Chapter 26 Chapter 9 The Good of Justice-3

As a consequence of the preceding discussion, there is no such thing as a goal by which all our choices can be rationally made.Some important intuitionistic factors are involved in the determination of what is good, and in teleology these factors must necessarily affect what is right.Traditional utilitarians have tried to avoid this outcome with the theory of hedonism, but to no avail.We cannot stop there, however; we must find a positive solution to the problem of choice that hedonism seeks to answer.We are thus once again confronted with the problem: how can a rational plan of life be really found if there is no single goal which determines the proper pattern of goals?The answer to this question, however, has long been given, and it is this: a rational plan is one that might be chosen with deliberate rationality, as dictated by a comprehensive theory of the good.Whether this answer is entirely satisfactory within the framework of contractarian theory, and whether there are no problems that hedonism cannot solve, remains to be proved.

I have said that moral personality manifests itself in two capacities: the capacity to have a certain notion of the good, and the capacity to have a certain sense of justice.The acquisition of the first ability is manifested in a reasonable life plan.The acquisition of the second capacity manifests itself in the prescriptive desire to act according to certain principles of justification.A moral agent is thus one who has his chosen ends, and his basic choices are the conditions which enable him to devise a way of life which, so far as circumstances permit, fully expresses him as a free and equal rational human nature.This unity of personality manifests itself clearly in the coherence of his projects, which is based on the higher desire to employ the principles of rational choice in a way consistent with his sense of right and justice.Of course, a man's goals are not achieved at once, but are formed gradually; but he can formulate and carry out a certain plan of life in the manner that justice allows, and thereby form the unity of his self.

A distinctive feature of the primary goal view is the manner in which it assumes self-unification.For example, according to hedonism, the ego becomes ego by striving to maximize the total amount of pleasure within its psychic domain.A rational self must in this way achieve its unity.Since pleasure is the chief aim, the individual treats all aspects of himself equally, and regards his natural assets, mental and physical, and even his natural inclinations and affections, as means to the attainment of pleasure. .Moreover, his goal of happiness is not happiness itself; but only the happiness of realizing the unity of self.Whether it is his happiness or another's that should be promoted raises another question, but this question can be left alone as long as I am only dealing with one's good.But once we consider problems of social choice, the utilitarian principle in its hedonistic form is perfectly natural.If any one man had to order his deliberate thinking by the chief end of seeking pleasure, and could not in any other way secure his qualifications as a rational being, it seemed that many should conspire to try to maximize This collective pleasure arranges their collective actions.For example, as a single saint serves the honor of God, so all members of a community of saints should cooperate to do all that is necessary to accomplish the same end.The difference between the individual and the social situation is that the means of the ego, its mental and physical capacities, its emotions and desires, are placed in a different sphere.In both cases, the means serve this primary goal.But if relying on other existing means for cooperating with them, it is the pleasure of the self or of the social group that should be maximized.

Moreover, if the same considerations that lead to hedonism as a first-person theory of choice apply to the theory of right, then the principle of utility seems to make a lot of sense.Let us first assume that happiness (defined in terms of pleasure) is the only good.Thus even an intuitionist would admit that it is, at least on the face of it, the legitimate principle of maximizing happiness, and if this is not the only principle that governs, there are presumably also other principles such as distribution that deserve some attention. some other criterion of the class.But what social behavior should be the primary goal to balance these criteria?If judgments of right are to be considered rather than arbitrary, there must be such an end, and the principle of utility seems to clearly define the required end.No other principle has the character required to define the ultimate goal of just conduct.Fundamentally, I think, it is this reasoning that underlies what Mill calls the utilitarian test.

However, according to the theory of justice as fairness, the priority of right and the interpretation of Kant put forward a completely opposite point of view.To understand this we have only to revisit the character of the original position and the nature of the principles chosen.Various parties argue that the fundamental aspect of the self is moral personality rather than the ability to perceive pleasure and pain.They don't know what people's ultimate goals are, and all notions of major goals are discarded.It would not occur to them, therefore, to accept the principle of utility in its hedonistic form.The parties agreed to this maxim, let alone for any other reason than to give due weight to any other particular purpose.They see themselves as beings who can and do choose their ultimate goals (always a majority).Just as one individual should choose his life plan according to the comprehensive knowledge he has acquired (here without limitation), so many people should be in a position that gives them full and equal representation as moral subjects. determine the terms of their cooperation.The object of the parties in the original position is to determine the just and favorable conditions under which each can form his self-unity.Their great interest in liberty and in the means of equitable use of liberty shows that they see themselves first and foremost as moral subjects with an equal right to choose their own way of life.They therefore sanction the ordering of the two principles of justice, as circumstances permit.

We must now relate these observations to the problem of the ambiguity of choice that we spoke of at the outset.The main idea here is that we make choices about our conceptions of the good within certain limits, given the priority of right.The principles of justice and their realization in social formations set the limits for our deliberate deliberation.The concept of righteousness has formed the necessary self-unity.Moreover, in a well-ordered society this unity is the same for all; and every idea of ​​the good that arises from its rational plan is a subordinate plan of a more comprehensive plan which schemes governing groups of social associations that are one of several social associations.Many groups of different sizes and goals, fitted together according to a general conception of justice, simplifies decision-making by proposing definite ideals and ways of life that have been developed and tested by countless individuals, sometimes generations.Thus we do not start from scratch in making our own plans for life; we are not required to choose from countless possibilities when we are ignorant of the structure and fixed outlines of the plan.Thus, despite the absence of any system of rules for determining our good, without a first-person method of choice, right and the priority of justice place reliable constraints on these deliberate considerations, making them more manageable.Now that fundamental rights and liberties are firmly established, our choices are unlikely to alter what we demand of each other.

Ambiguity about the idea of ​​the good would be far less troublesome if there were right and justice first.In fact, various considerations leading to teleology using the concept of primary goals lose their meaning.First, the pure priority factor in choice, though not eliminated, is still subject to existing constraints on justification.Since people's demands on each other have not changed, this ambiguity is relatively harmless.also.There is no need for any other standard of right than that of prudence and reasonableness, so far as the principle of right allows.If a man's plan of life meets this standard, if he has successfully carried it out, and found it worthwhile to do so, there is no reason why it could have been better if he had done something else.We should not simply assume that our rational goodness is determined in unique ways.From the point of view of a theory of justice, this assumption is unnecessary.Second, we need not go beyond prudential rationality in order to prescribe a definite and practicable conception of right.The principles of justice have definite content, and arguments in favor of principles of justice make use of only partial accounts of the good and their accounts of the primary good.Once the concept of justice is established, the priority of right also provides a guarantee for the priority of the principle of justice.Thus, the two considerations that make the primary teleological view attractive to teleology are absent in contractarianism.This is the result of changing the structure.

