander and Cui Tianmin as the deputy political commissar, consisted of 4 divisions, 1 regiment and 1 railway aid corps, fighting day and night. Due to the characteristics of enemy plane bombing, the emergency repair policy of focusing on concentration and maneuvering against maneuver is adopted to ensure emergency repairs.When the enemy concentrated its forces to bomb the triangular railway north of Pyongyang, the Volunteer Army Railway Corps concentrated more than half of its emergency repair forces to ensure the emergency repairs in this area.When the enemy planes were severely attacked by the Soviet Air Force, Volunteer Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery units in this area, they switched to mobile bombing in uncertain areas. , so that other areas can be repaired as they are bombed.In order to ensure the smooth flow of roads and transport more materials, they worked together to overcome difficulties and took many creative measures to increase the speed of emergency repairs.At important stations, detour lines have been built, and simple bridges have been built in important bridge areas.In order to improve the speed of emergency repairs, the opening time to traffic was increased. During emergency repairs at night, white ash was applied to the road studs, and the method of cross-ties was used to replace the filling of large bomb craters, etc., to improve the efficiency of emergency repairs.In order to confuse the enemy planes and minimize the number of bridges being bombed, the method of erecting movable bridges was adopted. A few holes in the bridge were removed before dawn, so that the enemy planes thought it was a broken bridge and there was no need to bomb it. pass.

The railway corps not only has heavy repair tasks, but in addition to defending against enemy air strikes, they also have to risk their lives to eliminate unexploded bombs dropped by US planes during bombing, a large number of which are time bombs.These time bombs are several meters deep underground and are in danger of exploding at any time.Combining the revolutionary spirit and scientific attitude that are not afraid of sacrifice, the officers and soldiers of the railway corps eliminated these time bombs in time.In October 1951 alone, 108 time bombs were eliminated on the tens of kilometers of the triangle railway north of Pyongyang.Many experts in bomb discharge emerged in the railway corps. Even the U.S. Air Force expressed its admiration for the Volunteer Army’s railway soldiers’ strong repair capabilities: “The Communist Army’s repair troops can fill the crater at a speed comparable to the bombing speed of the F-80 pilots. The bombed railways can be quickly repaired. Communist road workers and bridge repairers have smashed our blockade of the railway lines north of Pyongyang and won the right to use all railway lines.” The Volunteer Army’s railway transportation also took many special measures: in areas where bridges and lines were blown up and could not be opened to traffic, the method of transporting cars in sections was adopted to connect the available railways; bridges erected temporarily could not bear the weight of locomotives It adopts the method of pushing the wagons over, while the locomotives do not pass the bridge, and the locomotives on the opposite side pick them up. The so-called "crossing the river with cattle"; in order to make full use of the opening time at night, they adopt concentrated forward transportation, and then look for opportunities to row back to the empty space. Car way, the so-called "one-sided transportation".Thereby improving the efficiency of railway transportation. On the road front, under the unified organization of the Volunteer Army's Rear Service Command with Hong Xuezhi as the commander, the Volunteer Army's engineering units and the various armies and units directly under the corps that were resting in the rear widened and strengthened the roads, and built hundreds of miles of new roads. Highway; many underwater bridges and car shelters were built along the way; with a public security division and the guard regiment battalions of the various logistics branches of the Volunteer Army, air defense posts were set up on the main road arteries to provide air defense alarms for driving cars and direct traffic .When an enemy plane comes, fire a gun or launch a signal flare to give an alarm immediately, and the car immediately turns off the lights and drives.When the enemy planes bombed and strafed, the car drivers either braked suddenly or stepped on the gas pedal to avoid the bombing and strafing. Some immediately set fire to the broken oil barrels or worn-out clothes near the car after the enemy planes bombed and strafed, pretending to Cars were bombed and burned to confuse enemy planes and protect vehicles.Taking these measures has not only greatly reduced the loss of cars, but also greatly improved the efficiency of road transportation.The quarterly car loss rate dropped from nearly 50% at the beginning of the dynasty to 2.3% in the first quarter of 1952. The road transport capacity increased by 95% from September to December 1951 compared to April to August, and from January to April 1952 to 2.3%. From September to December 1951, it increased by another 19.8%. When Mao Zedong talked about the victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in September 1953, he highly praised these mass creations of the Volunteer Army, pointing out: "Our cadres and soldiers have come up with various ways to fight. Let me tell you an example. The first battle of the war In November, our cars suffered a lot. What should we do? Apart from the leadership, we mainly rely on the masses to find a way. There are more than 10,000 people standing guard on both sides of the car road. When the plane comes, the signal gun will be fired, and the driver will hide when he hears it. or find a place to hide the car. At the same time, the roads for cars were widened and many new roads were built, so that cars could drive here and there without hindrance. In this way, the loss of cars was reduced from 4% at the beginning Ten, reduced to a few tenths of a percent." When the U.S. military carried out a large-scale "strangling battle", the Volunteer Army had 4 field divisions, 4 city defense regiments, and more than 50 independent battalions of antiaircraft artillery units. There were more than 