Chapter 24 Chapter 9 The Good of Justice-1

In this chapter, I discuss the second and final part of the stability problem.This part deals with the question of whether the two concepts of justice, that is, fairness, and favor, that is, rationality, are consistent.It remains to be proved that, given the circumstances of a well-ordered society, a man's rational plan of life would approve and affirm his sense of justice.I have approached this question by treating in turn the exigencies of a well-ordered society, and the ways in which just arrangements promote the good of its members.I would therefore first point out that this society allows for the autonomy of men and the objectivity of their judgments of what is right and just.Next, I would also like to point out how justice unites with the ideal of social association, how it reduces the tendency to envy and resentment, and how it prescribes a balance in which liberty takes precedence over existence.Finally, I intend to examine the difference between justice as fairness and hedonistic utilitarianism in order to show how a just institution creates the conditions for the unity of the self and enables people to express their nature as free and equal moral subjects .Putting these points together, I can then say that, in a well-ordered society, an effective sense of justice becomes part of a man's good, so that tendencies to instability are restrained, if not eliminated. .

Before discussing the various features of a well-ordered society, I should stress that my concerns with uniformity apply only to this form of society.So we still limit ourselves to strict compliance theory.However, this is a question that needs to be studied first, because if a well-ordered society cannot be consistent, it seems bound to do nothing.On the other hand, even in cases where right and good coincide, this is by no means a necessary consequence.For the relation of right and good implies that the members of a well-ordered society will decide to maintain their sense of justice in order to regulate their mutual behavior when evaluating their life plans with the principle of rational choice.There is this necessary co-ordination between principles which may be assented in the absence of knowledge, and principles of rational choice which are not chosen and applied with full knowledge.However, some principles, stated in markedly different ways, also cooperate when the principles of justice are fully realized.Of course, the way in which contractarianism is presented also accounts for this consistency.But this consistent relationship is not taken for granted, and the basis for the consistency still needs to be deduced.

I next examine some of the features of a well-ordered society which, taken together, enable rational men to affirm their sense of justice.This argument is cumulative, and rests on a synthesis of opinions, the substance of which is left to be summarized later (§ 86). Let me start by pointing out that if we think carefully about the psychological roots of our moral attitudes, we sometimes doubt the rationality of those attitudes.Since we think of these feelings as arising in situations marked by subservience to authority, we might wonder whether we should throw them out altogether.Since the arguments for just goodness depend on members of a well-ordered society having an effective desire to act justly, we must reduce this uncertainty.So imagine a person who experiences the incentive of a moral sense as an inexplicable prohibition that he cannot justify at the moment.Why doesn't he think that this incentive is simply due to neurotic compulsion?If it turns out that these scruples were in fact formed and caused chiefly by accidental events of childhood, perhaps by the course of our family history and class position, and at the same time prove to have no other cause , then, there really is no reason for these concerns to dominate our lives.But of course there are many other things that should be accounted for for someone in a well-ordered society.One can point out to him the essential features of the development of the feelings of justice and how, finally, the morality of principle should be understood.Moreover, his moral education itself has been guided by the principles of right and justice which he might have subscribed to in his original position of equal representation of all men as moral subjects.The adopted morality, as we know, is independent of the accidents of nature and of social circumstances; therefore, the mental process by which moral conscience is acquired is consistent with the principles which he himself may choose, And he chooses these principles on terms which he may admit to be fair, unaltered by chance and chance.

Nor can a man living in a well-ordered society object to the customary practice of moral education which inculcates a sense of justice, since the parties in the original position, by assenting to the principles of right, also agree that in order for these principles to act upon them arrangements necessary to be effective.In fact, the adaptability of these arrangements to human imperfections is an important consideration in choosing a conception of justice.Therefore, no one's moral beliefs are the result of forced indoctrination.As the natural duty of mutual respect requires, moral education is thought to be carefully considered, along with understanding.There are no ideals, principles, and maxims that are socially assented that take undue advantage of human frailty.A person's sense of justice is not a subtly coercive psychological mechanism put in place by those in authority to ensure that they firmly abide by rules designed to further their interests.Nor is the educational process merely a causal sequence with the final result of producing appropriate moral feelings.Every stage of the educational process, in teaching and explaining, anticipates as far as possible the conception of right and justice for which it was aimed, and with which we shall later see that the These ethical standards that we set forth proved to be correct.

These observations are clearly the conclusions of contractarianism, and show that the principles of contractarianism determine the usual practice of moral education in a well-ordered society.If we follow Kant's interpretation of justice as fairness, we can say that people act according to these principles, that is, act autonomously, as they can under the conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational human beings. Recognize principles to act on.Undoubtedly, these conditions also reflect the place of individuals in the world, their subjection to circumstances of justice.But this is only to say that the idea of ​​autonomy is an idea which applies to man; the idea which applies to a superior or inferior nature may well be different (§ 40).Therefore, moral education is an education for self-discipline.In due time each will know why he accepts the principles of justice, and how they arise from the conditions which define him as an equal in a society of moral subjects.It follows that we accept these principles on this basis, largely independent of tradition and authority, or of the opinions of others.However necessary these means may be in order to bring us to a comprehensive understanding, we will ultimately adhere to a conception of justification for just reasons which we ourselves can independently adduce.

From a contractual point of view, however, the concepts of autonomy and objectivity are not contradictory: freedom and rationality go hand in hand.Both self-discipline and objectivity can be consistently described in raw terms.The concept of the original state is an extremely important concept for the whole theory, and some other basic concepts are stipulated according to it.To act autonomously, therefore, is to act according to principles which we, as free and equal rational beings, might subscribe to, and which we understand as such.These principles are also objective.These are the principles we want everyone to abide by, including ourselves, if we are to adopt the appropriate general views together.The original position prescribes this point of view, and the conditions of the original position embody the conditions of objectivity: its prescribing expresses the constraints on certain arguments which force us to consider the importance of principles irrespective of the particularity of our circumstances. choose.The veil of ignorance prevents us from forming a moral outlook consistent with our peculiar allegiances and interests.Instead of looking at the social order in terms of our own status, we adopt a view that everyone would take on an equal footing.In this sense, we are looking at our society and our place in it objectively: we share a common point of view with others, and we do not base our judgments on personal biases.Thus, to the extent that our moral principles and beliefs are obtained and tested by taking this general view and evaluating the arguments in favor of them against the constraints expressed by the original position view, they are objective.Considerate virtues such as impartiality and empathy for others are the intellectual and emotional strengths that enable us to do these things well.