When I introduced Kant's explanation of justice as fairness earlier, I mentioned that there is a recognition that the conditions of agreement on the principles of justice are even suitable for expressing the nature of a single self (section 40).This opinion seems absurd at first glance.How could this demand for consensus not be a limitation?One reason is that the veil of ignorance guarantees that everyone thinks in the same way, so this condition is taken for granted.But a further explanation is that contract theory has a structure that is quite different from utilitarian theory.According to the theory of utilitarianism, each person can formulate his own rational plan without hindrance under the condition of mastering comprehensive knowledge, so the society proceeds to maximize the aggregate realization of all the resulting plans.On the other hand, according to the theory of justice as fairness, all people agree in advance the principles by which their demands on each other will be resolved.These principles, therefore, are given an absolute priority, so that they unquestionably govern the social order, and lead every individual to formulate his plans in accordance with them.Some plans that happen to be inappropriate must be corrected.This ex ante collective agreement is then established by virtue of certain basic structural features common to everyone's plans.The nature of this self as a free and equal moral subject is the same for all, and the similarity in the basic form of the rational plan shows this.Moreover, the notion of a society as one social association among several social associations suggests that the members of a group all have the same nature as one another: we see what others do as something we could have done, but it was done for us by them. done, and see what we do as doing for them.Since this self is realized in the activities of many, just relations according to principles likely to be approved by all are best suited to express the nature of each self.Thus, the condition of consensus is ultimately linked to the notion of people seeking common values ​​as members of a social association.

One might think that, so long as the principles of justice are given priority, there is a main purpose which ultimately organizes our lives.However, this perception is based on misunderstanding.Of course, the principle of justice takes precedence over the principle of utility in lexical order, and the first principle of justice also takes precedence over the second principle of justice.As a result, a vision of an ideal social order is established that determines the direction of change and reform efforts (Section 41).But the very principles of personal responsibility and duty which define what this ideal requires of men do not make it dominant.also.I have also always thought that this proposed main goal falls within the realm of teleology, in which the determination of the good is inherently irrelevant to right.Part of the function of this aim is to make the conception of legitimacy quite explicit.In a theory of justice as fairness, there can be no main goal in this sense, and, as we have seen, there is no need for such a goal for this purpose.Finally, the admonition not to propose a primary goal is always applicable, as teleology dictates that such a goal can never be realized even in the end.Here it is possible to recall the previous observations as to why the principle of utility is in fact inapplicable to lexical sequences: except in special cases where the relation is broken, the latter criterion never comes into play.On the other hand, principles of justice embody more or less explicit social goals and constraints (Section 8).Once we have achieved a certain institutional structure, we have the right to determine and pursue our good within the limits of its arrangement.

According to these views, the difference between teleology and contractarianism can be expressed in the following intuitive way; Contrary to a certain amount of extension maximized on the basis of a certain total amount, contract theory points out a series of more and more definite structural forms of just behavior, each of which is contained in In the former form, it is in this way that the parts of the structure are determined more and more clearly from a general basis applicable to the whole structure.Hedonistic utilitarianism is a classic example of the first approach and demonstrates it with convincing simplicity.The theory of justice as fairness exemplifies the second possibility.Thus, the four-stage sequence (Section 31) proposes a sequence of arrangements and regulations in order to establish in several steps a hierarchy of principles, standards, and rules that, if consistently applied and adhered to, standards and rules, and finally a clear structure for social action.

