Chapter 33 Chapter 32 Misunderstandings and Disagreements

In April, June, September, and December 1934, the Shanghai Central Bureau was destroyed four times, all of which were major leaders who were arrested and rebelled.Yang Guanghua, acting secretary of the Manchuria Provincial Party Committee, was transferred from the Shanghai Central Bureau in October.Wang Ming and Kang Sheng even suspected that the Manchurian Provincial Committee had problems, and instructed Yang Guanghua and other provincial party committee leaders to go to Moscow to discuss work. In fact, the Manchurian Provincial Committee was abolished. The twenty-seven-year-old acting secretary is obviously aware of the end of the Manchuria Provincial Committee and what it will mean to the anti-Japanese soldiers who are fighting bloody battles. Before leaving on April 5, 1935, the "Provisional Notice of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China" was issued, requiring that "party groups in various places should always follow the instructions of the central government, and strive to adapt it to the situation of each place, brave, independent, confident, independent to carry out work".

This should be the last document of the Manchuria Provincial Committee since its establishment eight years ago, and it is also a sincere farewell letter. Soon, a new leadership channel was opened from the Moscow CPC Central Committee delegation to the Comintern, to the delegation’s Vladivostok traffic station, to the Jidong Special Committee, and finally to the party organizations in various places in Northeast China. The Jidong Special Committee replaced the Manchuria Provincial Committee to guide and lead the parallel local special committees (central county committees). The problem is not only that the name is not correct, the words are not right, and it is against the party's organizational principles, but also that the Manchurian Provincial Party Committee officially stopped working in 1936, and the left-behind organs existed until June. Wang Ming and Kang Sheng never announced the withdrawal of the Manchuria Provincial Party Committee.

The confusion and trouble caused by the disordered organizational relationship soon became apparent. In the autumn of 1935, the Zhuhe Central County Party Committee and the 3rd Army received the June 3 "Secret Letter to Comrades in Charge of Jidong" (hereinafter referred to as "Wang Kangxin") from Wang Ming and Kang Sheng sent by the Jidong Special Committee.At the end of the year and in the spring of the following year, I also received the "Letter to the Zhuhe Central County Party Committee and Comrades in Charge of the Three Armies" (hereinafter referred to as "Jite Letter") from the Jidong Special Committee, and the "Letter to the Zhuhe Party and Youth League County Committee and the Comrades in Charge of the Three Armies" from the Central Representative in Northeast China. Letter (hereinafter referred to as "Zhongdai Letter").

Along with the "Jitter letter", there was another secret letter that puzzled the county party committee and the leaders of the 3rd Army, and immediately became alert, and even broke out in a cold sweat. The general idea of ​​the secret letter is: 1. Inform us that there are spies in Manchuria, tell us to immediately sever all ties with Manchuria, and tell the Third, Sixth, and First Army organizations to also completely sever ties with Manchuria. 2. The party organizations in Northeast China will be changed into four provincial committees: Jidong, Nanman, Dongman, and Zhuhe. There is no need for the old Manchu province to exist. 3. It is also said that the main person in charge of the old Manchurian province has left Manchuria since Hong May issued a temporary notice to work independently. The person in charge who stays in Manchuria now only maintains the relationship between various places and does not bear the responsibility for solving any political organization issues. right. 4. He also said that this was an order from the international government by the person in charge of the old Manchuria province. 5. And saying that you (Zhizhu County Party Committee) have a relationship with us (Jite) is the way to restore the relationship with the higher-level organization in the future. 6. I gave you Wang Kang’s instruction letter and informed you who Wang Kangzhi was. At that time, there was a small note, which was lost by traffic and not transferred to your side. The small note said “Don’t send Wang Kang’s letter to Manchuria Province Committee". 7. Pay attention to inspecting the people who came after May.

The so-called representative of the Central Committee in the Northeast is Wu Ping, whom I wrote about earlier.Wu Ping returned to China with Wei Zhengmin. Dongman had contacts with Jidong, and Nanman could learn some things through Dongman, but Beiman was completely unaware of all this. The old man Li Fanwu said in his memoirs that he was "shocked" when he learned that the Manchurian Provincial Committee had an internal traitor.At that time, he was the acting secretary of the Jidong special committee, and he knew everything clearly, and the source of the news was absolutely reliable. Even so, one can imagine the state of mind of the leaders of the Zhuhe Central County Party Committee and the 3rd Army who were kept in the dark.

The Central County Committee sent Han Guang, secretary of the League County Committee, to Jidong to find out the situation, but the letter arrived when he didn't come back, saying the same as the secret letter. Just at this time, Luo Ying, director of the Political Department of the 4th Army, was arrested and rebelled, and the Jidong Special Committee was destroyed. The first link that made Beiman and Jidong about to start a pen and ink lawsuit, and finally led to Zhao Shangzhi's bad luck, seemed to be the origin of Yang Guanghua's Shanghai Central Bureau.Since then, there have been many cases of mutual misunderstanding and suspicion (in September 18, 1936, many were listed in the "Resolution of the Party Committee of the Zhuhai and Tangzhong County Committees of the Communist Party of China, the Party Committee of the Third and Sixth Armies on the Organization of the Provisional Provincial Committee of North Manchuria"), and suddenly Connecting with the link of the destruction of the Jidong Special Committee, it has arrived at the point step by step by accident.

The Central County Party Committee and Zhao Shangzhi became more and more aware of the complexity and seriousness of the problem, and sent people to the Manchuria Provincial Party Committee in Harbin to meet Xiao Luo, a member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and secretary of the Youth League Provincial Party Committee who was left alone.Xiao Luo said that there may be spies in Jidong, and the Central County Party Committee and the 3rd Army should pay attention to the investigation. As a result, Zhao Shangzhi and others became even more confused, full of "?", "!".

As mentioned earlier, there were spies in southern and northern Manchuria once infiltrating the ranks, and both Yang Jingyu and Zhao Shangzhi were almost killed.Nervousness is certainly one of the reasons for the tragedy of the anti-"Minshengdan" in East Manchuria. In fact, the devils have never been idle in this regard.Or send people to sneak into the party and the Anti-Japanese Alliance, or use various relationships and methods to instigate rebellion. Japan's spy agencies are quite sophisticated.The weakness of the Northeast Party, especially the weakness of local work, gave the enemy an opportunity to take advantage of it, and left many unsolved mysteries at that time and today.

