Chapter 20 3. The Volunteers are still preparing for protracted combat

Because the first three battles were fought relatively smoothly, among the volunteer troops, even among the middle and senior commanders, the idea of ​​underestimating the enemy and quick victory was relatively common, and they lacked sufficient understanding and preparation for the long-term nature of the war.After the fourth and fifth battles, especially the fifth battle, I saw that the war could not end in a short period of time. At the same time, due to the busy combat, the troops also lacked in-depth and systematic education for long-term combat.After the fifth battle, the 3rd, 9th, and 19th Corps all required the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to clarify the future combat policy and conduct necessary ideological and political education.

The Party Committee of the Volunteer Army has also considered this. On May 26, 1951, after being approved by Peng Dehuai, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army sent a telegram to the Central Committee and reported to Gao Gang, asking for instructions: "In order to solve the above-mentioned problems of the troops and facilitate future operations, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army plans to hold a high-level meeting in mid-June if the situation permits. The cadres will discuss the following three issues: 1. Explain the situation of the Korean War and establish a long-term combat concept. 2. Summarize the military experience of entering North Korea and determine military guidelines. 3. Implement the instructions of the party committee on supply, streamline the organization, and cancel Unnecessary levels, reducing non-combatants. The meeting adopts the form of a joint meeting of cadres from the Chinese and North Korean armies. It is planned to use our army as the main force and invite comrades from the North Korean side to participate... For this meeting, I hope the central government can send people to guide, and I hope that the central government will Give instructions on the development of the situation in the Korean War and the principles and tasks of our army, so that they can be followed.” On June 1, the Central Military Commission replied, agreeing that the Volunteer Army should hold a high-level meeting to discuss the three proposed issues.

Mao Zedong summed up the experience of the Volunteer Army's five battles, and called Peng Dehuai on May 26, proposing the policy of fighting a small war of annihilation against the US and British troops.Mao Zedong pointed out in this telegram: Previous battles have proved that it is difficult for our army to achieve the mission of annihilation by encircling several divisions of the US military, or an entire division, or even an entire regiment by encircling a large strategic or operational detour.This is because the U.S. military still has a strong fighting will and self-confidence at present.In order to defeat the enemy's self-confidence and achieve the goal of encircling and annihilating in the end, it is advisable not to be too ambitious in each battle. It is only required that each army of our army wipe out an entire battalion of the US and British troops in one battle, at most two Entire battalion is enough.Now we have eight armies on the front line, and each army has wiped out an entire battalion of the enemy. There are eight entire battalions in total, and this has dealt a great blow to the enemy.If each army can wipe out two entire battalions of the enemy each time, for a total of sixteen entire battalions, the blow to the enemy will be even greater.If this is not possible, it is more appropriate to require each army to wipe out only one entire battalion of the enemy at a time.That is to say, fighting against the U.S. and British troops is different from fighting against the puppet troops. When fighting against the puppet troops, a large strategic or campaign encirclement can be carried out, while against the U.S. and British troops, such a large encirclement should not be carried out within a few months, but only a small tactical encirclement. , that is, each army only carefully selects one battalion or a little more of the enemy's battalion each time as its target, and encircles and annihilates them all.In this way, if three or four more battles are fought, that is, three or four whole battalions of each American and British division will be completely wiped out, and their morale will definitely be lowered and their confidence will definitely be shaken. division, or two or three whole division plans.In the past when we fought against Chiang Kai-shek's New First Army, New Sixth Army, Fifth Army, Eighteenth Army and the Seventh Army of the Guangxi clique, it was through this process of annihilation from small battles to major wars of annihilation.The five campaigns since our army entered the DPRK have completed some of the journey of this small war of annihilation, but it is not enough. We still need to go through several battles before we can complete the stage of the small war of annihilation and enter the stage of the major war of annihilation.As for the location of the attack, as long as the enemy is willing to advance, the more north the better, as long as it does not exceed the Pyongyang and Wonsan lines.

On the 27th, when Mao Zedong met with Jie Fang, Chief of Staff of the Volunteer Army, and Chen Geng, Commander of the Volunteer Army's 3rd Corps (who has not yet arrived), he vividly described the above-mentioned policy of fighting small annihilation wars as "zero-knocking brown sugar."Mao Zedong's policy on fighting a small war of annihilation was put forward based on the characteristics of the weapons and equipment of both the enemy and ourselves on the battlefield, and the actual situation of fighting with the volunteers. On the 27th, Mao Zedong notified the contents of this telegram to Stalin.Stalin apparently misunderstood the telegram.In his reply to Mao Zedong on the 29th, he believed that Mao Zedong's policy was "adventurous" and could easily be seen through by the US and British troops. "It is not convincing to use Chiang Kai-shek's army as an analogy." , and establish a line of defense, you will pay huge losses if you break through the line of defense.He suggested: "It seems that you are going to prepare for a major battle. The purpose is of course not for local maneuvers, but to deal a heavy blow to the US and British forces."

