Chapter 10 1. The question of whether it can be played or not and Mao Zedong's analysis

The Chinese People's Volunteer Army was adapted from the troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. After long-term training and testing in the Chinese Revolutionary War, it has a tradition of defeating powerful enemies with superior equipment with inferior equipment, and has rich experience in fighting the Kuomintang army and the Japanese invaders. The victorious division of the Revolutionary War.But going to North Korea to fight against the U.S. military is different from fighting at home in the past. First of all, the combat opponents are different.The main opponent of the Volunteers is the US military.The weapons and equipment of the U.S. military are not comparable to that of the domestic Kuomintang army or the Japanese army that invaded China back then. They are the most modernized army among all the armies in the world, and they are well-trained, ranking second The victorious division of World War I has rich experience in modern combat.This is the first time in the history of the People's Liberation Army that it has encountered such an opponent.

The great disparity in the quality of weapons and equipment between the enemy and the enemy is a prominent feature of this war.The gap in weapons and equipment between the two sides is like "a beggar and a dragon king compare treasures", which can be summed up in twelve words: "the enemy has us and we have no, the enemy has many and we have few, the enemy is good and we are inferior".This gap was particularly prominent when the volunteer army first entered the DPRK. We have no enemies: At this time, the United States has about 1,200 air force and navy aircraft on the Korean battlefield, including fighter interceptors (fighters), strategic bombers, light bombers, fighter bombers, and transport, ambulance, and command aircraft. In addition, each division of the ground forces has 22 artillery correction machines; more than 300 naval ships of various types have been put into the battlefield, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, battleships, destroyers, landing ships, and minesweepers.The U.S. ground forces are all mechanized or motorized. There are more than 1,000 tanks (each infantry division and marine division each have more than 140 vehicles), and more than 330 armored vehicles (each division has 35 vehicles). There are more than 3800 kinds of vehicles.The Volunteer Army has neither the Air Force nor the Navy to participate in the war, nor does the ground force have tanks and armored vehicles. Each army is only temporarily equipped with about 100 vehicles for material transportation.

The enemy is more than we are: In addition to the above-mentioned weapons and equipment, the enemy has nothing to do with us, the main weapons that both the enemy and ourselves have, and the number of volunteers is far less than that of the US military.In addition to tanks, each division of the U.S. ground forces has 959 various artillery pieces, including 72 howitzers, 120 various direct-firing artillery pieces (mountain artillery, field artillery, and recoilless artillery pieces), 160 various mortars, There are 64 anti-aircraft guns and 543 rocket launchers, including more than 330 guns with a caliber above 70 mm.The U.S. military has 7 divisions and the headquarters of the Eighth Army in North Korea, with a total of 6,049 artillery pieces, including 568 howitzers and 784 anti-aircraft guns (excluding those of the South Korean Army and other "United Nations forces").The Volunteer Army has 522 artillery pieces of various types, including 108 direct-fire guns, 333 various mortars, and 81 rocket launchers. There are no tanks, howitzers, and anti-aircraft guns. Among them, there are only more than 190 artillery pieces with a caliber of 70 mm or more. .The artillery of an army of the Volunteer Army is not as many as that of a division of the US Army, which is only equivalent to 54% of the artillery equipment of a division of the US Army.The first batch of 6 armies of the Volunteer Army entered the DPRK (of which the 50th Army and the 66th Army had even fewer artillery establishments), including the artillery of the Volunteer Army Artillery, there were less than 3,000 artillery pieces of various types (including 320 howitzers and 36 anti-aircraft guns) ), which is only equivalent to about 45% of the total number of US artillery.The Volunteer Army has no air force, no tanks, and very few anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.In addition, a division of the U.S. military is equipped with 1,400 wireless communication machines of various types and 1,100 wired telephones.A Volunteer Army is equipped with only 69 wireless communication machines and 375 wired telephones, which are only equivalent to 5% and 34% of the same equipment of a US military division.

