Chapter 21 4. Zhou Enlai’s Operational Negotiation Guidance

The United States, through its ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kirk, found out from the Soviet government that Malik's speech on June 23 represented the views of the Soviet government, and instructed Ridgway to speak at 8:00 a.m. Tokyo time on June 30 with "United Nations Army In the name of the commander-in-chief, he issued a notice requesting armistice negotiations to the commanders of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army via radio."After receiving notification of your willingness to hold talks, I will appoint my representative and propose a date for a meeting between representatives of both parties. I propose that such a meeting be held on a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Port," the notice said.

Before Ridgway sent out the broadcast notice, the U.S. representative to the United Nations informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry of the content of the notice to be issued by Ridgway. After Kim Il-sung learned the content of the notice, he called Mao Zedong on June 30, thinking that Ridgway should be answered by radio. , agreed to hold a meeting with its representatives on the armistice negotiations, and drafted a draft reply to the notice, requesting that this draft be signed by both Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai. Without Peng Dehuai's signature, the Americans might think that this reply is meaningless .On the same day after Li Qiwei’s broadcast announcement was issued, Mao Zedong called Stalin and sent roughly the same content as Kim Il Sung’s prepared reply draft, asking for opinions, and asked Stalin to report his opinions directly to Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong. On July 1, in the names of Kim Il-sung, commander-in-chief of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's Volunteers, he responded to Ridgway's broadcast notice: "We agree to negotiate with you on the cessation of military operations and the establishment of peace. Representatives of the meeting. The meeting place, we suggest the Kaesong area on the 38th parallel line.”

Since then, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army have formed an armistice negotiating delegation in early July. The representatives of the Volunteer Army are Deputy Commander Deng Hua and Chief of Staff Jie Fang. Zhang Pingshan, chief of staff, and Nan Ri as the chief representative of the People's Army and the Volunteer Army.Although this armistice negotiation is a military negotiation with representatives sent by the commanders of both sides, due to the large number of countries participating in the war and the fact that the war itself was a product of the Cold War, and it was negotiated under a situation where the forces on the battlefield were evenly matched, the Volunteer Army and the People’s Army The main opponent of the negotiation is the representative of the US military who is pursuing power politics and trying to dominate the world. This negotiation itself is extremely political and has special arduousness and complexity.Therefore, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung attached great importance to this negotiation, and after consultations, a third-line negotiating team was established.The first-line team is composed of the negotiating delegation, which has a face-to-face confrontation with the "United Nations Army" delegation on the negotiating table; the second-line team is Li Kenong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Intelligence Department of the Central Military Commission, and Qiao Guanhua, Director of the International Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The front-line command of the armistice negotiations was formed to directly command from the front and put forward plans for daily negotiations.And formed a party committee of the Volunteer Army Negotiation Delegation with Li Kenong as the secretary and Deng Hua, Jie Fang, Qiao Guanhua, etc. as members.Li Kenong directly contacted Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kim Il Sung, and Peng Dehuai to report the situation and obtain relevant instructions.The third-line team was the highest decision-making group, which was jointly negotiated by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Kim Il-sung, and Stalin, and Peng Dehuai’s opinions were sought to determine the overall plan, guidelines, and principles of the negotiations, and to issue instructions in a timely manner according to the specific progress of the negotiations.Mao Zedong once suggested that Stalin should lead him personally, but most of the top decision-making instructions on negotiations were issued in the name of Mao Zedong, and a small part was issued in the name of Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai was in charge of telegrams on the problem and instructions to Li Kenong and the negotiating delegation.

After consultations between the two sides on the battlefield, on July 10, the delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers (hereinafter referred to as the “North Korea-China delegation”) and the “United Nations Army” delegation (hereinafter referred to as the “US delegation”) started a military battle in Kaesong. Korean Armistice Negotiations.The chief representative of the United States participating in the negotiations was Lieutenant General Turner Joy, Commander of the US Far East Navy, Major General Lawrence Kretch, Deputy Commander of the US Far East Air Force, Major General Henry Hodge, Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Eighth Army, and Vice Admiral of the US Far East Navy. Major General Alyn Burke, Chief of Staff, and Major General Baek Son Yeop, Commander of the 1st Army Corps in South Korea.