Mao Zedong and the Chinese People's Volunteers did not accept Stalin's suggestion, but based on the actual situation of the war, they educated and deployed the troops according to the policy of small annihilation wars. Because the attack of the "United Nations Army" had not stopped at that time, the battle on the battlefield was still relatively tense, and a meeting could not be convened.In order to implement Mao Zedong's instruction, and according to the equipment and supply situation of the Volunteer Army, Peng Dehuai drafted a letter to Jin Xiong, the front-line commander of the People's Army, on May 30.In this letter, the "three to six months combat policy" was proposed, pointing out that: in the absence of special circumstances, the Volunteers will not organize a full-scale large-scale campaign against the US and British forces in the next three months, but use the corps as a unit Continue to carry out small battles, and strive to wipe out an entire battalion of the US and British troops per month on average. In this way, within 3 to 6 months, the fighting will of the US and British troops will gradually decrease, and the objective conditions for large-scale annihilation of the US and British troops will be reduced. will mature and communicate overall field deployment and operational requirements.Peng Dehuai first sent the draft letter to Mao Zedong.When Mao Zedong received this letter, Kim Il Sung was about to come to Beijing to discuss the war situation and policy issues with Mao Zedong, so Mao Zedong instructed that this letter should not be sent for the time being. On June 2, Peng Dehuai forwarded this letter to the second-line armies of the Volunteer Army, the Volunteer Air Force, and the Volunteer Army's logistics department, requesting that the work be arranged according to this, and at the same time solicit opinions.

After Deng Hua and his party returned to the Volunteer Army from Beijing, the battlefield situation has basically stabilized. From June 25 to 27, an enlarged meeting of the Volunteer Army Party Committee (also known as the June Senior Cadre Meeting) was presided over by Peng Dehuai. Ministers and political commissars attended the meeting.The North Korean side sent Park Il-woo to attend the meeting.Peng Dehuai made an important speech at the meeting, Deng Hua made a report, and conveyed the guidelines of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on "fully preparing for protracted warfare and striving for peace talks to end the war", as well as various important decisions of the Central Committee on the volunteer army's operations. The spirit of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the issue of preparing for armistice negotiations with the enemy, regardless of whether the negotiations are successful or not, the Volunteers must not relax in any way, and must be resolutely prepared to fight for a long time.Negotiation issues are directly under the control and guidance of the central government, and the volunteers just fight and don’t talk. Therefore, the enlarged meeting of the volunteer army’s party committee summed up the combat situation of the volunteers in the past eight months, and focused on implementing the central government’s policy on protracted combat and Various important decisions (later summarized as the policy of "protracted combat and active defense").

The meeting held that due to "subjective and objective conditions, and the proof of five battles, it is impossible to think about destroying several divisions of the US and British forces at present. It is difficult to end the Korean War until the main force of the US and British forces is not wiped out." Therefore, it is necessary to deplete the enemy considerably and buy time to speed up the necessary preparations of our army so as to gradually change the subjective and objective situation before we can annihilate the enemy in large numbers.” "Wars cannot be resolved quickly, and our combat guidance must follow the instructions of the central government, and we must have long-term plans and implement the policy of steady and steady warfare" and "adopt the policy of protracted warfare."In order to implement the policy of protracted combat, the meeting decided:

First, about the combat area.In accordance with the guidelines of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on "full preparation for protracted warfare and striving for peace talks to end the war" and Mao Zedong's instructions, "Under the condition that the enemy does not increase troops in front of the enemy and does not land on the rear, we must adhere to the 38th parallel to 38.5 degree line".Adhere to this area, which can not only maintain the position of North Korea, but also facilitate the concentration and mobile forces of the Volunteers; this area is large in mountains, and most of them are located in the upper reaches of rivers, and the terrain is favorable to us; the transportation line is short, which can reduce the difficulty of supply; and It is beneficial to prevent the "United Nations Army" from carrying out a side-rear landing attack.According to the supply capacity, the front should not be stretched far. Mao Zedong instructed, "Until the 38th parallel, don't cross the Nanhan River and Zhaoyang River, which will increase your own difficulties. The counterattack must be steady, and you cannot fight twice at once. Further consolidate and prepare When you are done, fight again. If you don’t hit too far once, it will prevent the enemy from coming back.” Fighting to the 38th parallel is not only beneficial to supply, but also politically beneficial.Hold on to the banner of peace to loosen and divide the enemy camp.