Strive to be objective, a result of trying to form our moral outlook and moral judgments according to a common point of view, making it more likely that we will come to an agreement.In fact, other things being equal, the original position is best described as its maximum concentration of opinion.It is partly for this reason that we accept the constraints of a common standard, since we cannot reasonably expect our views to agree if they are affected by the accidents of our different circumstances.Of course, we will not judge all problems uniformly, and indeed, many, if not most, of social problems may remain unsolvable, especially if they are viewed in their full complexity.This is why many simplified forms of justice as fairness are recognized.We need only recall the reasons for developing certain concepts, namely the veil of ignorance, purely procedural justice (as distinct from distributive justice), lexical sequences, the division of basic structures into two parts, and so on.Taken together, it is hoped that these and other means will simplify political and social issues to such an extent that the balance of justice that might be achieved by greater consensus outweighs that by ignoring some potentially relevant aspects of the moral position. possible losses.Judging the complexities of the problems of justice is the responsibility of those in the original position.While ethical differences are bound to remain, fundamental agreement can be reached when society is viewed in its original state.Acceptance of the principles of right and justice can form a friendly relationship among citizens and establish a basis for comity in cases of intractable differences.Even on constitutional issues, and certainly on many policy issues, agreement may occasionally be broken, but citizens can recognize each other's sincerity and desire for justice.However, unless there is some kind of shared point of view.Otherwise it may be pointless to adopt this narrowing of the differences of opinion, reasoning, and evidence, and we may not have any reasonable grounds for believing that our beliefs are justified.

This account of autonomy and objectivity obviously rests on a theory of justice.The concept of the original state is used to consistently illustrate these two concepts.Of course, the content of these concepts must change appropriately if principles of justice are not to be considered to be chosen.If one thinks that the principle of utility may be approved, one thinks that our self-discipline is manifested by the adherence to this standard.Even so, the general concept will remain the same, and autonomy and objectivity will still be accounted for in their original state.However, some people state self-discipline and objectivity in a completely different way.Self-discipline, they propose, is total freedom to form our moral claims, and that the conscientious judgment of every moral embodiment should be absolutely respected.Objectivity thus derives from these judgments, because they meet all the relevant criteria of the free judgment of the person who embodies the morality himself.These standards may or may not have anything to do with the adoption of a common point of view that others may reasonably be expected to share; the corresponding notion of autonomy associated with that point of view certainly has nothing to do with it.I mention these different interpretations only to show the nature of contractarianism by contrast.

From the point of view of justice as fairness, it is not true that everyone's conscientious judgment should be absolutely respected; nor is it true that individuals have complete freedom to form their own moral beliefs.These arguments are false if they are to say that we often claim to be able to act on our moral claims after we have carefully (we think so) acquired them.We pointed out in our discussion of conscientious objectors that the question here is how one should respond to those who try to act as their false moral conscience dictates (section 56).How can we be sure that it is their conscience that is at fault, and not ours?Under what circumstances would they have to give up the idea of ​​acting in accordance with a wrong moral conscience?To find the answers to these questions one has to go back to the original position: a man's moral conscience is led astray if he tries to impose upon us certain conditions contrary to the principles to which each of us in this position might subscribe. .We can then resist his plan in ways that might be sanctioned when the contradiction is viewed from that point of view.Strictly speaking, we should not respect a person's moral conscience.On the contrary, it is he who we should respect, and to do so is to limit his actions only as permitted by principles which we both may recognize, and so far as the facts prove necessary.In the original position, all parties agree to be responsible for the chosen conception of justice.As long as the principles of this conception of justice are strictly observed, there will be no question of violating our self-discipline.Furthermore, the principles state that in many cases we cannot absolve ourselves of responsibility for the actions we inflict on others.Those in power are accountable for the policies they pursue and the instructions they issue.Those who acquiesce in the execution of unjust orders or the instigation of criminal schemes generally cannot excuse their ignorance, nor can they blame their superiors entirely.Details about these issues are within the purview of partial compliance theory.The crucial point here is that the principles that best serve us as free and equal reasonable beings dictate our responsibilities.Otherwise, autonomy would only lead to a conflict between self-righteous ends, and objectivity would lead to attachment to some unchanging but idiosyncratic institution.

Here we should point out that, in times of doubt about society and loss of faith in long-established values, there is a tendency to turn to the virtues of integrity: honesty, sobriety, determination, or Authentic, as some say.If no one knows what is right, at least we can make our beliefs our own in our own way, without accepting what others offer us.If traditional moral principles are no longer relevant, and we cannot agree on what should replace them, we can at least use our heads to decide how we intend to act, rather than Thinking that this is already decided anyway, and that we need only recognize this or that authority.These virtues of rectitude are of course also virtues, and virtues of free men.But, though these virtues are necessary, they are not sufficient; for their prescribing can include almost anything: and a tyrant may display them to a high degree, and thus a certain charm, because he does not use politics and destiny as Make excuses to deceive yourself.It is impossible to explain a moral point of view in terms of these virtues alone; they are formal virtues, and thus in a sense they are secondary.But when they are combined with an appropriate conception of justice, which takes into account both autonomy and objectivity properly understood, these virtues become genuine virtues.The concept of the original position, and the principles chosen in the original position, show how this is done.

