Chapter 25 Chapter 9 The Good of Justice-2

When I propose principles of justice, I usually arrange them in lexical order, so that the first principle takes precedence over the second.I have explained the meaning of this order of precedence and made it manifest in the rules of precedence (Sections 39, 46).I call these sequential principles a particular conception of justice as opposed to a general conception of justice (§11, §26).But I must still connect the reasons for this arrangement, though I have mentioned its theoretical convenience, and I have endeavored to show that its conclusions agree well with our considered judgments.Moreover, the discussion of the first principle shows why men in the original position should place the first priority on their concern for equal liberty.Now that the various components of a theory of justice have been presented, it is time to consider the general arguments for this priority.

I mentioned earlier the intuitive notion that the right to liberty takes precedence (section 26).My assumption is that if people in the original position believed that their basic liberties could be effectively exercised, they would not trade some lesser liberty for an improvement in their economic well-being, at least up to a certain level of wealth Sometimes they won't do it.One recognizes limitations on these rights only when social conditions prevent them from being validly established.The denial of the right to equal liberty is acceptable only if it is necessary to improve the quality of culture so that, in due course, all may enjoy equal liberty.Arranging these two principles in lexical order is a long-standing tendency of a general conception of justice that has been pursued under fairly favorable conditions.Finally, there will be a period in the history of a well-ordered society after which the particular forms of these two principles will prevail.It will then presumably prove that this arrangement is justified from the point of view of the parties in the original position.The good-as-reasonable view and the principles of moral psychology apparently answer this question in part.

The grounds for the priority of liberty are roughly as follows: As the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance of our larger economic and social interests, compared with the concern for liberty, gradually decreases, because as the conditions conducive to the exercise of equal liberty are improved, The more fully realized, the more intense the concern for liberty.From the point of view of the original position, the acceptance of less liberty in exchange for greater material wealth and a more comfortable position becomes irrational beyond a certain point, and remains irrational.Let's point out why this is the case.First, as the level of general welfare rises (this level is represented by an index of the primary goods expected to be received by the less beneficiary), it is only some less urgent needs that still need to be further improved, at least This is the case where people's needs are not primarily generated by institutions and social formations.At the same time, the barriers to the exercise of equal liberty have decreased, and the spirit of asserting the right to pursue our spiritual and cultural interests has grown.Individuals and groups are attracted to the goals and advantages of equal liberty, and they seek to realize them in various interest associations in a manner consistent with social associations of equal liberty.Therefore, it is more and more important to ensure the free internal life of these associations.In addition, people began to gain control over the legal regulations governing their groups, either through their own direct participation in the group's affairs or indirectly through representatives with whom they were closely related in terms of cultural and social status.

Of course, even if liberty priorities are valid, not all material needs can be met.On the contrary, material desires are not so important as making people in the primitive position reasonably agree to accept unequal liberty to satisfy these needs.Accounting for the good enables the parties to propose a structural hierarchy of their different interests and to note which goals should be prescriptive in their rational life plans.The relative urgency of individuals' concerns for liberty cannot be determined decisively in advance until their basic needs can be met.This urgency is determined by the requirements of the least benefited from the constitutional and legislative stages.But under favorable circumstances the chief concern which determines the plan of our lives will in the end take precedence.One reason for this I have already discussed in relation to the right to freedom of conscience and freedom of thought.A second reason is the importance of self-esteem as a basic good and the desire of people to express their nature in free social association with others.For example, the desire for liberty is a prescriptive primary concern that the parties must assume they will sooner or later share.The veil of ignorance obliged them to leave aside the details of their life plans, leading to this conclusion.Thus, there is a sequence of these two principles.