The emergence of the Korean armistice negotiation situation is the result of actual contests on the battlefield.The United States is forced to seek a negotiated solution to the issue, which is a manifestation of the US authorities' admission of failure in the Korean War.This acknowledgment, however, is haphazard and timid.Although the U.S. authorities seek to achieve a truce in North Korea through negotiations, they are unwilling to resolve the North Korean issue in a fair and reasonable manner.As Peng Dehuai said in September 1953 after the Korean armistice was achieved: "The Korean armistice negotiation is an unprecedented armistice negotiation. It is neither an armistice negotiation in which the imperialists conquered other countries and forced them to accept surrender conditions, nor It was not the truce negotiations in which the imperialists fought for peace and stalemate and had to compromise and carve up the colonies to achieve a short-lived peace. It was an imperialist who wanted to dominate the world and suffered from the young and emerging people's democracies in the war of aggression. After resisting and containing, they had to give up and reluctantly accept the truce negotiations. Obviously, the imperialists will not willingly accept such negotiations, and they are always trying to reverse the case." The US delegation showed that The haughty posture of the aggressor, therefore, made negotiations difficult from the outset.

Before the start of the armistice negotiations, Mao Zedong proposed a six-point draft agreement on July 5 to realize the Korean armistice after negotiating with Kim Il-sung and Stalin via telegrams, namely: 1. On ×month×day, 1951, the two sides simultaneously issued a ceasefire order, and the land, sea and air forces of both sides in North Korea ceased hostile actions against each other; 2. The land, sea and air forces of both sides will retreat 10 miles from the 38th parallel, and establish a demilitarized zone 10 miles north and south of the 38th parallel. The civil affairs in the demilitarized zone will be restored to the state before June 25, 1950. The north of the 38th parallel in the military zone is under the jurisdiction of the Korean People's Government, and the south of the 38th parallel is under the jurisdiction of the South Korean government;

3. The two sides stop the transfer of weapons and equipment from outside the DPRK to the DPRK, and the transfer or replenishment of personnel; 4. Within 3 months of the cessation of military operations, the two sides will exchange all prisoners of war in batches; 5. All non-Korean foreign troops (including the Chinese People's Volunteers) withdraw from North Korea in batches within 2 to 3 months; 6. North and South Korean refugees should return to their original residence within 4 months. According to these six plans, Li Kenong drafted the speeches that Nam Il and Deng Hua were going to make at the first negotiating meeting. In the speech at the first meeting, three suggestions were put forward whose contents were roughly the same as those of the above-mentioned six proposals, namely:

First, on the basis of mutual agreement, both sides ordered the cessation of hostile military operations at the same time. The army stopped attacking, attacking and reconnaissance against each other; the navy stopped bombing, blocking and reconnaissance against each other;Obviously, the ceasefire between the two sides can not only reduce the loss of life and property, but also be the first step in putting out the war in North Korea. Second, to determine the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, the armed forces of both sides should withdraw 10 kilometers from the 38th parallel at the same time, and complete it within a certain time limit.The area where the two sides have withdrawn is the demilitarized zone, and neither side will station armed forces or conduct any military operations.The civil affairs here have been restored to the original state before June 25, 1950.At the same time, negotiations on the exchange of prisoners should be carried out immediately, so that the prisoners from various countries can return to their hometowns and reunite with their families as soon as possible.

Third, all foreign troops should be withdrawn in the shortest possible time. Once the foreign troops have withdrawn, there will be a basic guarantee for the cessation of the Korean War and the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. Deng Hua, a representative of the Chinese People's Volunteers, spoke in full support of the three proposals put forward by Nam Il, pointing out: "The ceasefire between the two sides fighting in North Korea, the determination of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between the two sides, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops are in line with the Korean people, the Chinese people and The wishes and demands of the people of the world. We believe that the three proposals put forward by representatives of the Korean People's Army are the premise and basis for stopping the Korean War and peacefully resolving the Korean issue."

