Chapter 25 1. The problem of whether it can be kept is solved, and the way is to drill a hole

As early as in the first battle, the 2 divisions of the Volunteer Army fought in the blocking operation south of Changjin Lake on the east front, and in the fourth battle, Deputy Commander Han Xianchu commanded 2 armies and 1 corps of the People's Army in the blocking operation on the south bank of the Han River on the western front. It has already been seen that the weapons and equipment of the Volunteer Army are backward, relying on field fortifications, and facing the fierce fire attack of the "United Nations Army" aircraft, artillery and tanks, it is quite difficult for the organization to hold on to the defense. During the attack, the "United Nations Army" can fire hundreds of shells and bombs to tens of thousands of rounds (pieces) within a day against the positions defended by a company to a regiment of the Volunteers, causing huge casualties to the Volunteers. Most positions held for only a few hours, and many fell with ammunition exhausted and most or all of the men killed.

But at this time, the Volunteer Army was practicing mobile warfare, which was mainly a counter-offensive campaign in the overall strategy, and sticking to the defense was a partial and auxiliary operation.After the start of the armistice negotiations, both sides switched to strategic defense on the battlefield and practiced positional warfare.When the situation of armistice negotiations emerged, the Volunteer Army will greatly reduce the movement and combat methods of advancing and retreating on the battlefield in accordance with the war policy determined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It is not easy to defend one place and attack the enemy's strong positions. It is determined to implement a tug-of-war combining mobile defense and counterattack, that is, a combat method combining active defense and short assault.

With the start of the armistice negotiations, especially with the start of the negotiations on the military demarcation line, the development of the situation no longer allows the Volunteers to conduct a tug-of-war combining mobile defense and counterattack, and strategically must implement defensive warfare of a persistent nature.At the enlarged meeting of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army held in early September, Peng Dehuai pointed out: Our policy is to fight protracted battles and learn how to attack and defend positions. This kind of positional warfare is becoming more and more obvious day by day. , It should be an active defense, fighting step by step, every position must be fought repeatedly, not easily give up, take positional counterattacks and small attacks, and kill more enemies.In offensive operations, we must fight steadily. As long as the current equipment conditions of the enemy and ourselves have not changed, it is not appropriate to advance too far.After the start of the autumn defensive operations, on October 8, the Volunteer Army Command instructed the front-line departments to strengthen key fortifications, and all important points must be prepared to stick to them and not give up casually.The Volunteer Army's autumn defense and the tactical counterattack starting at the end of October were carried out in line with the above-mentioned policies and principles.

In early October, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting. According to the development trend of the Korean War situation and the need to resume domestic construction, it determined the policy of "better troops and simpler administration, increase production and save money". Defensive warfare, to consume a large amount of the enemy, and strive for victory in a local truce".Mao Zedong told the central government's policy to Deng Hua, who came to Beijing to ask for instructions and report work, and returned to the volunteer army to convey it.On November 14, in the name of Mao Zedong, in the telegram to Stalin on the Korean armistice negotiations and China's domestic construction and battlefield policy, the battlefield policy was expressed as follows: "Save military, material and financial resources, and adopt a long-lasting active defensive operation. policy, stick to the current front, consume a large amount of the enemy, and strive for victory in the end of the war."

In the battle to smash the local offensives of the "United Nations Army" in summer and autumn, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army carried out defensive operations with a persistent nature.However, some positions were still lost due to the weak counterattack firepower and the field fortifications could not withstand the enemy's firepower attack.With the agreement reached in the negotiations on the issue of the military demarcation line, solving the problem of whether relying on inferior weapons and equipment can be defended has become a major strategic issue of whether the final victory of the war can be won.

Some Volunteer Army units built "cat ear holes" on the front line at the beginning of their transition to strategic defense. Casualties, self-preservation played a very obvious role.At the same time, some volunteer troops have creatively developed this "cat ear hole" into a small tunnel with 2 to 3 entrances and exits, which can be used not only to preserve themselves, but also to kill and injure the attacking enemy.Volunteer army chiefs and leading agencies should promote these practices in a timely manner. On September 16, in the name of the "Joint Division", all ministries were required, "Our important positions must be tunnel-like strongholds, especially the core positions."But at this time, the front-line troops were busy fighting and could only use the gaps in the battle to build fortifications.The battlefield was relatively quiet after negotiations on the military demarcation line reached an agreement.Therefore, starting from December 1951, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army launched a large-scale fortification activity on the front line to build a solid position with tunnel fortifications as the backbone.