Second, about the arrangement and use of troops.The Korean battlefield is narrow and the coastline is long, so that the number of troops is too small to be sufficient, and the number of troops is too large to be deployed, and supply is also difficult.Therefore, according to operational needs and transportation and supply capabilities, in addition to special forces, 18 armies will be divided into two batches to take turns to fight.Nine armies were deployed on the front line to fight frontally, nine armies on the second line were placed on the east and west coasts and mobile areas to perform coastal defense and maneuver tasks, and two armies were placed in Northeast China as the general reserve of the Volunteer Army.The first and second line troops take turns every three months or so.Each army maintains a supplementary regiment of 3,000 people to train the recruits mobilized in the country. In addition to a major supplement for each campaign, it can also be supplemented at any time. Each division maintains a teaching team and selects the backbone of the squad for training to facilitate the campaign Replenish afterward to keep troops intact.Generally speaking, the principle of the troops entering North Korea is to persevere to the end. However, the Korean War was cruel and difficult, with heavy casualties, short intervals between battles, and difficulty in recruiting veterans and cadres. Therefore, it is difficult for troops that have persisted for more than one year to recover their combat effectiveness in a short period of time due to heavy casualties. Or they can be transferred back to the country and replaced with new troops.In this way, the combination of rotation and shift change can more effectively persist in the protracted war on the Korean battlefield.

Third, on the way of fighting.According to the situation on the battlefield, in the future, the mobile combat method of striding forward and retreating will be greatly reduced, and it will not be easy to stick to one place and attack the enemy's strong positions.Therefore, the future combat method will be a kind of tug-of-war combining mobile defense and counterattack, that is, a combat method combining active defense and short assault.Adopt zigzag or electro-optical deep equipment, use favorable terrain, build strong fortifications, and guard the forward position with a small number of troops.When the enemy is attacking, our army will take the initiative to shrink, not to live and die with the position, and use counter-charge and tactical counterattack to repel the enemy and regain the lost position.Dealing with the enemy in this way, after the enemy has been weakened and consumed to a certain extent, choose its salient or weak part to carry out a campaign counterattack to annihilate the enemy.Strategically, we can fight the enemy to the end.If the enemy does not attack, the volunteers will find the enemy's weak points and launch an attack on the basis of full preparation.

Fourth, the general principles of combat guidance: 1. Advance steadily if you have a position, and don’t rush forward; 2. Take turns and wipe out the enemy one by one; 3. Repeatedly seesaw, gradually consuming the enemy’s vital strength; 4. Make necessary preparations to fight again , do not fight hastily and unprepared battles; 5. From small strikes to small strikes, "zero strikes on brown sugar", fight small annihilation battles, and strive to gradually develop into large-scale fights; 6. Concentrate superior forces and firepower, and focus on pinching the enemy; 7. Be flexible and do what is within your capabilities; 8. Closely combine offense and defense with a two-pronged approach; 9. Strategy is a protracted war, and defensive campaigns and battles are also protracted wars, but offensive and counterattack campaigns and battles must be quick-decision battles; 10. Develop guerrilla attacks behind enemy lines War, cooperate with frontal combat; 11. Vigorously carry out the work of the enemy army and disintegrate the enemy army.General guiding principles for counterattack campaigns were also identified. The meeting pointed out that after five battles, "Although the beast of the US imperialism was seriously injured on the battlefield, it still has the strength to bite us back, and it is insidious and cunning, ready to bite us hard at any time." Therefore, it is completely wrong and naive for us to wait for victory without going through arduous, complicated, protracted and tenacious struggles, or to win casually. Especially if we do not raise our vigilance a hundredfold and pay attention to the This kind of conspiracy and sweet talk will be fooled by imperialism. Only we have the greatest courage and perseverance, a high degree of wit and flexibility, survive the most difficult and difficult process, and find a favorable opportunity to give this wounded Only when the wild beast takes a heavy blow will it retreat in the face of difficulties and die down. Only then will the final victory come and peace will be guaranteed." In accordance with the CPC Central Committee's strategic policy of "full preparation for protracted warfare and striving for peace talks to end the war", as well as some guidelines and principles determined by the enlarged meeting of the Volunteer Army Party Committee, the domestic and volunteer forces have made various preparations. First, extensively carry out education in establishing long-term combat thinking among the troops.Because the first three battles were fought relatively smoothly, the idea of ​​underestimating the enemy and quick victory has generally appeared in the troops, and