In sum, therefore, a well-ordered society affirms people's autonomy and encourages the objectivity of considered judgments of justice.When the members of this society think carefully about how their moral feelings were acquired, so long as they understand that their beliefs are consistent with the principles that might have been chosen in the original position, or even if they were not, they can be reconciled by modifying their any doubt they might have about the validity of their moral feelings can be dispelled. We have seen that, despite the individualistic character of justice as fairness, the two principles of justice provide an Archimedean point for evaluating existing institutions and the desires and aspirations they generate.These criteria provide a way to guide the process of social change without resorting to a perfectionist or organic view of society as stand-alone criteria (Section 41).But the question remains whether contractarianism is a satisfactory structure for understanding corporate values ​​and choosing social arrangements to realize those values.It is natural to speculate that the consistency of right and good depends to a large extent on whether a well-ordered society realizes the corporate good.I intend to discuss several aspects of this problem in this section and in the next three sections. First, we can recall that one of the conditions of the original position is that the parties know that they are governed by the circumstances of justice.They assume that each person has his conception of his own good, according to which he insists on what he makes of other people.Thus, although they regard society as a mutually beneficial cooperative enterprise, this enterprise is characterized not only by the unity of interests but also by the conflict of interests. However, there are two views on these assumptions.The first view is that held by a theory of justice: this is the view in which satisfactory principles are derived from the least adequate assumptions.The premises of the theory should be some simple and reasonable conditions on which everyone, or nearly everyone, is likely to agree, and for which convincing philosophical arguments can be made.At the same time, the greater the conflict of the initial requirements into which these principles can introduce an acceptable order, the more comprehensive the theory is likely to be.It can be argued, therefore, that there is a profound antagonism of interests. Another way of thinking about these assumptions is to see them as describing some kind of social order, or some aspect of the basic structure that is actually realized.We are thus led to the notion of a society of individuals.The main characteristic of this society is, first of all, that the people it includes, whether individuals or groups, have their own individual ends, which either compete with each other or are independent of each other, but in no case are complementary.Second, the system itself is not considered to have any value, nor is participation in the system a good, but a burden.Each therefore sees social arrangements only as a means to the attainment of his own ends.Neither considers the good of others or what is appropriated by others; It is the commodities and assets that he possesses, not the possessions of others, nor their level of utility). We can also assume that the actual distribution of benefits is largely determined by the balance of power and pivotal positions created by the existing situation.It is of course possible, however, that this distribution be quite equitable and in accordance with the requirements of mutual relations.Due to good luck, this position might lead to this result.The public good consists chiefly of those means and conditions which are in the hands of the state, and which each individual may use as available means for his own ends, just as each traveler on a road has his own destination.The theory of competitive markets is a typical illustration of such a society.Since the members of the society are not motivated by the desire to act justly, even when just and efficient arrangements exist, sanctions are usually required to maintain their stability.The combination of individual and collective interests is thus the result of institutional means steadily applied to people who are forces of mutual