Chapter 22 1. The rhetoric at the negotiating venue

On the same day when an agreement on the negotiating agenda was reached, the negotiations entered substantive discussions on the issue of the military demarcation line. China and the DPRK regard the negotiations on the military demarcation line as the core issue in the agenda of the negotiations.According to the insincere and sideways performance of the US side in the negotiations on the agenda, it is estimated that the negotiations on the military demarcation line will be more difficult and there will be a more intense verbal war.As expected, the US delegation was completely unreasonable, hardly negotiating, but a show of force.

During the negotiations on the substantive issue of the military demarcation line, the DPRK-China delegation once again proposed to use the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, and explained the rationality of this proposal, pointing out that the 38th parallel is a universally recognized military demarcation line. The demarcation line is a historical fact and the basis of the armistice negotiations; the war broke out precisely because the warring party first destroyed the demarcation line of the 38th parallel. boundary; since January 1951, the fronts of the two sides have swayed between the north and south of the 38th Parallel four times, which shows that the line basically reflects the military strength of the two sides. Until the actual armistice, the front is still unstable.Therefore, it is reasonable to use the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between the two sides, and it is in line with the history and the actual situation of the two sides.The U.S. authorities also made such statements when they were seeking negotiations.

However, the U.S. delegation believed that the repeated concessions made by the DPRK and China delegations in the negotiations on the agenda issue were signs of weakness, so they appeared even more arrogant and rude. The Eighth Line is a reasonable suggestion for the military demarcation line, and it brazenly flaunts its "advantage" in the navy and air force, unreasonably demanding that this advantage be "compensated" in the determination of the military demarcation line. Joey, the chief representative of the United States, said in the negotiation meeting on July 27: The front of the ground forces cannot reflect the actual strength of the armies of the two sides. The "United Nations Army" has the "advantage" of the navy and air force. Fully appreciating, therefore, the impact that naval and air forces will have on regional operations must be properly assessed", "The vast area controlled by the 'United Nations Forces' with its air and naval line to the Yalu River and the Tumen River, your side has no comparable position in Korea. corps' withdrawal of its air and naval forces from North Korea". On the 28th, Joey said in the negotiation meeting: "When choosing the demilitarized zone, we must consider the terrain and the potential of the United Nations land, sea and air force. However, we have proposed to withdraw our navy and air force. For these concessions, We should be compensated.” To this end, the US delegation also drew up a map of the military demarcation line they requested, drawing the military demarcation line in the area dozens of kilometers behind the Volunteer Army and the People’s Army.According to this military demarcation line, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army will withdraw from the 12,000-square-kilometer area from the actual contact line between the two sides at that time.

In this regard, on the 28th, Mao Zedong called Li Kenong and informed Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai. At the same time, he also notified Stalin, pointing out: (1) Joey's speech was arrogant and absurd. It was completely clamoring on the battlefield, not negotiating an armistice.In your prepared speeches, you must first question whether he has plans and sincerity, whether he is negotiating a truce or preparing to expand the war, and then refute his so-called influence of the navy and air force on ground operations and the strange talk that the ground ceases the war but the sea and the air do not.For the former, there were two defeats to Daegu last year and to the Namhang River this year, which can prove the impact of the navy and air force on ground operations; the latter, if the opponent really wants to, Ningfu has the slightest plan and sincerity.

(2) Judging from Joey's speech, we must insist on the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line at present, and reject his unreasonable demands with a firm attitude, so as to break the enemy's belief that I can give way again and again. Let the illusion.On this point, let it go on arguing, and it may take a few days before the enemy reconsiders.If the enemy is determined to break up on this issue and publish it, he will be completely passive. Based on this, during the negotiations on the 28th, the North Korean and Chinese delegations refuted the arrogance and unreasonableness of the US side. On August 1, Mao Zedong called Li Kenong again and told Jin and Peng that the two sides had been arguing about this issue for six days. Another line beyond the argument, or they offer to discuss the next item on the agenda first. "In this regard, regardless of what the enemy intends, we should still insist on first resolving the issue of using the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between the two sides in accordance with the procedures. Even if the stalemate continues, it will still be beneficial to us. The boundary line is open and reasonable, and it is the basis of this armistice negotiation. The enemy dare not make his proposal public, but can only passively oppose the 38th parallel. If the proposed boundary line is announced, it will most likely arouse the surprise and condemnation of the majority of public opinion in the world."