because of the passivity of the fourth battle and the incomplete victory of the fifth battle, the army has generally grown tired of the long-term war. , Difficult thoughts and emotions.Some cadres were depressed, "thinking that without the cooperation of aircraft, artillery, and tanks, it would be difficult or even impossible to annihilate the enemy in large numbers. There is general concern that future operations will be more difficult, especially that supply difficulties will not be resolved, and they doubt the future of victory in the war.In order to solve these problems, after the enlarged meeting of the Volunteer Army Party Committee, the education of establishing long-term combat ideology was generally carried out among the volunteers. Explain the nature of war, its prospects, the conditions of the enemy and ourselves, strategic principles, and methods of combat, etc., and on the basis of this idea, carry forward revolutionary heroism, enhance confidence in victory, and overcome the mood of quick victory."After the education of each unit, profound changes have taken place in their thinking. After the fifth battle, the 3rd and 19th Corps, which had relatively large ideological fluctuations, improved significantly. The troops actively demanded to fight again. Confidence to win. Second, strengthen the leadership of the volunteer army.When the Volunteer Army entered North Korea to participate in the war, because the troops were based on the 13th Corps, the leaders of the Volunteer Army, except Commander Peng Dehuai, were all members of the 13th Corps. Entering North Korea to participate in the war, on the one hand, the number of troops increased, and the leadership of the Volunteer Army was insufficient. On the other hand, the various units of the Volunteer Army used to belong to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Army and the North China Military Region. They had their own characteristics in command and combat. Command terminology is also inconsistent.In order to strengthen the leadership of the Volunteer Army and coordinate the command of various units, Deputy Commander Deng Hua suggested to Commander Peng Dehuai, the General Cadre Department of the Military Commission, and Chairman Mao Zedong before the fifth battle that Chen Geng should be appointed as the first deputy commander and first deputy commander of the Volunteer Army. The deputy political commissar assisted Commander Peng, with Song Shilun as the second deputy commander and commander of the 9th Corps, and himself (Deng Hua) as the third deputy commander and commander of the 13th Corps, and suggested that a full-time The deputy political commissar or deputy director of the Political Department, and other leaders of the original 13th Corps who served as leaders of the Volunteer Army, either returned to the 13th Corps or transferred to other leaders of the Corps.Before the end of the fifth battle, Commander Peng Dehuai called Chairman Mao Zedong on May 27, asking for instructions, "For the convenience of contacting the field armies, the Zhi Division should add Chen Geng as the second deputy commander and Song Shilun as the third deputy commander." On June 1, the Central Military Commission approved the request.Soon after, Gan Siqi was appointed as the deputy political commissar and director of the Volunteer Army's Political Department, Du Ping was re-appointed as the deputy director of the Volunteer Army's Political Department, Zhang Wenzhou acted as the chief of staff of the Volunteer Army (the former chief of staff Xie Fang was the Volunteer Army negotiator), and Wang Zhengzhu was the deputy chief of staff of the Volunteer Army. Third, strengthen logistics construction.In order to strengthen the logistics work of the Volunteer Army, after a logistics work meeting was held in January 1951 to study and solve some problems, on May 3, the Volunteer Army Party Committee issued a special instruction, pointing out that "war is a competition of manpower and material resources, especially for those with high-tech equipment. If there is no minimum supply of supplies, it is impossible to defeat the enemy.” He emphasized that logistics work “is the most important part of all our work in the current period” and instructed party committees at all levels to “strengthen the leadership of logistics.” , List it as the first item on the agenda, often study the logistics situation, and solve difficult problems in a timely manner", requiring the army, division, and regiment to designate a suitable deputy to be responsible for the logistics work at this level.In the instruction, it was decided to send the logistics department of the Northeast Military Region to the front logistics headquarters of the Volunteer Army to "reorganize into the Volunteer Army Logistics Command, which is responsible for the management of all matters such as supply, transportation, and sanitation of the entire army," and reported it to the Military Commission for approval. On May 19, the Central Military Commission made a special decision to establish the Volunteer Army Rear Service Command.Subsequently, the Central Military Commission appointed Hong Xuezhi, the deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, as the commander of the rear service command, Zhou Chunquan, the former head of the front logistics command, as the political commissar of the rear service command, Zhang Mingyuan as the deputy commander, and Du Zheheng as the deputy political commissar.From then on, under the leadership of the Rear Service Command, the Volunteer Army began to comprehensively strengthen logistics