However, this sequence is not intended to be a complete specification of behavior.Rather, the concept is to suggest the approximate range, however ambiguous, within which individuals and groups are free to further their own ends and to which prudent rationality is free to operate.This generality should eventually shrink gradually, that is to say, the unexplained cases become less and less important the further one goes.This concept, which guides the whole structure, is that of the original position and Kant's interpretation of it: the concept itself contains elements which single out the relevant A series of adjustments were made. Now that we have discussed the various parts of a theory of justice, the argument for consistency is complete.Just bring together the aspects of a well-ordered society and view them in their proper context.The concepts of justice and goodness are related to principles of different nature, so the so-called problem of consistency is the problem of whether these two kinds of standards are consistent.More precisely, each concept, and the principles associated with it, prescribes a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be evaluated.The sense of justice is an actual desire to apply and act according to the principles of justice, that is, according to the point of view of justice.It should be recognized, therefore, that it is reasonable (as prescribed by an incomplete theory of the good) for people in a well-ordered society to regard their sense of justice as the governing force in their life plans.It remains to be shown that the tendency to adopt the point of view of justice, and be guided by it, is in accordance with the personal good. Whether these two views are consistent may be a key factor in determining stability.But even in a well-ordered society, consistency is not an inevitable consequence.Of course, the rationality of choosing principles of justice in the original position is not in question.The arguments for such a decision have been advanced; and if it is true, then, from a fairly general point of view, just institutions are generally sound and in everyone's interest.It is equally reasonable for each to urge others to support these arrangements and to fulfill their duties and obligations.The question is whether, in the light of an incomplete theory with no limits to knowledge, the dominant desire to adopt a view of justice is not in accordance with one's own good.We would like to know that this desire is actually justified; as it is justified to one, it is also justified to all, so that the tendency to instability would not exist.To be more precise, consider any particular individual in a well-ordered society.I assume that he knows that the system is just, that others have (and continue to have) his sense of justice, and that they obey (and continue to obey) the arrangements.What we wish to demonstrate is that, on these assumptions, it is reasonable for a person to affirm his sense of justice as prescribed by the incomplete theory.Such a plan of life is his best answer to the same plans of his fellows; what is reasonable to any one is reasonable to all. It is important not to confuse this problem with the problem of proving to an egoist that one should be a just person.An egoist is someone who believes only in his own interests.His ultimate goal, his wealth and position, his happiness and social prestige, etc., concern only himself.It is also possible for such a person to act justly, that is to say, to do what a just man would do; but so long as he remains an egoist, he cannot to do these things.If he also had these reasons, he would not be an egoist.In some cases, the views of justice and his views of his own interests would lead him to take the same course of action, but this is mere coincidence.I do not intend, therefore, to prove that in a well-ordered society an egoist might act according to a sense of justice; conducive to furthering his aims.Likewise, I do not intend to argue that an egoist, by living in a just society, may become wise enough to abandon his goals and repent and become a just man.Instead, we are concerned only with the benefits of this fixed desire to adopt the perspective of justice.I assume that the members of a well-ordered society already have this desire.But the question is whether this governing affection is in accordance with their good.We are not studying justice in terms of certain points of view, or the moral worth of actions; we are estimating the value of the desire to adopt a certain point of view, the value of justice itself.We must evaluate this desire not according to the