The enemy is good and we are bad: Not only does the Volunteer Army not have the air force and navy to participate in the war, it does not have tanks and armored vehicles, and the performance and quality of artillery and guns cannot be compared with the US military.The U.S. artillery is new, with large caliber, long range, and sufficient ammunition. The maximum range can reach more than 20 kilometers. They are all towed by cars or transported by jeeps. They are powerful and maneuverable.Almost all of the artillery equipped by the Volunteers was the equipment captured by the Japanese army and the Kuomintang army during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation. Carried by personnel, it has low power and poor maneuverability.The guns of the American infantry are all automatic and semi-automatic; the guns equipped by the volunteer infantry are all made in the United States, Russia, Germany, Japan and old China, and there are very few automatic guns.

The disparity between the pros and cons of the weapons and equipment of the enemy and the enemy makes the two sides form a sharp contrast on the battlefield. In terms of combat space, the U.S. military holds air and sea dominance over the entire battlefield, and implements all-round three-dimensional operations that combine land, sea, and air forces; the Volunteer Army does not have air dominance and sea dominance, but only a single ground force (infantry with a small amount of artillery support). , the so-called plane against three-dimensional, one army (army) against three armies (army, navy and air force).The U.S. Army can attack the Volunteer Army's rear and coast; the Volunteer Army has no ability to attack the U.S. Army's rear and coast.

In terms of combat time, the U.S. military can conduct all-weather operations with fewer restrictions; the Volunteer Army mainly uses night and weather conditions that are not conducive to the dispatch of U.S. military aircraft to organize troop operations during the day. In terms of combat organization, the U.S. military has strong mobility, fire assault capabilities, and logistical supply capabilities, as well as smooth communications and sensitive command.The Volunteer Army is under heavy air defense pressure, difficult to transport supplies, difficult for troops to maneuver, weak firepower, and unsmooth combat command.

Second, the battlefield is different.The Korean battlefield is different from the domestic one. The land is small, surrounded by the sea on three sides, and the north and south are narrow and long. The volunteers have little room for maneuver in combat, and it is not convenient to deploy more troops. They have become accustomed to the mobile warfare of striding forward and retreating on the vast domestic battlefield, but it is difficult on the Korean battlefield. display.North Korea's geographical conditions are conducive to the U.S. military relying on its naval and air force advantages to implement side-to-back landing attacks.After decades of colonial rule by the Japanese imperialists, North Korea was already poor economically.After the war broke out, and after the crazy bombing, destruction and plunder of the US military, it was almost destitute.Hundreds of thousands of volunteers are fighting here, and it is difficult to solve the supply of combat materials on the spot.What's more, when the volunteers first arrived in North Korea, they were unfamiliar with the place of life, the language, the base area they were familiar with, and the masses they were familiar with.All of these have added difficulties to the volunteer army's operations.

In addition, most of the main force of the Korean People's Army was still isolated behind the enemy lines, and Kim Il Sung directly controlled only three divisions north of the 38th parallel. This is the combat condition of the Volunteer Army. The decision of the central government to send troops has been made, and various domestic preparations have been made to ensure the victory of the war. However, under such combat conditions, whether the volunteer army can fight and how to fight is a very real problem. On October 9, the day after Mao Zedong signed the order to form the Chinese People's Volunteers, Commander Peng Dehuai, who had just been ordered to command the Volunteers, and Gao Gang in Shenyang, convened a meeting of cadres above the frontier defense army (Volunteer Army) to convey the central government's decision to send troops , Deploying volunteers to dispatch matters.It is expected to be dispatched on October 15.At this meeting, the commanders of the various armies had great concerns about dispatching operations, especially the U.S. Air Force and tanks, based on insufficient preparations for dispatching and the disparity in weaponry between the enemy and the enemy.The Volunteer Army has only one anti-aircraft artillery regiment with 36 guns, which cannot cover hundreds of heavy artillery. The Anton and Ji'an railway bridges are not covered by anti-aircraft artillery. .There is a serious lack of anti-tank weapons, and it is difficult to deal with the cluster tanks of the US military.It is possible to fight desperately against U.S. tanks, but there is no way to deal with U.S. aircraft.Ask the Military Commission to transfer one or two anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and ask how many fighters and bombers the Military Commission can send to cooperate with the troops when they are dispatched, and when will they be dispatched?On the 9th and 10th, Peng Dehuai telegraphed the concerns of the various armies to Mao Zedong twice.At this time, the air force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was not yet capable of combat. Zhou Enlai went to the Soviet Union and negotiated with Stalin about the dispatch of the Soviet air force to cover matters, but there was no result.Mao Zedong replied on the 11th, telling Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Deng Hua that an anti-aircraft artillery regiment had been dispatched from East China to depart from Shanghai for Shenyang on the 14th to transfer to the front line, but the air force could not be dispatched for the time being.

