Chapter 23 Chapter Eight Sense of Justice-2

There is another aspect of moral attitudes which I pointed out when I outlined the development of the sense of justice, and that is their relation to certain natural attitudes.In studying moral feeling, therefore, we should ask: What are the natural attitudes related to moral feeling?There are two issues here, one is a transformation of the other.The first question asks which natural attitudes prove to be absent when one does not have certain moral feelings; while the second asks which natural attitudes do not exist when one has certain Attitudes are proven to exist.In outlining the three stages of moral development, I have dealt only with the first problem, since the transformation of this problem raises other, more difficult problems.I used to think that, in the specific case of a position of authority, the child's natural attitude of love and reliance on those in authority led to a sense of guilt (of the authority) when he violated the prohibitions imposed upon him.The absence of this moral feeling may be an indication of the absence of this natural relationship.Likewise, within the sphere of group morality, the natural attitudes of friendliness and mutual trust produce a sense of guilt for failing to fulfill the recognized duties and obligations of the group.Not having these feelings can mean not having this kind of loyalty to the group.These insights must not be mistaken for conversion propositions, for although feelings of righteous indignation and guilt can usually be regarded as evidence of such feelings, they can be interpreted otherwise.Generally speaking, moral principles are affirmed for various reasons, but it is usually enough for the moral feeling only to admit these principles.Of course, according to contract theory, the principles of right and justice have certain content. As we know, there is an idea here that acting on these principles can be regarded as acting out of concern for human beings, or acting for others. act of kindness.Whether this fact is a sign that a man acts partly from certain natural attitudes (especially when these attitudes involve devotion to particular individuals) rather than from mere sympathy and benevolence in general, I ask Not going to discuss it here.Of course, the preceding account of moral development assumes that affection for certain people plays an essential role in the acquisition of morality.But the extent to which these attitudes are necessary for later moral motives is open to debate, although I think it would be surprising if such fidelity were not to some extent necessary.

The relation of natural attitudes to moral sentiments may be expressed as follows: These sentiments and attitudes are peculiar dispositions of ordered series which overlap one another, and the absence of certain moral feelings indicates the absence of certain natural relations.Or, to put it another way, the existence of certain natural allegiances necessarily produces certain moral emotions once the necessary moral development has occurred.We can see why this is the case with an example.If A cares about B, then, unless otherwise stated, A is concerned about B's danger and tries to help B.Similarly, if C intends to treat B unjustly, A will feel righteous indignation against C and try to defeat C's intention.In both cases, A intends to protect B's interests.Furthermore, except in special circumstances, A will be happy to be with B, and will be very sad if B is hurt or dies.If A caused the harm to B, A will feel remorse.Love is a feeling, a set of dispositions to feel and express these basic emotions evoked by specific situations and to act in appropriate ways.To demonstrate the relationship between natural attitudes and moral sentiments, it is sufficient to point out the tendency of A to feel remorse or guilt for infringing B's legal claims because of hurting B, or A's tendency to feel guilty because of C's strenuous efforts to deny B's rights. The tendency to feel righteous indignation is as closely related psychologically to the natural attitude of love as the tendency to be happy in the presence of others or to feel sorrow when others are suffering.In some ways, moral feelings are more complex.The precondition of complete moral feeling is the knowledge and recognition of certain principles, and the ability to judge in accordance with these principles.But if this is supposed to be the case, the disposition to moral feelings seems to be as much a part of the natural affections as the disposition to joy and sorrow.Love is shown sometimes through grief, sometimes through righteous indignation.Either emotion might be equally extraordinary without the other.The content of sound moral principles is to make these relationships understandable.

A major conclusion of this theory is that moral feeling is a standard feature of human life.To exclude moral feeling is to exclude certain natural attitudes at the same time.Among those who were not driven by selfishness and interest, who never acted according to their duty of justice, it is impossible for any relationship of friendship and mutual trust to exist.As long as this loyalty exists, other reasons for acting legitimately will also be recognized.This point seems fairly obvious.But it can also be inferred from the above observations that the egoist will not feel dissatisfaction and righteous indignation unless he deceives himself.If there are two egoists, one of whom cheats the other, and the cheating is discovered, neither of them has reason to be dissatisfied.They do not recognize principles of justice, or any other notions that are reasonable from the point of view of the original position; nor do they feel restrained by a sense of guilt for failing to do their duty.We know that dissatisfaction and indignation are moral feelings, and that they therefore presuppose the recognition of the principles of right and of the account of the principles of justice.But hypotheses alone cannot be properly explained.To say that selfish people do not feel resentment and righteous indignation certainly does not mean that they do not feel annoyed and unhappy with each other.A person who has no sense of justice may be extremely angry at someone who acts unfairly.But anger and unhappiness are different from indignation and dissatisfaction; indignation and dissatisfaction are moral emotions, while anger and unhappiness are not moral emotions.It is also undeniable that an egoist may wish to be recognized and treated kindly by others.However, these desires should not be mistaken for a loving relationship, which can lead a person to make sacrifices for his friends.Undoubtedly, it is difficult to distinguish between discontent and irritation, between apparent friendship and real friendship.Of course, public appearances and actions may look the same if viewed from momentary behavior.In the long run, however, the difference can usually be seen.