What lingered in the minds of Zhao Shangzhi and others at this moment was that the provincial party committee had an internal traitor, why didn't they cut the mess quickly according to the organizational procedures?The central government is investigating, can you explain?That's something to be careful about.But the main leaders of the Provincial Party Committee had been in the Soviet Union for almost a year, and they didn't feel anything unusual, but Ji Dong really had a problem.Why did a central representative appear?Ji Te replaced the Provincial Party Committee, not to mention that the organization is untenable in principle, if an internal traitor is involved in it, manipulating and monopolizing everything, wouldn't it be too dangerous?The letters sent and forwarded by Ji Te are not normal in terms of procedures. For example, the "Zhongdai letter" was received by the 3rd Army and 4th Division from the Mishan County Party Committee.

Also, when Han Guang went to Jidong, he wanted him to find out the truth and he must come back. Coincidentally, he was catching up with the notice from the Vladivostok traffic station that the two Youth League secretaries of Ji Te and Zhuhe were asked to go to Moscow to participate in the Communist International Sixth Formation. The next congress, but the Zhuhe side doesn't know.Why did this person disappear after sending a letter?Is something wrong too? Moreover, the problem is not just misunderstanding and suspicion. "Jite letter" and "Zhongdai letter" are supplementary letters of "Wang Kangxin", and all three are related to the general strategy and specific guidelines of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in Northeast China.

"Wang Kangxin" was written when the Communist International was preparing to hold the Seventh Congress. The main content was to clarify the anti-Japanese united front, strategic guidelines, guerrilla movements, party leadership, party building, and mass work.The letter pointed out that to break the closed-door doctrine, we should not oppose the upper-level united front and the lower-level united front, or even regard the establishment of the upper-level united front as "collusion between the upper-level". We must center on our team and unite all anti-Japanese armed forces to fight against Japan. The basic spirit of "Wang Kangxin" and the "August 1st Declaration" nearly two months later are the same. They are both important documents guiding the Northeast War of Resistance, along with the "1.26" instruction letter two years ago.However, like the "1.26" instruction letter, there are some obvious mistakes in "Wang Kangxin".For example, the military movement work against the puppet army and landlords' armed forces is mentioned as "occupying the first important position in the party's work", and the best forces should be concentrated in it, "sacrificing the work of some local party departments and branches of". In addition to re-emphasizing the anti-Japanese united front, "Jitexin" and "Zhongdaixin" further emphasized some mistakes in "Wang Kangxin".For example, "Zhongdaixin" said that "the Manchu army and the Japanese army should not be treated as enemies", and "Jitexin" said that "the general principle is to unite or neutralize the puppet self-defense regiments, and it is definitely not to fight them."Regarding the "group tribe", "Jitexin" requires that "the residents under our influence should not stay alone in the mountains, but should immigrate to Datun with other people", "legal and semi-legal mass organizations should be established in Datun", " Recommend the people we designate as Baochang, Jiachang, and Paichang.” "Nakadai Nobu" simply said: "Closed opposition to the enemy's annexation policy." More than three years ago, after the Manchuria Provincial Party Committee received the "1.26" instruction letter from Jidong, it also suspected that the letter was fake.That's just because the content of the letter feels that it is too different from the previous line, guidelines, and policies.At this moment, I was already full of question marks, but because of some mistakes in the letter, it made people even more suspicious——It was against this background that the Pearl Soup Joint Meeting was held. The premise of all this is that the connection between Beiman and the central government has been interrupted for more than a year. On September 18, the joint meeting of the two central county committees of Zhuhe and Tangyuan and the party committees of the 3rd Army and the 6th Army was held at the 3rd Army Clothes Factory on the northern slope of Maoer Mountain in Tangwanghegou.Zhang Lansheng, Secretary of Zhuhe Central County Party Committee, Feng Zhongyun, Minister of Propaganda, Zhu Xinyang, Acting Secretary of the Youth League Committee, Baishuijiang, Secretary of Tangyuan Central County Party Committee, Zhao Shangzhi, Commander of the 3rd Army, and Xia Yunjie, Commander of the 6th Army, attended the meeting.Attending the meeting were Li Fulin, Director of the Political Department of the 1st Division of the 3rd Army, Li Xishan, Commander of the 3rd Division, and Huang Yinqiu, Secretary-General of the 6th Army. In Zhu Xinyang's "Explanation on the Draft of Zhu and Tangzhong County Committees and the Joint Meeting of the Third and Sixth Armies" written in the same year (no month and day): Lao Feng said that Wang Kang's instruction letter was correct, and it was different from the letter from the Central Committee and Jidong, which was almost a surrender. Old Zhao said that Wang Kangxin was mostly correct, much better than the Central Committee and Jidong’s simple retreat policy, because he (Wang Kangxin) mentioned struggle, and advocated struggle, not a retreat policy, but he did not propose a way out for resistance and The way out of the struggle, such as the issue of Baojia Datun. I said that according to the report materials Wang Kang received at that time, Manchuria had not yet been returned to Datun. Lao Zhao said that it had already started at that time. Isn't it based on the environment to decide a strategy?Look at what was said in the letter, how was