Chapter 11 2. Truman and MacArthur believed that China was "not enough to cause trouble"

The day after Mao Zedong signed the order to form the Chinese People's Volunteers, Peng Dehuai, who was appointed as the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, took office. Peng Dehuai, 52 years old at the time, served as chairman of the Northwest Military and Political Committee and commander of the Northwest Military Region.At this time, what he had in mind was how to implement the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and do a good job in the economic recovery of the motherland's Northwest.At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee discussing the issue of sending troops to resist US aggression and aid Korea, he firmly supported the idea of ​​sending troops.Although as early as August 27, Mao Zedong had called him and told him: "In order to cope with the current situation, twelve armies must be concentrated for maneuvering (four armies have been concentrated), but this matter can be decided at the end of September. I invite you to come to Beijing for an interview." However, it was a real surprise for him to be the commander of the volunteer army, and he was not mentally prepared.He originally thought that Lin Biao was in charge of the expedition, but the glorious and arduous task fell on his shoulders.This General Peng, who dared to "slash the knife immediately", obeyed the needs of the party and never put conditions on it.Now that the central government has made the decision, Peng Dehuai did not say anything else. He firmly obeyed the decision of the central government and shouldered the heavy responsibility of the commander-in-chief of the volunteer army. Before he had time to explain his work and say goodbye to his relatives, he immediately devoted himself to the intensive preparations for the volunteer army to go out.

On October 8, he and Gao Gang rushed to Shenyang.From October 8th to 18th, he traveled back and forth between Beijing, Shenyang, and Anton many times, busy for the dispatch of volunteers. On the 9th, he and Gao Gang hosted a meeting of cadres above the Volunteer Army in Shenyang, and immediately decided that "the first two armies will be dispatched in Yuzai to gather North Korea's Xichuan and Dechuan lines to facilitate east-west maneuvers."And telegraphed Mao Zedong.That night, he met with Park Il-woo, the representative sent by Kim Il-sung, to learn about the situation in the Korean War and discuss matters concerning the entry of volunteers into North Korea.After listening to Park Yiyu's introduction, he felt that the situation in North Korea was tense. If the Yalu River Bridge was bombed, the follow-up troops would be blocked in the north of the river and it would be difficult to call in time.Therefore, it was decided to change the plan reported on the 9th to dispatch two armies first, and all four armies and three artillery divisions were dispatched. On the 10th, Mao Zedong was called again, requesting that "the original plan was to dispatch two armies and two artillery divisions first. Fearing that it would be difficult to concentrate superior forces and lose fighter opportunities when the Yalu River Bridge was bombed, it was decided to assemble all Jiangnan and change the original plan." On the 11th, Mao Zedong replied: "October 9th and 10th, all telegrams have been received. It is agreed that all four armies and three artillery divisions will be dispatched and assembled at the location you have planned, waiting to wipe out the enemy." Afterwards, Peng Dehuai went to Andong, Specifically study the deployment of volunteers to North Korea, and prepare to enter North Korea as soon as possible to contact Kim Il Sung.

On the 13th, after the Political Bureau of the Central Committee studied the issue of dispatching troops again, Peng Dehuai returned to Anton from Beijing on the 15th. On the 16th, a meeting of cadres above the division level was held in Andong to further mobilize before the war, expounding the necessity and correctness of the CPC Central Committee's decision to send troops, and explaining that the Central Committee's decision was "after repeated discussions and careful consideration."We only support the Korean People's Revolutionary War in the name of the Chinese People's Volunteers, which does not mean declaring war on the United States.After analyzing the favorable and unfavorable conditions of both the enemy and ourselves, Peng Dehuai put forward the combat principles for the Volunteer Army after entering the DPRK, pointing out: "According to the enemy's situation and terrain conditions, the mobile warfare we used in the past in the country was to advance in great strides and retreat in great strides. It must be suitable for the Korean battlefield. Because the territory of North Korea is narrow, the enemy still has certain advantages for the time being, so we must adopt a combination of positional warfare and mobile warfare. When the enemy attacks, we must resist him and prevent him from advancing; discover the enemy's weakness, that is, Attack quickly, go deep into the enemy's rear, and resolutely wipe them out. It is our task to protect the land, but more importantly, to wipe out the enemy's vital forces. As long as there is an opportunity, even a battalion or a regiment must be resolutely and completely wiped out." Peng Dehuai also particularly emphasized Policy issues of discipline and attention after entering the court.