egoist point of view (whatever that may be), but according to an incomplete theory of the good. I am going to assume that human action is produced by existing desires, which can only be changed gradually.We can never decide at any given moment to change our system goals (Section 63).We act now as who we actually are, according to our present needs, not as we could have been, or could have been if we had chosen differently. act on those desires.Dominant objects are especially subject to this restriction.We must therefore endeavor to estimate our position over a considerable period of time in the future in order to predetermine whether or not to affirm our sense of justice.We can't have it both ways.We cannot maintain some sense of justice and all that it means to do so, and at the same time be ready to act unjustly, in the hope that by doing so we may gain some personal advantage for ourselves.A just man cannot do something, and if he is too easily moved by external things, it is after all that he is ready to do so.Therefore, our question is only relevant to those who have certain psychological and systemic desires.It is obviously asking too much to ask for stability not to depend on explicit limits in this regard. On one interpretation, though, the answer to this question is obvious.Assuming that someone has an effective sense of justice, he will also have a governing desire to obey the corresponding principles.Criteria for rational choice must take this desire into account.This is reasonable if one wishes to act with prudent rationality first from the point of view of justice.In this case, therefore, the question is irrelevant: as members of a well-ordered society, their kind especially desire to act justly, and the fulfillment of this desire is part of their good.If we acquire a true and final effective sense of justice, as the priority of justice requires, we further confirm our plan of life which, so long as we are rational, will enable me to maintain and encourage this feeling .Since this fact is well known, the first kind of instability cannot exist, and therefore the second kind of instability cannot exist either.If we imagine that someone values ​​his sense of justice only because it conforms to other accounts linking him to the reasons prescribed by an incomplete theory of the good, then the problem that arises from this is the real problem of consistency.We should not rely on the principle of purely voluntary action (section 72).Thus, the desire to act justly is not supposed to be an ultimate desire, it is different from the desire to avoid pain, misfortune, or indifference, and it is different from the desire to satisfy a wide range of interests.Theories of justice provide additional accounts of the sense of justice as a desire for something; we must use these accounts to show that a man who adheres to an incomplete theory of the good would in fact think that this feeling is beneficial to his The life plan plays a dominant role. The explanation of this problem ends here.I would now like to point out the grounds for consistency by revisiting the various arguments that have been advanced.First, principles of justice are universal, as required by contractarianism: they state accepted moral beliefs shared by the members of a well-ordered society (Section 32).We are not talking about someone who doubts these principles.Hypothetically, he admits, like everyone else, that these principles are optimal from the point of view of the original position (of course, this is always doubtful, but it raises an entirely different question).Since, then, it is assumed that others also have (and will continue to have) some effective sense of justice, our hypothetical individual is in fact considering a strategy of pretending to have some moral Opportunity acts as a man who enjoys only rights and does not perform duties for the advancement of his own interests.Since the conception of justice is universal, he considers whether, in a manner of deliberate deceit and hypocrisy, he would insincerely admit the accepted moral point of view to suit his purpose.The fact that deceit and hypocrisy are wrong, I do not think, will disturb him; but he will have to seriously consider the psychological toll, for he will have to guard against them, he will have to put on airs, and he will have to consider the fact that after all. There will be times when you don't act like you are.As things stand, in most societies this pretense may not be very costly, since institutional injustice and the common meanness of others make one's own hypocrisy more bearable; In a well-ordered society, things are not so convenient. This is confirmed by the fact that there is a connection between acting