However, even if the desire for an absolute increase in economic gain diminishes, people's concerns about their relative position in the distribution of wealth will continue.In fact, if we assume that each person wants a larger share of the distribution, the resulting desire for material abundance may become increasingly stronger.As individuals strive to achieve goals that cannot be achieved collectively, it is conceivable that society might become increasingly focused on improving productivity and economic efficiency.These goals may become so salient that they undermine the primacy of the right to liberty.It is on this principle that some have objected to the tendency towards equality, which, they think, may obsess the individual about his relative share in the distribution of the wealth of the community.Notwithstanding the fact that in a well-ordered society there may very well be a tendency to demand greater equality, the members of that society are seldom interested in their relative status as such.They are, as we have seen, less susceptible to envy and caution, for for the most part they do what they think is best, according to the judgment of their own plans for life, and do not Frustrated by seeing other people's greater pleasures.Therefore, there is no strong psychological tendency to reduce their liberties in favor of greater absolute or relative economic well-being.The desire for a higher relative position in the distribution of material wealth should be sufficiently weak not to affect the priority of liberty.

This does not mean, of course, that in a just society everyone is indifferent to questions of status.The account of self-esteem, perhaps counted as the main primary good, has highlighted the enormous significance of how we think others judge us.But the satisfaction of the need for status in a well-ordered society depends not only on the general recognition of just institutions but also on the rich and varied inner life of the many free associations of interests that the right to equal liberty permits.In a just society, therefore, self-esteem is based not on the amount of one's income but on a generally recognized distribution of basic rights and liberties.Since this distribution is equal, men all have a somewhat similar secure position in the conduct of common affairs together in the wider society.No one would seek further political means to secure his position than the constitutional guarantee of equality.On the other hand, no one is willing to accept some kind of insufficient equal liberty.For one thing, doing so might put them at a disadvantage and, from a strategic point of view, weaken their political position.Moreover, this may have the effect of generally confirming their inferior status, which is determined by the basic structure of society.This subordination in the public forum is felt in attempts to participate in political and economic life and in association with persons of greater freedom.This status is indeed humiliating and destructive to one's self-esteem.Likewise, acquiescing to an inadequate right to equal liberty can lose both ways.This is especially likely to happen as societies become more just, since prevailing attitudes of equal rights and mutual respect play an extremely important role in maintaining political balance and securing citizens' self-worth.Thus, while social and economic differences between segments of society, i.e., groups that we may consider incomparable, are unlikely to generate hatred, suffering due to political and civil inequality, as well as cultural and racial discrimination, may not be easily accepted.If it is equal citizenship that satisfies the need for status, then the priority of equal liberty becomes all the more necessary.After choosing a conception of justice that seeks to neutralize the influence of relative economic and social advantages that underpin people's self-confidence, it is essential to firmly uphold the primacy of liberty.Therefore, also for this reason, the parties finally accepted the sequential arrangement of these two principles.

In a well-ordered society, therefore, self-respect is secured by the universal affirmation of the equal citizenship of all; the distribution of material wealth is left to its own accord according to purely procedural justice.This, of course, assumes the necessary background institutions that narrow the range of inequality so that justifiable envy cannot arise.There are, however, some noteworthy features of this approach to status, which can be expressed as follows.Conversely, it can be assumed that how others value a person is determined by that person's relative position in the distribution of income and wealth.In this case, having high status means having more material wealth than most people in society.Therefore, not everyone can have the highest status, and to raise the status of one is to lower the status of another.Social cooperation that enhances the conditions of self-esteem is impossible.The so-called status and wealth are fixed, and what one person gains is another person's loss.This situation is obviously a great misfortune.People are at odds with each other in their quest for self-esteem.Given the prominence of this primary good, the parties in the original position certainly do not wish to find themselves so opposed to each other.First, it may make the good of social association difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.Moreover, I mentioned in my discussion of envy that if the means of providing a good are indeed fixed and cannot be extended by cooperation, then, other things being equal, justice would seem to require an equal distribution.But an equal distribution of all primary goods is irrational from the point of view that acknowledging some inequalities might improve everyone's situation.Therefore, the best solution is to distribute the basic liberties that can make them truly equal, and provide equal status for all people, so as to maintain the basic good of self-esteem as much as possible.At the same time, distributive justice as it is often understood, that is, justice in the relative distribution of material wealth, is reduced to a subordinate position.We have thus another reason for dividing the social order into two parts, as dictated by the principles of justice.While these principles permit the exchange of inequality for contributions that benefit all, the primacy of liberty necessarily produces equality based on respect for such a society.

