Chapter 23 2. Peng Dehuai's military preparations for the negotiation

In the first ten days of June 1951, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung determined the policy of carrying out talks while fighting according to the changes in the war situation. The side has no illusions about the success of the negotiations, fully prepares for a protracted war, and uses resolute military actions to cooperate with the smooth progress of the armistice negotiations.Since then, the military operations of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army on the battlefield are closely related to the negotiation situation. After the fifth battle, both Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong saw more fully that under the conditions of the disparity between the enemy and our own weapons and equipment, the war is not only difficult but also quite long-term, and it is appropriate to adopt the policy of small annihilation wars for deployment.On May 27, both Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai proposed the education of protracted combat in the troops and the establishment of the idea of ​​long-term combat. In early June, when Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to discuss the war situation with Mao Zedong, he also agreed with this point. On June 11, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai to inform: "We have negotiated with Comrade Kim Il Sung that we will not carry out a major counter-offensive campaign within two months, and prepare for a sure and steady counter-offensive in August." In the case of an offensive, in June and July, we must adhere to the 38th parallel to the 38.5th parallel, and complete some necessary military preparations.When organizing a campaign, we should not only take into account our army's supply capacity, but also consider the political impact of the negotiations, and fight until the 38th parallel, not exceeding the Namhan River and Soyang River. In late June, Deng Hua also conveyed these spirits at the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army.

After learning that the U.S. authorities would respond to Malik’s speech on June 23, Mao Zedong called Kim Il-sung and informed Peng Dehuai on June 29, pointing out that while preparing to negotiate with the enemy, “the People’s Army and the Volunteer Army should actively pay attention to combat and not Let the enemy take the opportunity to succeed." According to the above spirit, Peng Dehuai began to consider the sixth campaign plan from July 1.Peng Dehuai pointed out in a telegram to Mao Zedong that day: "It is absolutely necessary to fully prepare for a protracted war and strive for peace talks to end the war. I can hold the banner of peace, which is beneficial to both the Korean people and the Chinese people. Adhere to the 38th parallel as the boundary Both sides can get by. If the United States insists on occupying the area now, I will prepare to counterattack in August. Before the counterattack, I must let him advance for dozens of miles, so that it will be more beneficial to me militarily and politically.”

On July 2, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang and told Kim Il Sung, "During the preparation and implementation of negotiations with the representatives of the enemy ... we must be vigilant. Our frontline troops must be prepared to deal with the enemy before the negotiations. And during the negotiation period, the enemy may launch a big attack on us, and carry out large-scale air bombing in the rear, in order to force me to enter into an alliance under the city. In case of a large-scale attack by the enemy, our army must counterattack and defeat it. " On July 8, the Volunteer Army Command issued the tactical preparation instructions for the sixth campaign. The fortifications had been strengthened against the "United Nations Army". The participation of tank troops in battle requires the troops to organize education and exercises for tackling tough situations, and organize infantry, artillery, and tank cooperative tactical education and exercises. The education and preparations should be completed by the end of July or early August.After the start of the armistice negotiations, on July 16, Peng Dehuai informed the negotiating delegation of the military preparations. At the same time, he reported to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, pointing out that political struggle and military struggle are two-pronged. "If there is no peaceful offensive (peace talks) political struggle, only pure military struggle, it is impossible to quickly isolate the United States and quickly end the Korean War. However, the peace talks may not necessarily go smoothly, and may require serious Only two or three more major military victories can make the enemy retreat in the face of difficulties."

As expected, at the very beginning of the negotiations, the US side refused to include the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line and the withdrawal of all foreign troops on the agenda, and caused side effects in the negotiations.In order to show their sincerity, the DPRK and China have repeatedly made concessions, but as of July 24, negotiations have been going on for half a month, and no agreement has been reached on the agenda issue.In view of this, Peng Dehuai called Mao Zedong on the same day, pointing out: Judging from the current situation, in order to maintain its reactionary political position in the world, the United States relies on its superiority in equipment and can defend North Korea, which is surrounded by seas on three sides and is long and narrow. It is also trying to maintain a state of war. At the same time, it is trying to drag my country into a long-term war and delay the construction of a new China. cause.I won a few more victorious wars, fighting to the south of the 38th parallel, and then I withdrew to the 38th parallel as the boundary, conducted peace talks, gradually withdrew foreign troops in North Korea in proportion, and insisted on rationality and restraint.After complex struggles, the possibility of peace still exists.If peace cannot be achieved through all the above-mentioned methods, I will continue to fight. In the protracted war, although I have many difficulties, I can overcome them and win the war in the end.From the overall point of view, there are many benefits to peace, and there is no fear of war... I will try to complete the preparations for the counterattack in mid-August. If the enemy does not attack, it will be held until September.It is best to wait for the enemy to attack, and it is advantageous for me to rely on the position to attack.