800 antiaircraft artillery with calibers of 85 and 37 mm, which was not as good as the invasion of North Korea and the United States. Half of the number of aircraft used by the military in the Korean War.Most of the independent battalions are attached to various corps and armies, and most of the field divisions are built at the cover airport.In order to smash the "strangulation battle" of the U.S. Air Force, at the end of September 1951, according to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the Volunteer Army Headquarters divided the North Korean Railway into 4 air defense zones, and designated 1 regiment and 12 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery units. Combat, covering railway transportation.At the same time, there are city defense anti-aircraft artillery units covering important railway bridges.These antiaircraft artillery units were actively fighting and dealt severe blows to the US Air Force planes that came to bomb.The combat history of the U.S. Air Force admits that the anti-aircraft artillery fire of the Volunteer Army caused great losses to the fighter-bombers of the U.S. 5th Air Force, which was responsible for bombing the North Korean Railway. "In September, 32 were shot down and 23 were injured; in October, 33 were shot down." 238 were damaged; in November, 24 were shot down and 225 were damaged.” The U.S. carrier air force is even more afraid of the antiaircraft artillery units deployed on the Xinchengchuan-Plateau section of the Pyongyang-Wonsan railway line. The anti-aircraft guns were fierce and accurate, and they called this area the "Valley of Death" and were afraid to go there to attack the railway. After October, when the U.S. Air Force’s bombing of the triangular railway north of Pyongyang and south of the Qingchuan River intensified, in November, according to the proposal of the Joint Railway Transportation Command, the Central Military Commission and the Volunteer Army Headquarters will cover the three anti-aircraft artillery divisions and One city defense regiment, all of which were used to cover railway transportation, and based on the headquarters of the 64th Antiaircraft Artillery Division, formed a railway antiaircraft artillery command post to uniformly command the antiaircraft artillery units covering railway transportation. In December 1951, these antiaircraft artillery units adopted the policy of "concentrating forces and focusing on defense", and deployed 70% of their forces and firepower along the railway in the triangle area to attack enemy aircraft.In December alone, 38 enemy planes were shot down and 68 were damaged.Fearing the anti-aircraft artillery fire in this area, the U.S. military planes had to change their bombing tactics and look for areas with weak anti-aircraft artillery firepower of the Volunteers to conduct mobile assaults. There are always people who better than you.The enemy changes and I change.Due to the expansion of the bombing range of the US military, the focus is not fixed, and the Volunteer Army's anti-aircraft artillery units are small and insufficient.In order to solve this contradiction, the antiaircraft artillery unit adopted the combat policy of "key defense and high mobility", focusing on defending some bridges and stations with a part of the force, and conducting mobile operations with the main force, dividing the railway line into several combat areas In each district, the antiaircraft artillery division as a unit commanded the mobile operations of the antiaircraft artillery units in the area, which reduced the blank area of ​​cover, effectively covered the railway transportation, and severely attacked the enemy planes. From January to June 1952, a total of 198 aircraft were killed and 779 were damaged. Throughout the struggle against the "Strangling War", the Volunteer Army's anti-aircraft artillery units gave full play to their power, shooting down more than 260 enemy planes and injuring more than 1,000 aircraft, which played an important role in crushing the "Strangling War" of the US Air Force. From mid-September 1951, under the command of Commander Liu Zhen, the Air Force of the Volunteer Army took turns to launch combat operations in units of divisions, and fought with the Soviet Air Force over the area north of Pyongyang (mainly north of the Qingchuan River) to attack the invading aircraft of the US military. , Covering railway transportation and airport construction.During the Chinese People’s War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Soviet Air Force maintained 2 to 3 fighter pilot divisions, 4 to 7 regiments in total, and 120 to 210 aircraft. They fought in the air above the area north of the Qingchuan River. At that time, the fighter force of the Volunteer Air Force was mostly equipped with MiG-15 fighters made in the Soviet Union. The combat performance of this aircraft was comparable to the most advanced F-86 aircraft of the US military, and its flight performance was slightly better than that of the F-86 aircraft.Each division and two regiments are equipped with a total of 50 aircraft.Volunteer pilots have only dozens of hours of flying experience on this kind of aircraft, and at most 100 hours. They have neither air combat experience nor flying experience.This is incomparable with the experience that most American pilots have participated in the air combat of World War II.However, most of the pilots of the Volunteer Army have experience in life and combat in the army, have strong political qualities, and have a tenacious fighting style. They competed with the U.S. Air Force on the Korean battlefield and showed extraordinary skills. The Volunteer Army Air Force first dispatched the 4th Division, which completed actual combat exercises under the leadership of the Soviet Air Force as early as December 1950 to April 1951.After this dispatch, from September 20 to October 19, a total of 508 sorties were dispatched within one month. Under the leadership of the Soviet Air Force, more than 10 large and small air battles were carried out, including 7 large air battles involving a total of 200 aircraft between the enemy and us. , 17 enemy planes were shot down, 7 were damaged, and 14 planes were lost.The 4th Division made a good start for the Volunteer Air Force's operations.After Mao Zedong saw the air battle report of the 4th Division on October 2, he happily wrote down