It is quite possible that this concept cannot be fully realized. People's sense of self-worth may be determined in part by their position in the system and their share of income.However, if the account of social envy and caution is correct, then, given the proper background, these tendencies will not be excessive, at least not so long as the primacy of liberty is effectively maintained.But in theory, we could include self-esteem, where necessary, among the primary goods whose indices dictate expectations.Thus, in applying the difference principle, the index can take into account also the consequences of justifiable jealousy (section 80), the more severe the lower the expectations of the less advantaged.The question of whether to make some adjustment to self-esteem is best decided from the point of view of the legislative stage, when the parties have more knowledge of the social situation and the principles of political decision-making can apply.Admittedly, this question is a nasty complication.Since brevity itself is desirable for a general conception of justice, conditions which induce justifiable envy should be avoided as far as possible.I raise this point not to resolve it, but only to point out that the expectations of the less advantaged can be understood, if necessary, to also include the basic good of self-respect.

With regard to this account of the priority of liberty, however, one might object that society has other ways of asserting self-esteem and of dealing with envy and other destructive tendencies.For example, in a feudal system or a caste system, each person is considered to have his or her natural and uneasy prescribed status.Probably he can only be compared with people of his same class, and these classes have in fact become many non-comparative groups established without human control and recognized by religion and theology.Even if men sometimes have doubts about their own status, they can only accept it willingly; since all men may think their vocation is fixed, everyone is regarded as having the same fate, and in the sight of God. is equally noble.This kind of social view eliminates the root causes of social justice problems in thought, thus solving the problems of social justice.The basic structure is said to be fixed and cannot be changed by man.On this view, it is to misunderstand man's place in the world to think that the social order should be proportionate to the principles to which beings, as equals, might subscribe.

Contrary to this view, I have always assumed that the parties are guided by knowledge of the general facts of society in their choice of conceptions of justice.Therefore, they believe that the system is not fixed, but is always changing, changing with the natural environment and the activities and conflicts of social groups, which is not a problem.Limitations on human nature are acknowledged, but people are not powerless to change their social arrangements.This assumption is likewise part of the basis of a theory of justice.It follows that certain methods of dealing with jealousy and other abnormal tendencies are closely related to a well-ordered society.For example, the society cannot stop these tendencies by spreading false or unfounded beliefs.Our question is: How should society be arranged if it is to be brought into conformity with the principles which a reasonable man of true universal belief might admit in the original position?The publicity condition requires parties to assume that, as members of the society, they will also know the general facts about the society.This reasoning, step by step, towards the original protocol should be universally understood.Of course, in proposing what are necessary principles, we must rely on prevailing knowledge recognized by common sense and the existing scientific consensus.But there is no other reasonable way to do this.We have only to admit that as established beliefs change, the principles of justice that seem to be reasonably selectable may change with them.If, for example, belief in a fixed and unchanging natural order that affirms a hierarchical society is discarded (which is assumed to be incorrect here), there will be a tendency to move towards these two principles of justice in the sequence .The effective protection of the right to equal liberty has increasingly become a matter of paramount importance.