justly and a natural attitude (§ 74).Given the content of the principles of justice and the laws of moral psychology, the desire to treat our friends fairly and to do justice to those we care about is as much a part of these feelings as the desire to be with them and to feel sorry for their loss. part.So, assuming that one needs these feelings, the conceived strategy is probably to do justice only to those with whom we have a relationship of love and compassion, that is, to respect the way of life we ​​love.But in a well-ordered society, this relationship is greatly extended, and if the three psychological laws are fully valid, this relationship also includes the relationship to the institutional structure.Furthermore, we generally cannot choose who will be harmed by our injustice.For example, if we cheat on our taxes, or if we find some way to evade our responsibilities to society, everyone suffers, our friends and colleagues as well as the rest of us .Of course, we can also consider secretly transferring some of our interests to someone we particularly like, but this kind of thing is both unreliable and complicated.In a well-ordered society, where real relationships extend not only to individuals but to social structures as well, and we have no choice of who loses by our perfidy, there is good reason to keep an individual sense of justice.Doing so naturally and simply preserves institutions and individuals, and allows us to welcome new and wider social relationships. Another fundamental consideration is this: It follows from the Aristotelian principle (and its incidental effects) that it is a great good to participate in the life of a well-ordered society (§79).This conclusion is determined not only by the psychological character of our nature, but also by the meaning of the principles of justice and their priority in the plans of each individual.The specification of the contract point of view establishes this relationship.Since this kind of society is a kind of social union among various social unions, it realizes various forms of human activities to a great extent; Far from being a fact of life, we depend on the cooperative efforts of others, not only for the means of achieving happiness, but also for the realization of our potentialities.If something is achieved everywhere, everyone enjoys greater affluence and a more colorful collective life.But to participate fully in this life we ​​must recognize the principles governing our conception of life, and this means that we must affirm our feelings of justice.Music industry must be dedicated.It is the mutual recognition and acceptance of the principles of justice that unite social endeavors into a kind of social union; it is this general recognition that extends the relationship of recognition to the whole of society and thus enables the Aristotelian principle to have a wider effect.Individual and collective achievement is no longer seen as merely the good of many separate individuals.And failing to affirm our sense of justice makes us myopic. Finally, there is one more reason related to Kant's interpretation: to act justly is what we, as free and rational beings, wish to do (section 40).The desire to act justly, and the desire to express our nature as free moral subjects, turn out to be almost the same desire.If a man has sincere beliefs and a correct understanding of the theory of justice, these two desires drive him equally.They all have a disposition to act on exactly the same principles as those which might have been chosen in the original position.Of course, this argument is based on a theory of justice.If this theory is not correct, the actual unity of the two desires does not exist.But since we are dealing with the special case of a well-ordered society described by this theory, we may assume that the members of this society have a clear understanding of the general conception of justice which underlies their interrelationships. . Let us assume that these are the main reasons (or representative reasons) that an incomplete account of the good argues for preserving one's sense of justice.The question now is whether these reasons are conclusive.Here we encounter the well-known difficulty of a balance of motives, which in many respects is analogous to a balance of fundamental principles.The answer to this question can sometimes be found by comparing the balance of one reason with the balance of another, for if the first balance clearly favors a certain course of action, at the same time if the second balance favors this If the reasons for choosing one option are stronger and the reasons for favoring other options are weaker, then the second balance must also favor this same course of action.But to argue