On the 12th, Mao Zedong received a telegram jointly sent by Zhou Enlai and Stalin, informing the Soviet Air Force that it could not dispatch the Volunteer Army to fight.This is probably something Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not expect, because Stalin had made a promise.Mao Zedong asked Peng Dehuai if he could fight without air force cover.Although Peng Dehuai found it very difficult, he could still fight.Both Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang believed that they were sure of attacking the South Korean army. On the 13th, the comrades of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee agreed that even if the Soviet Union did not deploy air force cover, we must participate in the war.The troop dispatch time was postponed to the 19th.

On the 16th, Peng Dehuai held a meeting of cadres above the volunteer army division in Anton to mobilize for overseas operations.Knowing that the Soviet Air Force could not provide cover, the troops still had great concerns about whether they could fight abroad.It is believed that the Volunteer Army has too few antiaircraft artillery, and there is no air force to cooperate, while the U.S. military can concentrate a large number of aircraft, artillery, and tanks to carry out large-scale bombardment without any scruples. Fortifications, such as the enemy's attack, are difficult to persist.At present, transportation, supply, and cold protection work are still poor.In case of being unable to withstand the enemy after being dispatched, it will be even more unfavorable for future operations.After the meeting, on the 17th, Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Xie Fang, and Du Ping, leaders of the 13th Corps, telegraphed the concerns of the troops to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, suggesting that if new equipment is guaranteed within two or three months, especially the air force can be dispatched , it can be dispatched as planned, otherwise, it can be considered to suggest that the dispatch time be postponed.However, at this time, the central government received news that the US military was advancing northward at an accelerated pace, preparing to attack Pyongyang.The situation in North Korea no longer allowed the Volunteers to postpone the dispatch time, so they dispatched as planned on the 19th.