construction, such as the construction of a military station transportation network, and changed the original organic supply system to a division-based supply to the army and below the army. supply system etc. Fourth, negotiate with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to unify the management of railway transportation in North Korea during wartime.In order to ensure the supply and transportation of combat materials for the Volunteer Army and the People’s Army, on May 4, 1951, the Chinese and North Korean governments negotiated and signed the "Agreement on Wartime Military Control of the Korean Railway". Must be placed under unified military control for unified command of rail transport.The agreement stipulates: "Under the leadership of the Joint Command, the China-North Korea Joint Railway Transport Command will be established in Shenyang to unify the planning and command of wartime Korean railway transportation, repair and protection." "Under the leadership of the Joint Railway Military Transport Command , set up the General Administration of Railway Military Management in North Korea, which is responsible for the implementation of military management, transportation, repair, maintenance and protection of North Korea's railways." Three people served as deputy commanders and deputy political commissars. The director of the General Administration of Military Affairs was appointed by a Chinese comrade, and each of the DPRK and China sent one person to serve as the deputy director general.” In addition, the troops of the Railway Corps and the North Korean Railway Restoration Command were also unified under the Joint Railway Transportation Command and the General Administration of Railway Military Management.The agreement also stipulates in detail the organizational setup and specific responsibilities of the Joint Railway Military Transport Command and the General Administration of Railway Military Management. According to this agreement, China and North Korea began to prepare for the establishment of the Joint Railway Military Transport Command and the Railway Military Administration in June, and formally formed the two organizations in early August.He Jinnian, deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region, concurrently serves as commander of the Joint Railway Military Transport Command, Zhang Mingyuan, secretary-general of the Northeast Bureau, serves as political commissar, and Liu Juying, Nan Xuelong (North Korean side), Jin Huangyi (North Korean side), Li Shouxuan, and Ye Lin serve as deputy commanders Members, Cui Tianmin and Su Shangxian (North Korea) served as deputy political commissars, and Liu Juying was also the director of the General Administration of Railways.At this time, the railway repair force consisted of 4 divisions and 1 regiment of the Volunteer Army Railway Corps, and 1 North Korean railway engineering brigade. Fifth, build an airport in North Korea and prepare the air force for operations in North Korea.In order to enable the air force to participate in the war as soon as possible, and to use the airport in North Korea as a base as soon as possible to cooperate with the ground forces in combat, in addition to the establishment of the China-North Korea Air Force Joint Command through consultation between China and North Korea, Liu Zhen served as the commander, and Chang Qiankun and Wang Lian (North Korea) He served as the deputy commander, unified command of the Chinese and North Korean air forces, and completed actual combat exercises with a division of the Volunteer Air Force under the leadership of the Soviet Air Force. After Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung agreed, the construction of an airport in North Korea has begun. The first batch of volunteers Responsible for repairing four airports in the south of Anju and north of Pyongyang, including Yongrou, Namyangri, Sunan, and Suncheon. The North Korean side also repaired several airports in Pyongyang and Meilin.After Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Stalin negotiated, the Soviet Union agreed to provide steel plates for the metal runways of the two airports. From early April to mid-September, four armies of the Volunteer Army successively undertook the task of building the above-mentioned airport. At the beginning of September, the 23rd Corps, with Dong Qiwu as the commander, Gao Kelin as the political commissar, Yao as the deputy commander, and Pei Zhouyu as the director of the Political Department, led 4 divisions of the 36th Army and the 37th Army into the DPRK. Sichuan, Yuanli, Nanshi 3 new airport tasks. At the same time, 3 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 1 regiment and 3 battalions are responsible for the air defense task of airport construction. After mid-August, the Soviet Union also sent five anti-aircraft artillery regiments to undertake the air defense mission of the airport construction in Anzhou. (The first batch of 4 airports were completed successively from mid-July to mid-September; the 3 airports built by the 23rd Corps were completed at the end of October. However, after the repairs were completed, the US military planes came to bomb, and then repaired after the bombing. Repeatedly , so these airports have never been used.) While building the airport, the country is also accelerating the expansion and training of the air force. By mid-June 1951, 20 aviation divisions had been established, including 16 fighter divisions, 2 bomber divisions, and 2 attack aircraft divisions.There are 2 fighter pilot divisions equipped with MiG-15 fighters (100 planes in