the environment in Northeast China at that time?He pointed to the issue of the Baojia system mentioned in the letter and the issue of the destruction of countless villages and the massacre of millions of people, saying, if this is the case, why can't it cause peasant riots?It can be seen that the situation at that time was already like this, but it was not as obvious as it is now.For a strategic decision, if you want to point to what is ready-made, that is not a strategy, it is called an afterthought lesson (he also said a lot, I can’t remember). Old Feng was silent at this moment. I said that we have no problem with the general line, but mainly with the understanding and application of the new line.This letter is basically correct, but for some reason, after reading it, it always makes people feel prone to leaning to the right. If you want to misinterpret this letter from a right-leaning point of view, it will be bad. The joint meeting, which lasted for three days, mainly focused on the analysis of the current situation in Northeast China, the application of the party's new strategy, organizational issues, work reports and inspections, and new work arrangements.Zhao Shangzhi and others made a report. They discussed major issues in politics, military affairs, organization, etc., determined future work principles and strategies, and made the "Joint Meeting of the Zhutang Central County Party Committee on the Analysis of the Current Political Situation and Our Party's New Strategies". Draft resolution on the mandate: At present, the central strategy of our party is the "National Anti-Japanese United Front". Due to the correctness of this strategy, the anti-Japanese movement has opened up a new situation.However, we did not achieve the results we deserved. This is because of the serious mistakes in understanding the essence of the new line and the flexible application of it in practice, from the top to the bottom of our party, which caused the emerging anti-Japanese movement to suffer constant setbacks. In the complicated environment of Manchuria and the disordered organization of our party, the anti-Japanese movement in Northeast China is at a critical juncture.The treacherous Japanese imperialism will always use reactionary factions and spy organizations to confuse our party's correct line.At present, specious lines and many extremely suspicious incidents have been produced, which have caused infinite damage to the anti-Japanese movement and are almost on the verge of self-extinction.There may be spies, so we have to be more vigilant about the application of the new line in addition to adopting special measures to properly solve organizational problems.Therefore, in the spirit of fighting on two fronts at the "Joint Meeting of Zhutang Central County Party Committee" on September 18, we discussed the current political situation enthusiastically, and re-studied the views of Wang Kang, Ji Te and the representatives of the Central Committee in the Northeast. Instruction letter, and based on the bloody experience and lessons learned in the united front work in the past years, and the inspection of recent work, found a serious crisis of the rightist line, unanimously raised firm opposition, and called on all comrades in the party to carry out this struggle. The use of our party's new strategy of the national united front must be based on an offensive standpoint. In a positive sense, we must understand offensive and defensive strategies and use them flexibly according to the actual environment. In order to successfully break through the big "crusade" in autumn and winter this year, the team must adopt an offensive strategy, expand to the new area, attack in the gaps (seams) where the Japanese "manchu" rule is weak, and use surprisingly "winning" guerrilla tactics to deal with the enemy. The draft resolution also puts forward its own opinions on how to deal with the "group tribes", the puppet army and the Japanese and puppet rule in the countryside. According to Feng Zhongyun's report, the meeting passed the "Resolution on Organizational Issues", which clearly stated: Now that the Manchurian Provincial Committee has been abolished, the organization is so chaotic, and the line is so wrong, the old Manchurian Provincial Committee, the Jidong Special Committee, and the "Central Representative in the Northeast" have to be denied from the standpoint of consolidating the party, and the Find a relationship with your superiors yourself. At the same time, he made serious criticisms to the central government from the standpoint of Bolshevik's self-criticism. (1) In the environment of war and revolution, it is extremely necessary for party departments at all levels to work independently, but under the current possible environment, they should not give up leadership for such a long time. (2) If Jidong's "Central Representative in the Northeast" is official, the relationship of the organization should not be so neglected. (3) The Seventh Congress of the Communist International has been held for more than a year, but the main documents have not been delivered so far. These views on party responsibility do not allow such a phenomenon.At the same time, it is suggested that the central government should thoroughly check the serious phenomenon of chaos and wrong responsibilities in this organization, and eliminate other factions and spies from the party within Git. After the direct relationship between the Northern Manchurian Provisional Provincial Committee, it will be established according to the new instructions and then cancelled. Twenty-four years later, the old man Feng Zhongyun recalled: "At that time everyone—mainly me and Zhao Shangzhi—thought it was a big deal. If we made a mistake, we would all have to be punished. Therefore, the provincial party committee is temporary." "We I think we can talk about it after finding the central government.” The joint meeting decided to expand to the new area, "to attack in the cracks (cracks) where the rule of Japan's 'Manchu' is weak", specifically "the three armies are mainly responsible for breaking