Chapter 9 V. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai's comprehensive planning and deployment

Although the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee discussed the decision to send troops to Korea, many Politburo members had concerns about sending troops to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and advocated not sending troops or sending troops at a later date. In the first place of all work in the country.The party, the government, the army, and the people went all out to ensure the victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.The determination of the CPC Central Committee is to prepare for the worst possible situation.For this reason, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central People's Government, and the Central Military Commission made comprehensive arrangements and preparations for victory in the war.

In addition to the decision to postpone the liberation of Taiwan when the Northeast Frontier Defense Force was formed, the focus of military struggle preparations was changed from the liberation of Taiwan to the preparations for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and the focus of national defense was shifted from the three areas centered on Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou to the Northeast region. After the formation of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the Central Military Commission also decided to draw follow-up units for the Volunteers from various strategic regions across the country.On October 10 alone, the Central Military Commission's working meeting decided to transfer 9 divisions from 3 armies from the Southwest Second Field Army to form a corps, which was ready to be dispatched in January 1951; Division, ready to go out in February 1951.At the same time, the 9th Corps was ordered to assemble in Shandong, on standby to drive to the northeast, and later ordered the 19th Corps to complete all departure preparations before November 24, and to be on standby to drive to the northeast.

The focus of army building has shifted from strengthening the navy and air force to focusing on strengthening the air force, artillery (including anti-aircraft artillery) and armored forces. In mid-February, the Chinese government and the Soviet government signed a US$300 million trade agreement on loans from the Soviet Union to China, of which US$150 million was originally planned to be used to purchase naval equipment. In order to meet the needs of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, most of it was used to purchase air force aircraft and army weaponry. The production and construction tasks undertaken by the National Field Army were relieved, and the focus was shifted to military training. At the beginning of December, the military education originally scheduled to begin in January 1951 was changed from focusing on cultural improvement to intensifying military training for the troops. 60%, adjusted to 60% for military, 30% for politics, and 10% for culture.The large-scale demobilization work that had begun had also ceased by the end of 1950.

In order to prevent the United States from attacking coastal cities and industrial bases with its air force and navy, on October 31, Zhou Enlai summoned Nie Rongzhen, acting chief of the General Staff of the Central Military Commission, Bo Yibo, deputy director of the Central Finance and Economics Commission and Minister of Finance, Li Lisan, Minister of Labor, Luo Ruiqing, Minister of Public Security, Yang Shangkun, director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing (suffering from an eye disease from time to time, was replaced by Liu Ren, deputy secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee) held a meeting to study the national air defense problem.Determined: Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, Nie Rongzhen, Bo Yibo, and Li Lisan will form the National Air Defense Preparatory Committee, with Li Lisan as the secretary-general and Yang Shangkun as the deputy secretary-general. , Relevant departments were instructed to draw up plans, which were reported to the Military Commission and the Central Committee for approval before implementation.At the same time, the guidelines and principles for the evacuation of personnel and materials were determined when necessary.Accordingly, some factories in southern Liaoning were relocated to the north, and a total of 20 factories were relocated to Songjiang Province and Heilongjiang Province (both are now Heilongjiang Province).

In late October, Zhou Enlai instructed the Navy Command to formulate a mine-laying plan for coastal defense. Starting from Shanghai, going north to the Changshan Islands, Yingkou, and the coast of Andong, key points were selected to deploy mines. It is estimated that a total of 4,500 mines will be needed.At that time, there were only 1,500 mines in the country. Zhou Enlai instructed that the mine defense of the Yalu River Estuary in Andong should be deployed first, and the remaining 3,000 mines were ordered from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Central Military Commission also deployed the 4th Mixed Brigade, the only combat unit of the People's Liberation Army Air Force, in Shanghai to undertake air defense tasks.Since then, the fighter aviation divisions formed one after another, in addition to participating in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, were also deployed in Guangzhou, Qingdao, Tianjin, Beijing, Tangshan and other cities to undertake air defense tasks.He also asked the Soviet government to agree that the Soviet Union dispatched fighter aviation units to assist China in undertaking air defense missions in Jilin, Gongzhuling, Andong, Shenyang, Liaoyang, Anshan, Tangshan, Qingdao, Guangzhou and other places.It also deployed the only anti-aircraft artillery units in China to large and medium-sized coastal cities such as Shenyang, Anshan, Benxi, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou.