Therefore, one might say that a person who has no sense of justice, who never does what justice requires except when driven by selfishness and interest, not only has no relationship of friendship, love, and mutual trust, but also has no sense of justice. Discontent and righteous indignation.He lacks certain particularly basic natural attitudes and moral sensibilities.In other words, a person who lacks a sense of justice also lacks some of the basic attitudes and abilities included in the concept of humanity.These moral feelings are undeniably unpleasant in a somewhat enlarged sense of unpleasantness; but we cannot avoid the tendency to produce them without spoiling our image.This tendency is the price of love and trust, of friendship and affection, of fidelity to institutions and traditions from which we benefit and which serve the general good of humanity.Moreover, given that people have their own interests and aspirations, and that they are prepared to impose their demands on each other in the pursuit of their aims and ideals, that is, so long as there exist among them the conditions which give rise to questions of justice, then, in certain This tendency will inevitably be realized under the temptation and fanaticism of human beings.Since driven by goals and ideals of human merit; imply a tendency to lead to humiliation and shame.And the absence of a tendency to lead to humiliation and shame means the absence of such aims and ideals, and what more one can say about humiliation and shame is that they are part of the very concept of human nature.If a person lacks a sense of justice and thus a tendency to feel guilty, he lacks certain basic attitudes and abilities, and this should not be seen as a reason to do what justice requires.But it does mean that knowing what is possible without a sense of justice - and knowing that to lack a sense of justice may be to lack a part of our humanity - makes it possible for us to admit that we have such feelings .

It follows that moral feelings are a normal part of human life.To lose these moral feelings is to lose at the same time the natural attitude.We also know (§§ 30, 72) that moral sentiments are concomitant with these attitudes, that is, that human love and the desire to preserve the common essential to the goals.To say this is in no way to deny that our existing moral feelings may be irrational in many respects and harmful to our good.Freud was right in the view that these attitudes are often punitive and blind, and that they embody many of the harsher aspects of their first attainment of authority.Resentment and righteous indignation, guilt and remorse, responsibility and blaming others, often take perverse and destructive forms, unjustifiably weakening human spontaneity and reducing human joy.When I say moral attitudes are part of human nature, I mean those attitudes that need to be justified by the right principles of right and justice.The rationality of the fundamental moral outlook is a necessary condition; the propriety of moral sentiments to our nature, therefore, depends on those principles which might have been approved in the original position.These principles dictate moral education and the expression of moral approval and disapproval, just as they dictate institutional design.Yet even if a sense of justice is a normal product of man's natural attitudes in a well-ordered society, it can still be said that our current moral feelings have the potential to become irrational and capricious.One of the advantages of a well-ordered society, however, is that its members suffer far less from the burden of repression of conscience, since the arbitrary authority is gone.

We must immediately turn to the question of the relative stability of justice as fairness, in the light of this overview of moral development.But before doing so, I would like to say a few words about three laws of psychology.This will help to illustrate the three laws before us.They represent certain tendencies, and, other things being equal, it is unquestionable that they are all valid, so they may be expressed as follows. First Law: Suppose the family system is just, and the parents love the child, and manifest their love by caring for his good, then the child begins to love his parents when he recognizes the manifest love of his parents for him.

Second Law: Assuming that a person's capacity for sympathy is realized by learning to be loyal in accordance with the first law, and assuming that some social arrangement is just and known to be just, then this person has an interest in this The feeling of friendliness and trust of others in a group who, with apparent intent, observe their duties and obligations, and act in accordance with the ideals inherent in their position. Third Law: Assuming that a person's capacity for sympathy is realized by virtue of the allegiances he has developed in accordance with the first two laws, and assuming that the social system is just and known to be just, then when the person realizes that he is in agreement with what he is When the person concerned is the beneficiary of these arrangements, he acquires a corresponding sense of justice.

Perhaps the most striking feature of these laws (or tendencies) is that when formulating these laws, a certain institutional background is called just, while in the latter two laws, it is said that everyone is just.The principles of moral psychology have a place in any conception of justice; and the formulation of these principles is different if the conception of justice used is different.A certain view of justice, for example, becomes part of the account of the development of corresponding feelings; even though the assumptions about such mental processes are understood to be only part of a theory of mind, these assumptions include certain moral concepts.This point seems obvious, and if it is assumed that ethical concepts can be clearly stated, it is not difficult to see why there are such psychological laws.The previous overview of moral development shows how these issues can be clarified.After all, a sense of justice is a stable tendency to adopt a moral perspective and wish to act in accordance with it, at least insofar as the moral perspective is regulated by the principles of justice.It is hardly surprising that these principles are concerned with the formation of such dominant feelings.In fact, it seems probable that our understanding of moral learning will not be much greater than our understanding of the moral values ​​that should be learned.same.Our understanding of how we learn our language is limited by our understanding of the grammatical and semantic structure of our language.Just as psycholinguistics is determined by linguistics, so the theory of moral learning is determined by accounts of the nature of morality and its various forms.Our commonsense notions of these problems are insufficient for theoretical purposes.

No doubt some people would prefer social theory not to employ moral concepts.For example, they may wish to describe emotional relationships in terms of laws concerning the frequency with which people engaged in a common task interact with each other, or with the laws by which certain persons take the initiative or exercise authoritative direction .A law might state, for example, that, so long as equality is governed by accepted rules, the more frequently mutual influences are exerted on co-operating equals, the more likely is a feeling of friendship to develop between them.Another law might hold that the more a person in a position of authority wields his power and directs his subordinates, the more they respect him.But since these laws (or tendencies) make no reference to the justice (or fairness) of said arrangement, they are necessarily very limited in scope.Those who are subordinate to another who exercises authority will of course think of him differently, depending on whether the whole arrangement is just and well designed to further what they consider to be their legitimate interests.This also applies to cooperation among equals.Institutions are patterns of human behavior prescribed by a system of public rules, and the occupation of offices and positions prescribed by institutions usually indicates certain intentions and goals.The justness of social arrangements and people's views on these issues have a profound impact on social feelings; effort.