On the 18th, Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing from the Soviet Union. Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang were summoned to Beijing again to listen to the report on the talks between Zhou Enlai and the Soviet leaders, and to study the relevant issues after the volunteer army was dispatched. On October 19, Mao Zedong called the Central South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and told the East China Bureau, Southwest Bureau and Northwest Bureau, pointing out: "In order to defend China and support North Korea, the Volunteer Army will be dispatched today, and first establish a foothold in a part of North Korea that has not been lost. Look for opportunities to fight some campaigns to support the continued struggle of the North Korean people. In the current few months, we will only do nothing and do not publicize this matter in the newspapers. We will only let the senior leading cadres in the party know about this matter so that they can make arrangements for their work. We have made preparations above, please pay attention to this point.”

At 12 o'clock that day, Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Corps, Deputy Commander Hong Xuezhi, and Chief of Staff Jie Fang issued instructions to march into North Korea. The policy of organizing a defensive battle south of the Sichuan-Ningyuan Highway, "The Corps is determined to control the lines of Guicheng, Taichuan, Stadium, Dechuan, Ningyuan, and Wulaoli as the basic defensive positions." That night, Peng Dehuai, the commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Army who had been in office for only 12 days, led the Chinese People’s Volunteers, shouldering the great trust of the people of the motherland, secretly went to the Korean battlefield, and started the Chinese people’s great War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

In order to prevent the volunteers from entering the DPRK from being discovered by the enemy, act secretly, conceal their intentions, and achieve suddenness in strategy and battle, all volunteer troops changed into Korean People's Army uniforms. Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai asked the troops to start operations at dusk and start operations at dawn. Before all the concealment and camouflage are completed, the radio is kept silent, and the news is strictly blocked.Mao Zedong also instructed that after the volunteers entered the DPRK, "reconnaissance teams dispatched by various ministries should pretend to be the Korean People's Army instead of being called the Chinese People's Volunteers, so as to confuse the enemy."

At this time, the situation on the Korean battlefield has changed. Although, before the U.S. military crossed the 38th parallel, the U.S. authorities considered Zhou Enlai’s warning on behalf of the Chinese government as “just an intimidation against the United Nations.”Furthermore, the warning came from India’s ambassador to China, Panikha, who the U.S. authorities considered “as a guy who was often sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party in the past, so his words cannot be taken as those of an impartial observer. At best It’s just a mouthpiece for the Communist Party.”Both the US State Department and the military believe that if the Russians or the CCP intervene in North Korea, they will risk a world war; the Russians are not yet ready to risk a world war for North Korea; China does not have the military capability to intervene alone ability.Therefore, neither the Soviet Union nor the CCP would intervene in North Korea.As a result, the U.S. military crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, and on October 9, MacArthur issued a second ultimatum demanding North Korea's surrender.

Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a directive to MacArthur, approved by the President, and issued on October 9 on behalf of Secretary of Defense Marshall.The instruction said: "If the Chinese Communist Party uses a large number of troops openly or covertly anywhere in North Korea without prior announcement, you should use your own judgment and continue to act as long as the troops under your control are likely to win. In any event, any military action against targets within China must be approved in advance by Washington." Truman still felt uncertain about the possibility of the Soviet Union and China participating in the war, and he was uneasy about the actions of the US military in North Korea. He hoped to get first-hand information from MacArthur. In addition, since Truman became president, he had never met the American general. .So it was decided to meet with MacArthur.Truman with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Ambassador at large Philip Jessup, Special Counsel to the President Avril Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Pacific Fleet Commander Arthur Redford and others flew to Wake Island in the Pacific Ocean on October 15, and held talks with MacArthur on the situation in North Korea.

Referring to the situation in North Korea, Truman asked, what is the possibility of Chinese and Soviet interference?MacArthur replied confidently that the Chinese were "very unlikely to interfere. If they interfered in the first month or two, it would be decisive. We no longer worry about their interference. We no longer cringe. China There are 300,000 troops in Manchuria. Among them, no more than 100,000 to 125,000 are deployed on the banks of the Yalu River, and only 50,000 to 60,000 can cross the Yalu River. They have no air force. Our air force has bases in North Korea. If the Chinese Try to go south to Pyongyang, and that would be a massacre for them." He believed that formal resistance across North and South Korea would all be over by Thanksgiving.He hoped to withdraw the 8th Army to Japan by Christmas, leaving the 10th Army composed of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the United States and other United Nations forces to complete the occupation task.The Russians were a little different, MacArthur said.They have an air force in Siberia, and they are of good quality, they can put 1000 planes into action, and they have another 2000-3000 planes in their naval fleet.But they are no match for American aircraft.Russia has no ground troops it could send into North Korea.Other than that, the only possibility is that the Russian air force would support the Chinese ground forces, but there would be no coordination between them, and the Russians would drop as many bombs on the Chinese as they would on the Americans.Their synergy doesn't work either.So it's not a problem either.