indifference, if not mutual hostility.What holds societies of individuals together is not the general belief that the basic arrangements of society are just and secure, but the intention of each individual, or a substantial number of them, to maintain them, that any practicable change would reduce their Pervasive beliefs about the means available to pursue their individual goals. It is sometimes said that contractarianism necessarily assumes that a society of individuals is an ideal society, at least so far as the distribution of benefits satisfies some appropriate criterion of mutuality.But this is not the case, as evidenced by the notion of a well-ordered society.As I said earlier, there is another interpretation of the concept of the original position.The notion of what is good as reasonable and the account of human sociality also require a different perspective.However, the social nature of man must not be regarded as irrelevant.Man's sociality does not merely mean that society is necessary to human life, or that, by living in a community, people acquire needs and interests which impel them to act according to what their institutions allow and approve. Some specific ways to work together for mutual benefit.What embodies the social nature of human beings is not the cliché that social life is a condition for our ability to develop language and thinking skills and to participate in common social and cultural activities.Doubtless, even the concepts by which we describe our plans and situations, and express our individual claims and aims, often presuppose not only certain beliefs and systems of thought that are the result of long-traditional collective efforts, And it's a certain social background.These facts are not insignificant, of course; but if they are used to explain our mutual relations, it is an insignificant explanation of the sociality of men, since they are irrelevant to those who view their relations from a purely functional point of view. The same applies. The sociality of man can be fully understood by contrasting it with the concept of individual society.For example, people actually have common end goals, and at the same time, they all think that their common institutions and activities are good in themselves.Because of the need for companionship in an agreed way of life, we all need each other as companions, and the achievements and joys of others are a necessary and admirable thing to our own good.These problems are quite obvious, but still need to be explained further.In explaining the notion that what is good is reasonable, we have come to the well-known conclusion that a reasonable plan of life generally creates the conditions for the development of at least some of a person's faculties.Aristotelian principles also point in this direction.Yet it is a fundamental characteristic of man that no one can do everything he can do; let alone everything anyone else can do.Every man's potential is greater than he can hope to realize.These potentials are far below the average ability of the average person.therefore.Each must choose those faculties and possible interests which he wishes to develop; he must plan for their cultivation and employment, and methodically time his realization.Different people with similar abilities or complementary abilities can work together to realize their common complementary nature.If people really enjoy using their own abilities, they are likely to show appreciation for the talents of others, especially when their respective merits occupy an unanimous place in a way of life in which everyone can accept their goals. . Thus, we can say, like Humboldt, that it is through social association based on the needs and potentialities of the members of the society that each receives a share in the total amount of natural assets acquired by others.We are thus led to the conception of a human society whose members appreciate each other's virtues and individualities induced by free institutions, who recognize that the good of each is a constituent of a total activity whose whole arrangement It is unanimous, and it brings joy to all.The society can also be conceived as being continuous in time, and so can the same be conceived of the common contributions of generations in the history of the society.Our ancestors accomplished something, and we do