In order to be able to study the problem of the good of justice, I will discuss how justice institutions determine our choice of rational plans and how to embody the prescribed components of our good.We'll deal with this in an indirect way, and in this section talk about the concept of happiness again, and point out why people tend to think of it as being determined by the main goal.Naturally, doing so would lead to problems of hedonism and the unity of the ego.How these questions are connected will become clear in due time. I said before that, under certain conditions, a man is happy if he is (more or less) successfully carrying out a rational plan of life which has been conceived under (more or less) favorable conditions, He will have considerable confidence that his purpose will be accomplished (v. 63).Therefore, if our rational plans are going well, and our larger objects are being achieved, then we are happy, and we have reason to be sure that our good fortune will continue.The achievement of happiness depends on circumstances and luck, and this requires an explanation of favorable conditions.Although I do not intend to discuss the concept of happiness in detail, we should consider a few other issues in order to illustrate its relation to the problem of hedonism. First, happiness has two aspects: on the one hand, the smooth execution of a rational plan (predetermined plan of activities and goals) that a person is trying to achieve, and on the other hand, his state of mind that he has good reason to think that he Our success will support this unwavering confidence.Happiness is some achievement in action and some reasonable confidence in the outcome of that action.This definition of happiness is objective; the plan must be adapted to the conditions of our lives, and our confidence must be grounded in sound belief.Happiness, on the other hand, can also be determined subjectively as follows: if a person believes that he is carrying out (more or less) a reasonable plan, etc. or misunderstood, but by chance and coincidence, nothing happened to him to abandon his mistaken view, then he is happy.It is because of luck that he can continue to dream of his yellow beams.The definition that should be chosen, therefore, is the one that best fits the theory of justice and is consistent with our considered value judgments.Suffice it to say here, as I pointed out earlier (section 82), that we have assumed that the parties in the original position had correct beliefs.They accept a certain conception of justice based on general facts about man and his position in society.It seems natural, therefore, to assume that they were all equally sober in making their plans for life.Of course, strictly speaking, this is not an argument at all.Finally, one has to evaluate this objective definition as part of a moral theory. Using this definition, and bearing in mind what has been said above (§63-65) concerning rational planning, we shall be able to account for what is sometimes supposed to be characteristic of happiness.Happiness, for example, is self-sustaining, that is, it is chosen entirely for its own sake.Of course, a rational plan may include many (at least a few) end goals, and any such goal may be pursued in part because it also complements and promotes one or more other goals.The mutual support of ends that are pursued for their own sake is an important feature of rational planning, so that these ends are not usually pursued entirely for their own sake.Still, for the sake of the plan itself, the execution of the whole plan and enduring confidence in its execution is something we wish to do and something we wish to have.In formulating the plan, all considerations, including those of right and justice (using here a comprehensive theory of the good), are fully accounted for.So, this whole activity is self-sustaining. Happiness is also self-sufficient: if a rational plan is realized with