It may be objected that a large part of social theory does just as well without any concept of morality.The obvious example is economics.However, the situation dealt with by economic theory is special in that one can generally assume a fixed structure of rules and constraints that dictate the kinds of actions from which individuals and firms can choose, while certain simplistic The motivational assumption also seems quite reasonable.The theory of prices (some of the more basic parts of the theory anyway) is an example.One does not consider why buyers and sellers act according to the laws governing economic activity, nor how choice opportunities are formed, or how legal norms are established.For the most part, these issues are considered a given, and to a certain extent this is okay.On the other hand, so-called democratic economic theory, that is, the extension of the basic concepts and methods of price theory to the political process, must be treated with caution, despite all its merits.Any theory of constitutional institutions cannot take these rules as given or simply assume that they will be obeyed.Clearly, the political process is primarily a process of making and modifying rules, an effort to control the legislative and executive branches of government.Even if everything is done according to constitutional procedures, we still need to explain why these procedures are accepted.Any restrictions resembling competitive markets do not apply to this situation.There are no legal sanctions in any general sense for the many unconstitutional actions of the heads of parliament and the executive and the political forces they represent.The principal political actors, therefore, are guided in part by what they consider to be morally permissible; and since no system of constitutional checks and balances can establish the dominance of an invisible hand by which they can direct the course of attaining just results, Some general sense of justice is in part necessary.It would seem, then, that a correct theory of politics under a just constitutional system must include a theory of justice that explains how moral sentiments affect the conduct of political affairs.I have spoken of this in connection with the role of nonviolent resistance; suffice it to add here.A test of contractarianism is the extent to which it is suitable for this purpose.

Another problem with the laws of psychology is this: These laws determine the changes in emotional relations which are our ultimate ends.To illustrate this, we may point out that to describe a conscious action is to show how it relates to our life plan or to the circumstances, given our beliefs and available options. The minor part is consistent.Often this can be done by a series of instructions, that is, do the first thing to get the second thing, do the second thing to get the third thing, etc., the series is infinite , and finally achieved the purpose of doing all the previous things.In explaining our various actions we can invoke many different chains of reasons which, in view of the complexity of the plan of life and the multiplicity of its aims, often cease to be reasons at different moments.Furthermore, a series of justifications can have several distinct parts, since an action can be used to further more than one goal.How the activities to further these many ends are ordered, and how they are balanced against each other, will be determined by the plan of life itself and the principles upon which it is based. Among our ultimate goals, though, are our allegiance to others, our interest in furthering their interests, and our sense of justice.These three laws of psychology illustrate how our set of desires begins to take on a new end goal when we achieve an emotional connection.These changes should be distinguished from the derived desires we are forming as a result of greater knowledge and opportunities, and from our more concrete determination of our present needs .For example, a person wishing to travel somewhere is told that a certain route is the best route.When he accepts this suggestion, he has a desire to move in a certain direction.There is a plausible explanation for this derived desire.They are the desire to do the kind of thing that, from the available evidence, will most effectively achieve our current goals, and they change with knowledge and belief, and with available opportunities.These three laws of psychology