The Volunteer Army Command put forward unified tactical requirements and technical standards for the construction of tunnel fortifications, requiring each position to have a tunnel. , cold protection, and fire prevention are not only conducive to self-preservation, but also conducive to the use of tactics to eliminate the enemy. There are both combat facilities and living facilities. Each position has become a complete system that can defend, fight, maneuver, and live. By the end of May 1952, the Volunteers had excavated a total of 7,789 tunnels, 198.7 kilometers long, built 750,000 bunkers, and built more than 3,420 kilometers of open-air and concealed trenches on the front-line positions of more than 250 kilometers in front and 10 kilometers in depth; Excavated 1,730 tunnels with a length of 88.3 kilometers, completed more than 30,000 various bunkers, and more than 260 kilometers of trenches.The entire frontal front has basically formed a support-point solid defensive position system with tunnels as the backbone and various field fortifications.In this way, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army will have a relatively reliable position to rely on when they stick to the defense.According to statistics, in April, the "United Nations Army" attacked the volunteer positions with small forces more than 60 times, and none of the volunteers lost their positions. During defensive operations in the summer and autumn of 1951, the "United Nations Army" fired an average of 40-60 shells to kill and injure one volunteer. From January to August 1952, the "United Nations Army" fired an average of more than 660 shells to kill one volunteer. .

At the same time, in the absence of a campaign counterattack, the Volunteer Army adopted an active policy in tactics, actively carrying out various combat activities to attack the enemy, consolidate the front line and cooperate with the negotiation struggle.Especially after the middle and late March of 1952, the position system with tunnels as the backbone began to take shape. On March 19 and 26, the Volunteer Army Headquarters and Peng Dehuai issued instructions twice, requiring the front-line armies: First, each army organizes one or two small battles to actively attack and annihilate the enemy in a prepared, planned, and restrained manner to cooperate with the negotiations in Panmunjom. "Our current combat policy should take active measures to consolidate the current position, not to let go of any advantageous fighters, to wipe out moving and exposed enemies, and to crowd the place with cameras." Accordingly, in April, the Volunteer Army began to rely on the completed tunnel fortifications , in an organized and planned manner, to carry out combat activities to occupy the middle ground between the enemy and ourselves and to capture the enemy's prominent individual company and platoon positions.This kind of activity has achieved obvious results. In May and August alone, more than 20 positions were crowded, and the area of ​​the expanded position was more than 30 square kilometers.Cold guns and cold guns sniping and annihilating the enemy were also widely carried out on the front line.Push the focus of military struggle to the enemy's position. In June, the tunnel fortifications of the Volunteer Army also withstood the test of counterattacks by troops above the scale of the "United Nations Army" battalion. Not only did they not lose their positions, but they also killed and injured a large number of enemies relying on the tunnels, and initially gained experience in fighting in the tunnels.

In this way, as Mao Zedong said, the problem of whether we can defend is also solved, "The way is to drill holes. We dig two layers of fortifications. When the enemy attacks, we enter the tunnel. Sometimes the enemy occupies the upper part, but the lower part still belongs to us. When the enemy enters the position, we will counterattack and inflict great damage on him. We use this simple method to pick up foreign cannons. The enemy has nothing to do with us." "Now the policy is clear, the position is consolidated, and the supply is guaranteed. Every soldier knows how to persevere to the end." "We have drilled thousands of holes under the mountain stretching hundreds of kilometers and tens of feet high, and our troops attacked the enemy at the exit of the holes. No matter how much they bombed, they could not defeat us." Even if an atomic war breaks out, our caves will not be destroyed. These tunnels are connected to each other, and troops can be stationed, meetings, exercises, and camps can be held inside.”

After the front-line positions were basically consolidated, in order to further implement the policy of sticking to the defense, the Volunteer Army held a meeting with the participation of cadres from all corps from June 6 to 9.At this time, Mr. Peng had a small tumor on his head. Under the repeated urging of the central government, he returned to China in early April for treatment, and then stayed in China. In early July, he took over Zhou Enlai's daily work of the Central Military Commission and was still the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. .After Peng Dehuai returned to China, Chen Geng presided over the work of the volunteer army.The corps cadre meeting was hosted by Chen Geng and Deng Hua.Deng Hua made an important speech at this meeting.The meeting focuses on the research to solve the following three problems.