it; their accomplishments influence the direction of our endeavors and provide a broader basis for understanding our goals.To say that man is a man of history means that the realization of the abilities of man living in any period takes advantage of the cooperation of many generations (or even many societies) over a long period of time.That is to say, when interpreted in terms of social tradition, such cooperation is always guided by awareness of past achievements.Unlike man, every animal can and does do what it can do in most cases, or what any other animal of its kind, living at the same time, could or could do.Generally speaking, the range of the realized abilities of an individual in the same class is actually not less than the potential of other individuals similar to it.The notable exception is the gender difference.Both humans and animals have a need for the opposite sex, which is perhaps why attraction between the sexes is the most obvious example.But the form this attraction may take is purely utilitarian, with each seeing the other as an instrument for its own pleasure or reproduction.Unless the attachment relationship incorporates elements of love and friendship, it will not display the characteristics of social bonding. Many ways of life, however, are characterized by social associations, with end goals and common activities that they value.Science and art provide examples abound.Families, friends, and other groups are also social associations.Considering the simpler example of a race, however, has its benefits.Here, we can easily distinguish four kinds of goals: the goal of the game stipulated by the rules of the game, such as winning the most races; the various motivations of the players in the game, such as the player seeks excitement from the game, the desire to exercise , etc., these aspects may vary from person to person; the social goals achieved by the game, these goals may be unconscious.The players don't know about it, and even no one in the society knows about it.This is a matter for the thoughtful observer to figure out; and in the end the common goal of all players, the desire that the game should be done well.This common goal can only be achieved if the game is played fairly according to the rules, if the parties are more or less evenly matched, and if all players feel that their game is good.However, if this goal is achieved, everyone gets pleasure and satisfaction from the above actions.A good game is like a collective achievement, it requires the cooperation of all. But the common purpose of social association is clearly more than a common desire for the same concrete action.Grant's and Lee's desire to occupy Richmond was the same, but this desire did not create commonality between them.People generally want the same things, such as liberty and opportunity, housing and food, but this need may cause them to quarrel.Men's interests are determined by the principles of justice, and whether men have common ends or not depends on the more detailed features of the activity to which their interest inclines them.People presumably have a consensual arrangement of actions in which the merits and pleasures of each are complementary to the good of all.Thus each takes pleasure in the actions of the other as they jointly carry out a plan acceptable to all.Although many games have their competitive side, they clearly demonstrate this aim: the general desire to have a good and fair game must moderate if everyone's enthusiasm and fun are to be kept alive, and It's effective. The development of arts and sciences everywhere, as well as the development of various religions and cultures, of course, can basically be viewed in the same way.People gradually build up systems of knowledge and beliefs, learning from each other and valuing each other's different contributions; they devise accepted techniques of doing things, and specify types of feeling and expression.In these cases, the common goal is dictated by the respective arts, sciences, or religious traditions, and thus often appears subtle and complex; understanding it often takes years of training and learning.The crucial issue is to have a common end goal and recognized means of furthering it that take into account the universal recognition of the achievements of each individual.If this end is achieved, everyone