On the 26th, Mao Zedong replied and pointed out: Telegram received on July 24th.Whether the enemy really wants to cease fighting and negotiate a peace can be determined after the Kaesong Conference is held a few more times.Before the armistice agreement is signed and the war has not really stopped, it is absolutely necessary for our army to actively prepare for the September offensive. After the armistice negotiations entered substantive discussions on the issue of the military demarcation line, the U.S. representative not only rudely refused to use the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, but even more arrogantly proposed the "compensation theory" for the superiority of the navy and air force, demanding that the military demarcation line be drawn at In the depths of the front lines of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, after several days of debate, there was no sign of concession.In view of this, on July 31, Deng Hua, the negotiator of the Volunteer Army and the reconciliation party, called Mr. Peng and pointed out: It is correct to strive for peace talks to end the Korean war.But the current timing is not right, and some of our concessions in the negotiations have caused the enemy to have an illusion, so the enemy's arrogance is very high during the negotiations. "According to our estimation, at most we can only allow an on-the-spot truce. If there is no external motivation (such as Soviet pressure, conflicts between Britain and France, etc., especially our victory in the battle, etc.), if the enemy is to withdraw ten kilometers south of the 38th parallel It is extremely difficult. Negotiations require the cooperation of victorious battles and military preparations for a rupture. For this reason, it is recommended that the preparations for the battle should be completed before August 15th, and that the counterattack after the preparations are ruptured should be carried out within August... ...Using part of our army to cooperate with the People's Army to attack the enemy in the east and recover the area north of the 38th parallel in the east... It is beneficial to strive for two steps to complete the recovery of the 38th parallel. If the negotiation continues, it is best It is to take advantage of the enemy's attack and give a powerful blow...or I will launch a regional initiative to attack the enemy. In short, negotiations need to be coordinated with political offensives, especially battle victories, to be more beneficial."

On August 1, after being approved by Zhou Enlai, Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force of the Military Commission, called Peng Dehuai to inform the Air Force of its preparations for the sixth campaign. 1 piston destroyer regiment, 2 shock aircraft regiments, 1 bomber regiment), and another 14 regiments are still quite unfamiliar in technology and can only barely participate in the war.Each regiment is calculated with 25 aircraft.In addition, North Korea has 100 aircraft that can participate in the war.But North Korea has limited airports and could be bombed by U.S. planes.If the airport situation permits, jet planes and shock planes can move to the line of Seoul, and bombers can move to Daegu and Busan.During combat, the joint command of the Chinese and North Korean air forces can be located in Pyongyang, and the forward command post and the headquarters of the Volunteer Army are together.

On August 8, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Mao Zedong and Gao Gang about the deployment plan for the sixth campaign; Central Military Commission and Northeast Military Region.The overall idea is: 13 armies of the Volunteer Army are divided into two echelons, the first echelon consists of 8 armies (3 armies of the 19th Corps, 2 armies of the 20th Corps, the 42nd Army, the 47th Army, and the 26th Army). 42. The 47th and 47th armies encircled and wiped out the US 3rd Division in the Cheorwon area, the 26th Army and the 20th Corps encircled and wiped out the South Korean 2nd Division and the 25th US Division in the Jinhua area, and the 19th Corps served in the southwestern area of ​​​​Cheorwon Contain and block enemy reinforcement tasks; the 5 armies of the second echelon (3 armies of the 3rd Corps, the 38th Army, and the 40th Army) will continue to expand the results with the second echelon after the first echelon is over; The line is divided into two echelons with 4 legions to cooperate with the volunteers to fight; it is estimated that 3 divisions of howitzers, 1 division of anti-aircraft artillery and rocket launchers, 3 regiments of tanks and 10 regiments of the air force will participate in the battle; Defensive missions, with the 2 armies of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army and the 39th Army as the second echelon of defense on the east and west coasts.All troops are required to continue to make tactical preparations for continuous in-depth assaults, and complete all operational preparations before September 10. If there are no unexpected changes, the attack is planned to be launched in the afternoon of September 10.After the attack was launched, on the basis of sufficient supplies and supplementary guarantees, the previous limit of only six or seven days of fighting was broken, and continuous attacks were carried out. The two echelons each fought for 20 days to one month.In this way, it is possible for the United States to agree to a truce and withdrawal of troops based on the 38th parallel.The key to whether the campaign can be attacked continuously is whether the supply of materials and the replenishment of soldiers are guaranteed.In the plan on the 17th, all troops were also required to submit supplementary and revised opinions based on the actual situation, and Commander-in-Chief Kim Il Sung was asked to provide opinions.Peng Dehuai also notified the sixth campaign plan issued on the 17th to Deng Hua's reconciliation party who was negotiating in Kaesong, and asked for their opinions.