do not provide a plausible explanation of desire in this sense; rather, they account for a change in the pattern of our ultimate goals, which result from the ways in which we recognize institutions and the actions of others as affecting our good. produced.Of course, it is often not easy to determine whether a goal is an ultimate goal or a derivative goal.This distinction can be made only in light of a man's rational plan of life, the structure of which is not always apparent even to himself.For our topic here, however, the distinction is quite clear. A third insight: These three psychological laws are not just about association or reinforcement principles.Although they bear some resemblance to these principles of learning, they hold that positive feelings of love and friendship, and even a sense of justice, arise from the apparent intention of others to act for our good.Because we recognize that they wish us well, we reciprocate by caring for their welfare.In this way, we earn our allegiance to people and institutions based on our goodness to how they affect us.The basic idea here is the idea of ​​reciprocity, a tendency to reciprocate.This tendency is a deep psychological fact.Without this tendency, our natures would be very different, and fruitful social cooperation would become fragile, if not impossible.A rational man is certainly not indifferent to things which greatly affect his good; and if he forms an attitude towards them, he acquires either a new allegiance to them, or a respect for them. new disgust.If we return evil for good, or even dislike those who treat us justly, or resent activities that promote our good, any society will instantly dissolve.Men with different psyches either never existed, or must have disappeared very quickly in the course of evolution.The capacity for a sense of justice, formed by the same reward, may seem to be a condition of practical human action.The most stable conception of justice is probably that on which the corresponding sense of justice has the most solid foundation on these tendencies (§76). Finally, a few more observations concerning the account of the moral development as a whole.Relying on these three principles of moral psychology is, of course, a simplistic approach.A fuller account might distinguish between different kinds of learning, and thus between instrumental conditioning (reinforcement) and classical conditioning, so that it is possible to form our moods and feelings.Consideration of simulation and emulation, and the learning of concepts and principles, may also be necessary.There is no reason to deny the significance of these forms of learning, however, for our thesis this three-stage schema may suffice.As long as moral learning emphasizes the formation of allegiances as the ultimate goal, the overview of moral learning resembles the empiricist tradition in emphasizing the importance of acquiring new motivations. Moral learning also has something to do with what we call rationalist views.First, a sense of justice is acquired at a stage associated with the growth of knowledge and deepening of understanding.A man must acquire ideas about society, and to acquire just feelings one must also acquire ideas about what is just and what is unjust.Apparent intentions toward others are recognized in the context of prevailing institutions explained by ideas about the self and its status.However, I do not claim that these stages of development are inherent or determined by psychological mechanisms.Whether various natural tendencies affect these stages is a question which I have not discussed.Instead, a theory of rightness and justice is used to illustrate what the expected course of development might be.The manner in which a well-ordered society is arranged, and the repertoire of principles, ideals, and maxims which govern this whole arrangement, provides a means of distinguishing the three stages of moral development.It seems plausible that, in a society dominated by contractarianism, moral learning might follow the proposed order.These stages are determined by the structure of the learning objects. With the realization of the necessary abilities, they have experienced a process from relatively simple to relatively complex. Finally, since the account of moral learning is clearly based on an ethical theory, it is important to understand in what sense the sequence of stages represents a gradual development