The U.S. authorities imposed strict restrictions on Ridgway's negotiations on the battlefield, and asked Lidgway to be careful not to involve politics, not only not to mention Taiwan's intentions and the issue of Communist China's seat in the United Nations, but also not to mention the 38th parallel. It needs to be considered during political negotiations.Therefore, after Nam Il and Deng Hua's speeches, the chief representative of the United States, Joey, repeatedly stated at the negotiating meeting that this negotiating meeting will only discuss military issues related to North Korea, and will not discuss political or economic issues, nor will it discuss issues that have nothing to do with North Korea. It also said that the three proposals from the DPRK and China contained political issues, but did not specify them.At the same time, they put forward the agenda to be negotiated first, and put forward 9 agenda plans they had prepared in advance, namely:

1. Adoption of the agenda; 2. The location of the prisoner-of-war camps and the right of the ICRC to visit them; 3. Negotiations are limited to military issues related to North Korea; 4. Cessation of North Korean military actions under conditions sufficient to ensure that no hostile military action will take place in North Korea; 5. Reach an agreement on the demilitarized zone across North Korea; 6. The composition, powers and functions of the Military Armistice Commission; 7. The principle of agreement to establish a military observation group under the Armistice Commission and conduct inspections in North Korea; 8. Functions of military observation teams; 9. Arrangements for prisoners of war. The DPRK-China delegation believes that the 9-item agenda proposed by the United States, the 1st item is a procedural issue, the 2nd item is not within the scope of this negotiation, the 3rd item has no practical significance, and the 4th to 9th items are the content to be discussed , This has been included in the three proposals put forward by the DPRK and China, but the US side neither raised the issue of the 38th parallel nor the issue of troop withdrawal.After research, the North Korean and Chinese delegations proposed an agenda plan including five items based on the three suggestions made by Nam Il for the U.S. plan, namely: 1. Adoption of the agenda; 2. As a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in North Korea, the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between the two sides and the establishment of a demilitarized zone; 3. Withdrawal of all foreign troops from North Korea; 4. Specific arrangements for ceasefire and truce in North Korea; 5. Regarding the arrangement of prisoners of war after the armistice. Li Kenong telegraphed the content of these five agenda items to Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai at noon that day.The DPRK and Chinese delegations proposed the above-mentioned five-item agenda plan after pointing out the confusion of the U.S. plan and the lack of distinction between priorities at the negotiation meeting in the afternoon of the same day. In the ensuing discussion on the agenda, the U.S. delegation made some excuses for their own proposed nine-item plan and changed it to four.According to the established policy of the U.S. authorities not to discuss the issue of the 38th parallel or the withdrawal of foreign troops, the U.S. delegation only raised general issues on the agenda, without discussing the specific demarcation line and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Under the pretext that the issue is a political issue, we resolutely refuse to include the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops on the agenda and to include the words 38th Parallel in the agenda. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Kim Il Sung all believed that realizing the Korean armistice with the 38th parallel as the boundary is the fundamental issue to be resolved in this negotiation, but the words 38th parallel can not appear in the agenda, leaving the specific discussion of the military demarcation line Let me bring up the question again, if the issue of the 38th Parallel can be resolved, then the issue of withdrawing foreign troops can be left to be resolved after the Korean armistice as the second step in solving the issue of North Korea and the Far East.And on July 14, Stalin's consent was obtained. On July 15, a telegram drafted by Zhou Enlai to Li Kenong and to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai was sent in the name of Mao Zedong, stating: We have taken the initiative in the negotiation, and after several trials and debates, we can propose our The new 5-item agenda (the main change is that the word 38th Parallel does not appear), but only after the other party agrees to withdraw all foreign troops from North Korea on the agenda, we agree to consider other agenda items. On the 16th, Peng Dehuai pointed out in a telegram to Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang and to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung: "The most basic issue of principle in the peace talks is to withdraw all foreign troops from North Korea within a time limit; Line as the boundary, restore the state before June 25, 1950. Our insistence on the issue of basic principles is "justified and justified", and it is reasonable to insist that all foreign troops withdraw from North Korea; take the 38th parallel as the boundary There are restraints; striving for an early end to the war is beneficial to the people of the DPRK and China. However, the peace talks may not necessarily go smoothly, and may encounter many difficulties, even a tortuous process, and may require serious military struggles. No matter what No matter how many difficulties there are in the negotiation, insist on an amicable reasoning attitude, and attribute the responsibility