total) and 2 bomber pilot divisions (60 Tu-2 planes) that can be dispatched to participate in the battle, and 2 attack pilots and 4 fighter pilot divisions can barely be dispatched fight.Three and a half of the four fighter divisions that are barely capable of combat operations are equipped with relatively backward MiG-9 and La-11 fighter jets. Under the leadership of Soviet instructors, these fighter divisions were gradually converted into MiG-15 fighters. It is planned that 8 MiG-15 fighter divisions will be put into combat after September. Sixth, strengthen and improve weapons and equipment.As early as May, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China entrusted Xu Xiangqian, who went to the Soviet Union to recuperate from his illness, to negotiate with the Soviet side on the issue of military orders. On June 10, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China entrusted Gao Gang to go to Moscow to discuss the situation of the Korean War with Stalin, he brought a specific order list, that is, to order weapons and equipment for 60 divisions from the Soviet military loan. In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Soviet Union was required to Fang first provided the equipment of 10 divisions (including tanks and artillery urgently needed on the battlefield) before the end of 1951, and the rest were provided in batches from 1952 to 1954, with Stalin's consent.Later, in order to solve the urgent needs of the Volunteers for combating anti-aircraft weapons and artillery shells in North Korea, Mao Zedong and Stalin negotiated through telegram exchanges. In addition to 60 divisions, they provided additional 120 85mm caliber anti-aircraft guns, 2.2925 million rounds of various artillery shells, and anti-aircraft guns. 100,000 tank grenades and 1,056 artillery and tractor tires were provided before the end of 1951, and the provision of equipment for 56 of the 60 divisions was postponed for half a year.In addition, Stalin called Mao Zedong twice on May 22 and 26, pointing out that because the Soviet Union failed to provide China with more MiG-15 aircraft in the past, he estimated that the MiG-9 aircraft could rival the best of the United States. Jet fighters, this is a mistake now, and the responsibility for this mistake should be borne by the Soviet Union. As an action to correct this mistake, the Soviet Union provided 372 MiG-15 fighter jets to China free of charge (only for transportation fees). To refit China's six MiG-9 fighter divisions, the first batch of 72 aircraft arrived in China before June 20, and the remaining 300 aircraft arrived in China in batches before the end of August.In addition, China and the Soviet Union agreed that China would order 6,000 Soviet vehicles from the Soviet Union's military loans at market prices, and provide them in the second half of 1951. Seventh, form a guerrilla detachment and prepare to fight behind enemy lines.In this way, it is possible to contain, disperse, consume, and strike the enemy behind the enemy, and cooperate with the frontal volunteer army and the main force of the people's army in strategy and campaign. This issue has been considered as early as the first battle of the Volunteers in North Korea.Peng Dehuai pointed out at the enlarged meeting of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army on November 13, 1950: "Guerrilla warfare is an indispensable part of our army's current operations. The enemy has planes to fly to the rear of our army to scout our army, destroy traffic, and bomb our supplies, so that I can't eat. However, the lack of ammunition replenishment has added to our difficulties. We now have no aircraft to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage the enemy's rear transportation. Therefore, we must have active guerrilla warfare, attack and destroy enemy rear transportation, disperse the enemy's forces, reconnaissance the enemy's situation, and directly Cooperate in operations." "Going to South Korea to open up guerrilla warfare behind the enemy's battlefield is of great strategic significance. If the enemy-occupied area is reduced and the area occupied by us is expanded, manpower and material resources will be protected, and our own strength will be saved; Weaken the enemy's human and material resources, strategically disperse the enemy's forces, and cooperate with the main battlefield to annihilate the enemy." After consultations between China and North Korea, the Joint Division issued instructions at the end of May 1951, deciding to form a guerrilla detachment to carry out guerrilla activities south of the 38th parallel.Accordingly, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army selected reconnaissance backbones with strong military and political qualities from various units, and formed a guerrilla detachment in mid-June, with a total of 2,050 people in six squadrons.The Volunteer Army drew up 4 squadrons, that is, the 3rd, 9th, and 19th Corps each drew a squadron, and the original 13th Corps formed a squadron.The People's Army formed 2 squadrons.The guerrilla detachment had Liu Zhenhua, Director of the Political Department of the 118th Division of the 40th Army of the Volunteer Army, as the commander, and Rufu, the deputy commander of the 125th Division of the 42nd Army, served as the deputy commander and chief of staff. The People's Army sent a deputy commander and a deputy political commissar. The concentration was completed in mid-July, and they were engaged in the suppression of bandits and coastal defense tasks in the Xinchuan area of ​​​​the coastal peninsula, waiting to go deep into the enemy's