rather than a mere prescribed sequence. It's obvious.Just as men come to work out a rational plan of life which serves their greater good, so they come to know that moral principles and ideals arise from principles which they might have accepted in their original state of equality.Ethical principles are no longer considered mere limitations, but are combined into a logical conception.The relationship between these standards and human aspirations is now understood, and people see their sense of justice as an extension of their natural allegiances, a means of caring for the collective good.Many chains of reasons, with their own different ends, are no longer distinctive, but are regarded as part of a systematic view.These views, however, appear as a particular theory of justice.A different account of these problems would be favored by a person who adopts a different theory of justice.But in any case, a certain conception of justice undoubtedly has its place in explaining moral learning, even if this conception of justice belongs entirely to the scope of psychological theory and is not recognized as correct in philosophy. I shall now compare justice as fairness with other notions of stability.It may be useful to recall that stability problems arise because a cooperative arrangement may be unbalanced, let alone stable.From the point of view of the original position, of course, the principles of justice are generally sound; if all obey them, each can hope to improve his position, at least without any agreement with him. This may be the case when comparing prospects.Pervasive egoism characterizes this non-agreemental validity.However, from anyone's point of view, whether it is solipsism or egoism that only enjoys rights but not obligations, it may be better.Of course, neither is a prudent choice given the conditions of the original position (Section 23).In everyday life, however, if a person is inclined to this choice, he can sometimes take advantage of the cooperative efforts of others to his own greater advantage.There are a considerable number of people who may be doing their part, and so, if exceptional circumstances arise which prevent them from contributing (one may not feel less without him), they may have their own way: at any rate in this Under such circumstances, the egoism that only enjoys rights but not obligations seems to be recognized. Thus, just arrangements may be unbalanced, since acting fairly is generally not each person's best answer to his fellows' just actions.In order to ensure stability, people must have some sense of justice, or some concern for those they may lose by failing to do their duty, preferably both.A just arrangement is stable if these feelings are strong enough to overcome the tendency to violate these rules.At this time, everyone believes that fulfilling their responsibilities and obligations is the correct answer to the actions of others.Their rational plan of life, governed by their own sense of justice, leads to this conclusion. As I said earlier, Hobbes linked the problem of stability to the problem of political obligation.One can think of Hobbes' ruler as a mechanism that complements the cooperative system, without which the cooperative system is unstable.The general belief in the efficacy of rulers removes two kinds of instabilities (Section 42).It is thus clear how a relationship of friendship and mutual trust, and a general perception of some common and usually valid sense of justice, produced this result.Given these natural attitudes and the desire to engage in just actions, no one wishes to unjustly promote his own interests at the expense of others; this removes the first instability.At the same time, since everyone recognizes that these tendencies and feelings are universal and valid, no one has reason to think that he must violate these rules in order to protect his legitimate interests; It is also non-existent.Certain violations may occur, of course, but once they have occurred, a sense of guilt and justice, born of friendship and mutual trust, will often restore the arrangement. Moreover, a society governed by a general sense of justice is inherently stable: other things being equal, the forces in favor of stability increase over time (up to a certain limit).This inherent stability is the result of the interrelationship between the three laws of psychology.The more effective action of one of these laws