for the breakdown to the other party." Accordingly, at the negotiation meeting on the 16th, the DPRK and China delegations agreed to only raise the issue of determining the military demarcation line in order to establish a demilitarized zone in the agenda, and leave it to the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line when discussing the military demarcation line in detail. , and focused his speech on the withdrawal of foreign troops.However, the United States did not back down on the issue of withdrawing foreign troops during the negotiations, which brought the negotiations on the agenda issue to a stalemate. On July 20, Li Kenong telegraphed the negotiations to Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Peng Dehuai, and believed that: Judging from the speeches made by the U.S. representatives at previous meetings and Acheson’s statement on the 19th that U.S. troops would not withdraw from North Korea, The United States is unlikely to make concessions on the withdrawal of foreign troops from North Korea.Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai believed that, judging from the talks between Kennan and Malik, the attitude of the United States during the armistice negotiations, and the overall situation in the Far East, "the enemy only intends to stop the war in Korea and avoid further damage and delay in the war. As for everything else Issues include withdrawal from North Korea, and the enemy intends to continue the current tense situation." We agreed to negotiate a cessation of military operations at the 38th parallel because "our armed forces today can only drive the enemy out of North Korea, but The enemy cannot be driven out of South Korea. If the war is protracted, it will consume the enemy even more, but it will also cause us a great financial crisis, and it will be difficult to increase national defense. If it is delayed for a longer period, Assuming that the enemy can be driven out of South Korea within half a year to eight months, we are still willing to pay the price of this crisis, but we cannot see this possibility now.”If the negotiation breaks down now, we will fight for a few more months. We have the ability to fight all the enemies to the south of the 38th parallel. At that time, the enemy may still refuse to withdraw foreign troops from North Korea. If the negotiation breaks down again, the war will end. It will take a long time to delay.Originally, Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung had considered leaving the issue of withdrawing foreign troops to be resolved after the Korean armistice. In this way, "instead of engaging in a long-term war with no results in the future for the withdrawal of troops, it is better not to make the withdrawal of troops a condition that must be resolved immediately in the armistice negotiations." , and according to what Comrade Malik said, the 38th parallel armistice is the first step to peacefully resolve the Korean issue, and the issue of withdrawing troops from North Korea will be reserved for discussion after the armistice.” On the 20th, Zhou Enlai drafted and sent Mao Zedong’s telegram to Stalin , and consulted Stalin for the above considerations.The next day, Stalin replied, agreeing with China's point of view, and pointed out: You can use the issue of troop withdrawal during the negotiations, on the one hand to show that you love peace, and on the other hand to expose that the enemy does not want to speed up the peace process. On the 22nd, Mao Zedong called for Kim Il Sung's opinion.Kim Il Sung also agreed. On the 23rd, Mao Zedong instructed Li Kenong and told Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai: "The truce negotiations should still focus on the withdrawal of troops from the 38th Parallel and the truce to achieve a peaceful solution to the North Korean issue. As for the withdrawal of foreign countries from North Korea, The issue of the army may be agreed to be left to another meeting after the armistice and not included in the agenda of this meeting." And instructed that the delegation issue a statement at the negotiating meeting, "State that we insist on guaranteeing It is a great pity that the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the reason that the armistice cannot be separated from the fact that there will be no more hostile military actions, but after consultations at eight meetings, the other party has not been able to get the attention and consent of the other side on this issue. Now In order to seek an early conclusion of an armistice agreement, to realize the initial aspirations of the peace-loving people in the world, and to open the way for soldiers from various countries to return home, we would like to agree not to include the discussion of the withdrawal of foreign troops on the agenda of this meeting , but we propose to add a fifth item 'Other issues related to the armistice' in addition to the four agreed items on the agenda." Li Kenong was asked to prepare a statement and telegraph it to Beijing. The negotiations were adjourned for 3 days because the bridge in Panmunjom was destroyed by a flood in North Korea.The North Korean and Chinese delegations issued a statement at the negotiating meeting on the 25th, agreeing not to include the withdrawal of foreign troops in the negotiating agenda, but to add item 5 of the agenda, which is to "propose matters to the governments of the two countries concerned."In this way, the United States can no longer object.After half a month of hard work by the DPRK and China, the negotiating parties reached an agreement on the agenda on July 26: 1. Adoption of the agenda; 2. Determine the military demarcation line to establish the demilitarized zone; 3. Specific arrangements for realizing the ceasefire and truce; 4. Arrangements for captives; 5. Suggest matters to the relevant governments of both parties.