First, the military policy was further clarified and new tactical requirements were put forward.According to the procrastination attitude of the U.S. representatives in the negotiations and their performance on the battlefield, the meeting pointed out: "We must be resolute in our ideology and organization to prepare for the fight. And our guidelines are to insist on the two principles of protracted combat and active defense. Basic principles." Our army has formed a support-point defense system with tunnels as the backbone, the equipment has been strengthened, the transportation situation has been improved, and the troops have rich experience in defensive operations. Therefore, our army's "current active defense , The content is of a persistent nature", in the case of not launching a campaign offensive, "we must adopt an active policy in tactics... Always put the enemy in a posture of defending against our attack, forcing the enemy to be in a passive position." If the war drags on for a long time, the enemy may massively increase its troops to North Korea, and may carry out landing attacks on the east and west coasts, and cooperate with frontal attacks. For this, we must be fully prepared to land from both sides of the enemy at the same time. In addition, prepare for the most serious situations such as airborne landing, frontal attack, and use of bacteria and atomic bombs.We just need to adjust our deployment and establish a complete defense system based on these situations. Second, it was decided to adjust the deployment of the frontal front and strengthen the mobile force to attack the enemy.Since the first-line solid position system is basically completed, the defense capability has been enhanced, saving the front-line defense forces.Therefore, the meeting decided that the Volunteer Army would draw out one army from the eight first-line armies as the second echelon, and suggested that the People's Army draw out one division to strengthen the coastal defense of the east coast (later the People's Army draws out one corps).At the same time, it was decided to adjust the command relationship between the corps on the battlefield. It is no longer possible for the Corps to maintain a strict subordinate relationship, but it has become a command relationship with each army.The corps and headquarters on the frontal front and the east and west coasts each have 1 or 2 armies as the second echelon, and the Volunteer Army also has 1 army as the general reserve.In this way, the mobile force is increased, and the front and the east and west coasts can more freely deal with various situations that may arise. Third, it was decided to strengthen the coastal fortifications and complete the entire defense system.The meeting decided to establish a strong and deep defensive position system from the mouth of the Yalu River, along the west coast of North Korea to connect with the frontal front, and then along the east coast of North Korea to the mouth of the Tumen River.The fortifications of the positions have all developed from field fortification to permanent fortification. The construction of this kind of fortification must be done no matter whether the armistice negotiations are delayed or the war stops. The content of the meeting's decision was approved by the Central Military Commission.The decisions and arrangements made at this meeting made the implementation of the policy of adhering to the defense more concrete and more perfect. After the meeting, Chen Geng was transferred back to China to prepare for the establishment of a military engineering academy. The Central Military Commission decided that Deng Hua would act as the commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army to preside over the overall work of the Volunteer Army. In July, Mao Zedong signed an order, appointing Yang Dezhi as the second deputy commander of the Volunteer Army to assist Deng Hua in the work of the Volunteer Army; appointed Han Xianchu to replace Yang Dezhi as the commander of the 19th Corps, and Zheng Weishan, the deputy commander and chief of staff of the 19th Corps, returned to China for treatment Yang Chengwu was the acting commander of the 20th Corps. In September, Wang Jian'an was appointed to replace Song Shilun, who had returned to China, as the commander of the 9th Corps. By the end of August 1952, the fortification of the solid position on the second front line was basically completed. In addition, the equipment was improved and the transportation problem was basically solved. In order to improve the defense situation, promote negotiations, and combine the defense of the first-line troops, the battle was obtained before the defense was changed. The exercise was reported to the Central Military Commission for approval. Under the command of Deng Hua and Yang Dezhi, the Volunteer Army mainly consisted of the 12th, 39th, and 68th Armies, and the front-line 65th, 40th, 38th, and 15th Armies cooperated. From mid-September to the end of October, a campaign-scale full-line tactical counterattack was carried out.In this tactical counterattack, use the completed tunnel fortifications, according to the situation of the enemy's position, take the method of conquering the position and annihilating the defending enemy and then withdraw immediately (grab and go); ; Conquer the positions and annihilate the defending enemy and stick to it in three ways. A total of 60 positions were selected to defend with troops below the enemy's battalion, and they attacked 77 times (among them, the People's Army chose 3 positions to attack 3 times), and wiped out more than 27,000 enemies. If it is attacked, it must be conquered, and if it is attacked, it must be wiped out. Except for a few positions where the attack was unsuccessful and the enemy retreated from one position, all other positions were conquered and the enemy was wiped out.After repeated battles, 17 of these positions were consolidated. The "United Nations Army" is in a passive state of being beaten across the board. Compared with the previous battles, the Volunteers have made great changes in the use of troops and firepower in this battle. Generally, one company of the enemy is attacked, one company of infantry is used, and 8 to 10 companies of artillery support are used. There are 30 to 40 artillery pieces, and the artillery firepower has been greatly enhanced.This is an important factor why the Volunteers must overcome their attacks and stick to their rules.Mao Zedong pointed out in a telegram to Stalin on December 16: "I have won such a victory in the autumn battle this year. In addition to the brave officers and soldiers, solid fortifications, proper command, and sufficient supplies, the fierce artillery fire and the accuracy of shooting are the key to victory. Elements." Mao Zedong spoke highly of tactical counterattack operations, pointing out: "If this method of warfare continues to be practiced, it will surely kill the enemy and force the enemy to adopt a compromise method to end the Korean War." During the Battle of Shangganling from mid-October to late November, the "United Nations Army" used three divisions, 300 cannons, and nearly 200 vehicles to defend a position of less than 4 square kilometers defended by two companies of the 15th Volunteer Army. Tanks and 3,000 sorties of aircraft fired more than 1.9 million artillery shells and dropped more than 5,000 bombs, overturning the ground and rocks to a depth of more than 2 meters. In the battle for Yu Tian, ​​more than 25,000 enemies were wiped out, and all of them recovered their positions, creating a model of sticking to the defense. So far, the Volunteer Army has not only solved the problem of whether it can defend, but also fully grasped the initiative on the frontal battlefield, while the "United Nations Army" is in a helpless state of being beaten passively across the board.For this battlefield situation, the war histories written by the United States and South Korea after the war all recognize it.