In order to prevent the United States and Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek Group from jointly landing and attacking, after the volunteer army was dispatched, on November 17, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the Central South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Party Committee of the Central South Military Region, and the South China Branch Bureau, instructing: “In order to deal with the possible landing and invasion of the enemy in Guangdong, we must Prepare to use five to seven armies." "You must coordinate Guangdong and Guangxi, and use Guangdong and Guangxi as a unified unit to deal with imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's invasion." At the same time, a telegram was sent to the East China Military Region, instructing: "All work in East China must be based on the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. The landing attack is based on a hypothetical basis to make arrangements." Later, he instructed: "Any incident in Guangdong must be handled independently by the four fields to ensure the victory of the possible invasion of Taiwan's bandit army and consolidate Guangdong's defense." "Four armies in Fujian are enough... The coastal areas of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces also need to be prepared to deal with enemy attacks. The entire army in East China should be fully responsible for annihilating the attacking troops of Chiang Kai-shek on its own, and don't hope for foreign aid." In order to strengthen the work of the East China Military Region, Chen Yi, the commander of the East China Military Region who also served as the mayor of Shanghai, returned to Nanjing to preside over the work of the military region.

As early as August 26, Zhou Enlai presided over a national defense meeting to inspect the preparations of the Northeast Frontier Defense Forces. He pointed out: "Our battle this time is to deal with the US imperialists, not just against the Syngman Rhee puppet army. The US military relies on artillery , aircraft and other firepower...Our equipment is sufficient to deal with domestic enemies, but it is not enough to deal with US imperialism." In order to prevent US imperialism from pushing the world war step by step, "our military construction should have a longer-term If a long-term plan cannot be drawn up today, a short-term army building plan of at least three years must be drawn up as a plan for the preparatory stage."

The meeting determined that the Navy, Air Force, Artillery, Armored Forces and other arms and arms each made a three-year construction plan to be completed before the end of the year and implemented in 1951. The meeting also determined that by the end of January 1951, the Air Force would add three more bombing regiments and one naval aircraft regiment, and increase the establishment in the second half of 1951.The air force began to enter the war by the end of January 1951 at the latest. In 1950, the armored corps was organized into 3 brigades, 9 tank regiments, and 360 tanks. They were formed before the end of September and completed training before the end of the year. They were ready to go to war in 1951.

Howitzers, field artillery, rocket launchers, anti-war artillery, etc. were planned to be equipped with artillery units of 10 armies. After these units were organized, they completed training before the end of 1950 and began to participate in the war in 1951.The anti-aircraft guns were organized into 18 regiments, with 428 small and medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns, and the training was completed in two batches within 3 months. Most of the above-mentioned plans were realized. Except that the naval construction was relatively complicated, it was difficult to form combat capabilities at the moment, and it did not participate in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

Most of the equipment and equipment required for the construction of the above-mentioned arms and arms needs to be ordered from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the equipment of the Volunteer Army’s infantry units is also quite backward, and operations in North Korea require air force support and cover, while the People’s Liberation Army Air Force does not yet have such capabilities. After the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee made the decision to send troops, in early October, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, who had gone to the Soviet Union to recuperate, were entrusted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to secretly fly to the Soviet Union. In addition to informing the Soviet leader Stalin and others of the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to send troops, they also asked the Soviet Union for weapons. Equipment assistance, and dispatched the air force to directly support the Chinese People's Volunteers in operations, and brought a list of weapons requested for Soviet assistance.