strengthens the action of the other two.For example, while the second law leads to stronger allegiances, the sense of justice gained through the third law is strengthened by greater concern for the beneficiaries of a just institution.In turn, a more effective sense of justice leads to a more reliable intention to do one's duty, and the recognition of this evokes a stronger sense of friendship and trust.In addition, with a firmer confidence in self-worth, there is a more active receptivity to sympathy that arises from the more favorable conditions of the first law.The effects determined by the other two laws seem to be strengthened as well.Conversely, people who have developed a dominant sense of justice and a strong belief in self-esteem are more likely to care for their children with overt intentions.Together, then, these three psychological laws maintain the structure of a well-ordered society. So there seems to be no doubt that justice as fairness is a fairly stable moral conception.But the decisions made in the original position depend on comparisons: the preferred conception of justice is the most stable conception of justice, other things being equal.At best we should compare the contract view with all the views that rival it in this respect, but, as ever, the principle of utility will remain my sole consideration.In order to do this, it is instructive to review the three factors that make the laws of psychology work: unconditional concern for our good; explanation and the possibility of giving precise and convincing reasons); those who admit that they live by these maxims and ideals and do their part in social arrangements not only accept them but also through their lives and Character, which embodies the form of human goodness which commands our admiration and respect (Section 7O).The stronger the resulting sense of justice, the greater will be the fulfillment of these three factors.The first factor makes our sense of self-worth sharper, thereby strengthening the tendency to reciprocate; the second factor presents a moral concept, making it easy to understand; the third factor shows that this moral concept is attractive because of its The force has been abided by.Therefore, the most stable concept of justice is probably the concept of justice that our reason thinks is clear and clear, it is in line with our good, and its basis is not self-denial, but self-affirmation. There are, however, several instances where the sense of justice associated with the conception of justice as fairness is stronger than that instilled in other conceptions of justice.First, unconditional concern for others and for institutions consistent with our good is much stronger from a contractual point of view.The limits contained in this principle of justice secure to every individual an equal right to liberty, and assure us that our claims will not be ignored or flouted even by the greater sum of the interests of society as a whole.We need only remember the rules of precedence, the meaning given to the principle of difference by Kant's interpretation (i.e. that persons should not be treated as tools at all) and its relation to the idea of ​​fraternity (§23, §17) .The role of these aspects of justice as fairness is to enhance the role of the principle of mutuality.As we have already pointed out, a more unconditional concern for our good, and a more explicit refusal by others to take advantage of chance, must strengthen our self-esteem; A closer relationship with others and institutions.These effects are stronger than those of the principle of utility, so the fidelity arising from them should also be stronger. We may prove this opinion by examining a well-ordered society which is fitted with the principle of utility.Here the three laws of psychology must be changed.For example, the second law now holds that people tend to develop friendly relations with people who clearly intend to be conscientious in cooperative arrangements known to maximize aggregate or average welfare (whether what kind of different statement).In either case, the resulting psychological laws seem less plausible than they once were.It is assumed that the adoption of certain institutions is based on the general understanding that greater benefits to some outweigh smaller losses to others.Why should acceptance of the utilitarian principle (either of the two forms) by the more fortunate generate friendly feelings towards them from the less fortunate?