in terms of this comparison must presuppose the arrangement of these reasons, and for this structure to function as a kind of reference point it obviously tends in one direction and not in another.If this were not the case, it would be impossible for us to get past conditional comparisons: if the first equilibrium favors a certain choice, so will the second. It is now evident that the content of the principles of justice is a crucial factor in the decision.Whether a man is good to have a dominant sense of justice depends on what justice requires of him.The identity of right and good is determined by the criteria used to define each of these concepts.As Sidgwick points out, utilitarianism calls more explicitly than common sense for the sacrifice of individual self-interest when necessary for the greater happiness of all.It is also stricter than contractarianism because, while acts of kindness that go beyond our natural duty are good and command our respect, they do not have to be.Utilitarianism may appear to be a nobler ideal, but on the other hand, it may also presume that some people receive less welfare and liberty for the greater happiness of others who may already be more fortunate .A rational being may hesitate, in formulating his plans, as to whether such a strict principle should be given priority.This may not only exceed his capacity for sympathy, but also endanger his freedom.So, however implausible the consistency of right and good may be in a theory of justice as fairness, it is certainly more likely than on the basis of a utilitarian view.A conditional balance of reasons is in favor of contractarianism. The following concerns raise another, somewhat different argument.The misgiving is that, although the decision to preserve our sense of justice may be reasonable, we may in the end suffer great loss, or even be destroyed, by it.We have seen that a just man refrains from doing something, so that he may rather risk death than do injustice when faced with bad circumstances.Yet while it is true that one man may lose his life and another may live longer for justice's sake, the just man does, in all respects, what he most wishes to do and in this sense he was not overwhelmed by the foreseeable and possible doom.This question has something in common with the dangers of love; in fact, it is a special case entirely.People who love each other, or have strong feelings for other people and ways of life, are at the same time easily destroyed: their love makes them at the mercy of misfortune and the injustice of others.Friends and lovers help each other at great risk; members of the family do so voluntarily.Their willingness is as much due to their feelings as any other inclination.Once we are in love with something, we have a weakness: there is no such thing as being in love and being ready to consider whether or not we should love, that is the way it is.The love that can do the least harm is not the best love.If we love, we accept the danger of harm and loss.Based on our general knowledge of possible life paths, we don't think the risks are so great as to stop us from loving.Even when misfortune happens, we know how to avoid it and resist those who seek to cause it.If we are loving, we will not regret our love.If these circumstances apply, or often apply, to love in the world, they seem to apply even more to love, and thus to the sense of justice, in a well-ordered society.在一个其他人也都是正义的社会里，我们的爱使我们主要受天然的不测事故和环境的偶然因素的影响。对于同这些感情相联系的正义感情来说，情况也类似。如果在目前情况下把使我们确认我们的爱的理由平衡当作一种标准，那么，一旦我们逐渐成熟，我们就似乎应该准备在一个正义的社会的比较有利的条件下保持我们的正义感。 表达我们作为道德的主体的本性的这种欲望的一个特征，使这个结论更加有力。除了自我的其他一些倾向外，还有个对程度和范围作选择的问题。我们的欺骗和虚伪的策略不必是全面系统的；我们对体制和对别人在感情上的联系可强可弱，我们对更广泛的社会生活的参与程度也可大可小。这里存在的是可能性的一种连续统，而不是要么全有要么全无这样的一种决定，虽然为了简明起见，我在相当多的地方都用了这种说法。但是，只有在认为正当和正义原则具有第一优先的地位并按它们来行动时，表达我们作为自由而平等的有理性的人的本性这种欲望，才能得到实现。这是决定性条件所产生的结果：既然这些原则是具有支配作用的，那么，按这些原则来行动的欲望，只有在它对其他欲望同样具有支配作用的情况下才能得到满足。正是根据这种优先选择来行动，才表明了我们不受偶然事件的影响。因此，为了实现我们的本性，我们只有为保持我们的正义感作好打算，把我们的正义感看作是对我们其他目标的指导。如果这种感情受到损害，并在同其他目标相比较时把它看作不过是其余的欲望之一，那么它就不可能得到实现。它是一种首先以某种方式表现自己的欲望，即在其自身中包含其自己的优先的一种努力。可以制定一个计划，使每一种目标都能在计划中有其地位，从而使其他目标也能得到实现，因为这些目标的实现，可以不依赖于它们在序列中的地位。但对正当和正义感来说，情况就不是如此；所以，错误地去行动，常常容易引起由于我们的起支配作用的道德感情遭到挫伤而产生的犯罪感和羞耻感。当然，这并不意味着，实现我们作为一个自由而有理性的人的本性这件事本身，就是一个要么全有要么全无的问题。相反，我们在多大程度上表达了我们的本性，这决定于我们在多大程度上始终如一地按照作为最后的支配因素的正义感来行动。我们决不能按照一种把我们的正义感看作不过是同其他欲望一样的计划来表达我们的本性。因为这种感情表明这个人是什么样的人，而损害这种感情不会使自我取得自由的支配，而只会听命于世界上的偶然和意外事件。 最后还有一个问题也必须提一提。假定即使在一个井然有序的社会里，也会有这样的一些人，对他们来说，确认自己的正义感并不是一种善。从他们的目标和需要以及他们本性的特点来看，对关于善的不全面说明所规定的理由，并不足以使他们保持这种起支配作用的感情。有人认为，要把正义作为一种美德如实地向这些人推荐是不可能的。如果原定这种推荐意味着合理的根据（由不全面的理论确定）向他们各个个人建议采纳这个方针，那么上述看法无疑是正确的。但是，这就又产生了另外一个问题，即那些确实确认自己的正义感的人，在要求这些人遵守正义体制时是否在不正义地对待他们。 不过，遗憾的是，我们还不能恰当地回答这个问题，因为要回答这个问题，必须先有某种关于惩罚的理论。而关于正义理论的这一部分，我一直言之甚少（第39节）。