confidence, it shows that a certain life choice is entirely worthwhile and requires nothing else.If the environment is particularly favorable and the execution of the plan is particularly smooth, then a person's happiness is complete.According to this general idea that people try to adopt, there is no such thing as something important, and it is impossible to have a way better than it.Thus, even though the material wealth which contributes to our mode of life may often be conceived more abundantly, even if a different mode of aim may often be chosen, the actual realization of the project itself may be as often the case in music, painting, and poetry. There is a certain integrity which, though breached by circumstances and by human error, is still evident when taken as a whole.Then there are those who are models of human achievement and models to learn from, whose lives are as instructive as any philosophical doctrine on how to live. A man is happy, therefore, if he is successfully carrying out some rational plan, and has reason to be sure that his efforts will eventually bear fruit.It can also be said that he is approaching the good fortune with very favorable conditions and a very happy life.This does not mean, however, that a man who is pursuing a rational plan is pursuing happiness, at least not in the usual sense.First, happiness is not one goal among many that we strive for, but the fulfillment of the whole scheme itself.But I also assumed first that rational planning complies with the constraints on what is right and just (specified by a comprehensive theory of the good).To say that one seeks happiness does not seem to imply that one is prepared to either violate these limits or to affirm them.Therefore, acceptance of these limitations should be expressly stated.Second, the pursuit of happiness often implies the pursuit of certain goals, such as the pursuit of life, liberty, and one's own welfare.Thus, a person who makes a selfless devotion to a just cause, who devotes his life to promoting the welfare of others, is not usually seen as pursuing happiness.To saints and heroes, to those whose life-plans are quite obviously extraneous matters, this statement may be misleading.They do not have such goals, and admittedly, they are not clean-cut.But even saints and heroes, and those who intend to accept the limitations of what is right and just, are in fact happy so long as their plans are carried out.Although they do not strive for happiness, they may still be happy by promoting the claims of justice and the welfare of others, or by realizing those virtues to which they are attracted. However, generally speaking, how can we choose a plan reasonably?What procedure can one follow when faced with such a decision?Now, I'm going to talk about this issue.As I said before, a reasonable plan is one that can be selected with prudence and rationality from a class of plans that all conform to the principle of rational choice and can withstand rigorous scrutiny.At last, however, we come to a moment when we have to decide, without further guidance from principle, what plan we prefer (section 64).There is, however, another prudent means which I have not yet mentioned, and that means is the analysis of our object.That is to say, we can strive to find a more detailed and illuminating account of what we aspire to, in the hope that these principles of computation will in due course solve the problem.So some fuller and deeper account of what we want might reveal that some compatible plan exists after all. Let us consider again the example of vacation planning (section 63).When we ask ourselves why we wish to be in two different places, we often find that there are certain more general goals and that going to one place achieves all of them better than going to another.For example, we may wish to study certain art styles, and further reflection may tell us that a certain plan is better or equally good