这种反应事实上似乎是相当令人惊异的，如果地位较有利的人认为更大的总（或平均）福利可能是他们得到满足的结果，从而坚持他们的要求，这种反应就尤其令人惊异。在这种情况下，没有任何相互关系的原则是起作用的，而求助于功利也只会引起怀疑。同正义原则所表达的对所有人的关心比较起来，通过把每个人算作一个人（即对每一个人的功利予以同等考虑）而对所有人表示的关心是不强烈的。因此，在一个受功利标准支配的井然有序的社会内产生的忠诚，可能会由于社会部门的不同而大不相同。随着稳定性的相应减少，有些集团可能很少会获得正义地去行动的欲望（这种欲望现在由功利主义原则规定）。 当然，在任何井然有序的社会中，各个社会集团的正义感的力量是不同的。然而，为了保证使相互关系把整个社会，即社会的每一个成员结合在一起，人们不得不接受诸如正义的两个原则之类的原则。功利主义者何以要强调同情的能力，理由显而易见。没有从别人的较有利地位中得到好处的人，必定认同于较大的满足总（或平均）量，否则他们就不会有按照功利标准办事的欲望。这种利他主义倾向无疑是存在的。然而，同作为相互关系原则而被提出来的这三条心理学法则所产生的倾向相比，这种利他主义倾向可能不那么强烈，而对同情的认同作用的明显能力也似乎比较少见。因此，这些感情对社会基本结构的支撑作用较小。此外，正如我们所知道的那样，按功利主义观办事往往会破坏失败者的自尊，而尤其在他们本来就已比较不幸的情况下会产生这种作用（第29节）。如果把权威的道德看作是适用于整个社会秩序的道德，那么这种道德的特点就是要求为了更大的善而作出自我牺牲，就是反对个人和次要团体的价值。自我的空虚应在为更大目标服务时克服。这种理论可能由于其破坏性的结果而促使人们去自怨自艾。当然，功利主义还没有走到这种极端，但类似的作用是必然要发生的，这种作用会进一步削弱同情的能力，并改变感情关系的发展方向。 相反，把别人的善看作就是自己的善，意识到别人所做的事就是我们自己的善的一部分（第79节），这种倾向在一个受正义即公平观指导的社会制度中可能是十分强烈的。但这一点之所以可能，完全是由于正义原则已经包含了这种相互关系的缘故。有了这些原则所提供的持久保证，人们就可以培养起一种构成人类之爱的基础的巩固的自我价值意识。如果直接求助于同情的能力，把它当作在缺乏相互关系时的正义行动的基础，功利原则不但比正义即公平观要求更高，而且也决定于不那么强烈和不那么共同的倾向。其他两个因素也影响了正义感的力量，即道德观的明晰性及其理想的吸引力。我将在下一章考虑后者。我打算在下一章指出，契约观点同与它对立的一些观点相比，更符合我们的善；这里我先采用这个结论，用它来进一步证明前面的意见。正义原则的更大的明晰性已经在前面考虑过了（第49节）。我曾经指出，同目的论相比，正义原则规定了一种明确的观念。相反，最大限度地提高福利总量或臻于至善的概念，是模糊不清、难以名状的。确定平等自由权在什么时候受到侵犯和根据差别原则来证实矛盾，要比确定不平等待遇是否会增进社会福利来得容易。这两个原则（以及各种优先规则）的比较明确的结构，使它们对人们的理智表现了更大的明确性，从而牢牢地掌握了人们的思想。为它们提出的各种解释和理由，可以更容易得到理解和承认；要求我们采取的行动，也可以更明确地用公认的标准来规定。因此，从所有的这三方面的考虑来看，契约观点似乎具有更大的稳定性。 值得注意的是，穆勒似乎也同意这个结论。他指出，随着文明的进步，人们越来越认识到，除非所有人的利益都得到考虑，否则人类社会就显然不可能有任何存在的基础。政治体制的改善消除了利益的对抗，也消除了使个人和阶级漠视彼此的要求的障碍和不平等。这种发展的自然结果是产生了一种人类心理状态，在这种状态下，每一个人都有一种要与别人团结一致的感情。穆勒认为，如果这种心理状态得到完善，它就会使人产生一种欲望，只想去做那些对别人同样有利的事。人的自然需要之一就是他的感情与他的同胞的感情应该和谐一致。他想知道，他的目标和他们的目标不是对抗的，他不是要反对他们的善，而是要帮助实现他们的真正需要。 不过，穆勒在这里所描述的是按照差别原则（或某种类似标准）办事的欲望，而不是一种按照功利原则办事的欲望。穆勒没有注意到这个差异；但他似乎从直觉上认识到，如果在一个完全正义的社会里，人们的目标遵照人人都可接受的方式而协调一致，那么这个社会就可能是一个按正义原则所表达的相互关系概念来办事的社会。他的看法是与这样的一种思想一致的，这种思想就是：诱发人们的团结和同情这些自然感情的稳定的正义观，比功利主义标准更有可能体现这些原则。这个结论从穆勒对正义感的来源所作的描述中得到了证明，因为他认为，这种感情不仅来自同情，而且也来自自卫的自然本能和获取安全的欲望。这种双重来源表明，在他看来，正义在利他主义和自我要求之间建立了平衡，从而提出了相互关系的概念。契约论也可以取得同样的结果，但不是通过特别权衡两种对立倾向而取得的，而是通过最后导致适当的相互关系原则的理论推定而取得的。 在论证正义原则的更大的稳定性时，我曾经假定，某些心理学法则是真实的，或者是接近于真实的。除此以外，我不打算对稳定性问题进行更深入的研究。然而，我们可以指出：人们可能会问，人们是怎样获得这些心理学法则所描述的本性的。进化论可能认为这是自然选择的结果；获得正义感和道德感觉的能力，就是人类对它在自然界的地位的适应。人类学家认为，某个人种的行为模式和获得这些行为模式的心理机制有其自身的特点，正如他们的身体结构有其显著的特点一样；同时这些行为模式也完全同器官和骨骼一样，经历了某种进化过程。对于生活在稳定的社会集团中的成员来说，遵守公平的合作安排和培养为维护这些安排所需要的感情的能力，是非常有用的，尤其在人们寿命很长和互相依赖的情况下，这种能力是非常有用的。这些条件保证在无数情况下彼此之间一贯得到遵守的正义对所有各方都是有益的。 然而，这里至关重要的问题是：正义原则与进化倾向的关系是否比功利原则更为密切。如果选择始终是个人的选择和他们的子孙后代的选择，如果对各种道德行为方式的感知能力也是以遗传为基础的，那么，严格意义上的利他主义就立即显得好像普遍地限于同一家族和人们朝夕相见的较小团体。在这种情况下，作出巨大的自我牺牲的意愿，可能有利于一个人的子孙后代，因而往往会得到选择。现在再来谈谈另一个极端。如果一个社会在其与其他社会的关系中对职责以外的行动具有强烈的癖好，它就可能会危及自己特有文化的存在，它的成员也可能会有被人支配的危险。因此，可想而知，按照合理的仁爱的更广泛形式来办事的能力，可能会泯灭殆尽，而在亲属关系之外的团体和个人的关系中，按正义原则和自然责任办事的能力，可能会得到赞同。我们还可以看到，作为维护自然责任的倾向以及作为对正义安排的稳定手段，这一系列道德感觉可能会发生演变。如果这种看法是正确的，那么正义原则就又一次获得了比较牢固的基础。 这些看法不是为了替契约观点提供辩护理由。赞成正义原则的主要依据已经提出。这里，我们只是检查一下已经采用的正义观是否是一种切实可行的正义观，它是否并不那么不稳定，以致某种其他选择是否可能更好。现在我们触及了这个论据的第二部分，在这个部分中我们要问，以前所承认的事情是否可以重新考虑（第25节）。我并不是认为正义即公平观就是最稳定的正义观。回答这个问题需要有远远超出我所概述的这种粗糙理论所包涵的理解力。得到一致同意的正义观只要相当稳定就行了。 现在，我来谈谈平等的基础，即人们赖以得到符合正义原则的待遇的人的特征问题。我们对待动物的行为不是由这些原则指导的，或者说，人们是普遍这样认为的。那么，我们根据什么来区别人和其他动物，并认为正义的限制只适用于我们与人的关系呢？我们必须研究是什么决定了正义观的应用范围。 为了说明我们的问题，我们可以区分适用平等概念的三个层次。第一个层次是把平等应用于管理作为公共规则体系的体制。就这一点来说，平等基本上是规则性的正义。它意味着按照同样情况同样处理之类准则（由法规和惯例规定）等等，来公正地应用规则和始终如一地解释规则（第38节）。这个层次上的平等，是常识性的正义概念中最少争议的成分。第二个层次，也是复杂得多的层次，是把平等应用于体制的实际结构。在这里，平等的含义是由要求人人都能得到平等的基本权利的正义原则明确规定的。大概这里不包括动物；动物当然也得到某种保护，但它们的情况和人的情况不同。不过，这种结果仍然没有得到说明。我们还需考虑哪些人应该得到关于正义的保证。这使我们达到了第三个层次，而正义问题正是在这个层次上产生的。 理所当然的答案似乎是：有权得到平等的正义的正是道德的主体。道德的主体的特征有二：首先，他们可以具有（并被认为具有）关于他们的善的观念（由合理的生活计划表达出来）；其次，他们可以具有（并被认为获得了）某种正义感，即至少在某种最低程度上应用正义原则并按照正义原则办事的一种通常有效的欲望。我们利用对原始状态中的人的描述，来挑出获选原则所适用的人。各方毕竟被认为是采用了这些标准来管理他们的共同体制和指导他们对彼此的行动；对他们的本性的说明，参与了这些原则赖以得到选择的推理。因此，平等的正义正是由于有了达成原始状态的普遍协议并按这种协议办事的人。应该指出，道德人格在这里被规定为在适当时候通常可以得到实现的一种可能性。正是这种可能性使正义的要求发挥了作用。下面我还要继续讨论这个问题。 因此，我们知道，获得道德人格的能力，是有权得到平等正义的一个充分条件。除了这个必不可少的起码条件外，再也无需其他条件。至于道德人格是否也是一种必要条件，我不打算讨论。我姑且认为，人类的压倒多数都具有获得正义感的能力，因此，这个问题并不产生任何重大的实际问题。道德人格足以使一个人成为权利要求的主体，这—点至关重要。我们决不可误以为这种充分条件是始终得到满足的。即使这种能力是必要的，但要以此为根据而拒绝给予正义，这实际上可能是不明智的。这可能会使正义的体制遭到太大的危险。 应该着重指出：获得道德人格的能力，即获得平等的正义的充分条件，并不是十分严格的。如果一个人或者由于天生或者由于偶然而缺乏这种必要的潜在能力，这种情况就被看作是一种缺陷或损失。没有哪个种族或哪个得到承认的人群是缺乏这种属性的。只有极个别的人没有这种能力，这种能力的极少实现和完全不能实现，是不正义的和条件极差的社会环境或偶然的不测事件所造成的结果。此外，虽然获得正义感的能力可以因人而异，但这不能成为剥夺那些具有较差能力的人受到正义的全面保护的理由。一旦某种最起码的条件得到满足，一个人就同其他任何人一样有权得到平等的正义。