through the western wilderness, that is, Longjiang Guangyuan Nenjiang plain. The six armies opened up Luobei , Suibin, and Taipinggou areas, in order to open up the entire area around the Lesser Khingan Mountains into a guerrilla zone, and use it as a basis for occupying the Greater Khingan Mountains.” Soon after the meeting, Zhao Shangzhi led an expedition. While the Western Expeditionary Forces were braving the wind and snow, fighting fiercely with the enemy all the way, restraining and mobilizing a large number of Japanese and puppet troops, and relieving the pressure on the Xiajiang coalition forces, the coalition forces gathered in Xiajiang began to dispute. The debate also kicked off. After the coalition meeting ended, the North Manchurian Provisional Provincial Committee sent the meeting documents to Zhou Baozhong and the 5th Army Party Committee, "We feel that these documents are of great significance to the work of Manchukuo", "I hope you will study them in detail and provide opinions." . On December 28, "Letter from Zhou Baozhong to Li Fulin" stated that after reading the resolutions of the meeting, he believed that "the problem is extremely serious" and "we must first meet and discuss everything with you. If Comrade Commander Zhao cannot come south, Comrade Zhang Shouzhen or Feng It is most urgent that you come from the south and meet with me first.” Of course Zhou Baozhong knew what was going on with the Jidong Special Committee and the Central Representative in the Northeast. If the Northern Manchurian Provisional Provincial Committee denied everything, the problem was of course serious.Moreover, Jidong and Beiman have been fighting each other for a long time, and the leaders rarely meet, and misunderstandings are inevitable.Also, after the central delegation decided to abolish the Manchuria Provincial Committee, the Harbin Special Committee was formed, and the Zhuhe Central County Committee got in touch with the Harbin Special Committee, but Gil Dong knew nothing about it.Just like the "Central Representative in the Northeast" in Beiman who didn't understand where Jidong came from, why did "Hart" appear again?Ji Dong's side is also suspicious. On January 24, 1937, "Zhou Baozhong's letter to Comrade Feng and forwarded to Zhao Shangzhi" stated: The gene of all serious trends lies in the differences and suspicions of the North Manchurian Party and the three armed forces on the central line. The time is extended by one day, and the potential danger of guerrilla movements that affect the more tense struggle with the current situation is increased by one day. However, we finally believe that the comrades in the North Manchurian Party and the three armed forces are the party of Bolshevik, the heroic executors of the general line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the pillars of the Northeast Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Guerrilla Movement.The so-called divergence of routes is actually nothing more than some differences in the execution methods of work, and many so-called divergences of routes are actually caused by misunderstandings and isolation of communication and communication. However, if it is prolonged, then there will be real routes formed The danger of disagreement. On the 25th, "Song" (Yu Huanan, a member of the Jidong Special Committee and a liaison officer of the Central Representative in Northeast China—the author) to Comrade Feng and Commander Zhao said: I met with Comrade Li Fulin in Mudanjiang, and as a result of the conversation, I learned in detail that you have cut off direct mutual contact with the Central Committee for a year.At the same time, after reading the resolution of the North Manchurian Provisional Provincial Committee, it emphasized that the organization was disordered and the line was different. We have nothing to do with it. It is just a gap between you and the central government. There are some doubts, and there is no place to question them.At the same time, you have not obtained the resolution of the Seventh International Congress and the new materials on the united front, and the application of the line is still sticking to the old rules. Although there was a misunderstanding, they were all seeking truth from facts at this time, and their attitude was quite peaceful. Correspondence is a kind of exchange and communication, but some things can only be discussed in person.Not to mention the limitations of the letter, sometimes a few words may deepen misunderstandings.However, it is impossible for Zhao Shangzhi, who led the expedition, to come south, and Zhang Shouzhen, Feng Zhongyun and Zhou Baozhong are also separated by hundreds of miles.Zhou Baozhong and Yu Hua went north and south to meet Zhao Shangzhi and Feng Zhongyun. For the same reason, Jidong couldn't delay too long for a mess, and had to return halfway, and the "urgent" meeting was difficult to achieve. The ensuing correspondence became a pen-and-ink lawsuit. On February 12, Yu Huanan wrote a letter to the Northern Manchurian Provisional Provincial Committee and the leaders of the 3rd Army and 6th Army, saying that he "stands in Jidong's party qualifications", and systematically criticized some problems in the draft resolution of the Zhutang Joint Meeting, " If Wang and Kang are believed to be right-leaning, then the International and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China are also right-leaning, does that make sense?" Pointing out that the North Manchurian party and army "misinterpreted Wang Kangxin's internal strength to avoid the sacrifice of cadres as a retreat strategy." On March 2, 5 days before the Bingtianzi victory, "XXX (the author withholds his name) to Zhuhe, Tangyuan Central County Party Committee to Northern Manchurian Temporary Provincial Party Committee" stated that the joint meeting " It is wrong to deny the letter from the representative of the Central Committee in Northeast China without any basis.” “In fact, the organizational relationship is not chaotic. It is your own petty bourgeois nervousness that has caused unreasonable suspicion.” “I firmly