rear. (However, since the armistice negotiations began, major changes have taken place in the political and military situation on the battlefield, so the guerrilla detachment has not gone deep into the enemy's rear. In August 1952, the guerrilla detachment was abolished, and the 4 squadrons of the Volunteer Army were reorganized into independent regiments directly under the Volunteer Army Command .) Eighth, build positions and fortifications.As early as the end of May and early June, when the Volunteer Army and the People's Army blocked the counterattack of the "United Nations Army", Peng Dehuai deployed three lines of defense and built fortifications in the area from the 38th parallel to the 38.5th parallel. After mid-June, the front line became stable, especially in late June when Mao Zedong’s instructions on adhering to the 38th parallel to the 38.5th parallel were implemented, the Volunteer Army made adjustments to the original first and second defense lines. Focusing on the line of defense, fortifications were constructed.By mid-August, the fortifications with a total length of more than 250 kilometers in the front-line positions had been completed. Some troops also built semi-permanent "cat ear holes" (bullet holes) and tunnel-style firearm shelters. Second line positions.In addition, a vertical transportation line was built behind the front, two horizontal transportation lines were started to be built, and more than 200 concealed field warehouses have been built. Ninth, deploy new combat forces into the DPRK.As early as the end of May, Peng Dehuai suggested that the Central Military Commission order an army of the 20th Corps, which had already completed preparations for entering the DPRK, to enter the DPRK to take over the task of building the airport. added to the first line.The Central Military Commission decided that the 67th and 68th armies of the 20th Corps would all enter the DPRK to increase mobile forces on the battlefield. In early June, the 20th Corps, with Yang Chengwu as the commander, Zhang Nansheng as the political commissar and director of the political department, and Xiao Wenjiu as the chief of staff, led the 67th and 68th armies into the DPRK.The 50th Army entered the DPRK for the second time in early July, and another 4 regiments of armored troops and 4 regiments of modified artillery entered the DPRK. Tenth, carry out the campaign of donating aircraft and cannons throughout the country.In order to improve the weapons and equipment of the Volunteers, enhance their combat capabilities, and mobilize the people of all ethnic groups across the country to help the country overcome difficulties, on June 1, the Chinese People's Association for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea issued a "Call for Promoting the Patriotic Pact, Donating Aircraft and Cannons, and Preferring the Family of Martyrs." The "Call" pointed out: According to reports from the front, "The combat effectiveness of our Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army can completely overwhelm the enemy in all aspects. Volunteers can destroy more enemies with smaller sacrifices and win the final victory of the war as soon as possible. We must quickly supply the front with more aircraft, artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and other weapons. We recommend that all walks of life in the country be patriotic Compatriots, men, women, young and old, all carry out patriotic campaigns to increase production and increase income, use part or all of the newly increased income to purchase aircraft, cannons and other weapons, and donate them to the Volunteer Army and the People’s Liberation Army to strengthen their power, Consolidate our national defense." "We hope that everyone will highly develop the enthusiasm of patriotism, and make persistent efforts to develop the patriotic convention movement, carry out the campaign of increasing production, donating weapons and preferential treatment, so as to support the front line more effectively and strive for the final victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea." On the same day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued an instruction stating: "In order to further popularize and deepen the movement and education of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Central Committee has decided to carry out the patriotic convention movement throughout the country, carry out the movement of increasing production, donating weapons, and giving preferential treatment to the families of martyrs and disabled soldiers, so as to improve the quality of life." The political consciousness and patriotic enthusiasm of the people are used to encourage the morale of the front line and solve some financial difficulties. Now the Chinese People's Association for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea has issued a specific call, and I hope it will be implemented." "The campaign of donating weapons must be related to increasing production or other increase Combining the income movement. If people from all walks of life can donate five to ten catties of rice on a voluntary basis within the next six months from the income they have worked hard to increase, the country will have an income of several billion catties of rice. It will be a big help to the frontlines and to the country's finances." Under the organization and leadership of the Chinese People's Association for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, its general branches, and branches, the campaign of donating weapons to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea quickly spread across the country.All over the country, all ethnic groups, people from all walks of life, government agencies, organizations, and democratic parties have adopted various methods to raise funds for donations.Staff of Chinese embassies and consulates abroad, returned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese also actively made donations.As of the end of May 1952, the arms donations remitted by the People's Bank of China from all provinces and cities to the General Association of Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea in the past year amounted to more than 5.565 billion yuan (old currency value), which is equivalent to 3,710 planes based on 1.5 billion yuan per plane.The great achievements of this patriotic donation movement have greatly strengthened the power of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and at the same time supported the country's finances, strengthened the country's construction and improved the people's lives. Eleventh, carry out publicity and education on armistice negotiations. On June 23, at the invitation of the Department of Information of the United Nations Secretariat, Malik, the representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, delivered a speech on the "Peace Price" radio program organized by the Department, and put forward suggestions on the peaceful settlement of the North Korean issue. He said: for peace To solve the North Korean issue, "the first step is that the warring parties should negotiate a ceasefire and truce, and the two sides withdraw their troops from the 38th parallel." On the 24th, Stalin called Mao Zedong to inform: "You should know from Malik's speech that our promise to raise the issue of the armistice has been fulfilled. There may be progress on the issue of the armistice." On the 25th, China's "People's Daily" published an editorial, stating that "China The people fully support Malik's proposal and are working hard for its realization."In order to find out whether Malik's speech expressed the views of the Soviet government, the United States instructed its ambassador to the Soviet Union, Alan Kirk, to meet with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko on the 27th to obtain confirmation and confirm that the truce was negotiated by the military headquarters of both sides. Sending representatives to reach a military agreement for a truce is only the first step toward a peaceful solution to the North Korean issue. On the 28th, Stalin notified Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung of this situation.At the same time, it was also reported that Li Qiwei would be ordered to negotiate with the commanders of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army. On June 29, Kim Il Sung called Mao Zedong to inquire about how Li Qiwei would respond to this request.On the same day, Mao Zedong replied to Kim Il Sung and told Peng Dehuai, suggesting that the People's Army and the Volunteer Army, while actively paying attention to combat and preventing the enemy from succeeding, "consider the issue of armistice negotiations and prepare to send appropriate representatives... As for if Li Qiwei proposed As for how to answer the question when negotiating, we can consider the content and wording of the answer when Li Qiwei makes the request." As the truce negotiations were about to begin, education about the truce negotiations was also carried out within the country and among the volunteers. On July 3, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a special propaganda instruction on the issue of Korean armistice negotiations, explaining why the armistice was in favor, why the armistice was at the 38th parallel, and whether the negotiations could be successful.Pointing out: "We have always advocated peaceful solutions to the Korean issue, and the purpose of the Chinese People's Volunteers participating in the anti-aggression war in North Korea is also for this purpose. This is the joint declaration of the democratic parties on November 4 last year and the repeated statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government. Explained. The Korean people fought for a year, and the Chinese people fought for eight months, forcing the United States to recognize the strength of the Chinese and North Korean people, abandoning the original plan of aggression, and ensuring the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. This is the direct result of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. The United States has felt great difficulties in the war and demanded a quick truce, so the current truce is beneficial to both sides." The truce at the 38th parallel and only solving military problems is "realizing peace in Korea." The most direct and urgent issue is easy to get the agreement of both sides and the sympathy and support of the world public opinion. If any party puts forward too high conditions, the negotiation will not succeed and peace will not be realized. “以前美国尚未遭到如此严重损失……故无意于真正的停战。此外，主张扩大战争的麦克阿瑟没有被撤职，也是美国谈和的一个阻力。敌人既然无意停战，而且仍然梦想占领全朝鲜并将战争扩及我国东北，则彼时谈判自然不可能。”谈判能否成功，“这要在谈判中看敌方诚意如何才能决定。如果敌方仍无诚意，则谈判不能成功，中朝人民必须继续作战。果尔，则对中朝人民不但毫无损失，且政治上占了更大的优势。”无论谈判成功与否，在停战实现以前，“前线作战和后方支援自应照旧进行，不得有丝毫的松懈”。 在此前一天，彭德怀在向各兵团各军首长通报关于即将开始停战谈判的情况时，即指示各部：“敌虽急于求和，但不会改变其帝国主义侵略本质。可能玩弄种种花样与欺骗阴谋，亦可能乘我麻痹之际，突然袭击，我军必须高度警惕，不准丝毫松懈。望转饬所属加紧战备工作，准备掌握情况，对进犯之敌，在充分准备下予以沉重打击。须知惟有经过坚决激烈的斗争，才能换得和平。也惟有持久作战的充分准备，才能获得较速的胜利。”7月9日，毛泽东在审阅中央军委总政治部关于纪念中国人民解放军建军24周年的指示稿时，特别加写一段话：“我前方部队，必须鼓励士气，继续英勇作战，千万不可有丝毫松懈，不要作此次可以和下来的打算，而应作此次和不下来还须继续打、还须给敌人以大量的消耗和歼灭，然后才能和下来的打算。只有我们作了此种打算，才于争取最后胜利有益处，否则是没有益处的。” 据此，在国内和志愿军中普遍进行了宣传教育。 这样，为志愿军坚持长期作战，作了各种准备。