The U.S. representatives made all kinds of unreasonable denunciations. On August 11, Joey put forward absurdly contradictory reasons for the "superiority" of his navy and air force to support his claim on the military demarcation line.Joey said: Your ground forces have a strong advantage, and this advantage will increase, while the US ground forces do not have this advantage, so the US ground forces must have a certain depth of natural defensive positions.Joey's theory is simply not worth refuting.Nam Il pointed out sharply: You use "two conflicting reasons to support your plan, don't you think it is ridiculous? You said that your navy and air force are strong, so you should compensate. Now you admit that your army is weak, But you also said that there should be compensation. No matter how strong or weak you are, you all need to be compensated, isn’t this a kind of irrational nonsense?”

The U.S. side also stopped mentioning its original claim on the demarcation line during the negotiations, and hinted that the proposal on this issue could be adjusted. Joey expressed his desire to define the demilitarized zone roughly according to the current front line.Based on the analysis of Li Kenong’s report, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai believed that if the other party abandons its baseless and extremely incorrect claims about the military demarcation line, and admits that the current front line is the basis for demarcating the military demarcation line and adjusts it, then our side will An amendment can be proposed. The 38th parallel proposed by our side is the best adjustment plan. This plan is basically in line with the current military reality of both sides. "Determine the 38th Parallel as the baseline of the military demarcation line between the two sides, and establish a demilitarized area based on this baseline. The two sides do not have to retreat 10 kilometers each. According to the terrain, the 'United Nations Army' can be located near the 38th Parallel in the east of the Linjin River." Withdraw less than ten kilometers to the south, and still retreat ten kilometers south of the 38th parallel on the west side of the Linjin River. Ten kilometers north of the Eighth Parallel, we still need to retreat ten kilometers.” Mao Zedong telegraphed Li Kenong at 7 o’clock on August 11, before proposing this proposal, he only stated that we are willing to make adjustments, observe the other party’s attitude towards this, and then decide whether to propose this proposal One plan.

However, at the negotiation meeting on August 12, the other party appeared to be even more arrogant and unreasonable, not only refusing to use the 38th parallel as the baseline of the military demarcation line, but also attempting to impose the responsibility for the stalemate in the negotiations on the DPRK and China.In the telegram to Mao Zedong that day, Li Kenong analyzed the development situation of the negotiations and the basic situation of the US side, and made suggestions on the positions of the DPRK and China on the demarcation line issue.Li Kenong said in the telegram: Judging from the attitude expressed repeatedly by the other party since the meeting and the general situation outside the meeting, it is impossible for the other party to accept the 38th parallel plan.In the past few days, although the other party has been exerting pressure on me on the one hand, trying to force us to make concessions first, on the other hand, it is also preparing for a possible rupture.Therefore, we feel that we must make a decision on the issue of the 38th Parallel. For example, we must strive for the principle of establishing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line, and only allow adjustments of one kind or another under this principle. We must plan and prepare for a breakup.Otherwise we should have a clear compromise.The compromise plan we proposed in the past certainly cannot take into account the various development possibilities of the current situation...

We (Li, Deng, Xie, Qiao) estimated that the opponent's final plan was to honestly cease fighting on the spot with some minor adjustments.So we must decide to fight for the 38th parallel and prepare for a rupture?Or should we consider an in-situ truce plus some minor adjustments in order to avoid a split and strive for an armistice?Based on limited materials, we considered the overall world situation, the needs of the country, and the actual situation that North Korea could no longer fight. We felt that instead of fighting for the 38th parallel and breaking up, it is better to consider a truce on the spot plus some possible adjustments to achieve an armistice. So as to strive for three to five years to prepare the strength of the time.Naturally, if the other party doesn't give up its ridiculous plan at all, we also feel that the only way is to break up.A few of us have limited vision and thought poorly, so please give us quick instructions so that we can follow them.

On the 13th, Mao Zedong pointed out in his reply to Li Kenong and sued Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai: (1) Judging from the contradictory situation of the enemy's publicity inside and outside the meeting these days, what the enemy is unwilling to accept is the 38th parallel, but he dare not disclose the military demarcation line and the non-military line that he proposes to go deep inside our front They only vaguely expressed their willingness to discuss the issue of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone based on the existing fronts and military situation, and make possible adjustments.It can be seen from this that the enemy's original proposal was only in exchange for my concession on the 38th parallel.As for the real target of the enemy, it is true that he wants to stop fighting on the spot and make minor adjustments. However, if he draws a line near the north and south of the 38th Parallel according to the terrain and military situation, that is, the east of the Linjin River is drawn north of the 38th Parallel. The west of the Linjin River is drawn to the south of the 38th Parallel, and the north and south areas are roughly equal, and the name is called the Military Demarcation Line. The enemy may be ready to accept it, but the enemy will not propose it himself, and always wants to lead us to propose an opposition to the 38th Parallel. In order to facilitate his bargaining, he said in the August 10 communique that we refused to discuss any demarcation line other than the 38th parallel, implying that he did not refuse to discuss it.Regarding such an idea, we are not sure yet. I hope our negotiating delegation will study it and ask Prime Minister Kim to consider it.

