Chapter 24 3. Negotiations on the issue of the military demarcation line reached an agreement

On October 25, the armistice negotiations resumed at the new venue, Panmunjom, and continued to discuss the issue of the military demarcation line in a subcommittee.At this time, the members of the negotiating delegations on both sides changed. For the Volunteer Army, Bian Zhangwu, deputy commander of the 23rd Corps, was transferred to replace Deng Hua as the negotiator. The United States has seen from the two consecutive months of summer and autumn local offensives by the "United Nations Army" that relying on the superiority of the navy and air force cannot achieve the military demarcation line they require.Therefore, after the negotiation resumed, the U.S. representative no longer talked about the "compensation theory" of its superiority in the navy and air force, and gave up the absurd claim that the Volunteer Army and the People's Army should withdraw from the 12,000 square kilometers.On the day when the negotiations resumed, the representatives of the United States announced their new plan for the military demarcation line. The military demarcation line of the new plan basically coincided with the front at that time. Kaesong, which is controlled by the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, is designated south of the military demarcation line, and the width of the demilitarized zone is 4 kilometers.According to this new plan, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army will also withdraw from an area of ​​about 1,500 square kilometers.

On October 22-24 before the resumption of negotiations, Li Kenong and Mao Zedong exchanged telegrams, negotiated repeatedly, and obtained the consent of Kim Il Sung, and decided that at the first meeting after the resumption of negotiations, the DPRK and China should propose that the two sides They both gave up their original plans and put forward new plans for discussion. If the US side disagrees, we will not propose a new plan. If the US side agrees, we can propose a new plan that has been studied and revised, that is, according to The plan formulated in principle in the telegram to Kim Il Sung on August 17 (the second plan) no longer mentioned the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, and the US side gave up 1944 square kilometers east of the Linjin River, and the Linjin River To the west, we give up 1,800 square kilometers, and the abandoned area is regarded as a demilitarized zone, and its administration is still managed by the two sides.This plan is actually a plan adjusted on the basis of the line of contact between the two sides.At the same time, we also considered that after a period of debate, when the other side approached our plan, we would propose a third plan, that is, a plan for a truce on the spot and a slight adjustment.At the negotiation meeting on October 26, our representative proposed the second plan.

During the negotiations, on the one hand, the contact line between the two sides has not been verified. On the other hand, the US side insisted on its plan, emphasizing the withdrawal of some areas in the eastern and central areas in exchange for the Kaesong area in the west.The two sides had another heated argument.The DPRK-China delegation analyzed that once the contact line between the two sides has been verified and clarified, the U.S. plan is no longer tenable. If the U.S. still disagrees with our plan, we may directly propose a truce on the spot, and the troops of both sides will retreat 2 km as a demilitarized zone, so as to avoid the opponent's unreasonable request to withdraw from some areas in the east and the middle in exchange for Kaesong, and the opponent has no reason to oppose our plan. On October 30, Li Kenong reported this consideration to Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.Mao Zedong agreed with this consideration and informed Stalin.

On the battlefield, as early as the autumn offensive of the "United Nations Army" had come to an end, and when the two sides were planning to resume negotiations, the Volunteer Army estimated that the negotiations would not go smoothly after the resumption of negotiations, and made arrangements to cooperate with the negotiations. On October 16, Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, Park Yiyu, and Gan Siqi called Yang Dezhi, Commander of the 19th Corps, Li Zhimin, Political Commissar, and Zheng Weishan, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, and pointed out: Although it is beneficial for me to hold a counterattack when the enemy is tired, However, due to the floods in North Korea and the bombardment of traffic lines by U.S. aircraft, our army’s transportation difficulties are temporarily difficult to overcome. Therefore, the sixth counterattack is planned to be postponed to mid-November.At present, "in order to increase the pressure on the enemy and promote the progress of the negotiations", the armies commanded by the 19th Corps should carry out some local counterattacks as much as possible, concentrate a part of artillery and an appropriate amount of tanks, and on the basis of full preparations, each army will attack each time with With the goal of annihilating one U.S. battalion, if two or three such victorious battles can be held before October and mid-November, it will have an impact on the promotion of negotiations. From the 24th to the 29th, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army called the front-line ministries many times, pointing out: "The enemy's autumn offensive has suffered a lot of casualties and is already exhausted. In order not to give the enemy a chance to breathe, we choose the enemy's weaknesses, concentrate our absolute superior firepower and appropriate Troop strength, the goal is to wipe out one or two companies to one battalion of the enemy at a time, and then wipe out another point according to the situation after success. The counterattack of the big battle will not be carried out without the cooperation of the air force. In order to promote the truce negotiations, some abandoned positions will be regained. Positive international public opinion, to attack the enemy's arrogance, please fight the above-mentioned small counterattacks several times in a row recently." On the 25th, the negotiation resumed, and the military demarcation line proposed by the US "compared with the current contact line between the enemy and ourselves, I have to withdraw 1,500 An area of ​​about 100 square kilometers, but the enemy has advanced an area of ​​more than 600 square kilometers in addition to the tiny area retreated, especially the unreasonable demand for Kaesong to be included in the enemy-occupied area. My front-line troops, It is very important to stick to the existing positions, hold local counterattacks as much as possible, take back some abandoned positions, show our strength, and promote armistice negotiations." "In November or even the end of this year (except for particularly favorable circumstances), it is planned We are preparing to carry out a large-scale counterattack campaign across the board. Based on our experience in September and October, we adopt an active defense policy. The enemy consumes a lot of energy, and we are also very afraid of the enemy. Standard. At present, in order to promote the armistice negotiations, it is very necessary to plan and prepare for the above-mentioned small offensives after the 5th of next month after the enemy has suffered heavy casualties. It would be better if the preparations are sufficient and earlier." It is also hoped that this kind of partial counterattack will be "launched as early as possible under the condition of full preparation, so as to facilitate the current negotiations on the military demarcation line."