in all of these directions.In this sense, we may find that our desire to go to Paris is stronger than our desire to go to Rome.Often, however, a more nuanced account is not decisive.If we want to see both the most famous church of Christianity and the most famous museum, we may be at a loss.These desires can also be further analyzed.Most desires are expressed in ways that do not suggest whether there is a more instructive description of our real needs.But we must take into account the possibility, indeed the probability, so that sooner or later we will reach incomparable goals which we must choose with deliberate rationality.There are a variety of ways we can balance, adjust, and transform these goals as we try to make them work together.We can narrow the range of purely preferred options by taking the principle of rational choice as our guide, and by stating our desires in the clearest form possible, but we cannot completely exclude them. A person can have many goals, but there is no existing standard of comparison for choosing between these goals when they conflict.From this point of view, therefore, ambiguity of decision seems to arise.There are many stopping points in practical considerations, and many aspects in which we account for what we want itself.So it's easy to see why the idea of ​​having a primary goal (other than compatible goals) that can reasonably be aspired to is so attractive.For if there is such a goal that subordinates all other goals, then presumably all desires (so long as they are rational) can be analyzed to show that these principles of calculation apply.The procedure for making a rational choice, and this view of choice, may then become quite clear: deliberate consideration may always involve means to an end, and all secondary ends may be arranged so that they become means to a primary end.These many limited chain reasoning finally lead to the same goal.So, in principle, rational decisions are always possible, since all that remains is computational difficulties and lack of knowledge. It is crucial, however, to understand what the theorist who asserts the primary end needs, the method of choice that the decider himself can consistently follow in order to make a rational decision.Thus, there are three necessary conditions: the concept of deliberation must specify (1) a first-person approach, (2) such an approach is generally applicable, and (3) guarantee that this approach produces the best results (at least in This is the case when intellectual conditions are favorable and computing power is available).We don't have any way to meet these conditions.Random strategies suggest a general approach, but such strategies may be justified only in special cases.In our daily lives, we apply carefully considered plans derived from our culture and modified in our personal experience.But that is no guarantee that these ways of thinking are sound.Perhaps, they meet only the minimum standards that allow us to get by, but are always far short of what we can possibly do to the best of our ability.Thus, if we are looking for a general way of balancing our conflicting goals in order to pick out, or at least mentally identify, the best course of action, the concept of primary goals seems to provide a simple and natural answer. So let's consider what such a primary goal might be like.It cannot be happiness itself, since the state of happiness is achieved through the execution of a rational life plan that has been independently formulated.The most we can say is that happiness is a compatible goal, that is, that although the fulfillment of a plan makes a person happy, the plan itself contains and arranges multiple goals, whatever they may be.On the other hand, it makes the least sense to regard the primary goal as a personal or social one, such as exercising political power, or gaining social admiration, or maximizing one's material wealth.There is no doubt that it