According to the memories of the translator Shi Zhe and the confidential secretary Kang Yimin who followed Zhou Enlai on the visit, the result of Zhou Enlai’s talks with the Soviet leaders was that the Soviet Union agreed to provide the Chinese People’s Volunteers with aircraft, artillery, tanks and other weapons and equipment. (The price of this batch of equipment was not mentioned at the time, and Stalin did not specify that it would be repaid in the future. But in the early 1960s, when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded the payment for this batch of equipment, and China The people gritted their teeth and tightened their belts in the case of three years of natural disasters, and repaid them all.) Stalin did not agree to send the Soviet Air Force to support the Chinese People's Volunteers in combat, but agreed to send the Air Force to China to assist in air defense. In November 1950, the Soviet Air Force dispatched to fight over the Yalu River.Later, Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen negotiated with the Soviet Union’s chief military adviser in China and the air force adviser, and with the consent of the Soviet government, starting in the second quarter of 1951, the Soviet Air Force secretly dispatched to the area north of the Qingchuan River in North Korea to cover the railway transportation and maintain a 4-4 Seven regiments fought until the end of the Korean War, and a total of 12 divisions were dispatched successively. In addition, after consultations between Mao Zedong and Stalin in telegrams and Stalin's consent, Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Commander Xiao Jinguang and Chief of Staff Luo Shunchu, accompanied by Ku Ciming, Soviet Navy Adviser to China, met with Soviet Navy leaders in Moscow at the end of October and November. Discussed the three-year construction plan of the Chinese Navy, and also discussed the order of long-distance torpedo boats, armored boats, small submarines, small minesweepers, water torpedo planes, coastal artillery, mines, depth charges, etc. Kind of equipment. In order to unify the ammunition supply of the Volunteers, on November 7th, in the name of Mao Zedong, he called Stalin, requesting the Soviet Union to provide infantry weapons and equipment for 36 divisions of 12 armies that China planned to fight in Korea from January to February 1951, and sent them to The list of weapons and equipment to be provided includes 140,000 Soviet-style rifles with 58 million bullets; 26,000 Soviet-style automatic rifles with 80 million bullets; 7,000 Soviet-style light machine guns with 37 million bullets; 2,000 Soviet-style heavy machine guns. Ting, 20 million rounds of bullets; 1,000 pistols for pilots, 100,000 rounds of bullets; 1,000 tons of TNT explosives.Obtained the consent of the Soviet government, and later delivered as scheduled. On October 8, 1950, Mao Zedong signed an order on the formation of the Chinese People's Volunteers, which stipulated: "The Chinese People's Volunteers use the Northeast Administrative Region as the general rear base, and all rear work and supply matters, as well as matters related to assisting North Korean comrades, Comrade Gao Gang, the commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region, dispatched the command and was responsible for ensuring it.” On the same day, Mao Zedong informed Kim Il Sung of this situation. On the 9th, Mao Zedong instructed in his telegram to the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang: "The Central Committee has entrusted Comrade Gao Gang to handle all issues related to the comrades who aided North Korea. Afterwards, all such matters will be directly contacted by Comrade Gao Gang. Comrade answer." At that time, the Northeast Administrative Region had jurisdiction over 6 provinces of Liaodong, Liaoxi, Rehe, Jilin, Songjiang, and Heilongjiang, and 5 cities of Shenyang, Luda (now Dalian), Fushun, Anshan, and Benxi, with a total area of ​​about 1.2 million square kilometers and a population of nearly 40 million. Geographically, the Northeast Administrative Region is closely connected with North Korea, separated by only one river, the Yalu River in the south and the Tumen River in the north. The border with North Korea is 1,400 kilometers.Historically, the people of Northeast China and the Korean people have a traditional friendship of mutual help and mutual support. The majority of Koreans, one of China's most populous ethnic minorities, live in Northeast China. After the "September 18th" Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism invaded Northeast China. North Korean revolutionaries represented by Kim Il Sung and Kim Chaek led a team to join the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Forces to fight against Japanese aggression together with Chinese soldiers and civilians. During the National War of Liberation, the Northeast was the first to be liberated (the entire Northeast was liberated at the end of 1948), the Northeast People's Government and people's governments at all levels were first established, the banditry was wiped out and the land reform was completed first, in order to support and guarantee the National Liberation War The victory made the greatest contribution. In 1949, the Northeast region started economic reconstruction. In 1950, planned economic construction began. In May 1950, in the 1950 National Economic Plan Summary compiled by the Central Finance and Economics Commission, the total amount of state investment in