derives satisfaction from the same thing; this and the complementary nature of individual goods confirm this common relation. However, I do not intend to emphasize examples of the arts and sciences and the religious and cultural aspects of advanced forms.These examples are of no particular value from the point of view of justice, as are the abandonment of the principle of perfection in favor of democracy in the appraisal of mutual merit.In fact, using the game as an example not only has the advantages of simplicity, but also is more appropriate in some respects.It helps to show that the primary problem is that there are many different kinds of social associations, and that from the point of view of political justice we should not rank them by value.Furthermore, the size of these unions is uncertain, ranging from family and friends to much larger groups.These associations are also not limited by time and space, because people can cooperate to achieve commonalities despite being in different historical periods and different environments.A well-ordered society, in fact most societies, will probably contain countless social associations of all kinds. Having made this prologue, we can now see that the principles of justice are connected with the sociality of man.The basic concept simply says that a well-ordered society (consistent with the notion of justice as fairness) is itself a social association.In fact, it is a social association among all kinds of social associations.It shows two features: the successful implementation of just institutions is the ultimate goal shared by all members of society, and at the same time these institutional forms are themselves considered good.Let us consider these two characteristics in turn.The first feature is quite obvious.Just as the players of a game all have the common aim of playing a good and fair game, so the members of a well-ordered society all have the common aim of fulfilling their own and others' natures in the manner permitted by the principles of justice. And the common goal of working together.This collective disposition is the result of each having some effective sense of justice.Every citizen hopes that everyone (including himself) can act according to the principles that everyone may agree on in some initial state of equality.This desire is prescriptive, required by the determinative conditions of moral principles; if each acts justly, then all are satisfied by said action. The description of the second feature is more complicated, but it is quite clear from the above situation.We need only point out that once the concept of social association is applied to the whole basic structure, the inherent merits of the basic institutions of society, the just constitution and the main part of the legal order, can be discovered in various ways.So, the first point is that Kant's interpretation enables us to say that everyone's action to uphold justice is in accordance with everyone's good.Men have a desire to express their nature as free and equal moral subjects, and they can do this adequately if they act according to the principles they might admit in their original position.If all strive to abide by these principles, and each succeeds, then individually and collectively their natures as moral subjects are most fully realized, and their individual and collective good are maximized. fully realized. But looking further, Aristotelian principles apply not only to any other human activity, but also to institutional forms.这样看来，正义的宪法秩序如果同日常生活中较小的社会联合结合起来，就能为这许多团体提供某种构架，并为所有人的最复杂、最多样的活动作出安排。在一个井然有序的社会里，每一个人都了解将要指导在许多世代实行的整个安排的基本原则，而所有的人也都有一种要在自己生活计划中遵守这些原则的确定意向。因此，每个人的计划都有一种在其他情况下不可能有的更丰富多采的结构；这个计划通过彼此都能接受的原则与别人的计划相适应。每个人的更带有个人性质的生活可以说是一种计划中的计划，这个主导的计划是在社会的公共体制中实现的。但是，这个较大计划并未确定一种主要的目标，如宗教联合的目标或显示文化的最大优点的目标，更不用说是增强国力和发扬国威的目标了，同这些目标相比，所有个人和团体的目标都是次要的。带有规定性的普遍意向不如说就是使宪法秩序去实现正义原则。如果亚里士多德原则是正确的，那么作为一种善，这种集体活动是必须经历的。 我们已经看到，道德上的优点就是人的优点，也就是人的属性。这些属性是人们可以向自己和相互合理要求的，它们是因为它们自身的缘故而得到赞赏的东西，或是在人们十分喜爱的活动中表现出来的东西（第66－67节）。显然，这些优点在一个井然有序的社会的公共生活中也表现了出来。因此，亚里士多德原则的这个附带原则的意思是说，人们赞赏和喜爱彼此的这些属性，因为它们是在确认正义的体制时表现出来的。由此可见，正义的集体活动是人类兴旺发达的最好方式，因为在有利的条件下，人们通过维护这些公共安排来最充分地表现自己的本性，并获得每个人都可能有的最广泛的规定性的优点。与此同时，正义的体制也考虑并促进了团体内部纷繁多样的生活，因为只有在团体里，个人才能实现自己的更具体的目标。因此，正义的普遍实现正是社团的价值所在。 最后，我应该指出：一个井然有序的社会并不取消最一般意义上的分工。当然，这种分工的最坏方面能够克服：任何人都不需要卑躬屈膝地去依赖别人，被迫在窒息人的思想感情的单调乏味的日常工作之间作出抉择。