would be contrary to our considered value judgments, and indeed inhumane, if we were attracted by only one of these ends, and then pursued that end in spite of the others.The primary goal takes precedence, at least in sequence, over all other goals, so that efforts to promote it often receive absolute priority.Loyola, for example, believes that the main goal is to serve God and in doing so save our souls.He has always held that the promotion of God's will is the only criterion by which secondary goals are measured.For this reason alone we prefer health to disease, wealth to poverty, honor to disgrace, long life to short life, and, one might add, friendship and love to hatred. and hostility.He said that we must treat all such feelings without distinction, for if they make us not like the scales on the scales, ready to follow the path that we think best reflects the glory of God, They become intemperate. It should be pointed out that this principle of indifference does not contradict our enjoyment of small pleasures and enabling ourselves to play and amuse ourselves.Because these activities allow the mind to relax and rest, thereby enabling us to better promote more important goals.Thus, while Aquinas believed that the vision of God was the ultimate goal of all human knowledge and endeavor, he also acknowledged the place of play and entertainment in our lives.Nevertheless, these enjoyments are permissible only if this supreme aim is thereby promoted, or at least not hindered.We shall arrange our affairs so that our mirth, our love and our friendship do not interfere with the fullest attainment of our ultimate object. This extreme nature of the main goal view is often masked by the ambiguity of the proposed goal.For example, if God is regarded as (and he undoubtedly must be) a moral being, then the goal of worshiping God above all else is not specified in detail, that is, God's will is not clearly revealed, nor is it Clearly shown from natural reason.Within these boundaries, the theological theory of morality also encounters problems of balancing principles and establishing priorities that beset other ideas as well.Since there are often contentious issues here, the solutions articulated by religious ethics become apparent instead.Of course, if the main goal is clearly defined as the achievement of some objective goal, such as the acquisition of political power or material wealth, then the fanaticism and brutality that underlie this goal become obvious.Human good is different because the goals of the ego are different.While subordinating all of our goals to one goal is not strictly speaking a violation of the principles of rational choice (and not of those principles of computation anyway), doing so still strikes me as irrational, or more likely insane of.The image of the ego is damaged, and for the sake of order the ego is turned to serve one of its purposes. Hedonism has always been explained from two aspects: either it is the claim that the only inherent good is pleasure, or it is a psychological proposition that the only thing that individuals strive for is happiness.However, I intend to understand hedonism in a third way, namely, as an effort to achieve a deliberate major end.It tries to show how rational choices are always possible, at least in principle.Even if this cannot be done, I will take a little look at it because it helps illustrate the difference between utilitarianism and contractarianism. The reasoning of the hedonist, I think, is as follows: First, he thinks that if human life is to be directed by reason, there must be some kind of main purpose.There is no rational way of weighing our opposing ends than as means to some higher end.Second, he narrowly understands happiness as pleasure.As a property of feeling and perception, pleasure is considered the only possible thing that sooner or later functions as the main goal, and is therefore the only good thing in