economic construction was equivalent to 15.46 billion jin of rice, of which 7.99 billion jin of rice was invested in the northeast region, accounting for 51.7% of the total investment in national economic construction. In addition, the equipment and materials used by the Soviet Union to aid the Chinese people in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea mainly entered from the Northeast, and the Chinese people’s manpower and materials to support the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea also left the country from the Northeast. Therefore, regardless of the geographical location of the Northeast, the economic conditions of the Northeast, or the social environment of the Northeast, it was determined that the Northeast could only be used as the general rear base for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. After the establishment of the Northeast Frontier Army, the Northeast People's Government, the Northeast Military Region, and the people of all ethnic groups in the Northeast did their best to provide guarantees for the various preparations of the Frontier Army.After the Northeast Frontier Defense Army was changed to the Chinese People’s Volunteers, the Northeast Military Region assisted Commander Peng Dehuai in making direct preparations for the volunteers to go abroad to fight. The Northeast Military Region dispatched logistics support and organized the establishment of a supply line for the dispatched military depots in North Korea to transport the volunteers abroad in advance. Grain, ammunition, oil and other materials needed for combat.The Northeast Bureau and the Northeast People's Government dispatched Li Fuchun, vice chairman of the government, Zhang Mingyuan, secretary general of the Northeast Bureau, and other 6 members of the Northeast Bureau, 4 ministers of the Northeast People's Government, and a group of cadres, together with the Northeast Military Region Logistics Department, to do a good job in rear support. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central People's Government, the Central Military Commission and various headquarters give full support to the work of the General Rear Base. On November 5, Zhou Enlai sent a special letter to Gao Gang and Li Fuchun, pointing out: "For the work of supporting all the troops in the Northeast, we have imagined that it will be heavy. As long as the Northeast makes a request, we are willing to go all out to help you solve your difficulties. Everything for the Northeast has been done. Those who make the decision, we will customize your backing and support you to carry it out. Some matters belong to the central government, but you can still act cheaply, as long as you notify, the central government should ratify it. We all agree to unify the northeast.” Beginning in October 1950, the Northeast Administrative Region was transformed into a wartime system. The party, government, military, and people from all walks of life went all out to carry out various support work at the general rear base, mobilized young people to join the army, and organized large convoys Caravans, trolley convoys, stretcher teams, railway workers, medical workers, car drivers, etc. went to North Korea with the volunteers to undertake field duties and raise various materials for volunteer operations. According to incomplete statistics, during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, more than 399,000 people were mobilized in the Northeast to join the army, including about 300,000 volunteers; more than 3.94 million people were mobilized to participate in combat work, and more than 740,000 migrant workers went directly to North Korea to serve There are more than 40,000 various technical personnel; only 4 provinces of Liaodong, Liaoxi, Heilongjiang, and Songjiang organized more than 16,600 stretchers; Liaodong, Liaoxi, and Jilin dispatched 248,000 combat carts. Around the New Year's Day in 1951, the people of Northeast China donated gifts and funds for the frontline, which were equivalent to more than 238 billion yuan in Northeast currency (equivalent to more than 25 billion yuan in old RMB).In addition, it also donated 50 billion yuan in northeast currency (equivalent to 5.26 billion yuan in old yuan) and 20,000 sets of clothes to relieve North Korean refugees.It also received and resettled a large number of North Korean refugees, and resettled more than 100,000 troops newly formed by North Korean military academies and the Korean People's Army for training in the Northeast. Taking the Northeast Administrative Region as the general rear base of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea effectively guaranteed the volunteers' operations in Korea.During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Peng Dehuai once said that two people should be thanked for the Volunteer Army's victory in the front. It shows the great role of the general rear base and logistics support work in the volunteer army's operations. In early June 1950, at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in view of the fact that the National War of Liberation was basically over, it was determined that it would take about three years to restore the national economy, strive for a fundamental improvement in the country’s financial and economic situation, and create conditions for planned economic construction.In order to implement this spirit, when the Central People’s Government formulated the 1951 national budget, it considered that the basic point of financial and economic work was to restore the national economy, that is, military expenditures accounted for more than 40% of total expenditures in the 1950 budget, which was reduced to 1951. 