每个人都可以得到各种不同的工作，来适当表现他的本性的不同成分。但是，即使工作对所有人来说都是有意义的，我们也不能摆脱我们对别人的依赖，我们甚至不应希望去摆脱。在一个完全正义的社会里，人们都是以自己的特有方式去寻求自己的善，他们依靠他们的同伴不但去做他们本来可以做但没有做的事，而且还去做他们本来就无法做到的事。以为每一个人都有可能充分实现自己的能力，至少有些人可以成为人类的完美典范，这种设想自然诱人，但这是不可能的。我们自己只是我们有可能成为的那种人的某些部分，这就是人的社会性的一个特征。我们必须指望别人去实现我们必定置而不用的或完全缺乏的那些优点。社会的集体活动，即那许多团体和管理它们的最大社团的公共生活，使我们的努力持续不断并作出贡献。然而，我们不再仅仅是不完整的部分：我们直接实现的属于我们自己的那一部分，同我们确认其目标的一种更广泛的正义安排结合了起来。从这个意义上说，从共同文化中得到的善远远超过了我们的贡献。消除分工不是靠每个人自身变得全面，而是靠所有人在愿意自由参加的社会联合中的一种正义的社会联合内作出自愿的有意义的贡献。 我自始至终假定，原始状态中的人不是由某些心理倾向驱使的（第25节）。一个有理性的人不会受妒忌的支配，至少在他和别人之间的区别不是被看作不正义的结果而且又没有超过一定限度时是这样。各方也不受对风险和不确定性的不同态度的影响，也不受统治或屈从等等诸多倾向的影响。我也曾设想，这些特殊的心理状态同各方对自己的关于善的观念的知识一样，是由无知之幕掩盖起来的。对这些规定的一个说明是：对正义观的选择应该尽可能地不受偶然事件的影响。我们希望，不管个人的偏爱和环境如何，所选定的原则是一律有效的，由于同样的原因，这些原则也不应因这些倾向的不同而变化。 这些假定是同康德对正义即公平的解释联系在一起的，因而大大简化了根据原始状态的观点提出来的论据。各方不受这些倾向中的个人差异的影响，从而避免了在协商过程中可能产生的复杂情况。如果对于存在哪种态度构成没有相当明确的知识。一个人也许就无法说明可能会达成什么样的协议。在每种情况下，这种协议都决定于已经提出的特殊假定。除非我们能够根据某种道德观点来证明所假定的一系列特殊心理具有某种特殊的价值，否则所采用的原则就可能是随意性的，而不再是合理条件产生的结果。同时，由于妒忌一般都被看作是应予避免和令人感到害怕的东西，至少在它变得强烈时是这样，所以尽可能使原则的选择不受这种特性的影响似乎是可取的。因此，为了简明起见也为了道德理论起见，我曾假定不存在妒忌，也不存在关于这种特殊心理的知识。 然而，这些倾向是的确存在的，而且从某个方面来说，还必须加以考虑．例如，我曾把赞成正义原则的论据分为两个部分：第一部分根据刚才提出的假定展开，而且迄今都得到这个论据的大部分内容的说明；第二部分是问：符合业已采用的正义观的井然有序的社会，是否会实际上产生破坏它认为是正义的安排的某些妒忌感情和心理态度模式。首先，我们当作根本不存在妒忌和特殊心理这个问题来进行推理；然后，在弄清楚了可能会选定哪些原则时，我们再来检查一下，看看这样规定的正义体制是否有可能产生并助长这些倾向，致使这种社会制度行不通并同人类善发生矛盾。如果是这样，那就必须重新考虑对正义观的选择。但是，如果已经产生的这些倾向维护了正义的安排，或者很容易地适应了这些安排的需要，那么这个论据的第一部分就得到了证明。这个两步法的基本好处在于，这些态度的任何特殊构成都不被看作是既定的。我们不过是在按照关于我们世界的一般事实所加的限制，来检查我们的原始假定的合理性，检查我们从这些假定得出的结论。 我对妒忌问题的讨论，是要说明这些特殊心理是怎样进入正义理论范畴的。虽然每种特殊心理无疑产生了不同的问题，但总的过程可能是基本相同的。首先，我要指出为什么妒忌会成为一个问题，即为什么得到差别原则认可的不平等会大到引起了足以危害社会的炉忌。为了说明这种可能性，区别一下一般的妒忌和特殊的妒忌是有益的。条件最不利的人对处境较好的人的妒忌，通常是一般的妒忌，就是说，他们妒忌受惠较多的人所占有的那些善而不是特殊的物品。例如上层阶级遭人妒忌，是由于他们占有较大的财富和机会；妒忌他们的那些人希望自己也能得到类似的好处。相反，特殊的妒忌则是对抗和竞争所特有的。在追求职位和荣誉或追求他人的爱情中遭到失败的人，容易妒忌他们的对手所取得的成功，并渴望得到他们已经得到的那些东西。因此，我们的问题是：正义原则，尤其是包括公平的机会均等的差别原则，是否会在实际上产生很大破坏性的一般妒忌。 现在，我再来谈谈似乎与这个问题相适应的妒忌的定义问题。为了确定概念，假定必要的人际比较是按照客观的基本善来作出的，这些善就是自由权和机会，收入和财富，为了简明起见，我一般用它们来规定在应用差别原则时的期望。因此，我们可以把妒忌看作是以敌视态度来看待别人更大的善的倾向，即使别人比我们幸运这一点并不有损于我们的利益。我们妒忌那些地位比我们优越的人（按照前面提到的某种商定的善的指数来估计），因此，我们宁愿使他们得不到更大的利益，即使我们必须有所舍弃也在所不惜。如果别人知道我们的妒忌，他们可能会小心翼翼地注意保护他们的较佳处境，并急于对我们的妒忌使我们易于产生的敌视行动采取预防措施。如果这样来理解，妒忌就是对集体有害的：一个人如果妒忌另一个人，就会准备去做两败俱伤的事，而只求他们之间的差距能够大大缩小。因此，康德——我几乎全部采用了他的定义——在讨论妒忌时，理所当然地把它称为仇恨人类的恶习之一。 这个定义需要说明。首先，正如康德所说的那样，在许多情况下，我们公开地把别人的较大的善看作是引起妒忌的根源。例如，我们可能会议论一件婚姻或一个家庭的令人妒忌的和睦和幸福。同样，一个人也可能会对另一个人说，他妒忌他的更大的机会和成就。在这种情况下，也就是在我将称之为良性妒忌的情况下，无论表达出来与否，都没有任何恶意。例如，我们不希望这件婚姻或这个家庭较少幸福或和睦。我们是在用这些传统的说法来肯定别人拥有的某些事物的价值。我们是在表明，虽然我们并不拥有同等价值的类似的善，但它们实际上是值得去争取的。听到我们说这种话的人，应该把它看作是一种称赞，而不要看作是表明我们敌视态度的一种迹象。好胜性妒忌的情况就多少有些不同了，它使我们努力去得到别人已经有的东西。看到别人的更大的善，会驱使我们以有利于社会的方式去为自己争取类似的东西。因此，这种妒忌本身和我们随意表现的良性妒忌不同，它是一种怨恨，对妒忌对象和妒忌者往往是同样有害的。在某些条件下，如在遭受挫折或感到失败时，好胜性妒忌就可能是这样。 还有一点是，妒忌不是一种道德感觉。不需要用任何道德原则来解释它。只需说别人的较好地位引起我们的注意就够了。别人的好运使我们感到沮丧，并且不再那么看重我们自己拥有的东西；这种受伤害感和丧失感引起了我们的怨恨和敌意。因此，人们必须小心，千万不要把妒忌和不满混为一谈。不满是一种道德感觉。如果我们由于自己的东西比别人的少而感到不满，这大概是因为我们认为别人处境较好是不正义的体制或他们的不正当行为所造成的。表示不满的人必须准备好说明为什么某些体制是不正义的，别人又是怎样使他们受到损害的。区分妒忌和道德感觉的界限的，是对妒忌的不同的说明方式，是用来考察这一情况的那种观点。 我们还应该指出的是，非道德感觉与妒忌有关，但不能把它们误认为妒忌。特别是，小心提防和吝于给予可以说是妒忌的对立面。一个处境较好的人可能会希望那些不及他幸运的人保持他们的原有地位。他小心谨慎地保护自己的优越地位，而不愿给予他们以更大的利益，因为那样他们就会和他处于同一层次了。如果这种倾向发展到连他不需要的和他自己不能使用的利益也不给他们，那么他就是为恶意所驱使了。这种倾向同妒忌一样是对集体有害的，因为吝于给予和心怀恶意的人宁愿放弃某些东西，也要维持他和别人之间的距离。 至此，我已把妒忌和吝啬当作恶习来对待了。我们已经看到，道德美德包含在具有广泛基础的性格特征之中，作为同伴，人们彼此是可以合理地要求对方具有这些特征的（第66节）。因此，恶习也是具有广泛基础的特性，但它们不是人们所要求的特性，恶意和妒忌就是这方面的明显例子，因为它们对每个人都是有害的。各方当然会选择某些在实现之后不致产生这种倾向的正义观。我们一般都应该避免去做这些倾向促使我们去做的事，并采取必要的措施使我们摆脱这些倾向。然而，有时候，引起妒忌的环境咄咄逼人，因此，考虑到人的实际情况，对任何人都无法合理地要他去克服他的怨恨情绪。用客观的基本善的指数来衡量，一个人的地位可能十分低微，以致使他的自尊心受到了伤害；考虑到这种情况，我们也许会对他的丧失感表示同情。实际上，我们可以由于成了妒忌对象而感到不满，因为社会可能会允许这些善的数量上的悬殊，以致在现存的社会条件下，这些差异不可避免地要导致自尊心的丧失。对于感受到这种伤害的人来说，妒忌情绪并不是不合理的；他们发泄了怨恨，可能会使他们感到好受一些。如果在没有理由指望一个人不产生这种感情时，妒忌是对自尊心丧失的一种反应，那么我就可以说，这种妒忌是情有可原的。既然自尊心是主要的基本善，那么我将假定，各方可能不会同意把这种主观上的损失看作是毫不相干的。因此，这里的问题是：符合正义原则的基本结构是否会引起如此大量的情有可原的妒忌，以致不得不重新考虑对这些原则的选择。 现在，我们随时可以研究一下一个井然有序的社会产生情有可原的一般妒忌的可能性问题。我只打算讨论这一点，因为我们的问题是，从人们的倾向来看，尤其是从人们不喜欢客观善的数量悬殊这种情况来看，正义原则是否就是一种合理的保证。我姑且假定，易于产生妒忌的主要的心理根源，是由于对我们的自我价值缺乏自信，并伴有一种无能为力感。我们的生活方式毫无趣味，我们感到无力改变它，也无法获得去做我们仍然希望去做的事的手段。相反，如果一个人对自己生活计划的价值和自己执行这个计划的能力深信不疑，他就不会产生怨恨，也不会对自己的好运小心翼翼地去保护了。即使他能够不惜牺牲自己的利益，使别人的利益降到同一水准，他也决不会有要去这样做的欲望。这个假定是说，受惠最少的人比较容易妒忌受惠较多的人的较优越的地位，他们越是不能坚定地确立自己的自尊心，他们就越是感到无法改善自己的前景。同样，一个人失败得越惨，由竞争和对抗产生的特殊妒忌就可能越强烈，因为对一个人的自信心的打击是一种更严重的打击，而这方面的损失也许是无可挽回的。然而，我们这里所关心的主要还是一般的妒忌。 