我曾经假定，人们会严格遵守任何可能会得到选择的正义观，然后我又考虑了在所提出的一系列的正义观中，哪一种正义观可能会得到采纳。然而，我们几乎可以同讨论非暴力抵抗问题（即部分服从理论的另一部分）一样来进行推理。因此，如果坚持任何得到一公认的正义观要完全出于自愿，这种坚持就是不彻底的。那么，在什么条件下，原始状态中的人才会一致赞成可以运用起稳定作用的惩罚手段呢？他们会不会坚持认为可以要求一个人按照关于善的不全面理论的规定仅仅去做符合他自己利益的事呢？ 从整个契约论来看，他们不会这样去做，这似乎是显而易见的。因为这种限制事实上就等于是普遍的利己主义，而我们知道，利己主义是要被否定的。此外，从集体来说；正当和正义原则是合理的；其他每一个人也都遵守正义的安排，这是符合每一个人的利益的。而且，对正义感的普遍确认。还是一种巨大的社会资产，它为互相信任奠定了基础；使所有的人一般都能从中得到好处。因此，在赞同为稳定某种合作安排而规定的惩罚时，各方接受了对自我利益的同样限制、这称限制是他们在选择正义原则时首先予以承认的。在根据业已考虑的理由而赞同这些原则之后，假定对平等自由权和法治的限制得到适当的承认（第38－39节），那么为了维护正义的体制而规定必要的措施就是合理的。那些认为打算正义地行动不符合自己的善的人，是无法否认这些论点的。对他们来说，正义的安排并不完全符合他们的本性；因而在某惟情况相等时，如果他们竟会确认自己的正义感，他们可能会更加不幸，这一点当然也是事实。但是，在这里，人们只能这样说：他们的本性还是他们的不幸。 因此，主要的问题是，为了证明某种正义观是正确的，我们无需认为，每个人不管有什么能力和欲望，都有充分的理由（由关于善的不全面理论规定的理由）来保持他的正义感。因为我们的善决定于我们是什么样的人，我们具有和可能具有什么样的需要和愿望。甚至可能会发生这样的情况：有许多人并不认为正义感是符合他们的善的；但是，如果真的如此，那么有利于稳定的力量就比较弱。在这种情况下，惩罚手段在社会制度中就会发挥大得多的作用。一致性越少，在其他条件相等时，产生不稳定及其伴随的不幸的可能性就越大。然而，这丝毫不影响正义原则的集体合理性；人人遵守这些原则，仍然是符合每个人的利益的。至少，只要这种正义观没有不稳定到使其他某种正义观可能变得更为可取，上述说法就是成立的。但是，我一直试图指出的是，在这一点上，契约论要比与它相对立的理论高明，因而无需重新考虑在原始状态中对原则的选择。事实上，只要对人的社会性予以合理的解释（通过对如何获得正义感的说明以及社会联合概念来作出这种解释），正义即公平观就似乎是一种相当稳定的观念。把正当与善配合起来，就可以消除囚犯的那种普遍的两难处境的危险。当然，在正常情况下，普遍的知识和信任始终是有缺陷的。因此，即使在一个正义的社会里，为了确保遵守而承认某些限制性的安排是合理的，但这些安排的目的也是为了保证公民的互相信任。人们很少会去运用这些机制，而这些机制也只构成社会安排的一个次要部分。 我们关于正义即公平观的稳定性问题的这个相当冗长的讨论，至此告一结束。唯一需要进一步指出的是，一致性使我们能够完成运用关于好的规定的程序。首先，我们可以这样说：在一个井然有序的社会里。做一个好人（尤其是具有某种有效的正义感的好人），事实上是符合这个人的善的；其次，这种社会是一个好的社会。第一个论断是根据一致性得出的；第二个论断之所以有效，是因为一个井然有序的社会具有可以根据这两个相关观点合理地向一个社会要求的那些属性。therefore.一个井然有序的社会符合正义原则的要求，而从原始状态的观点看，这些原则从集体来看是合理的；而从个人的观点看，把普遍的正义观确认为一个人的生活计划的支配因素，这种欲望是符合合理选择原则的。这些结论有助于说明共同的价值，而在得出这些结论时，我对正义即公平观的说明也就大功告成了。 我不打算对正义理论的说明进行总结，而是想就我所提出的论据最后再说几句话。既然我们考虑的是整个概念，我们就能够大体上指出可以说有利于说明这个概念的那些情况。这样做将会澄清几个仍有疑问的问题。 哲学家们通常试图用两种方法之一来证明伦理学理论的正确性。有时，他们试图找到一些不证自明的原则，从这些原则可以产生相当一批标准和准则，用来说明我们深思熟虑的判断。我们可以把这种理由看作是笛卡儿式的。它假定，可以把基本原则看作是正确的，甚至必然是正确的；然后，再用演绎推理把这种信念由前提变为结论。另一种办法（由于滥用语言而被称作自然主义）是利用假定的非道德概念来引进关于道德概念的规定，然后通过关于常识和科学的公认方法，来表明与所宣称的道德判断相配合的说法是正确的。尽管根据这种观点，伦理学的基本原则并不是不证自明的，但道德信仰的理由却没有造成任何特殊的困难。只要有了关于道德概念的规定，这些基本原则就能像关于世界的其他说明一样得到确认。 这两个关于理由的看法，我都没有采用。因为尽管某些道德原则看上去可能是自然的，甚至是显然的，但如认为它们必然是正确的，或者去说明这个看法究竟是什么意思，都存在着巨大的障碍。事实上，我始终认为，这些原则是有条件的，它们是在原始状态中按照一般事实而被选择的（第26节）。更可能的是，必要的道德实际情况决定于对采用原则所规定的条件；但实际上，最好似乎是把这些条件仅仅看作是一些合理的规定，最终要根据这些规定所归属的整个理论来评价。根本不存在人们可以合理地断言其为道德的必要而明确的条件或基本原则，从而也是最适于承担提出理由的责任的条件或基本原则。另一方面，所谓自然主义的方法，首先必须把道德概念和非道德概念区别开来，然后去为所作出的规定取得承认。要使这种理由为人所接受，必须先有关于含义的明确理论，但似乎并没有这种理论。总之，规定成了伦理学理论的主要部分，而它们反过来又需要证明。 因此，我认为，我们最好还是把道德理论看作是完全同其他任何理论一样，同时适当地考虑苏格拉底的观点（第9节）没有理由去设想道德理论的基本原则或假定必须是不言而喻的，或道德理论的概念和标准可以用其他一些能够被证明为非道德概念的概念来代替。例如，虽然我一直主张，某件事是正当的或正义的，可以理解为这件事符合可能在原始状态中得到承认的有关原则，并且我们可以以这种办法用后一种概念来代替前一种概念，但是，这些规定是在这个理论本身的范围内提出来的（第18节）。我们并不认为原始状态观本身没有道德意义，也不认为它所引起的一系列概念在伦理上是中性的（策23 节）。这个问题我干脆置而不论。我不曾把基本原则，或对这些原则的限制或规定，处理成似乎具有某些特征，而这些特征又使它们在证明某种道德理论方面具有一种特殊的地位。它们是理论的基本成份和手段，但其理由则有赖于整个概念以及这个理由在多大程度上符合并形成我们在反思平衡中深思熟虑的判断。正如我们在前面指出的那样，理由是许多考虑互为佐证的问题，是事事互相配合而成为一个合乎逻辑的观点的问题（第4节）。接受这个概念使我们能够置含义和规定问题于不顾，而去承担提出一种真正的正义理论的任务。 对这个理论的说明的三编，目的在于大致以下述方式使它们互为佐证，从而形成一个统一的整体。第一编提出了理论结构的主要部分，并在关于这些概念选择的合理规定的基础上对正义原则进行论证。我强调了这些条件的自然性质，并说明了接受这些条件的理由，但这并不是说它们是不证自明的，或是为分析道德概念或伦理条件的含义所必需的。在第二编，我考察了正义规定的各种体制和正义为个人规定的各种责任与义务。目的始终是要表明，这个拟议中的理治比其他众所周知的理论更符合我们深思熟虑的信念的固定点，同时它也使我们以经过仔细考虑似乎是更令人满意的方式去修正和推知成们的判断。基本原则与特殊判断总的说来似乎是相当一致的，至少在和某些可供选择的理论相比时是如此。最后，我在第三编中进行了验证，以便弄清正义即公平观是否是一种切实可行的观念。这使我们不得不提出稳定性问题，以及所规定的正当和善是否一致的问题。这些考虑并没有规定一开始就要承认论证的第一部分中的某些原则，而是为这种承认提供论据（第81节）。这些考虑表明。我们的本性竟使最初的选择贯彻始终。在这个意义上，我们可以说，人是具有某种道德性的。 不过，有人可能会认为，这种理由碰到了两种困难。首先，它容易招致普遍的不满，认为它所依靠的不过是意见一致这个事实。其次，对于我所提出的论据，还有一种更具体的反对意见认为，这种理由所依靠的是原始状态中的各方会去选择的一批特定的正义观，同时，这种理由还假定，不仅人们在深思熟虑的判断方面是一致的，而且人们在其所认为的为选择基本原则所规定的合理条件方面也是一致的。可以说，在深思熟虑的信念方面的这种一致是始终在变化的，而且在一个社会（或其一部分）和另一个社会之间也是各不相同的。有些所谓的固定点可能实际上并不固定，每个人不会为了弥补也们现有判断的缺陷而接受同样的原则。不管是哪些正义观，也不管关于所谓对原则规定的合理条件有什么样的一致意见，都肯定或多或少地带有随意性。这种论点认为，为正义即公平观所提出的理由也无法避免这些限制。 对这种普遍的反对意见的回答是，所谓理由就是向那些与我们意见不一致的人提出的论据，或是在我们犹豫不决时向我们自己提出的论据。这种论据假定人与人之间或一个人的内心存在着观点的不一致，因而力求使别人或我们自己相信，作为我们的要求和判断的基础的那些原则是合理的。理由服从于理智，它的出发点是参加讨论的各方的共同一致的意见。要向某个人证明某种正义观是正确的，最好是根据我们双方都能接受的前提，向他证明这种正义观的原则，而这些原则所产生的结果最符合我们深思熟虑的判断的。因此，单纯的证明还不成其为理由。证明仅仅表示陈述的逻辑关系。但是，一旦出发点得到相互的承认，或者结论十分广泛而又令人信服，使我们相信它们的前提所表明的正义观是正确的，那么证明也就变成了理由。 因此，赞成正义原则的论据应该从某种意见一致出发，这是完全正确的。这就是理由的自然之道。然而，这些比较具体的反对意见又含有这样的意思，即论据的力量决定于所依靠的意见一致的特征，就此而言，这些意见又是正确的。这里有几点值得注意。首先，虽然应该承认任何可供选择的正义观都可能在一定程度上带有随意性，但如把这理解为所有的正义观都是如此从而加以反对，那就错了。包括主要传统理论在内的一批正义观，就比忽略了较为明显的选择办法的一批正义观要少一些随意性。当然，如果指出正义原则仍然是一批得到系统评价的比较广泛的原则中的最佳选择，那么，赞成这些原则的论据就更加有力。我不知道能在多大程度上做到这一点。但我不相信正义原则（按照我的规定）对于似乎是一整批选择来说会是可取的观念（这里我假定，考虑到上限和其他限制，这类合理而切实可行的可供选择的正义观实际上是有限的）。即使我所提出的论据是正确的，那也只是表明，某种最后符合要求的理论（如果存在这种理论的话）看上去也会更像契约论，而不像我们所讨论的任何其他理论。严格说来，甚至这种结论也是无法证明的。 尽管如此，如果把正义即公平观和这些观念加以比较，被用到的这一批正义观完全没有什么特别之处：它们包括了来自道德哲学传统的一些有代表性的理论，而这个传统包括历史上对迄今为止似乎是更合理更切合实际的道德观的意见一致。随着时间的推移，还可能提出更多的正义观，从而在主要的正义观经受了一种更严格的检验的同时，为论证其正确性提供了一种更令人信服的基础。但这种情况我们只能预测。