want the North Manchuria Provisional Committee to wake up completely.” . Soon, the Provisional Provincial Party Committee of North Manchuria received documents from the Seventh Congress of the Communist International.This time there was no need to guess riddles. Feng Zhongyun and others felt that criticizing "Wang Kangxin" was untenable in terms of organizational principles, and began to change their attitudes.However, he still insists that "Jitexin" and "Zhongdaixin" made a right-leaning mistake in Wang Kangxin's understanding. In terms of specific work instructions, because he did not understand the actual situation in North Manchuria, he was overly affirmative and there were many mistakes. Flaws and mistakes. Because of this, some comrades of Git have amplified this right error and made more and serious mistakes!" Afterwards, on the surface, it seemed that there was no misunderstanding, and they turned to arguing about differences in specific strategies. You said I was right-leaning, and I said you were "left" leaning, and the tone became higher. On May 15, "Zhou Baozhong's Letter to Wang Guangyu" said: Our Jidong Party is not without mistakes, but it does not conform to the accusations of the Northern Manchurian Provincial Party Committee. In short, the North Manchurian Party needs our assistance to change its line.Ji Dong's own part of the "Left" and Right deviation had to be completely corrected.But we must understand that Beiman is full of mistakes in violation of the route, and Jidong is a mistake in the operation of the route. Ten days later, the "Letter from the Jidong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Nanman Provincial Committee, the Daonan Special Committee, the Party Committee of the Second Army, and the Party Committee of the Second Division of the Second Army" stated: Comrades from North Manchuria and the 3rd Army "has always been 'Left'. Its greatest manifestation was the resolution of the Zhutang Joint Meeting in October 1936 (year), anti-international and anti-central (it is undeniable that the central government has a strong influence on organizational ties and political issues) Leadership has flaws)". In late June, traffic workers who had been traveling between Beiman and Jidong for half a year finally had a chance to take a breather and rest their feet. On the 28th, an enlarged meeting of the Executive Committee of the Provisional Provincial Party Committee of Beiman was held in Maoershan 6th Army Clothes Factory. Attending the meeting were Zhao Shangzhi, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Commander-in-Chief of the Federation, and Commander of the 3rd Army; Feng Zhongyun, Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee; Zhang Lansheng, Member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and Director of Propaganda; Zhang Shouzhen, Director of the Political Department, Wei Changkui, Executive Member of the Provincial Party Committee and Zhuhe Local Party Representative, Yang ××, Local Party Representative of Tangyuan, Li Xishan, Executive Member of the Provincial Party Committee, Director of the Political Department of the 1st Division of the 3rd Army, Dai Hongbin, Commander of the 6th Army, and 4th Division of the 6th Army Division Commander Wu Yuguang, Army Secretary-General Huang Yinqiu, Secretary of the Youth League Provincial Committee Huang Chengzhi. Zhou Baozhong, commander of the 5th Army, was invited to attend the meeting as a representative of the Jidong Provincial Party Committee.The minutes of the meeting were Yu Baohe, Chief of the Propaganda Section of the 3rd Army, and Xu Wenbin, Chief of the Propaganda Section of the 6th Army. It's really not easy for so many heavyweights to get together, and it's even more serious if something happens.Therefore, Zhao Shangzhi carefully arranged three lines of defense in advance.The first route was led by Yu Zhiyuan, commander of the 9th Division of the 3rd Army, and Lei Yan, director of the Political Department, who led the cavalry to move along the road from Yilan to Fujin to contain the enemy.The second route is in the area of ​​Tangwang River Estuary and Zhulian Town. The 3rd Army and 6th Army each sent a regiment to set up checkpoints and patrol along the route.The third road is around the venue, and the juvenile company of the 3rd Army Command is in charge of guarding. During the 10-day meeting, the participants and their entourage trampled on their horses, and the grass near the secret camp fell down, and there were many footprints. There was no secret at all. Soon after the meeting, the clothing factory was relocated. The big woodcut house of the quilt factory is built on a hillside facing south, with a flat and spacious yard, a gurgling river in front, and the surrounding green trees cover the sky.On the north side of the room is a large kang, and on the south side is a rectangular wooden table the size of a ping-pong table.Xu Wenbin, Yu Baohe, Huang Chengzhi, Zhao Shangzhi, Feng Zhongyun, and Zhou Baozhong sat on the east side from north to south, and on the opposite side were Yang ××, Wei Changkui, Li Xishan, Zhang Shouzhen, Zhang Lansheng, Huang Yinqiu, Baishuijiang, and Wu Yuguang.In the kitchen without partitions, in the yard outside and beside the small river, the factory manager Pei Chengchun led Li Zaide, Li Min and others to wash rice and vegetables, and went all out to serve the meeting, being careful not to make noise. Feng Zhongyun announced the opening of the meeting, all stood up and sang the "Internationale", then silent for three minutes to the revolutionary martyrs, bowed three times to the party flag, and then began to speak at the meeting. Zhao Shangzhi made a work report on behalf of the provincial party committee as the chairman of the executive committee of the provincial party committee, and Feng Zhongyun made a supplementary speech on the work report. When discussing the issue of line, heated debates were launched on how to deal with the "big incident", "anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurianism" and "group and tribe". On the way Zhao Shangzhi sent his