Accordingly, from October 31 to the end of November, the 64th, 47th, 42nd, 26th, and 67th (replaced by the 12th Army on November 7th) and the 68th Army of the Volunteer Army's first line successively 7 armies, A total of 26 outstanding, exposed or weak positions were selected for defense by troops below the "United Nations Army" battalion. They attacked 34 times, conquered 21 positions, wiped out more than 10,000 enemies, and consolidated and occupied 9 of them.At the same time, the 65th Army, which was tasked with defending Kaesong, carried out two sweep operations, expanding an area of ​​more than 280 square kilometers.The 50th Volunteer Army on the west coast, with the direct support of the Volunteer Air Force, captured more than 10 islands occupied by South Korean armed forces from the mouth of the Yalu River to the mouth of the Qingchuan River. Two brigades of the People's Army also recovered several islands outside the mouth of the Datong River and the Wengjin Peninsula. islands.These operations of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army have effectively attacked the enemy and promoted the armistice negotiations.

In the midst of military strikes from the DPRK and Chinese negotiators, the U.S. representative still had a hooligan attitude and threatened that the ownership of Kaesong would be determined by force, but he had to start backing down step by step.In order to put them in a passive position, Mao Zedong telegraphed Li Kenong on November 6 that during the negotiations on November 7, we could take the initiative to propose a plan to cease fighting on the spot and retreat 2 kilometers as a demilitarized zone.At the same time, I instructed Peng Dehuai that if the enemy might attack Kaesong, I must be prepared and resolutely annihilate them when they attack.

After the representatives of the DPRK and China proposed the above-mentioned plan, the representative of the United States had no reason to object, but only agreed to sign an agreement in principle on this, and was unwilling to determine the specific military demarcation line. They attempted to determine the specific demarcation line after all negotiation agendas were reached. Thinking that they can get cheap weapons and equipment relying on their superiority.The DPRK and China believe that this agenda item discusses the issue of the military demarcation line. Therefore, a de facto demarcation line must be determined. At the same time, they are also full of confidence in the changes in the military demarcation line before the armistice. , proposing to adjust the military demarcation line according to the actual changes in the contact line between the two sides after all the agenda items are agreed.The U.S. representative had no choice but to agree that after the staffs of the two sides revised the line of contact, the delegations of the two sides approved the agreement on the military demarcation line reached by the subcommittee on November 23 on November 27: based on the existing actual contacts between the two sides The line is the military demarcation line, from which each side withdraws 2 kilometers to establish a demilitarized zone during the military armistice.If the armistice agreement is signed 30 days after the ratification of this agreement, the above-mentioned military demarcation line and demilitarized zone will be amended according to the changes in the actual contact line between the two sides at that time.

The emergence of the truce negotiation situation is the result of the successful battle between the Volunteer Army and the People's Army.Similarly, the agreement reached in the negotiations on the issue of the military demarcation line is also the result of the effective cooperation between the Volunteer Army and the People's Army.The four-month negotiations on the military demarcation line fully demonstrated that it is not easy to make peace with the Americans without a strong military strike. The Americans are very arrogant and unreasonable. It was forced to do so." Afterwards, the negotiating parties still entered into the third agenda item (specific arrangements for realizing the ceasefire and truce) and the fourth item on November 27, December 11, and February 6, 1952, respectively, in the form of subcommittees. Negotiations on the agenda (arrangement of captives) and the fifth agenda (about making recommendations to the governments of both parties).But the U.S. is still repeating its old tricks, adopting an unreasonable and procrastinating attitude.