itself.From this point of view, the outright assertion that only happiness is good is not based on the belief that it is a fundamental principle or that it fits with our considered value judgments.On the contrary, it is only because of a process of elimination that the notion that pleasure is the main goal arises.Given that rational choice is possible, such goals must also exist.At the same time, such a goal cannot be happiness or any objective goal.To avoid detours on the one hand, and ferocious fanaticism on the other, the hedonist then turns to introspection.The ultimate goal, he found, was some definite property of perception or feeling that could be cognized through introspection.如果我们愿意，我们可以假定，快乐可以被直接规定为就是知觉和感受通常都有的那种属性，而在其他条件相等时，我们对这些知觉和感受都持有一种赞赏的态度，并希望予以延长。因此，为了举例，也可以说快乐就是嗅玫瑰花、吃巧克力、爱得到了回报等等感受共同具有的那种属性，推而广之，也就是与痛苦截然相反的属性。 因此，享乐主义者认为，一个有理性的人完全知道如何来确定自己的善：他会弄清楚在可以供他选择的所有计划中，哪种计划有可能实现快乐对痛苦的最大差额。这个计划规定了他的合理选择，即规定了安排他的互相竞争的目标的最佳方式。这时，计算原则只起了无足轻重的作用，因为所有美好的东西都是同质的，因而作为实现快乐这一目标的手段，它们都是可比的。当然，某些不确定因素和缺乏知识也会使这种估计受到影响，从而通常只能作出最粗浅的估计。然而，对享乐主义来说，这不是一种实际困难：重要的是，最大限度的快乐产生了一种明确的关于善的概念。现在据说我们认出了这唯一的东西，对这个东西的追求，使我们的生活得到了合理的形式。主要是由于这些原因，西奇威克才认为快乐必定是能够指导审慎思考的唯一合理的目标。 重要的是要注意两个问题。首先，把快乐看作是感受和知觉的一种特有属性，也就是把它看作是可以作为计算基础的一种固定的尺码。如果把快乐感受的强度和持续时间作为计算的标准，那么，就可以在理论上作出必要的计算。这种享乐主义方法提供了一种第一人称的选择方法，这是关于幸福的标准所不能做到的。其次，把快乐看作主要目标并不意味着我们具有任何特殊的客观目标。我们在最丰富多采的活动中和在追求各种事物中找到了快乐。因此，以获得最大快感为目标似乎至少可以防止出现狂热和残暴，而同时又仍然为第一人称的选择规定了一种合理的方法。此外，对享乐主义的这两种传统的解释，现在可以容易地予以说明了。如果快乐的确是唯一的目标，而追求这种目标又使我们能够发现合理的计划，那么，毫无疑问，快乐似乎就是唯一的固有的善，这样，我们就可以按照合理审慎的条件来作出论证，从而得出享乐主义原则。心理学上的一种不同的享乐主义于是也随之而来：因为尽管认为合理的行动可能始终是有意识地以快乐为其目标这种说法过甚其词，但在任何情况下，快乐都是由旨在最大限度地提高快感的净差额的活动计划来调节的。由于追求快乐产生了唯一合理的审慎思考的方法这种论点导致了人们更为熟悉的解释，所以它就似乎成了享乐主义的基本概念。 享乐主义似乎显然并不能规定合理的主要目标。我们唯一需要指出的是，如果人们一定要以一种相当明确的方式来看待快乐，使快乐的感受者能够对它的强度和持续时间进行计算，那么，把它看作是唯一合理的目标，就似乎不再是合理的。当然，偏爱感受或知觉的某种属性甚于其他一切，同最大限度地增加一个人对别人的权力或增加一个人财富的欲望一样，是不均衡的和不近人情的。毫无疑问，正是由于这个缘故，西奇威克才不愿承认快乐是一种特殊的感觉属性；但是，如果像他所希望的那样，快乐可以用作对诸如知识、美和友谊这些理想价值进行相互比较的最后标准，那么他大概也会承认这一点的。 此外，还有一点是，除了具有强度和持续时间这些数量尺度的快乐外，还有一些不同的本身不可比的快感。如果这些快感发生了冲突，我们应该怎样来使它们保持平衡呢？我们是否要去选择一种短暂的然而强烈的快乐感受，而不应去选择另一种不那么强烈但时间较长的快乐的感受呢？亚里士多德说，善良的人在必要时可以为他的朋友而牺牲自己的生命，因为他宁愿得到一种短暂的强烈的快乐，而不愿得到一种长期的不那么强烈的快乐，他宁愿过十二个月的伟大生活，而不愿过许多年的平凡生活。但他是如何作出这个决定的呢？此外，正如桑塔亚纳所指出的那样，我们必须确定快乐和痛苦的相对价值。皮诗拉克说，一千种快乐抵不上一种痛苦。他这样说就是采用了一种把快乐和痛苦相比较而又比这两者中的任何一个都更为基本的标准。这个决定一定要由本人亲自来作出，他必须把他的现在和未来的全部倾向和欲望都考虑进去。显然，我们仍然没有比审慎的合理更前进一步。在这类主观感觉的范围内，目标的多重性问题又一次出现了。 有人可能会提出异议说：这些问题在经济学和决策理论中已经解决了。但这种论点完全是出于误解。例如，需求理论假定，消费者的选择符合各种各样的规定：他们对全部选择办法规定了一套完整的次序，从而表现了凸集和连续等等特性。根据这种假定，就可以看出存在某种功利数函，这个函数是与这些选择相一致的，就是说，只有在被选定的办法的函数值更大时，才会选择这个办法而不选择另一个办法。这个函数说明了个人的选择，就是说，假定他的选择符合某些规定，他事实上会选择什么。这个函数根本没有说明个人是怎样一开始就按照一种合乎逻辑的次序来安排自己的决定的，显然也不能说它就是某个人可以合理采用的第一人称的选择办法，因为它只不过是记录了他的审慎思考的结果而已。经济学家猜想，可以由有理性的个人所作出的选择来予以满足的那些原则，最多只能作为指导方针提出，供我们在作出自己的决定时考虑。但是如果这样来理解，这些标准恰恰就是合理选择原则（或与其相类似的原则），于是我们又一次回到审慎的合理这个问题上来了。 因此，不存在任何只要追求就能符合我们深思熟虑的价值判断的主要目标，这似乎是无可争辩的。关于实现某个合理的生活计划的兼容目标，是完全另外一回事。但是，享乐主义不能提供某种合理的选择方式，这应该是意料之中的事，维特根斯坦指出，为了说明我们怎样区别记忆与想象、信念与假定等等而为其他精神活动规定某些特殊的感受，这是一个错误。同样，认为某些快感可以规定一种计算单位，用以说明合理审慎的可能性，这本来就是不可能的。无论是快乐还是任何其他的明确目标，都不可能起到享乐主义者可能赋予它的作用。 不过，一些哲学家一直假定，特殊的感受是存在的，并且由于种种不同原因，指导着我们的精神生活。因此，尽管指出享乐主义使我们一无所得这一点似乎是一件简单的事，但重要的是要弄清楚为什么一个人会不得不采取这种不顾一切的手段。我业已指出了一个可能的原因，这就是在确定我们的善时打算缩小纯粹的优先选择范围的欲望。在目的理论中，关于善的观念的任何模糊不清都被转移给了正当观。因此，如果个人的善是完全应由个人自己来决定的事，那么，在一定范围内，对正当的事也应如此。但是，人们自然会认为，正当的事并不完全是一个选择问题，于是，一个人就试图去找到某种明确的关于善的观念。 然而，还有另一个理由：目的论需要一种把不同个人的不同的善加以比较的方法，以便能够最大限度地提高总体善。怎样才能作出这些估计呢？即使某些目标是用以组织个人单独采用的计划，但它们还不足以对某种正当观作出规定。因此，对快感的标准进行内省，似乎是要在许多人中间找到一种共同标准，也可以说一种在人与人之间通用的东西，以便用它来对社会安排作出规定。如果人们业已认为这个标准就是每一个有理性的人的目标，那么，上述意见就更有说服力了。 我的结论并不是说，为了提出一种合乎逻辑的理论，目的论就非得成为某种享乐主义理论不可。向这方面的发展看来确实是某种自然的趋势。人们也许会说，只要目的论试图提出一种明确而切实可行的道德推理方法，享乐主义就表明在向目的论变化。享乐主义的缺陷反映了无法规定一种适当的应予充分重视的明确目标，这就表明，目的论的结构完全被误解了：它们被认为从一开始就错误地把正当同善联系在一起。我们不应企图首先指望由独立规定的善来决定我们的生活方式。首先揭示我们的本性的不是我们的目标，而是我们可能会承认的原则，因为正是这些原则决定了形成这些目标的背景条件和追求这些目标的应有方式。自我优先于它所确定的目标；即使是一个主要目标也必须从无数的可能有的目标中去选择。审慎的合理是无法超越的。因此，我们应该把目的论所提出的正当和善的关系颠倒过来，而把正当看作优先于善。这样反其道而行之，道德理论于是就得到了发展。现在，我打算根据契约论来说明最后的这些论点。