就目前来说，适当的办法就是努力重新提出契约论，并把它同一些熟知的可供选择的理论加以比较。这种办法不是随意的；我们只能沿着这条路前进。 说到关于对合理条件的意见一致的特殊困难，应该指出的是，道德哲学的目的之一就是在似乎不存在意见一致的地方去寻找意见一致的可能基础。它必须努力扩大现有的某种意见一致的范围，提出一些更具特色的道德观供我们考虑。合理的根据不是可以信手拈来的：必需去发现它们，适当地表现它们，而这有时要靠侥幸猜中，有时要靠指出理论要求。正是由于考虑到这个目标，对选择基本原则规定的各种条件就被集中到关于原始状态的概念中来了。这里的想法是，把足够多的合理限制集中成一个单一的观念，这样就可以清楚地看出，在所提出的各种选择办法中。必有一种是最好的。我们希望看到发生这样的结果，即某种观点（在现时已知的那些观点中）是一种比较好的观点。大概这也是刚才谈到的意见一致所意想不到的结果吧。 同样，对体现在原始状态概念中的那一组条件，也不能不加以说明。可以认为这些条件是合理的，也可以把这些条件和道德原则的目的及其确立社会关系的作用联系起来。主张序列和决定性的根据以乎是相当清楚的。而且，我们现在可以看到，公开性可被解释为一种保证，使理由的论证过程能够贯彻始终（可以说达到了最大限度）。而不致产生不良后果。因为公开性承认，所有的人都可以向其他每一个人证明自己的行为是正当的（如果他的行为被证明是正当的），而不会产生不利于自己的或其他令人不安的结果。如果我们认真地把关于社会联合和社会的概念看作是这些联合中的一种社会联合，那么公开性无疑就是一种自然的条件。这种条件有助于使人相信，一个井然有序的社会就是一种活动，就是说，这个社会的成员互相追随，互相了解，他们采纳了同一个起支配作用的观念；他们每一个人都以众所周知是人人赞同的方式，分享全体努力带来的利益。从互相承认社会的基本原则这一点来看。社会并没有被分隔开来。而且事实上。如果要使正义观和亚里士多德原则（及其附带作用）化为有约束力的行动，情况也必须如此。 当然，对道德原则的作用所作的规定并不是唯一的；对它可以作不同的解释。我们在这些原则中进行选择时可以看一看，在说明原始状态时，哪一个原则利用了最不充分的一组条件。这种意见的缺点是，虽然在其他条件相等时，较不充分的条件当然应该优先得到选择，但所谓最不充分的一组条件却是没有的。虽然不能说根本没有条件，但可以说是最起码的条件却是不存在的，而且这种条件也是不重要的。因此，我们必须去寻找一种有限制的最起码的条件，一组仍然使我们能够创立某种可行的正义理论的条件。我们应该这样来考虑正义即公平理论的某些部分。我已多次指出了对单独考虑的一些原则的规定的条件的最起码的性质。例如，关于互不关心的动机的假定，就不是一种过分苛求的规定。这种规定不仅使我们能够把正义理论建立在关于合理选择的一种相当准确的概念上，而且对各方也几乎没有提出什么要求：这样，所选定的原则就能够调整比较广泛而深刻的冲突，而这显然是一种迫切的需要（第4O节）。它还有另一个优点，就是把原始状态中表现为普通条件和无知之幕等等比较明显的道德因素分离出来。使我们能够更清楚地看到，正义是怎样要求我们超越对我们自身利益的关心的。 关于良心自由的讨论，最清楚地说明了关于互不关心的假定。这里，各方的对立是很严重的，但人们仍然可以指出，如果能够取得任何意见一致的话，那就是关于平等自由权原则的意见一致。同时，正如我们已经指出的那样，这个概念也可以扩大应用于道德原则之间的冲突（第33节）。即使各方认为他们在社会中确认了某种道德观（这种道德观的内容是他们不知道的），他们仍然可以赞成正义的第一个原则。因此，这个原则似乎在某些道德观点中占有一种特殊的地位；只要我们按照对某种切合实际的正义观规定的某些最起码的条件而假定存在相当广泛的差异，正义的第一个原则便规定了一种最大限度的意见一致。 现在，我想提一下几种反对意见，这些意见与提出理由的方法没有关系，而只与正义理论本身的某些特征有关。其中一种意见批评说，契约观点是一种狭益的个人主义理论。对于这个问题，前面的评论已经作出了回答。一旦关于互不关心的假定的意义得到了理解，这种反对意见似乎就是无的放矢。在正义即公平观的基础上，我们可以利用某种相当普遍的合理选择观，来重新提出并确立康德的论题。例如，我们发现，关于自律和道德法则的解释体现了我们作为自由而平等的有理性的人的本性；绝对命令也有与其相似的表现，正如关于不要把人仅仅当工具对待或甚至根本不要把人当工具对待的主张一样。此外，在最后一编里，正义理论说明社团价值这一点也被指了出来；这就使前面的一个论点得到了加强，这个论点就是，某种个人理想深深植根在正义原则之中，它为判断社会基本结构提供了一个阿基米德点（第41节）。正义理论的这些方面，从看上去好像是不考虑社会价值的一种不适当的理性主义观念开始而逐步展开。原始状态首先被用来确定正义的内容，也就是规定正义的原则。直到后来正义才被看作是我们的善的一部分，并同我们固有的社会性联系在一起。要估计原始状态这个概念的意义，不能靠集中注意力于它的某一个别特征，而是要像我经常指出的那样，只能靠建立在它的基础上的整个理论。 如果说，正义即公平理论比过去对契约论的所有说明都更令人信服，我认为，那是因为正如前面指出的那样，原始状态把相当明显的选择问题同广泛认为对采用道德原则所规定的适当条件统一在一个概念里了。这种原始状态把必要的明晰性和有关的道德约束结合了起来。一部分是为了保持这种明晰性，我才一直避免把任何伦理动机赋予各方。只要各方能够确定他们的利益，他们就完全根据似乎最能促进他们的利益的办法来作出决定。这样，我们就能够利用合理的审慎来选择这个直觉概念。然而，我们可以通过假定各方受到道德考虑的影响，来规定原始状态的伦理变化。如果有人反对说，原始协议这个概念在道德上可能不再是中性的，那就是一个错误，因为这个概念已经包含了某些道德特征，而且必须如此，例如，它包含了对原则规定的正式条件和无知之幕。我把对原始状态的说明加以简单的划分，使这些因素在对各方的说明中不会出现，虽然即使在这里也仍然可能会产生哪些可以算作道德因素和哪些不能算作道德因素的问题。没有必要去解决这个问题。重要的是应该以最简单、最令人信服的方法来说明原始状态的种种特征。 有时我也提到这种初始状态的某些可能发生的伦理变化（第17节）。例如，人们可以假定，各方坚持任何人都不得利用不正当的资本和偶然事件去谋利的原则，因此他们选择了一种可以减少自然不测事件和社会命运的影响的正义观。或者，也可以说，他们接受了一种关于相互关系的原则，这个原则要求分配安排应始终处于差益曲线的向上斜升部分。此外，某个关于公平自愿合作的概念，也可能使各方准备接受的正义观受到限制。没有任何先验的理由可以认为这些变化必然不那么令人信服，或这些变化所表明的道德限制必然不会那么广泛地得到共同遵守。而且，我们已经知道，刚才提到的那些可能性似乎确认了差别原则，为这个原则提供了进一步的论据。虽然我们没有提出这种观点，但它们无疑是值得进一步研究的。最重要的是不要去利用有争论的原则。例如，在原始状态中采用一条反对冒险的规则以否定平均功利原则，可能会使这种方法变得无用，因为有些哲学家一直力图从某些危险情况下适当的客观态度所产生的结果来推导出平均功利原则，从而证明这个原则是正确的。我们必须找到反对功利标准的其他论据：冒险是否适当是一个有争论的问题（第28节）。只有在原始协议的条件事实上得到了广泛的承认，或者能够得到广泛的承认时，原始协议的概念才会是有效的。 有人可能会争论说，还有一个缺点是，正义原则不是来自对人的尊重这个概念，不是来自对人的固有价值和尊严的承认。既然原始状态（按照我的规定）没有包含这个概念，至少不是明显地包含了这个概念，赞成正义即公平观的论据就可被认为是不正确的。然而，我认为，虽然只有在人们有了某种正义感，因而的确做到了互相尊重的情况下，正义原则才会是有效的，但尊重的概念或人的固有价值的概念不是获得这些正义原则的适当基础。需要予以解释的正是这些概念。这一情况类似于有关慈善的情况：如果没有正当和正义原则，慈善的目的和对尊重的要求就都是不明确的；它们必须以这些已经独立获得的原则为先决条件（第30节）。然而，一旦有了正义观，尊重的概念和人的尊严的概念就能得到一种比较明确的含义。除其他一些情况外，表示对人的尊重，还要靠用他们能够认为是正当的方式来对待他们。不仅如此，我们所依靠的原则，其内容是很清楚的。例如，尊重人就是承认他们具有一种建立在正义基础上的不可侵犯性，而这种不可侵犯性甚至整个社会的福利也是不能凌驾其上的。它所要认定的是：某些人失去自由并不因其他人享受到更大的福利而变得正当。正义在词汇序列中的优先地位，体现了康德所说的超过所有其他价值的人的价值。正义理论提供了对这些概念的一种说明，但我们不能从这些概念出发。如果要系统地说明我们关于尊重的概念和平等的自然基础，关于原始状态或某些类似推定的复杂问题就是无法避免的。 这些意见使我们想起了我们在一开始就提到的常识性信念，即正义是社会体制的第一美德（第1节）。我一直试图提出一种使我们能够理解和估价正义第一这种感觉的理论。正义即公平理论就是这种努力的结果：这个理论明确表达了这种意见，并加强了这种意见的普遍倾向。尽管它当然不是一种完全令人满意的理论，但我认为，它提供了功利主义观点的一种替代观点。而在我们的道德哲学中，长期以来始终是功利主义观点占据着突出的地位的。我一直努力把正义理论作为一种切实可行的系统理论来介绍，这样，关于最大限度地提高善的概念，就不会不适当地占据支配的地位了。对目的论的零敲碎打的批判，是不可能取得成果的。我们必须努力创立一种不同的观点，这种观点要同样具有明晰性和系统性的优点，但又能对我们的道德情感作出一种更具特色的解释。 最后，我们不妨提醒一下自己，原始状态的假设性质引起了这样一个问题：为什么我们会对原始状态感到兴趣？这是道德上的兴趣，还是别的什么兴趣？可以重温一下对这个问题的答案：包含在对这种状态的说明中的条件，是我们事实上所接受的条件。如果我们不接受这些条件，那么可以用我们有时介绍的那些哲学上的考虑来说服我们去接受。可以对原始状态的每一个方面都给予一种赞同的说明。因此，我们所做的就是把全部条件结合成一个观念，而我们通过适当的认真反思，随时都准备承认，在我们的相互行为中，这些条件是合理的（第4 节）。一旦我们掌握了这个观念，我们就能够在任何时候按照规定的观点去看社会上的万事万物。只要按照某些方式来进行推理并遵循得出的结论办事就行了。这种观点并且是客观的，它表明了我们是自律的（第78节）。这种观点不是把所有的人合而为一，而是承认他们是不同的各别的人，它能使我们对别人不存偏见，即使他们不是我们同时代的人，而是属于许多世代的人。因此，从这种状态出发来看我们的社会地位，就是把它看作是几乎永恒不变的那种地位：应该不仅从所有的社会观点而且也从所有现世的观点来看待人的地位。永恒的观点不是现世之外的某个地方的观点，也不是超凡入圣的人的观点；相反，它是现世的每一个有理性的人都可以接受的某种思想和感情。不管他们是哪一代人，只要他们那样做了，他们就能把所有人的观点结合成一种安排，一起来提出一些起支配作用的原则。由于每个人都离不开这些原则，他们就可以按照自己的观点来予以确认。心灵的纯洁（如果能够达到的话）将会使一个人明察秋毫，并按照这种观点通情达理地、自我克制地去行动。