the praise of "the 4th Air Division fought bravely, very good and very comforting". Immediately afterwards, the 3rd Division of the Volunteer Air Force was dispatched to take over the 4th Division, and the 4th Division was transferred to rest.The 3rd Division played more beautifully.In the 86 days from October 21 to January 14, 1952, 2,391 sorties were dispatched, 23 large and small air battles were conducted, 54 enemy aircraft were shot down, and 9 were damaged.The division lost only 16 aircraft.Many pilots created outstanding records. The pilot with the best record shot down 6 enemy aircraft and damaged 2 aircraft. On February 1, 1952, Mao Zedong saw the combat report of the 3rd Division, and happily wrote down the comment "Congratulations to the 3rd Division of the Air Force". After the Volunteer Air Force was dispatched, it fought side by side with the Soviet Air Force, effectively combating the arrogance of the U.S. Air Force and posing a huge threat to the U.S. Air Force.The chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force exclaimed that the CCP became one of the most powerful air powers overnight.The combat history of the U.S. Air Force states: "Because of the superiority in numbers, the MiGs of the Communist Army took the initiative everywhere in the north of Pyongyang in November, while all the pilots of the 'United Nations Army' could only attack the pilots of the Communist Army. It is just resistance." The 5th Air Force had to decide, "His fighter-bombers will not block traffic in the MiG corridor (the US Air Force calls the area between the Yalu River and the Qingchuan River the 'MiG corridor'--the author's note) Since then, the attack can only be carried out on the railway traffic line in the area between the Cheongchon River and Pyongyang".General Otto Whelan, commander of the U.S. Far East Air Force, was also forced to order to cancel the bombing activities of the B-29 bombers during the daytime, and from the end of October, all of them turned to nighttime activities. After the 4th and 3rd divisions of the Volunteer Air Force underwent training and gained experience, they took turns leading the new troops to fight from the beginning of 1952.From November 1951, other units of the Volunteer Air Force also participated in the battle one after another. According to the capacity of the first-line airports (all in China), 2 to 3 divisions were maintained to fight, and each division fought for about 3 months to gain experience through training. After that, the rotation is performed.By June 1952, the 2nd, 6th, 14th, 15th, 12th, 17th, and 18th Divisions of the Volunteer Air Force successively participated in the war.Most of these troops conducted actual combat under the leadership of the 4th and 3rd divisions. From January to May 1952, the Volunteer Air Force shot down 53 enemy aircraft and damaged 16 aircraft. By the second half of 1952, 9 divisions of the Volunteer Air Force had undergone combat training, and each division could independently undertake combat missions, and mainly fought against US F-86 aircraft.The members of the Air Force Command of the Volunteer Army have also been adjusted. Nie Fengzhi, commander of the Air Force of the East China Military Region, will replace Liu Zhen as the acting commander of the Air Force of the Volunteer Army. In January 1953, the 16th Division of the Volunteer Air Force also participated in the operation.At this time, the Volunteer Air Force was able to carry out night combat and achieved night combat results. Throughout the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the Volunteer Air Force shot down 330 enemy planes and damaged 95; 231 were shot down and 151 were damaged.The newly born Chinese People's Air Force has been tempered in the air combat of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and grow rapidly. Under the powerful blow of the Volunteer Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery, coupled with the hard work of the railway, road repair and transportation troops and other troops in the rear, the Volunteer Army's combat resources were continuously transported to the front line.The battlefield transportation of the Volunteers has reversed the passive situation since the end of 1951.According to the combat history of the U.S. Air Force, during the entire "strangulation battle", only the aircraft of the Far East Air Force (excluding naval aircraft) performed this task, dispatching more than 87,550 sorties, an average of more than 300 sorties per day.But "the communist army was still able to supply their troops on the front lines and build up logistical supply depots in the forward areas. The communist army's firepower on the entire front was much stronger than in the past." "It is evident that the ten-month air blockade of the railway line did not cripple the communist forces enough to force them to accept the armistice terms from the 'United Nations' side".The US military's "strangulation battle" not only failed to "suffocate" the frontline troops of the Volunteer Army and forced the DPRK and China to accept their unreasonable demands in the negotiations, but also lost a large number of aircraft.According to the combat history of the U.S. Air Force, despite continuous replenishment, the aircraft losses of some fighter-bomber brigades are still quite serious, with only about half of the 75 establishments left. When Ridgway summed up the lessons of this war, he once said: "During the Korean War, some people believed that using the air force to cut off all the reinforcements and supplies of the enemy troops that had already entered the battle could create a miracle of cutting off the enemy. The air force cannot create this. It's a miracle. Air power does have certain limitations." By June 1952, the U.S. Air Force's "strangling battle" finally ended in failure.After the joint efforts of the domestic and the volunteers on the battlefield, the volunteers have built a combination of railway transportation and road transportation, combined with emergency repairs, rush transportation and air defense struggles, from the rear base to the front line of the army. The transportation network has formed a "steel transportation line that cannot be smashed and bombed", thus changing the passive situation of transportation on the battlefield and solving the major strategic issue of whether there is food or not.