(2) With regard to the current negotiation strategy, you should focus on opposing the enemy's original plan, and make less mention of your own ideas, so as to force the enemy to answer your questions.In the debate, it is also possible not to repeat one's own claims, but to focus on refuting the enemy's plan and its vague claims.The purpose is to induce the enemy to abandon or revise its original plan, and as long as the other party expresses to discuss the issue of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone on the existing front, we should point out that the enemy's original plan is no longer valid, and ask the enemy to put forward specific proposals .Regardless of whether the enemy admits to abandoning or revising his original plan, or even proposes to draw a line on the existing front, at that time, you can propose the plan we telegraphed at 7 o'clock on August 11.In all probability, the enemy will still not accept it, but we should link the 38th parallel to the existing fronts in the debate, and also link the military demarcation line to the demilitarized zone, so as to provide for the next originally agreed compromise Make a foreshadowing article.Adopting such a negotiation strategy will lead the enemy to approach the plan envisaged by our side, and the enemy will lose the initiative in propaganda. In the next few days, the DPRK and Chinese delegations engaged in a war of words at the negotiating meeting. On the 15th, the United States suggested that each side should form a subcommittee with one representative and two assistants (including translators) to exchange views on the second agenda item (about the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone) in order to get rid of the deadlock at the delegation meeting .The North Korean and Chinese delegations were ready to agree.Li Kenong reported this to Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, and Peng Dehuai, and at the same time suggested that when the DPRK and China responded to this, they should announce the plan of Mao Zedong's telegram at 7 o'clock on the 11th.The delegation's proposal was approved.At the meeting on the 16th, the DPRK-China delegation continued to refute the original plan of the United States, pointing out that if the United States does not abandon the original plan and does not study the plan of the DPRK and China, no matter how the form of the negotiation is changed, it is impossible to make progress. It agreed in principle to form the subcommittee for this agenda item, and announced for the first time that the demilitarized zone bounded by the 38th Parallel could be adjusted according to the terrain and the opinions of the two sides. On the 17th, the two sides formed the second agenda subcommittee to continue discussing the issue of the military demarcation line. On the same day, Mao Zedong called Kim Il Sung and told Peng Dehuai and Li Kenong about the DPRK-China position on the military demarcation line. On the basis of the telegram to Li Kenong on the 13th, he further proposed how to link the 38th parallel with the existing front. Specific ideas linking the military demarcation line to the demilitarized zone, stating that: Unless the enemy's determination is broken, he can only get a concession on the 38th parallel and the truce on the spot.Therefore, we assume that if a line is drawn near the north and south of the 38th Parallel according to the terrain and military situation, that is, the east of the Linjin River is drawn to the north of the 38th Parallel, and the west of the Linjin River is drawn to the south of the 38th Parallel. And the name is the military demarcation line, don't mention the 38th line; the demilitarized area also uses this line as the baseline. The enemy from the east of the Linjin River retreats from the current position to this line and will not retreat. We stay at the current position. Go up neither retreat nor advance, our side west of the Linjin River retreats from the current position to this line and will not retreat again, the enemy neither retreats nor advances on the current position.In this way, in a political sense, this line is certainly not the 38th parallel, but it is still near the 38th parallel, and the north and south areas maintained by the two sides are roughly equal, and it will not restrict the political settlement of the North Korean issue in the future; in the military sense Said that the enemy can retreat near the Kansas defense line he planned, but we still hold our current position east of the Linjin River, and there is no need to retreat to the 38th parallel west of the Linjin River. It is also combined with the demilitarized zone... It is difficult for the enemy to basically oppose such a plan... If you agree to the above plan, our delegation will ask it to reach an agreement with the enemy in three steps during the negotiation process. Because in early June, when Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to negotiate with Mao Zedong and the United States for an armistice, he considered that the final result might be an on-the-spot armistice, so Kim Il Sung agreed. However, as Mao Zedong estimated in his telegram on the 13th, in the discussion of the subcommittee, the United States made an inch of progress. Not only was it not interested in the proposal announced by the DPRK-China delegation that the demilitarized zone bounded by the 38th parallel could be adjusted, but also The "compensation theory" of naval and air force superiority was brought up again.In view of this attitude of the US representative, Li Kenong decided that the DPRK and China will not make