我认为，有三个条件触发了敌对性的妒忌。首先是我们刚才提到的心理条件：人们对自己的价值和对自己去做任何值得做的事的能力缺乏坚定的信心。其次一个条件（即两个社会条件之一）是，有许多事情会使一个人发觉这种心理条件令人感到痛苦和屈辱。一个人的社会的基本结构和生活方式，会使他与别人之间的差异变得明显。因此，比较不幸的人常常不得不想起他们自己的地位，这有时甚至会使他们对自己和对自己的生活方式的估计更低。第三个条件是，比较不幸的人认为，他们的地位较之条件较好的人的有利环境不可能发生任何积极的变化。为了减轻他们的痛苦和自卑的感觉，他们认为。唯一的选择就是不惜使自己付出某些代价来使处境较好的人也受到损失，当然除非他们准备听天由命和变得麻木不仁。 不过，一个井然有序的社会的许多方面即使不能防止这些条件的产生，也可使它们有所缓和。关于第一个条件，虽然它是一种心理状态，但社会体制却是一种基本的诱因，这是显而易见的。但我认为，契约正义观比其他政治原则更坚定地赞成一般公民的自尊心。在公共讲坛上，每一个人都得到了一个有主权的平等的人应该得到的尊敬，每一个人都拥有在被认为公平的原始状态中可能得到承认的那些基本权利。社会的成员都具有某种共同的正义感，同时公民的友好关系又把他们结合在一起。我已经联系稳定性问题讨论了这些观点（第75－76节）。我们还可以补充说，某些人的较大利益反过来补偿了受惠较少的人的利益；任何人都不能认为，从某种道德观点看，得到较大份额的人更理有应得。按美德来分配幸福作为一种分配原则被否定了（第48节）。同样，至善原则也遭到了否定：不管个人和团体具有什么优点，他们对社会资源的权利要求始终是由相互正义原则来裁定的（第50节）。由于这种种原因，较不幸的人没有任何理由认为自己低人一等，公认的普遍原则使他们的自信有了保证。他们对自己同别人之间的绝对或相对差异，应比对其他政治形态的差异更容易接受。 至于第二个条件，一个井然有序的社会所容许的绝对或相对差异，大概都小于经常发生的那些普遍差异。虽然从理论上说，差别原则允许无限大的不平等，来交换受惠较少的人的少量利益，但考虑到必要的背景体制，收入和财富实际上不应过分分散（第26节）。此外，在一个井然有序的社会里，团体是多种多样的，每一个团体都有它自己的稳定的内部生活，这就势必使人们前景的差异变得不太明显，或至少不是令人痛苦地那样明显。我们往往会把我们的境遇与同一个团体或类似团体中的、或我们认为与我们的愿望有关的地位中的其他人的境遇相比。社会中的各种各样的团体往往会把社会分割成许多不可比的集团，而这些集团之间的差异并未引起人们的注意，所以没有使处境较差的那些人的生活变得不稳定起来。由于在公民相互交往（至少他们必须在公众生活中相互交往）中平等正义的原则得到了承认，财富和境遇的这种差异也就比较容易被忽视。此外，在日常生活中，由于自然责任得到了遵守，条件较有利的人不会夸耀自己的较高地位，以有意贬低地位较低的人的条件。归根到底，如果容易产生妒忌的条件消除了，产生与妒忌相反的提防心理、吝啬态度和怨恨情绪的条件大概也会消除。如果社会上较不幸的那一部分人不会产生妒忌，较幸运的人也就不会产生对妒忌的逆反心理了。综上所述，一个井然有序的制度的这些特征，减少了使受惠较少者可能会感到他们的地位贫贱和卑微的机会。即使他们有产生妒忌的某种倾向，这种倾向也决不会被有力地唤起。 最后，从最后一个条件来看，一个井然有序的社会似乎也同其他任何社会一样，似乎为防止触发敌对性的妒忌提供了积极的出路。无论如何，一般的妒忌问题不会迫使我们去重新考虑对正义原则的选择。至于特殊的妒忌，在一定程度上它是人类生活所特有的；由于它和对抗联系在一起，它在任何社会都可能存在。对政治正义来说，更具体的问题是：由于追求官职和地位而引起的仇恨和小心提防的普遍程度如何，以及这个问题是否会改变体制的正义性。没有对立法阶段的现有社会形态的更详尽的知识，这个问题是难以解决的。但是，似乎没有理由认为，特殊的妒忌在一个由正义即公平观而不是由任何其他正义观指导的社会里会危害更大。 由此可知，正义原则不可能引起足以造成麻烦的情有可原的一般妒忌（也不可能引起特殊妒忌）。从这个检验标准看，这种正义观又一次似乎是相对稳定的。现在，我想简单地研究一下妒忌与平等之间的可能关系，把平等看作是由讨论中的正义理论详细说明的各个方面来规定的。虽然平等有许多形式，而平等主义也有程度的不同，但是，即使允许有某些重大的差异，也仍然有一些正义观被公认是平等主义的。我认为，正义的两个原则就是属于这个方面的原则。 许多保守的作家一直认为，现代社会运动中的平等倾向就是妒忌的表现。于是，他们就竭力贬损这种倾向，把它看作是对集体有害的冲动。然而，在这种论点能够得到认真考虑之前，首先必须证明遭到反对的平等形式的确是不正义的，它最终必然会使包括条件较不利的人在内的每个人的处境更糟。但是，按照正义的两个原则的规定来坚决主张平等，并不是表示妒忌。这些原则的内容和对妒忌的描述表明了这一点。从原始状态中各方的本性来看，这一点也是显而易见的：正义观是在假定任何人都不会为仇恨和恶意所驱使的条件下得到选择的（第25节）。因此，得到这两个原则支持的对平等的要求，不是由这些感情产生的。确认这些原则的人的主张有时也可能表示不满，但我们知道，这是另一回事。 要指出正义原则多少是以妒忌为基础的，那就必须证明原始状态的一个或多个条件是由这种倾向产生的。既然稳定性问题没有迫使我们去重新考虑业已作出的选择，那就必须按照这个理论的第一部分来论证妒忌的影响。但是，关于原始状态的每一个规定，都有不提妒忌的理由。例如，人们援引道德原则的作用，把它们看作是安排各种要求的适当而普遍的方法（第23节）。当然，也可能有不是由妒忌产生的平等形式。严格的平等主义是坚决主张平等分配所有基本善的理论，可想而知，这种平等主义就是从这种倾向产生的。这就是说，只有在假定各方都是相当妒忌时，这种平等观才有可能在原始状态中得到采纳。这种可能性丝毫不影响正义的两个原则。这两个原则所规定的不同的平等观是在假定不存在妒忌的情况下得到承认的。 可以从几个例子来了解区分妒忌和道德感觉的重要性。首先假定，在贫穷的农民社会里，妒忌被认为是无所不在的。其所以如此，可以认为是由于人们普遍相信社会的总财富或多或少是固定不变的，这样，一个人的所得就是另一个人的所失。可以说，这种社会制度被看作是一种天然地一成不变的一方得利引起另一方损失的游戏。不过，如果这种看法是普遍的，同时现有善的数量一般又被认为是已定的，那么，实际上就可以假定某种严格的利益对立是存在的。在这种情况下，认为正义需要平等的分配可能是正确的。社会财富不是被看作互利合作的结果，因此，不平等的利益分配就没有任何合理的基础。所谓的妒忌事实上也许就是可能被证明是正当或不正当的不满。 弗洛伊德对正义感的起源的臆测，也具有同样的缺点。他说，这种感情是妒忌和小心提防的产物。由于社会集团中的某些成员小心翼翼地努力保护自己的利益，受惠较少的人就会为妒忌所驱使，想要把他们的利益夺走。结果，每个人都认识到，如果他们保持彼此的敌视态度，就不能不造成对自己的损害。于是，作为一种妥协，他们就决定要求平等待遇。正义感就是一种反应－形成方式：原来的小心提防和妒忌变成了一种社会感情，这就是坚决主张人人平等的正义感。弗洛伊德认为，在托儿所和其他许多社会环境中可以找到这种过程的例证。然而，他的说明之所以似乎有理，是因为它假定这种原始态度得到了正确的描述。他所描述的这些例证的基本特征只要稍加改变，就可以和原始状态的特征相符。人们具有对立的利益，并极力促使他们自己的关于善的观念的实现，这一点同他们受到妒忌和小心提防的驱使根本不是一回事。正如我们所知道的那样，这种对立产生了正义的环境。因此，如果儿童争先恐后地要得到他们的父母的关怀和爱护（对于这一点，可以说他们的要求都是正当而平等的），那就不能断言他们的正义感是由小心提防和妒忌产生的。当然，儿童常常是妒忌的和小心提防的；毫无疑问，他们的道德观念非常原始，他们还不能明辨是非。但是，撇开这些困难不谈，我们也同样可以说，他们的社会感情来自不满，来自他们受到不公平待遇的感觉。同样，人们也可以对保守的作家们说，纯粹是出于吝啬，境遇较好的人才拒绝考虑条件不利的人希望得到更大平等的要求。但是，这种论点也需要仔细论证。不首先对个人真心诚意遵守的正义观以及他们对社会情况的了解进行考察，以弄清楚这些要求在多大程度上是以这些动机为基础的，那么，这些指责和反驳都是不可信的。 这些看法决不是想要否认诉诸正义常常是妒忌的伪装这个事实。所谓不满，事实上也许就是怨恨。但要使这种感情合理化，却涉及另一个问题。除了证明一个人的正义观本身不是以妒忌为基础的，我们还必须确定，在他的解释中所提到的那些正义原则是否得到了真心诚意的遵守，就像他把这些原则应用于与他无关的、甚至为了使这些原则得到遵守他宁愿蒙受某种损失的其他情况时所表明的那样。弗洛伊德想要肯定的，不只是妒忌常常冒充不满这种老生常谈。他想要说的是，激发正义感的能力借助于妒忌和小心提防的能力，没有这种能力，就不可能有给予正义的欲望（即使有，也会少得多）。除了由这些感情和类似感情产生的吸引力，正义观对我们几乎没有任何吸引力可言。错误地把妒忌和不满混为一谈，就支持了这种主张。 遗憾的是，关于其他特殊心理问题，只能置而不论了。总之，对它们基本上应和对妒忌一样来处理。一个人要努力估计正义的体制可能会产生的风险和不确定性以及统治和屈从等等的态度构成，然后再估计这些态度是否会使这些体制不起作用或没有效率。我们还必须问一问：从原始状态中的那些人的观点来看，不管最终我们的特殊倾向如何，所选定的正义观是否可以接受，或至少可以容忍。最好的选择办法是，只要所有这些不同的倾向有可能得到正义的基本结构的鼓励，那就应该承认它们的地位。在人和相反的倾向之间，可以说存在着某种分工。当然，有些这样的态度可能会像某些训练有素的能力一样得到鼓励，例如，愿意冒险和敢于承担罕见风险的意愿，就可能会得到鼓励。但是，如果真是这样，那么这个问题就和对自然资产的报酬完全一致，因而也就是属于分配份额的讨论范围（第47节）。社会制度决不能做的，显然就是鼓励那些必然会产生压制和阻碍的倾向和愿望。只要社会所诱发的特殊心理模式维护了社会安排，或者可以由社会安排来予以合理的调节，那就没有必要来重新考虑对正义观的选择。我认为（虽然我还没有证明），正义即公平原则是符合这个检验标准的。