30%, while 70% of the total budgetary expenditure is invested in economic construction and cultural and educational undertakings. In order to adapt to changes in the situation and ensure the needs of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the Central People's Government made adjustments to the originally considered 1951 financial plan.Zhou Enlai pointed out in November 1950: "In the budget estimate for 1951, we originally wanted to focus on investment and construction. The hope for this kind of national construction is shared by everyone, but the enemy does not allow us to To do so. He will attack Taiwan first, then North Korea, and also wants to attack our mainland. This makes our financial estimates have to be changed, and we have to plan to meet the needs of the war. We have to temporarily put aside the peace construction plan. Now The fire has reached the door, 'firefighting comes first'." After the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, the central government estimated that there were three possibilities for the impact of the war on the domestic situation: "(1) Neighboring wars, domestic peace; (2) Neighboring wars, domestic bombing; (3) Neighboring wars, the enemy is in Haikou landed, and the whole country turned to war.” The Central People’s Government took the second possibility of the change in the current situation as a starting point, and put the 1951 fiscal work policy on the basis of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Chen Yun, vice premier of the Government Administration Council and director of the Financial and Economic Committee, pointed out at the Second National Financial Conference held in November 1950: to take countermeasures based on the second possibility of changes in the current situation, "If the situation only changes to the first If the current situation changes to the third situation, financial and economic countermeasures need to be discussed separately. However, the base point is currently on the second situation, and there is no way to create a countermeasure for the third situation in the future. contradiction".This meeting determined that in terms of financial work deployment, "war comes first, everything is subject to war, and everything is for the victory of the war."Others are ranked second and third. In April 1951, Chen Yun further explained why he was so sure.He said: "The reason is very clear. If we don't put national defense first and suppress the aggressive arrogance of US imperialism, all economic construction will be unreliable." "Without victory in the war, there will be no other things." On December 21, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved the budget estimate for 1951. The total expenditure was 6.95 billion yuan, of which defense expenditure was 3.34 billion yuan, accounting for 48.05%, and economic construction expenditure was 1.18 billion yuan, accounting for only 16.9%. In 1951, the actual total national fiscal expenditure was 12.249 billion yuan, of which defense expenditure was 5.264 billion yuan, accounting for 43%, and economic construction expenditure was 3.511 billion yuan, accounting for only 28.7%. In 1952 and 1953, although the proportion of military expenditures in the total national fiscal expenditures decreased to 32.9%-34.2%, the absolute numbers both increased, and they were still subject to war needs. This enabled the victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, with financial guarantees. When the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, bandits had not yet been eradicated in the late liberated areas of East China, Central South, Southwest, and Northwest, and the banditry was still quite serious, and land reform had just begun.These areas account for about 2/3 of the country's total area and total population.Although great achievements have been made in suppressing counter-revolutionaries across the country, after the outbreak of the Korean War, counter-revolutionary activities became more aggressive. While the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central People's Government regarded the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea as the central task of the whole country, they also made the work of suppressing bandits, land reform, and suppressing counter-revolutionaries one of the central tasks related to the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Construction provides a solid social foundation.Therefore, the pace of bandit suppression, land reform and counter-revolutionary suppression was accelerated.After the start of land reform in the newly liberated areas, these three tasks were carried out together.Resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, land reform, and suppressing counter-revolutionaries were collectively called the three major movements at that time. After the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea, in order to concentrate troops as soon as possible to prevent the joint landing attack of the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek clique, and to mobilize troops early and put them in a mobile position, so that they can be ready to join the war in North Korea or support coastal defense in the south at any time, from mid-November , the Central Military Commission and Chairman Mao