After Mao Zedong received Peng Dehuai's telegram on the 8th, he asked Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen to convene a meeting to study and put forward their opinions. On the night of the 10th, Zhou Enlai convened Nie Rongzhen, Liu Yalou, Chen Xilian, Yang Lisan, Li Tao, etc. to conduct research on Peng Dehuai's telegram on the 8th regarding the sixth campaign, and reported the research results to Mao Zedong in writing on the morning of the 11th.According to the report: According to the current rainy season in North Korea, the railways, bridges, and roads may not be completely repaired in September. Even if the food for the whole month of September is expected to be able to cross the Yalu River in mid-August, it may not be able to be transported across the Qingchuan River (bridges are completely broken) .If the food is insufficient and the ammunition is damaged (wet part is possible, the front has not been checked yet), we decide to fight, and the air force is determined not to participate. Under the condition that the enemy has determined to stick to it, it may be difficult to fight continuously for 20 days. to one month.At the same time, politically, if negotiations continue in September, it will not be very beneficial for me to launch a big fight. If I cannot win a big victory, the impact will be even worse.From various perspectives, it is advantageous for me to step up preparations and delay the launch of the big fight.If the negotiations in September break down, then October will have to prepare for a big fight; if the enemy does not advance, then we can look for small battles along the route in September and December, and continue to inflict damage on the enemy. possibility of cooperation.

After receiving the combat plan issued by Peng Dehuai on August 17, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram from the Central Military Commission to Peng Dehuai and reported to Gao Gang. Based on the analysis of the situation inside and outside the battlefield, he proposed to reconsider the plan for the sixth campaign that was expected to be held in September. , can it be changed to step up preparation and not launch.The telegram was sent on the 19th, and the full text is as follows: After Peng Dehuai received the telegram from the Central Military Commission, he agreed with the analysis and opinions of the Central Military Commission. He replied to the Military Commission and told Gao Gang that he agreed to change the offensive in the September campaign to active preparations and prevent the enemy from attacking. If the enemy does not attack for the time being, wait until October decision.On the 20th and 22nd, Deng Hua and the solution party also put forward supplementary and perfect opinions on the sixth campaign plan, and based on the fact that the enemy's deep positions and deployments are not yet clear, they both suggested that one or two should be selected before the start of the campaign. Attack positions to gain experience.After receiving the telegram from the Military Commission on the 19th, Deng Hua suggested that the battle could be held in early November based on the negotiations and our army's preparations for the campaign.According to Deng Hua's suggestion and Mao Zedong's intention, while continuing to prepare for the campaign without launching a campaign counterattack, some tactical counterattacks should be carried out in September to regain some places, push the contact line forward, and better explore the situation. enemy positions.

Based on this, while continuing to prepare for the sixth campaign, the Volunteer Army launched a tactical counterattack at the beginning of September with the five armies on the front line, selecting several key points of the enemy in front of them, annihilating thousands of enemies, and effectively Cooperated with the defensive operations of the People's Army on the Eastern Front. Li Qiwei's summer offensive launched by the People's Army on the Eastern Front lasted for a month, causing more than 70,000 casualties before advancing the position by 2 to 6 kilometers.Then, from late September to late October, targeting the positions defended by the Volunteers, the autumn offensive was launched, and more than 70,000 casualties were paid, and the positions were only advanced 3 to 9 kilometers in some areas. What the "United Nations Army" didn't get at the negotiating table, it still couldn't get it with planes and cannons on the battlefield. After paying such a heavy price of casualties, it only occupied a few hills, and the gain outweighed the gain. Criticism, had to return to the negotiating table to negotiate.