troops westward and returned from the expedition, some traffic personnel should have delivered some letters to him, so it cannot be said that he knew much about the debate unfolding in the rear.But all this was of little concern to him. Zhao Shangzhi believed that we should not passively wait for the "major event" and that "anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurianism should not be mentioned together" means that there is no distinction between the enemy and ourselves. He persuaded the masses to return to the Datun and prevented the destruction from returning to the Datun. contact. Zhou Baozhong wrote in his diary that day: "Comrade Shang Zhi knew that Wang and Kang Xin were right-leaning. Due to the work of the Jidong, Dongman Second and Fifth Armies, Wang and Kang's instruction letter only mentioned the guerrilla movement and did not mention the general anti-Japanese issues. Wang , Kang’s letter of instruction did not include specific measures for the riots and struggles of the people. If the letter of instruction from the superior cannot meet the requirements of the subordinate and falls behind the objective situation, difficulties will inevitably arise in the work. Kang Xin's non-specificity and misinterpretation occurred." Zhou Baozhong believed that Wang Ming and Kang Sheng were the representatives of the Party Central Committee, and opposing Wang and Kang was opposing the Party Central Committee, and it was a non-organizational activity that caused small factions.We must respect the party's organizational principles, implement Wang and Kang's instructions, and fight against unorganized and undisciplined non-organizational behavior. Feng Zhongyun hesitated again and again, and said that Wang and Kang represented the central government, and they could not oppose it, and they could not oppose it even if they were wrong. Zhang Shouzhen later spoke, saying that "anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurianism should not be mentioned together" was not a slogan proposed by the central government, and we cannot implement it. If it was proposed by the party central committee, we would consider implementing it.I agree with Zhou Baozhong's organizational principles, and I cannot object to Wang and Kang's instructions. Li Xishan believed that "anti-Japanese and anti-Manchurianism should not be mentioned together" was wrong. Unlike the central government's line, Wang and Kang could not represent the central government. Wu Yuguang, Wei Changkui, Huang Chengzhi, Yu Baohe, Xu Wenbin and others all agreed with Zhao Shangzhi's opinion.Zhang Lansheng and Bai Shuijiang's attitudes were not clear, but they basically agreed with Feng Zhongyun and Zhang Shouzhen's opinions. This enlarged meeting of the provincial executive committee is actually a reflection on the Zhutang joint meeting.Or affirmation, or negation, or the affirmation of the affirmation, the negation of the negation.In the resolution on August 8 after the meeting, it was written: Although Wang Kangxin did not give detailed and more specific instructions on each issue of the struggle movement, the general spirit is correct, positive, forward and struggling. Although the joint meeting has any mistakes and shortcomings in its political organization, we cannot use these individual issues to oppose the correctness of the joint meeting as a whole. In any case, the joint meeting has not deviated from the international central political line, and it is not yet a small organization. Or anti-party.Moreover, at the time when the "Right" deviation had become a serious crisis, standing on the general political line of the International Central Committee, and in the spirit of opposing the serious "Right" crisis, theoretically cracked down on the serious mistakes of "Right" opportunism, No one can deny that the correct central work tasks have been determined, and considerable achievements and effects have been achieved in politics, theory, ideology, and practical work. The meeting elected Zhang Lansheng as the temporary secretary of the Northern Manchurian Provincial Party Committee, Wei Changkui as the Minister of Organization, and Feng Zhongyun as the Minister of Propaganda.It was also decided to transfer Zhang Shouzhen as the director of the Political Department of the 3rd Army, and Li Xishan as the director of the Political Department of the 9th Army. From the Zhutang joint meeting to the enlarged meeting of the provincial executive committee, one of the focuses of debate is how to treat "group tribes". In July 1936, two months before the Zhutang Joint Meeting, Zhao Shangzhi led a team westward to Bayan and Mulan returned to Tangyuan. When he saw Hou Qigang at the military headquarters, he said worriedly: If the Northeast is returned to Datun like Bamu, after another two years, all guerrilla movements will fail. In April 1937, "Letter from Chen Hanzhang, Member of the Standing Committee of the Taonan Special Committee of the Communist Party of China, to the Central Delegation" stated: Group tribes everywhere. When the "group tribe" first appeared in Dongman, many people did not understand what the devils were doing.In its report to the Manchuria Provincial Party Committee, the Eastern Manchurian Special Committee referred to it as "collective farms" and "collective farms".For quite a long time, quite a few party organizations in various places did not have a clear understanding of the dangers of "group tribes" and the scale and determination of the devils to engage in "group tribes". ".The reason is that returning to villages will bankrupt the rural economy, impoverish the people, and further intensify social conflicts. At the beginning of 1936, more than 200 peasant households in Raohegou asked the 7th Army for guns, preparing to resist returning to the village with arms.Similar situations exist everywhere.They traveled thousands of miles to the east of the Guandong. The place where they settled down was chosen by themselves. Some of them had lived there for several generations. Not to mention the family property of several generations, even if the family