Zedong ordered the newly liberated areas, especially East China and South Central, to speed up the suppression of bandits, and to wipe out bandits within a time limit.From November to January 1951, during the three months, Mao Zedong sent dozens of telegram instructions to East China, Central South, and Southwest China to speed up the suppression of bandits, paying special attention to Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, etc. Regarding the situation of bandit suppression in the provinces, the supervisor ordered the above-mentioned provinces to increase their efforts to suppress bandits, and within 6 months, that is, by the end of May 1951, to completely eradicate bandit troubles. In mid-November, Mao Zedong made several consecutive calls to the Central South Bureau and the South China Branch Bureau, pointing out: "In order to deal with the enemy's possible landing and invasion in Guangdong, we must prepare to use five to seven armies. For this reason, we must use all our strength to wipe out the bandits." "To deal with Taiwan Bandit gangs may invade Guangdong, and it is necessary to strengthen the troops in Guangdong. For this reason, it is necessary to eliminate the banditry in Guangxi in advance, so that an army can be drawn from Guangxi to strengthen Guangdong." Mao Zedong severely criticized Guangxi's ineffectiveness in suppressing bandits, pointing out: "Guangxi's bandit suppression work is the The reason for the poorest performance in the bandit suppression work in all provinces of the country must be that there are serious shortcomings in the leadership method." Tell us." At the same time, he instructed Ye Jianying, the first secretary of the South China Branch Bureau, commander and political commissar of the Guangdong Military Region, to go to Guangxi immediately to help guide the work, "and stay there for a few months, focus on the key points of work to eliminate bandits within a time limit, and launch land reform. Get results and come back."After learning that Tao Zhu, director of the Political Department of the Central South Military Region, was sent to Guangxi to help guide the work, he also instructed Ye Jianying to "stay in Guangxi for about a month before returning to the east. Therefore, Tao Zhu should stay in Guangxi for a while until the problem of suppressing bandits is basically resolved and then come back. "The deadline is to eliminate major banditry in Guangxi within 6 months.He pointed out: "Guangdong must start land reform immediately in a wide area, and delaying is a mistake." "Guangdong must quickly and extensively carry out land reform work." It will be dealt with." Later, he instructed, "We still hope to intensify the supervision of the suppression of bandits in the three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong and Hunan, and complete the task of suppressing bandits before May 31." At the same time, Mao Zedong called the East China Bureau, pointing out: "The work of suppressing bandits in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces is extremely important. In particular, the bandits in Fujian must use four or five main divisions to pursue them with all their strength and eliminate them within a time limit. The province is poor, and the reasons must be reviewed. I suggest that from now on, in conjunction with extensive land reform work (Fujian must implement land reform quickly), wipe out all gangsters within six months, and order Ye Fei and Ding Cheng to go all out Make achievements. As long as the bandits in Fujian are wiped out and the land reform is completed, even if Chiang Kai-shek lands and invades, it will be easy to deal with." Before and after that, Mao Zedong also called the East China Bureau, the Central South Bureau, the Southwest Bureau and the three major military regions many times to report the progress of the bandit suppression in each region.The three military regions of East China, Central South, and Southwest are required to report to the Central Committee on the situation of bandits suppression, and also to inform each other and promote each other.Mao Zedong also particularly emphasized: "In the tense situation, we must exterminate bandits within a time limit, accelerate land reform, develop local armed forces, and resolutely suppress counter-revolutionary activities. Only then can our party and our army take the initiative, otherwise there is a danger of falling into passiveness." In this way, the pace of bandit suppression in East China and Central South China was also the same as in Southwest China. By the end of May 1951, the bandits in these two areas had been basically wiped out. Military training. The land reform in the newly liberated areas, which accounted for 2/3 of the country's land area and total population, was originally planned to take advantage of the slack season. In 1950, it was first carried out in more than 300 counties in East China, South Central, Southwest, and Northwest China, with an agricultural population of about 100 million. , and the land reform in areas with an agricultural population of 160 million was carried out in most areas in the winter of 1951, and a small part in the winter of 1952. The minority areas and Tibet that have not yet been liberated will be discussed later. After the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, this plan was also adjusted, mainly to speed up the land reform in East China and Central South China, especially in Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi.These