any further concessions during the negotiations. On the 18th, Deng Hua called Peng Dehuai in his own name and forwarded it to Mao Zedong. He put forward some considerations on the position of the DPRK and China on the military demarcation line. He believed that the success of the peace talks is beneficial to the overall situation, and it is the current correct policy of seeking truth from facts. ;Agreement should proceed from reality, based on the principle of fairness and reasonableness, and strive for the best deal with Chairman Mao on the 17th; .In this case, the current truce will not be a disadvantage to our side, because although the area west of the Linjin River and the south of the 38th parallel is small, it has a large population and wealth. The position is closer to Seoul, and it is easier to touch the enemy's back; this kind of plan, the opponent says it is an on-the-spot truce, but we can also say it is a truce adjusted by the 38th parallel area, because the east of the 38th parallel and the area north of it are the It is owned by the enemy, while the area to the west of the 38th parallel and the area south of it is ours; the general policy is established, and we do not need to worry too much about minor aspects; although we are considering going through two or three more battles to defeat the enemy across the 38th parallel , but based on the current equipment status of our army, can we fight it?The second is that even if you fight in the past, you will have to pay a heavy price.Therefore, we should try our best to negotiate a good deal this time, unless the enemy does not even accept a truce on the ground, and then fight resolutely. On the 22nd, after the DPRK-China delegation analyzed the negotiation situation, they called Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai in the name of the delegation, and pointed out that the other party opposed the 38th parallel plan. The main reason was political. We insisted on the 38th parallel plan. It is also based on political considerations. Since we are ready to give up the idea of ​​using the 38th parallel as a strict military demarcation line, we will allow the opposing troops to stay north of the 38th parallel. The adjustment plan does not seem to have much political significance, and once the other party proposes a truce on the spot, our side will fall into a passive position.In this way, we do not need to wait for the other party to abandon the original plan, but we can propose a slightly adjusted plan that is close to a truce on the spot, so that the other party has no excuse for delay.We will not suffer politically, economically, or militarily from this plan, and it can also be said to be based on the 38th Parallel. Anyway, everyone has their own opinions, and it is actually just a matter of saying what to say. However, on August 18, in order to cooperate with his delegation's negotiations, Ridgway exerted military pressure on the DPRK and China. He used his ground forces to launch a summer offensive against the Korean People's Army defending on the line from the North Han River to the east coast. Destroying North Korea's northern railway system was launched as the main goal of the "strangling war", and successive sabotage and provocations were created in the Kaesong neutral zone. On the 19th, armed agents were dispatched into the Kaesong Neutral Zone to attack the volunteer military police guarding the Kaesong Neutral Zone; on the night of the 22nd, U.S. planes strafed the residence of the DPRK-China delegation in the Kaesong negotiation venue area, and the U.S. representatives denied it in every possible way during the investigation.In view of this, on the 23rd, Mao Zedong called Li Kenong twice and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai, pointing out: This night attack by the enemy plane has a very clear meaning, and I must fight back resolutely without fear of rupture.Our side should propose to temporarily suspend the negotiation meeting today to suppress the enemy's arrogance.At the same time, our army should step up its military preparations to meet the enemy's possible attack.Accordingly, the DPRK and China announced that starting from August 23, the negotiating meeting will be suspended, pending the US side's responsible handling of the incident in which its aircraft shot down the North Korean and Chinese delegations on August 22. On the 25th, Mao Zedong called Li Kenong and sued Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai, pointing out that "the task of the delegation is to negotiate and engage in literary battles." At present, no matter whether the other party breaks up or delays the negotiation, I should make a fuss from a positive aspect and carry out favorable publicity Struggle, respond calmly, and take the initiative to fight to watch the changes. On the 27th, Mao Zedong called Stalin and estimated the future negotiation situation. He believed that there were two possible developments: "One is to delay the rupture. We are already stepping up preparations for the possible frontal military attack of the enemy. port landing". "Another possibility is that the enemy is looking for a way to turn the corner during the delay and seek a compromise on the issue of the military demarcation line. At present, we are preparing to conduct a propaganda war with the enemy during the suspension period to expose the enemy's shameless and indecent crimes of provocation." , When "the enemy expresses his intention to reopen negotiations, we intend to propose a turnaround method and urge him to accept it." On the 29th, Stalin replied and agreed.