Neither Truman nor his entourage questioned MacArthur's analysis.On the contrary, they "all felt a great sense of relief that the Korean War would soon end." On the 17th, Truman also said in a speech on the meeting with MacArthur in San Francisco: "MacArthur told me about the fighting situation in North Korea. I firmly believe that these troops will soon restore peace to all of North Korea." Due to MacArthur's optimistic analysis of the North Korean situation and Truman's approval, and after mid-October, the organized resistance of the Korean People's Army has weakened, so the US military accelerated the speed of its northward offensive.

On October 17, MacArthur changed the original plan that the U.S. 8th Army and the U.S. 10th Army would meet in Pyongyang and Wonsan, and ordered all parts to continue northward.On the same day, the 1st Division and the Capital Division commanded by the 1st South Korean Army Corps advancing northward on the Eastern Front occupied Hamhung. On the 19th, the 6th, 7th, and 8th divisions commanded by the 2nd South Korean Army Corps, which attacked on the center line, occupied the Yangdeok and Chengchuan areas.The 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, the 24th Infantry Division, the 27th British Brigade, and the 1st South Korean Division commanded by the U.S. 1st Army, which attacked on the western front, occupied Pyongyang. On the 20th, the 187th U.S. Airborne Regiment, in order to cooperate with the U.S. 1st Army to capture Pyongyang, airborne for the first time in North Korea in an attempt to cut off the North retreat route of the Pyongyang People's Army in the Suchuan and Suncheon areas. MacArthur also personally inspected it.The U.S. 10th Army, which was preparing to carry out the second Korean landing in Wonsan on this day, was shipped to the waters of Wonsan (but Wonsan had been occupied by the South Korean Army as early as 10 days ago, and the People's Army deployed a The 1st U.S. Land Division and the 7th Infantry Division commanded by the army landed in Wonsan and Liwon on the 25th and 29th respectively. After the U.S. 10th Army landed, MacArthur sent the South Korean 1st Army 1 Legion under its command).After the U.S. military occupied Pyongyang, MacArthur and the senior U.S. generals on the battlefield believed that there was no longer any force in North Korea that could compete with them, so the northward march became even crazier. The South Korean Army on the eastern front has occupied the Wulaoli area where the Volunteer Army is scheduled to organize defense. The South Korean Army and the U.S. Army on the central and western fronts are only 90 to 130 kilometers away from the area that the Volunteer Army is scheduled to defend.As of the 20th, the Volunteer Army only had 5 divisions across the river, and it was still 120-270 kilometers away from the planned defense area.The rapid changes in the battlefield situation made it impossible for the Volunteer Army to organize a defensive battle north of the Pyongyang and Wonsan railway lines and south of the Dechuan and Ningyuan highway lines according to the original plan for the first phase of the battle. However, at this time, neither the U.S. intelligence agencies nor MacArthur's "United Nations Army" headquarters in Tokyo, nor the U.S. and South Korean troops on the battlefield had any awareness of the dispatch of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The "United Nations Army" troops marched northward without any scruples in units of divisions or regiments, and between the two offensive troops on the east and west lines, there was a wolf forest mountain range lying vertically, separating its troops from east to west. Correspondingly, this is an excellent opportunity for the volunteers to annihilate the enemy during the campaign. For this situation, the Volunteer Army also has an estimate in advance.The 13th Corps pointed out in its marching instructions at 12 o'clock on the 19th: "For this entry into North Korea, the Military Commission requires our Corps to withstand the enemy from the front, maintain positions, stabilize the situation, buy time, step up equipment, and prepare for a counterattack. Therefore , our campaign guideline is: use active defense, combine positional warfare with mobile warfare, and use counterattacks and ambushes to annihilate and consume the enemy's vital forces. However, according to the current progress of the enemy, before the enemy notices our army's actions, it may continue Rush forward. In the process of my advance, three situations may occur, one is that the enemy arrives at the predetermined area before me, the other is that the enemy arrives immediately after I arrive, and the other is that I encounter the enemy during the march. It is a favorable opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Therefore, all units should advance in a fighting posture while advancing, and be ready to encircle and annihilate the enemy at any time." At 12 o'clock on the 20th, Peng Dehuai and the head of the 13th Corps jointly sent a call to various ministries, pointing out: "At present, the U.S. and puppet troops are committing crimes in the north, and the resistance of the People's Army is very weak. They are still marching northward without any scruples. Before our army is aware of our actions, it will still advance northward. Therefore, it is fully possible for our army to use mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy in the initial operations. We should deeply understand and implement Chairman Mao’s instructions, and strive for it. And create a good opportunity for mobile warfare to wipe out the enemy, so as to start fighting a good battle, knock down the enemy's arrogance, and make the enemy dare not rush