three provinces were liberated late, and there are many bandits that have not yet been eliminated.While instructing these provinces to step up efforts to suppress bandits, Mao Zedong also instructed that land reform must be carried out quickly and extensively. According to the instructions of the Central Committee and Mao Zedong, the newly liberated areas expanded the scope of land reform in 1950, and carried out land reform in advance in many areas where the conditions were basically mature.By the autumn of 1951, land reform had been completed in the newly liberated areas with more than 150 million agricultural populations, exceeding 50% of the original plan. In the central and southern regions alone, land reform had been completed in areas with 80 million agricultural populations, exceeding 73.2% of the original plan.This not only strongly supported the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, but also greatly liberated agricultural productivity, making important preparations for large-scale economic construction. At the same time, efforts to suppress counter-revolutionaries were intensified. On October 10, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Instructions on Suppressing Counter-Revolutionary Activities".It is required to overcome the arrogance and underestimation of the enemy caused by the victory and the serious right tendency of "benevolence and boundlessness" that emerged during the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. Crack down on and suppress counter-revolutionary activities, and at the same time prevent indiscriminate killings and "Left" behaviors such as forced confessions.All central bureaus, sub-bureaus, provincial party committees, large municipal party committees, and district party committees must formulate work plans for suppressing counter-revolutionary activities in their own areas and implement them accordingly. The secretary of the party committee must be in charge of reporting to the central committee and the central bureau about the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities every four months. A special report on counter-revolutionary issues. In order to implement this instruction, from October 16 to 21, the Ministry of Public Security held a National Public Security Conference and made arrangements.Since then, a vigorous campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries has been launched across the country.Mao Zedong paid close attention to this work. From November to June 1951, he drafted relevant instructions and forwarded more than 130 relevant reports. By October 1951, the counter-revolutionary forces were basically eliminated, and the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries ended.The development of this movement brought unprecedented stability to the country's social order and effectively guaranteed the development of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the domestic land reform movement. In late June 1950, after the U.S. openly invaded North Korea and Taiwan, people all over the country launched campaigns against the U.S. aggression against Taiwan and North Korea in various ways.In order to unify the leadership of this movement, the Chinese People's Movement Committee for Opposing the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and North Korea was established on July 10. Under the organization of the committee, the "Week of the Movement for Opposing the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and North Korea" was held nationwide in mid-to-late July.After the Chinese people's Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea began, this movement was further developed into a national Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea Movement. On October 26, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Instructions on Propagating Current Affairs Across the Country" to all central bureaus, sub-bureaus, military regions, and provincial and municipal party committees.Pointing out: "The U.S. military's expansion of invasion of North Korea and direct invasion of Taiwan poses a serious threat to our country's security, and our country cannot ignore it. In order to make all the people correctly understand the current situation, establish confidence in victory, and eliminate fear of the United States, all localities should immediately launch a publicity campaign on current events. The basic contents of the propaganda are as follows: "(1) Our country cannot ignore the expansion of U.S. aggression against the DPRK; (2) Our people should have a consistent understanding and stand against U.S. imperialism, and resolutely eliminate pro-American reactionary ideas and mistakes that fear the U.S. mentality, and generally develop an attitude of hatred, contempt, and contempt for U.S. imperialism." It is required to correctly understand the relationship between resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea and safeguarding national security through propaganda, and to recognize that the U.S. is the common enemy of the Chinese and North Korean peoples and the weak nature of a paper tiger. , in order to thoroughly solve the problem ideologically, "to make everyone positive and confident in aiding Korea and not afraid of difficulties, to express indifference to U.S. imperialism, and to make the pro-American and fearful sentiments the same as those in the anti-Japanese movement." Can't stand." The "Instructions" also made requirements for the specific methods