was completely empty, who would want to leave the hot land?Even if the rich people hide their beards and go to the city, no matter what business or business they open in the city, the root is also in the land and compound in the countryside.As for rich landowners like "Hericium erinaceus", no matter whether there are cans of ocean or not, they are buried in the house or somewhere in the courtyard, and the house will be burned down with a fire. Abandoned, can he not risk his life to fight the Japanese? As for the Anti-Japanese Alliance, those scattered families in the mountains and mountains have all returned to Datun, isolated from the masses, and have no food or shelter. What should we do?hit?The landlord's compound is difficult enough to fight, that is, high walls and gun towers, while the "group tribe" is like a small city, with ditches and barbed wire outside the walls. In addition to the pseudo-self-defense regiment, there are also pseudo-police, Puppet troops, and some devils.The Taipingchuan tribe in Huachuan County stationed a squadron of devils, and many counties did not have so many devils.Before the gunshot, the security call was made, and the enemy came along the security road for reinforcements.Besides, how much capital do you have to attack the hardest and hardest?Is this still called guerrilla or guerrilla warfare? On June 11, 1937, Hideki Tojo, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, said at a meeting to convey Order No. 995: "Such groups and tribes are the most feared by bandits, so they must destroy them." "Jitexin" and "Zhongdaixin" instructed not to openly oppose Datun, but to let the masses go to Datun, hoping to carry out legal and semi-legal struggles in Datun. As will be written later, there are successful examples, but this can only be very rare. The gate of the tribe is closed and opened at regular intervals every day."Registration" is required when leaving the tribe (in some areas it is called "hangtiao", which has multiple meanings such as registration, reporting, and asking for leave), "registration" is required for visitors, and "registration" is required for visiting relatives. For "bandit".Visitors must have a "residence permit", and relatives must apply for a "travel permit".To go up the mountain to collect firewood and go down to the river to fish, you must have a license, and even to carry water by the river must have a fire-marked wooden sign.Human thinking and behavior cannot be unaffected by the environment.Hunting, logging, and gathering mountain products, etc., are more profitable than farming in the mountains, so you have to deal with all kinds of armed forces and maintain a friendly relationship with them.Moreover, no one knows about helping the Anti-Union in the mountains except for the beasts.Even the three generations of the ancestors are transparent about the affairs of each family in the old village.This time, more than a dozen or dozens of villages are assembled into a tribe. Under the eyes of the enemy, there are new faces everywhere. Who knows who is related to whom?Who is the spy, the informer?Some places simply put up a note saying "Don't talk about state affairs".However, the original local parties are almost all open. Once they need to go underground, there is no "underground" at all. How can they enter the tribe to do secret work? On August 28, 1937, the "Letter from Zhao Shangzhi and Zhang Shouzhen to Brother Xiang" stated: The Central Committee's simple instructions on the strategy of fighting for Datun have made our comrades who have rarely experienced struggles "blind" for two years, and have never had a more correct and effective way to answer the urgent demands of the masses. Zhao Shangzhi believes that just as guerrilla warfare cannot resolve the final outcome of a war, it is impossible for us to completely prevent the construction of "group tribes" because the strength of the enemy and ourselves lies there.However, it must be attacked, destroyed, and delayed where possible.It can be delayed for as long as it can be, and one more day is one more day of initiative.It is unrealistic to attempt to carry out a legal and semi-legal struggle in Datun, and it is even more wrong to persuade the masses to return to Datun, which is playing into the hands of the enemy. Some old people said that Zhao Shangzhi always held a small stick in his hand, a two-foot-long ash stick.When others speak, he sits in his seat and listens, so he doesn't have much time to sit when he speaks.I couldn't sit still while I was talking, and I walked and talked on the floor of the room, and when I got excited, the stick was flapping and waving in my hand, and a compelling light burst out from one eye.He knew what it meant to persuade the masses to return to the Datun Anti-Japanese Alliance, and he was anxious to get angry. Some old people said: Zhao Shangzhi has such a snarky mouth, even if several people are tied together, they can't beat him. The question is, is he right? No matter how correct and instructive the "Jite letter" and "Zhongdai letter" are on the macro level, persuading the masses to return to Datun is a fatal blemish. Another focus of debate at the enlarged meeting of the Provincial Executive Committee was the "Central Delegation: The New Political Line of the Central Committee" on October 2, 1936. As for "Wang Kangxin" mentioning the military movement work against the puppet army and the landlord's armed forces as "occupying the first important position in the party's work", Zhao Shangzhi disagreed. is developed from this. On November 15, 1936, the "Central New Political Line" reposted in the "Notice of the Fifth Army Party Committee" stated: In "Manchukuo" there were still Chinese people, and many staff, officers, and soldiers among them were also dissatisfied with the colonial oppression of the Japanese invaders, and sympathized with the resistance against Japan or adopted a neutral attitude.We proposed the anti-Japanese united front without mentioning "anti-Manchu", the purpose is to (isolate) the Japanese aggressors, so that a certain part of the "Manchu army" can join the anti-Japanese united front or make them neutral. Regarding the puppet Manchukuo personnel, mainly the puppet army sympathized with, helped the guerrillas, and resisted the Allied Forces, many of which have already been written before.Even the Jing'an Army, known as the "Royal Army" of the "Manchukuo"" by the puppet army, or the "Red Sleeve Head", won the trust of the Japanese invaders. Major General Fujii Juro was stabbed to death by soldier Li Yufeng.After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lieutenant General Nanmu Shanglong was assassinated again when he wanted to send him to fight in the Philippines.Since the establishment of the Jing'an Army, the assassination of Japanese officers of the immediate boss, as well as mutiny, anyway, have also occurred from time to time. 1935年只有一个日本人的安图县，有个绥芬大甸子街，居民1万多人。