获得正义感的更大能力，如在应用正义原则和在特殊情况下列举论据时通过更大的熟练和灵巧所表现出来的能力，和其他任何能力一样，是一种自然资产。一个人由于运用这种能力而得到的特殊利益，应由差别原则来决定。例如，如果某些人非常明显地具有为某些职位所需要的公正的美德，那么，他们当然就会得到理应与这些职位联系在一起的利益。然而，应用平等自由权原则，是不受这些差别的影响的。人们有时认为，基本权利和自由权理应随能力的不同而异，但正义即公平观否认这种看法：如果获得道德人格的起码条件得到了实现，一个人就应得到关于正义的全部保证。 对平等的基础的这一说明需要作几点评论。首先，有人也许会提出异议说，平等不能建立在自然属性的基础上。表明人人平等的自然特征，即人人（或相当多的人）都在同等程度上具有的自然特征，是不存在的。如果我们希望坚持某种平等理论，我们似乎必须用另一种办法，即把它当作一种纯粹程序性原则来解释它。例如，说所有的人都是平等的，就是说任何人如果没有令人信服的理由都不能要求得到特别优待。举证责任赞成平等：它规定了一种程序性的假定，即人人都应一视同仁。背离平等待遇的行为，无论在什么情况下，都应该用适用于所有人的同一套原则来予以辩护和公正评判；必要的平等被认为就是互相履行义务的平等。 这种程序性的解释有几个难点。首先，这种解释不外是适用于最高层次的同样情况同样对待的准则以及对举证责任的规定。可以用什么理由来证明某些不平等是正当的，对彼此互相履行义务的平等并没有规定任何限制。真正的平等待遇没有得到任何保证，因为奴隶制度和种姓制度（举两个极端的例子）也许能符合这个观念。对平等的真正保证，在于正义原则的内容，而不在于这些程序性的假定。规定举证责任还是不够的。但进一步说，即使这种程序性的解释给体制规定了某些真正的限制，我们为什么要在某些情况下而不是在另一些情况下遵循这种程序，这个问题仍然没有解决。当然，这种程序只适用于某一类人，然而是哪一类人呢？我们仍然需要为平等找到一个自然的基础，以便可以把这一类人识别出来。 此外，把平等建立在自然能力的基础上，不见得就会同某种平等主义观点格格不入。我们所必须做的，就是选择一个全距参数（姑且这样说），把平等的正义给予符合它的条件的那些人。例如，处于单位圆内的参数就是平面上的点的全距参数。这个圆内的各个点都具有这个参数，虽然它们的坐标在某个全距内是不同的。它们同样都具有这个参数，因为圆内的任何一点和其他任何一点都同样处于圆内。是否有某种合适的全距参数可以用来挑出把人当作同等人看待的那个方面，这个问题要由正义观来解决。但是，对原始状态中各方的描述找到了这个参数，同时正义原则也向我们保证，要像看待任何其他自然资产那样来看待这个全距内的能力的任何变化。不妨认为，是某种自然能力构成了平等的基础。 那么，认为以自然属性为平等的基础破坏了平等的正义这种说法，又怎么会似乎有理的呢？全距参数这个概念太明显了，不能视而不见。必须对它作进一步的说明。我认为，答案是：某种目的论常常被认为是理所当然的。因此，如果正当的做法就是最大限度地提高满足的净差额，那么就应为达到这个目的来分配权利和义务。人们的有生产能力的不同技巧和获得满足的能力，也是这个问题的有关方面。最大限度地提高总的福利，说不定需要按照这些特征的变化来调整基本权利。当然，如果存在标准的功利主义前提，那么也就存在平等的倾向。然而，有关的问题是，就这两种情况中的任何一种情况来说，正确的自然基础和权利的适当分配都决定于功利原则。为不平等的基本权利辩护的能力是不同的，而允许这些不同，乃是伦理学理论的内容和这个内容就是一种追求最高标准的观念这一事实，而不是以自然属性作为平等的基础这个概念。我相信，仔细研究一下至善主义，也可得到同样的结论。但正义即公平观不是一种追求最高标准的理论。我们的目标不是去寻找自然特征方面的差异，这些差异影响了某种最高要求，从而可以作为把公民分成不同等级的可能依据。虽然在自然属性的相关性问题上，契约观点同许多目的理论有一致之处，但为了规定平等权利，它对于自然属性的分配只需要远远不那么充分的前提。只要某种最起码的条件能够普遍地得到实现，这就够了。 还有几个问题也应该简单地提一下。首先，道德人格这个概念和最起码的必要条件，可能常常证明是令人头痛的问题。如果说许多概念在某种程度上都是模糊不清的，那么道德人格这个概念可能尤其如此。但我认为，这些问题最好是结合具体的道德问题来讨论。具体的道德问题的性质和现有的一般事实的结构，可能会使人想出解决这些问题的富有成效的办法来。总之，决不可把某种正义观的模糊不清与基本权利随自然能力的不同而不同这种论点混为一谈。 我已说过，规定道德人格的最起码的条件是指能力，而不是指能力的实现。不管这种能力是否有待发展，一个人只要有了这种能力，他就应该得到正义原则的全面保护。既然婴幼儿被认为也拥有基本权利（通常由父母和监护人代替他们行使），那么，关于必要条件的这种解释，就似乎为配合我们深思熟虑的判断所需要。此外，认为这种可能性是充分的这种看法，是同原始状态的假设性质一致的，也是同选择原则尽可能不要受偶然事件影响这个概念一致的。因此，完全有理由说：如果原始协议不是为了应付偶然情况，那就要保证能够参加原始协议的人得到平等的正义。 当然，这丝毫说不上是什么论据。我还不曾提出可以得出这个结论的前提，这和我在讨论如何在原始状态中选择正义观时的情况不同，那时，我曾努力提出前提，不过做得不十分有力罢了。我也不曾去努力证明必须把对各方的描述用作平等的基础。相反，这种解释似乎是正义即公平观的自然完成。全面的讨论可能要谈到关于缺乏能力的各种特殊情况，关于儿童的情况，我业已联系家长式统治（第39节）作过简单的评论，有些人由于不幸、偶然事故或精神紧张而暂时丧失了他们的现实能力，对这些人的问题也可以同样看待。但有些人则是或多或少永久地被剥夺了道德人格，这些人的问题可能比较难办。我不能在这里研究这个问题，但我认为，关于平等的说明将不会受到重大的影响。 我想用几点概括的意见来结束这一节的讨论。首先，在平等的基础这个问题上契约观点所表现出来的那种简明性是值得强调的。获得正义感的最起码的能力，保证每个人都有平等的权利。所有人的要求都应该用正义原则来裁定。为平等提供实证的，是关于人的本性的一般事实，而不仅仅是没有实际意义的程序规则。平等也不需要先对人们的固有价值作出估计，不需要先对他们的关于善的观念的价值进行比较。能够给人以正义的人应该得到正义。 如果研究其他一些关于平等的说明，上述直截了当的主张的优点就更加显而易见了。例如，人们可能认为，平等的正义是指社会应对每个人实现他能够享受的最美好生活作出同等的贡献。乍看起来，这似乎是一种颇具吸引力的意见。然而，这种意见具有严重的缺点。首先，它不但需要有一种方法来估计生活计划的相对优点，而且它也必须先要有某种手段，来判断怎样才能算是对具有关于他们的善的不同观念的人作出了同等的贡献。应用这个标准所引起的问题是显而易见的。更重大的缺点是：某些人的较大能力使他们产生更强烈的要求，而不考虑对别人的利益作出补偿。人们必须假定，自然资产的不同将会影响向具有不同生活计划的人给予同等帮助的必要手段。但是，这种平等观不但违反了互利原则，而且还意味着人们的要求的力量直接受到自然能力分配的影响，因而也就是受到从道德观点看纯属偶然的一些事件的影响。正义即公平理论中的平等基础避免了这些缺点。这里唯一的起决定性作用的偶然事件，就是是否具有获得正义感的能力。通过把正义给予那些也能给予别人以正义的人，相互关系原则就在最高层次上得到了实现。 还有一种意见是：我们现在可以更全面地把两种平等观一致起来。有些作家把平等分为两种，即在某些善的分配方面所实行的平等（其中有些善几乎肯定会使受惠较多的人得到更高的地位和威望），和不管人们的社会地位如何而一视同仁地予以实行的平等。第一种平等是由第二个正义原则规定的，因为这个原则规定了组织结构和分配份额，从而使社会合作变得有效而又公平。但第二种平等则是基本的。它是由第一个正义原则和互相尊重之类的自然责任规定的；它是作为道德的主体所应该得到的。这种自然的平等基础说明了它的更深刻的意义。第一个原则比第二个原则优先，这就使我们能够避免用特定的方式去决定这些平等观的优劣，同时，按照原始状态的观点而提出的论据，也表明了这种优先是如何产生的（第82节）。 如果要始终如一地去应用公平机会原则，我们就必须在看人时不受他们的社会地位的影响。但是，这种意向能在多大程度上得到实行？即使公平机会（按照对它们所作的规定）得到了实现，家庭似乎也会导致人与人之间的不平等机会（第46节）。那么，是不是应该取消家庭呢？从家庭本身来看，同时也考虑到某种优先原则，平等机会的思想有朝这个方面发展的倾向。但从整个正义即公平理论来看，采取这个方针的迫切性不大。承认差别原则，就要对自由的平等制度所设想的社会不平等现象重新规定理由；如果博爱原则和补偿原则都能得到适当的重视，那么资产的自然分配和社会环境的偶然事件就能比较容易地得到承认。既然可以使这些差异对我们产生有利的作用，我们就比较容易津津乐道于自己的好运，而不会由于想到如果消除了所有的社会障碍，使我们同别人一样享有平等的机会，我们的处境本来可能会好得多之类的问题而感到沮丧。如果这种正义观是真正有效的，并且是得到公认的，那么，它似乎比其他正义观更能改变我们对社会的看法，并使我们听从自然秩序的安排和安于人类生活的条件。 最后，我们还应该回顾一下正义理论的范围。不但关于道德的许多方面不曾涉及，而且关于动物和自然界的其余部分的正当行为也不曾予以说明。正义观仅仅是道德观的一部分而已。虽然我并没有认为，为了负起正义的责任，获得正义感的能力是必不可少的，但我们的确似乎没有必要把严格的正义给予没有这种能力的生物。但这并不是说，关于它们或在我们与自然秩序的关系中，就根本没有任何要求。对动物残忍肯定是错误的，而消灭整个物种可能是一种巨大的罪恶。感知快乐和痛苦的能力，了解动物可能会有的生活方式的能力，显然规定了对动物的怜悯和人道的责任。我不打算说明这些经过深思熟虑的看法。它们不属于正义理论的研究范围，而且也似乎不可能把契约论扩大以便能够自然而然地把它们也包括进来。关于我们与动物和自然界的关系的正确观念，看来可能决定于某种关于自然秩序及我们在其中的地位的理论。形而上学的任务之一就是提出一种适合于这一目的世界观；它应能发现对这些问题来说具有决定意义的真理，并使之系统化。在多大程度上将不得不对正义即公平理论进行修正，使之适应这种内容更广泛的理论，这是无法说明的。但似乎有理由希望，如果它能对人与人之间的正义予以正确的说明，而这些更广泛的关系又得到了考虑，那么，它就不可能是过分荒诞不经的。