of publicity, the publicity of newspapers and periodicals, and the cooperation of the literary and art circles and the publishing circles. In order to carry out patriotic education in the whole country to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, stimulate the patriotic enthusiasm of the people of the whole country, and support the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea in various ways and actions. Representatives of various people's organizations and representatives of various democratic parties from the Campaign Committee Against the US Invasion of Taiwan and Korea held a joint meeting in Beijing.The meeting approved the merger of the "China Defense of World Peace Conference" and the "Chinese People's Movement Committee Against U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea" and reorganized it into the "Chinese People's Defense of World Peace and Against U.S. Aggression Committee" to lead the national movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea.The association is composed of 158 representatives from various democratic parties, people's organizations, and representatives from all walks of life, including 31 members of the standing committee. The famous social activist Guo Moruo is the chairman, Peng Zhen and Chen Shutong are the vice-chairmen, and Liao Chengzhi is added as the vice-chairman. . From mid-March 1951, the association was abbreviated as the Chinese People's Association to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Since then, the Northeast, North China, East China, Central South, Southwest, Northwest and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regions have successively established general sub-commitments to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and established sub-communities in various provinces and cities to specifically lead the anti-U.S. aggression and aid Korea movement in major administrative regions, provinces and cities. Under the leadership of the Chinese People's Association for Resisting U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and local branches and branches, and in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 26, a campaign centered on "hatred, contempt, and contempt" (referred to as "three views") was launched across the country. Patriotic publicity and education activities to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. On November 4, the Communist Party of China and various democratic parties issued a joint declaration, clarifying the justice and necessity of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, defending the home and defending the country" On a voluntary basis, the Chinese people are fighting for the sacred mission of resisting US aggression, aiding Korea, defending their homes and defending their country."Since then, the "Three Views" education has been closely integrated with the education that supports this declaration.The press, literary and art circles, and publishing circles also actively cooperated in various ways.Mao Zedong attached great importance to this activity and made many instructions and instructions. Through the "Three Views" education, it has effectively eliminated the pro-American, admiring and fearful psychology among some Chinese people caused by imperialism, especially the aggression of US imperialism for more than a hundred years, and effectively stimulated the patriotic enthusiasm of the Chinese people to resist US aggression and aid Korea , Enhanced national self-esteem and self-confidence, strengthened the belief that the Chinese and Korean people will win, and the US aggression will fail, so that the Chinese people will unite, share the same hatred, and dedicate their strength to support the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. After the end of November, the Anti-U.S. Aid Korea Association led this activity to a deep and long-lasting level in a timely manner, and correctly guided the patriotic enthusiasm of the masses into practical work. Give preferential treatment to the families of martyrs, donate aircraft and cannons, organize condolence groups to the front line to condolences, and so on. Zhou Enlai pointed out: "The depth of mobilization and the promotion of patriotism this time surpassed any anti-imperialist movement in the past. This is an unprecedented, large-scale, nationwide movement that combines leadership and the masses. Its strength will be Unbreakable. The awakening of the Chinese nation has been raised higher and deeper this time.” The extensive and in-depth nationwide campaign to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is actually a flexible application of the Chinese Communist Party’s people’s war ideology during the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. It is a new form of people’s war created by the Chinese people after they gained state power.This is an effective way to mobilize the people to help the country overcome difficulties.The development of this movement not only strongly supported the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, but also effectively promoted the recovery of the national economy. These deployments and preparations made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central People's Government, and the Central Military Commission effectively guaranteed the victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and at the same time effectively consolidated domestic defense and ensured the recovery of various national constructions.