东满特委在这里有个区工委，5个支部，党员117人，反日会已成当地公开的政权机关，与伪政权共存。而老百姓有什么问题，像结婚、离婚、地亩、地租纠纷，都来找反日会解决，因为反日会办事公道，还不用花钱。反日会为2军和义勇军筹集粮款，伪政府不管。驻街伪军一个营，与2军和义勇军有秘密协议：一是彼此互不进攻；二是日军来了，伪军要提前送信，打仗时冲天放枪；三是尽力为抗日武装解决弹药及各种物品；四是保护当地反日组织、人员；五是伪军士兵有反日言论自由，并允许反日武装在伪军中进行反日宣传。 “大甸子现象”只是个例，而与伪军订立协议，互不开战，互通情报，则在各地或多或少都有。但是有个前提，就是在那个小环境内，你比他强大，或者旗鼓相当，或者另有许多对他不利的因素。 一个因素是他们是中国人，再一个是要给自己留条后路，不想把坏事做绝。宝清县三人班伪自卫团文书戴焕章，是3军4师32团副官，为抗联收集情报，购买东西，32团团长李明顺也常来常往，伪团总王贞什么都知道，还挺帮忙。可像张传福那样让他反正，参加抗联，想都别想。他常挂在嘴边的一句话是：“与人方便，自己方便。” 这种人物，这种心态，在与抗联订立协议的各色敌伪武装中，是比较普遍的。 但是，以上只是问题的一个方面，而且只是其中较少的部分。 许多老人说，天气暖和了，树叶关门了，咱们的好日子来了，伪军、伪自卫团对你也格外客气了。树叶落了，老天爷变脸了，秋冬季“讨伐”要开始了，许多人也变脸了。有什么事找到他们，就推三阻四起来。待到1938年后抗联进入困难时期，包括一些所谓“外白内红”的甲长也日趋反动，见到抗联别说不告密，不打你就不错了。 道理很简单，他们是敌人。 他们是中国人，有时也会表现出点中国人的良心。可是，要他们在国家、民族与个人利益之间进行选择，他们最终会选择自己。不然，抗联与伪军进行了那么多的战斗，有时还是很激烈的战斗，以及东边道“独立大讨伐”，就难以解释了。 “抗日反满不并提”，是从关内的“抗日反蒋不并提”演绎过来的。蒋介石反共、剿共，可他是抗日的。“满洲国”是个什么东西？是日寇一手制造出来的怪胎，溥仪是大汉奸，“满”军被老百姓称做“汉奸队”、“走狗军”。如此演绎，岂不是牛唇对上了马嘴？ “中代信”说“不应把满军与日军同样当敌人看待”——这话应改作“不应把满军与日军当做同样的敌人看待”。因为他们确有区别，不大一样，并不像当时的一幅宣传画画的，一个日军和一个伪军拥抱在一起，上面写着“日满两军亲如一体”。 真理再向前迈一步就是谬误。“中国人不打中国人”这个口号，曾被人视为没有阶级性，是向前迈了一步。而从伪军与日军确有不同，到“不应把满军与日军同样当敌人看待”，再到“抗日反满不并提”，迈出去的可就不止一步了。 在省执委扩大会上，赵尚志不能不对“抗日反满不并提”痛加驳斥——它对于抗联造成的危害，虽然不像劝群众归大屯那样大，却也是个涉及抗日民族统一战线的战略问题呀。 赵尚志激烈抨击的另一个问题，是“等待大事变”。 我们是处在紧迫关头，残酷的斗争着，工作着，积蓄保存进步和发展着，促进和造成一切有把握的胜利条件，而绝不是和平等待，消极退守，以为大的事变来，东北民族革命自然就成功，大事变不来，民族革命就算完了的一切错误观念，而产生目前最危险的右倾路线或曲解国际路线，认为目前是准备大事变的时期，不是领导紧迫斗争的时期。 以上是珠汤联席会议决议草案中的文字。而在此之后，北满临时省委和赵尚志等人批驳“等待大事变”，以及“抗日反满不并提”和劝群众归大屯的言论，比这更精练、更深刻，因为都是写给某人、某单位的信件，就不引录了。 “打”字当头的赵尚志，一向反对消极避战，“老熊蹲仓”，坐吃山空，怎能容忍“等待大事变”？ 问题是“王康信”中说的，是“我们的策略现时不是将所有的反日力量'孤注一掷'，而是要更大的准备群众，积蓄力量，保存和发展游击队的实力，培养大批军事干部，以作为准备将来更大战争和更大事变的基础”，是“准备大事变”，而非“等待大事变”。“准备”是磨刀擦枪，整军备战，一旦号角吹响，就跃出堑壕，发起攻击，与“等待”不是同一概念。那么，赵尚志和北满临时省委，为什么要批评“等待大事变”呢？ “王康信”是装在暖壶的夹层里，由交通员从海参崴交通站送到吉东特委的。当晚李范五复写6份，1份送往满洲省委，其余送到所属县委和4军、5军。珠河中心县委接到后，冯仲云让于保合刻写油印100多份，分送各县委和3军。 有老人说，会不会是复写、刻印时弄错了，把“准备”写成了“等待”？或者几个字油印得不清楚，顺着上下文意思一溜，就溜出个“等待”？不然，赵尚志怎么就认准了这两个字？有这个必要吗？随“王康信”一道发下来的还有个通知，告诉大家王明、康生是什么人。赵尚志若是故意把“准备”曲解成“等待”，那不是太岁头上动土吗？况且，他对“王康信”总体上是肯定呀？ 那时的信件，经常是坐在树底下写完了，交给通讯员就带走了。丢字落字错别字，字迹潦草看不清，有信封装错的，有缺页的，有途中淋雨、过河弄湿了，模糊不清的。晚上露营，衣服烧了，信也烧了，烧大了就废了，就根据那些残缺不全的文字猜吧、溜吧。 以上只是猜测，可以定论的，是有人确是在“等待”。这种情况在当年的文件中是不难见到的，连关东宪兵司令部也说某某部队“其行动却最为消沉”（请读者理解，就不注释了）。而在“王康信”指示不要孤注一掷，要积蓄力量，准备更大事变后，一些人等待得好像更心安理得了。连批评北满不执行“中代信”是“妄加曲解，故作误会”的人，后来也说“必须排除那些无根据的再等更大事变的机会主义的观点”。 在赵尚志的心目中，“准备”也不仅仅是磨刀擦枪，等到大事变到来再跃出堑壕，而是现在就要主动、积极地作战，向敌人统治薄弱地带突击。他没有说出“我们也是大事变的促成者”这样的话，他是用行动说的。 “大事变”这3个字，对于终年在山林僻壤游击的抗联官兵，已是够费解的了。问题还在于“我们的策略现时不是将所有的反日力量'孤注一掷'”，究竟有没有、有多少针对性？即便认为七七事变爆发是大事变到来了的人，也没有孤注一掷，拼命一战。老熊蹲仓般等待着的，倒有人在。赵尚志和北满临时省委，则认为七七事变还不是大事变。赵尚志的“打”字当头，3军、3路军的远征，更是与孤注一掷风马牛不相及。 “曲解”两个字频繁出现的第一个高峰，是在贯彻执行“1·26”指示信期间，杨靖宇、赵尚志、李延禄、周保中等人，都曾被批评为“曲解”统一战线为“上层勾结”。而珠汤联席会议后，则是吉东和北满互相指责对方“曲解”这个，“曲解”那个。再后来，这个是不是帽子的东西，就逐渐归结、集中到赵尚志的头上了。 王明，原名陈绍禹，字露清。他有许多笔名、化名和俄译化名，“王明”是1931年在苏联担任中共中央驻共产国际代表后使用的名字。 1904年，王明生于安徽省六安县金家寨镇。父亲陈嘉渭在镇子里开个小店，经营竹木。土地革命时期，担任六安县六区反帝大同盟主席和赤色互济会主席，国民党占领金家寨后，还组织群众给红军送盐送鞋。王明是家中长子，弟弟妹妹都是党员，先后参加革命，小妹妹还参加了长征。 王明聪明，六岁读书，八岁即能写对联卖钱，补贴家用。十六岁考入省立第三甲种农业学校，又考入武昌商科大学，并开始接受进步思想。前面介绍了本书许多人物在五卅运动中的作为。或者投身其间，或者置身事外，或者逆潮流而动，这是那个时代的青年学生都要作出的选择。王明表现积极，并在同年秋天入团入党，从此开始了职业革命家生涯。 使王明命运发生重大转折的，是随后到莫斯科中山大学学习，并受到副校长米夫的青睐。中国留学生精英济济，而王明半年内对俄语即能说会读，列宁、斯大林的一些经典语录张口即来。在二十五岁的没到过中国的副校长心目中，这个聪颖、俊秀的二十二岁中国青年，就有了种鹤立鸡群的感觉。王明当上中山大学学生公社主席是选举的，米夫的欣赏、信任和施加的影响，也是显然的。有了这个基点，再加上“阶级祖国”、共产国际这样居高临下的背景，王明后来平步青云也就不难理解了。其实，无论他在中共中央获取多么高的地位，在独具特色的中国革命斗争中，终其一生，也只能算个缺乏实践经验的难成大器的书生型人物。 回到本书，王明对东北抗战的重要贡献，是起草了“1·26”指示信、“王康信”和《八一宣言》。前者第一次提出在东北建立全民族的反帝统一战线的策略方针，纠正了“北方会议”的孤家寡人路线，使东北的抗日救国运动开始走向正轨，是一份里程碑式的文件。后者则向全国同胞提出停止内战、一致抗日，号召组织全中国统一的国防政府和抗日联军，并明确宣布“苏维埃政府和共产党愿意作成立这种国防政府的发起人”，“红军绝对首先加入联军，以尽抗日救国的天职”。这是中国共产党历史上一个非常重要的文件，为抗日民族统一战线提供了理论基础，并直接导致“一二·九”运动的爆发，从而掀起抗日救亡运动高潮。据说，毛泽东也赞扬了《八一宣言》。 北满临时省委执委会扩大会决议案中，认为“王康未有把每一个斗争运动问题都详细的更具体的指示”，这是苛求了。这样的文件即便不是没有的，也是极少的。任何文件都不能不受到各种各样的局限，连《八一宣言》也有缺点、不足，“1·26”指示信更是明显地拖着个“北方会议”的尾巴。我们今天看到的一些近乎完美的文件、著作，有的当年并不完全是那个样子。至于因为王明、康生后来变成了人所共知的那种人，就认为他们在娘胎里就不是好东西，做不出好事，否定他们的历史作用和功绩，更是站不住脚的、有害的。 但是，造成北满和吉东党的误会、分歧，并引发长达四年之久的亲者痛、仇者快的内争，这两个人是无论如何也脱离不了干系的。 半年多时间，上海中央局连续4次被破坏，主要领导人被捕叛变，杨光华等人又是这期间从上海调来的，王明、康生怀疑满洲省委也有问题，调杨光华等人去莫斯科，审查他们，应不为过。 准备成立南满、东满、吉东、松江4个省委，无疑也是正确的。实际上，之前的南满、东满、吉东3个特委，和北满的珠河、汤原两个中心县委，起的也是这样的作用。而成立4个小省委，显然更便于集中领导这四大游击战略区的抗战。 但是，撤销满洲省委，无论从哪方面说，都是没有道理的、错误的。 看看吉东所处的地理位置，就明白从莫斯科到海参崴，再到吉东，中央代表团通过这条线领导东北抗战是很便利的。但是，吉东特委也好，吉东省委也罢，都只能是转达中央代表团的指示，而不能取代满洲省委的地位。认为杨光华等人有问题，可以改组省委，杨靖宇、魏拯民都是省委委员，魏拯民应该是代理书记的非常合适的人选。如果认为经吉东再哈尔滨太远，浪费时间，贻误战机，满洲省委可以迁到吉东，或者干脆上队。实际上，满洲省委被撤销前后，一些地区的党组织已经陆续上队了。 问题的缘起，表面上看，似乎是因了误会和分歧。其实，各地斗争环境不同，领导人的思想、性格、作风也有差异，对于北方会议以来的方针、政策的理解也难免差异，行为方式自然也有差异，你可能左点，他可能右点。当不同风格的各军猬集下江，再加上经济利益的碰撞，误会和意见分歧、争论，也是自然的、难免的。 也就是说，即便吉东没说满洲省委有内奸，吉东没出叛徒，特委没被破坏，“吉特信”、“中代信”中，没有那样几处事关战略方针的明显的硬伤，后来的事情迟早也会发生的，问题大小而已。除非像南满那样，天各一方，互不接触。 1941年1月1日，《金日成、安吉、徐哲给王新林的报告——关于抗联第一路军情况和对问题的答复》中，第15个问题为：“对北满、吉东、及南满党委之互相关系以及领导意见之交换关系，总的对党委和领导人之分歧都是哪些问题？”回答是：“南满党委与吉东及北满党委长期没发生关系，因此也没发生过什么分歧的意见。” 1935年夏，日伪军疯狂“讨伐”珠河地区，“治标”、“治本”双管齐下，中心县委向满洲省委告急，省委又能怎么着？手中没有一兵一卒，又不可能从其他地区调兵增援。就是在平时，偌大的东北，只有个满洲省委，人手又少，一些事情也是鞭长莫及。东北没有南方大革命的经历，党员少，底子薄，每省一个省委也只能是空架子。况且，成立4个小省委领导4个游击区，那游击区之外的哈尔滨、长春、奉天、大连等城市，以及其他广大城乡的党组织，又该怎么办？无论有没有、有多少个小省委，都必须有个类似东北局的满洲省委这样的大省委，来统一掌管、领导、号令一切。“家有百口，主事一人。”党组织也是一样。没有领导，没大没小，各行其是，岂不乱套了？ 事实就是乱套了。 如今国内外的绿茵场上，无论有多少黑哨、假哨，如果没了裁判，那球还能踢吗？ 满洲省委当然不是裁判，它是领导、指导东北抗日救国的，当然也可以协调、裁定下级党组织的分歧、矛盾。以赵尚志、周保中、张寿篯等人的党性，倘若满洲省委还在，做出决定说句话，他们能不听吗？大敌当前，会耗费那么大的精力，没完没了地争论几年吗？ 前面写过几笔的北满省委交通员于兰阁，1942年春被派到绥棱县二道河子做地方工作，很快打开局面。他的办法是广