Now that we have been dispatched, we must be determined to overcome difficulties.On the second day after the Volunteer Army started dispatching, Deng Hua and other leaders of the 13th Corps sent a telegram to the party committees of the various military divisions and regiments to which they belonged and reported it to the General Political Department of the Military Commission, pointing out: The determination and intention of the Central Committee to send troops is completely wise and correct. All comrades in the Volunteer Army, first of all It is a Communist Party member and a party member cadre, and it should be resolutely implemented.We must overcome all difficulties, endure all pains, achieve victory without pride, defeat without complaint, unite the whole army, and complete this arduous, difficult and glorious task under the leadership of President Peng. The worries and questions raised by the troops are well-founded, and they are indeed real problems. However, the situation forced the Volunteers to rely on the equipment at the time to fight against the U.S. military.In this regard, Mao Zedong did not fail to consider it.It can be said that from the decision to dispatch troops to the victory of the third battle after the volunteers entered the DPRK, leaders of the Central Military Commission such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Nie Rongzhen spent most of their energy focusing on and researching and solving this problem. For the sake of prudence and safety, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai determined the initial combat policy for the Volunteers after research on October 13 and 14 before the Volunteers were dispatched. At that time, after the U.S. military crossed the 38th parallel, it had not yet moved north quickly. Mao Zedong estimated that the People’s Army could defend for a period of time north of the 38th parallel. If the U.S. forces in Pyongyang did not attack Tokugawa, the South Korean army that had already arrived at Wonsan (which occupied Wonsan on October 10) would not dare to attack alone. According to this, Mao Zedong determined that after the volunteers entered the DPRK, they would build two to three defensive fronts in the area north of the Wonsan railway line in Pyongyang and south of the Dechuan and Ningyuan highway lines, and keep the area north of Pyongyang and Wonsan at least mountainous. The area is not occupied by the enemy.In the first period, only defensive warfare was fought. If the U.S. Army in Pyongyang and the South Korean Army in Wonsan came to attack from two directions, the U.S. Army in Pyongyang should be restrained with necessary forces, and the South Korean Army that was coming from the direction of Wonsan could be concentrated to wipe out some isolated troops. US military.If the enemy sticks to Pyongyang and Wonsan within 6 months, the Volunteers will not go to Pyongyang and Wonsan, but will continue to strengthen the fortifications, find out the situation in all aspects, wait for the arrival of the weapons and equipment ordered from the Soviet Union, and equip them. Training, after the air and ground are overwhelmingly superior to the enemy, then cooperate with the Korean People's Army to attack Pyongyang, Wonsan and other places, and implement a strategic counterattack.After the fortifications are completed, if the enemy still sticks to Pyongyang and Wonsan does not come out, then half of the volunteer troops who entered the DPRK can be sent back to the Northeast for training and food, and then go again when the big battle is fought.That is to say, we will talk about the counter-offensive after six months. After the Volunteer Army entered the DPRK, Mao Zedong worried about whether the Volunteer Army could fight because of the huge gap in weaponry and equipment and lack of air force cover. He was especially worried about the joint attack of the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and tanks. The cities on the east and west coasts and Sinuiju would also be difficult to keep After Peng Dehuai started to deploy the first campaign, on October 23, he called Peng Dehuai and reported to Gao Gang, analyzed the issue of whether he could fight, and gave instructions, pointing out: We should start from a solid foundation and not do what is impossible.From the military point of view, the situation in the Korean War will be determined by the following points.The first is whether the campaign currently being deployed can take advantage of the enemy's sudden and complete annihilation of two, three or even four puppet divisions (pseudo-third divisions) will follow up with the puppet sixth divisions, and the puppet divisions may also reinforce ).If this battle is a big victory, the enemy will redeploy, and Sinuiju, Xuanchuan, Dingju, etc. will not come to occupy for at least a period of time, and the puppet first and puppet 32 ​​divisions will return to the Wonsan area from Hamxing , while Changjin can be protected, and whether Sinanju and Suncheon are conservative may also be a problem. The section of the railway from Seongcheon to Yangdeok without soldiers is a big gap for us. Under the conditions of the existing troops, the enemy will immediately be passive status.If the sudden victory in this sudden battle is not great, and the main force of the Pseudo Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions is not quickly annihilated, or they escape, or they actually stand by and wait for reinforcements, the Puppet No. If we retreat before the formation, the situation will change to the enemy's advantage, and the conservation of Xichuan and Changjin will also encounter difficulties.The second is how much the enemy's planes killed and injured our personnel hindered our activities.If I can use night marches to achieve a very proficient level, and although the enemy has a large number of aircraft, they will not cause me too much damage or hindrance, then our army can continue to conduct field battles and attack many isolated strongholds, that is to say, except for Pyongyang, Except for Wonsan, Seoul, Daegu, Busan and other big cities and their surrounding areas, which I cannot attack without aircraft, the enemies in other places may be annihilated by me one by one. Even if the United States adds a few more divisions, I can annihilate them one by one.In this way, it is possible to force the United States to conduct diplomatic negotiations with me, or to open these big cities one by one after the conditions for our aircraft and artillery are met.If the casualties and hindrances of the enemy's aircraft are so great that we cannot carry out effective operations, our army will be in a very difficult position within six months to one year before our aircraft conditions are ready.Thirdly, if the United States transfers another five to ten divisions to North Korea, and our army has failed to annihilate several American divisions and several puppet divisions in mobile warfare and operations against isolated strongholds before then, the situation will be dire. It will be against me, and if it is the other way around, it will be in my favor.All of the above points can be experienced and proved in this battle and in the following months.We believe that we should strive for a complete victory in this campaign, strive to maintain strong morale to carry out vigorous combat despite the enemy's bombardment, and strive to wipe out a few more of the enemy's forces before the enemy deploys more troops from the United States or other places to North Korea. Troops so that their supplements cannot keep up with their losses.In short, we should strive for all possible victories on a solid and reliable basis. In this way, the Volunteer Army has a clear and flexible strategic guideline in its operations, that is, starting from a solid base and based on the existing combat conditions, it will neither do what is impossible, but must strive for all possible victories.Whether you can fight or not, you have to gain experience and proof within a few months.