forward easily, so as to delay the enemy to gain time." In view of the situation on the battlefield, at 2:30 and 3:30 on the 21st, Mao Zedong sent electricity to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua respectively (Peng and Deng were not together at the time, and Peng first crossed the river to approach Kim Il Sung on the evening of the 19th, and Deng led the 13th The Ministry of Corps is preparing to cross the river on the 23rd according to the scheduled plan), pointing out: "Up to now, neither the United States and the puppet have expected that our volunteer army will participate in the war, so they dare to disperse into two routes, east and west, and advance boldly." "This time is to wipe out the puppet army. It is an excellent opportunity for several divisions to fight for the first victory abroad and start to change the situation of the Korean War. How to deploy it, I hope Peng Deng will carefully plan and implement it." "Now it is a matter of fighting for fighters. It is a matter of starting combat afterwards, rather than a matter of deploying defenses for a period of time and then discussing attacks." He also asked Deng Hua whether he had crossed the river, and pointed out: "I think the 13th Corps should immediately go to the place where Comrade Peng Dehuai is and where Peng lives. together and reorganized as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Command for deployment in operations." As a result, decisively abandoned the original defensive operation plan, and immediately helped the People's Army launch a counter-offensive. At this time, the organization and command organization of the Volunteer Army has not yet been formed. Except that the central government has appointed Peng Dehuai as the commander of the Volunteer Army, and Kim Il Sung has decided to send Park Il-yu as a liaison, Peng Dehuai has no command assistants.In order to facilitate the unified deployment and command of the volunteer army, on October 25, Mao Zedong drafted the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Political Department of the Corps Command and other institutions should be reorganized into the Political Department of the People's Volunteer Army Command and other institutions immediately; The four comrades are all deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army, Comrades Deng Hua and Pu Yiyu are both deputy political commissars, Xie Fang is the chief of staff, and the comrades in charge of the Political Department, Logistics Department and other institutions are still in charge; Comrade Peng Puer was added to the original list, with Comrade Peng Dehuai as secretary and Comrade Deng Huapu as deputy secretary." On October 24, MacArthur issued a new order, canceling the order given to him by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 27, regarding the decision not to use non-North Korean ground troops to enter the Sino-North Korean border, ordering the US Eighth Army and the US The 10th Army advanced to the border between China and North Korea at full speed and with all its strength.At this time, the "United Nations Army" had a total of 10 divisions, 1 brigade and 1 regiment in the ground forces on the front line, including 4 divisions and 1 regiment of the U.S. Army, 1 brigade of the British Army, and 6 divisions of the South Korean Army. . On the 25th, the volunteers encountered the enemy in the Yunshan and Onjing areas north of the Qingchuan River during the march, fired the first shot of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and opened the curtain of the Chinese People's War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.A year later, this day was designated as the Memorial Day for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. At this time, the Volunteers had not yet completed their march, so they marched, deployed, and fought.In order to strengthen the combat forces on the western front, according to Peng Dehuai's request, the Central Military Commission ordered the 50th and 66th armies to join the volunteer army and enter the DPRK.By October 30th, all campaigns have been completed.On the western front, the 38th Army and the 125th Division of the 42nd Army made a detour along both sides of the Qingchuan River to the enemy's rear, and the 40th, 39th, 66th, and 50th Armies carried out frontal attacks until November 5th. The first battle is over.Annihilated most of the 6th Division of South Korea, and severely damaged the 1st Division of the "Ace" Cavalry of the US Army (annihilated most of its 1 regiment).The troops of the U.S. 8th Army on the western front were all withdrawn to the area south of the Qingchuan River after being attacked suddenly.At the same time, the Volunteers fought hard for 13 days and nights with the 42nd Army (less than 1 division) on the Eastern Front, stubbornly blocking the northward advance of the 3 divisions of the U.S. Army and the South Korean Army, and effectively cooperating with the main force on the Western Front.A total of more than 15,000 enemies were wiped out on the east and west fronts, initially stabilizing the Korean War. After the first battle, especially the annihilation of most of the 1st regiment of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, the volunteers greatly enhanced their confidence.From the combat experience, we can see that although the U.S. military has strong firepower, it has poor fighting spirit. Without aircraft and cannons, it cannot attack and cannot defend.As long as our army makes good use of close combat, night combat, and roundabout encirclement tactics, and destroys the enemy's command organs and artillery positions first, we will be able to win, and we can expand the results of the battle through search and suppression.