Chapter 22 Chapter 8 Sense of Justice-1

Having explained the problem of the good, I now turn to the problem of stability.I'm going to approach this problem in two steps.In this chapter I shall discuss how members of a well-ordered society acquire a sense of justice, and briefly consider the relative strength of this feeling as dictated by different moral values.The last chapter deals with the question of coherence, that is, whether the sense of justice can be combined with our conception of the good so that the two work together to preserve just arrangements.It should be remembered that a large part of this chapter is just a preparation, and that the various issues covered are intended only to point out some of the more basic points related to philosophical theory.First, I want to make a provision for a well-ordered society and briefly say something about what stability means.I shall then briefly describe how the sense of justice is formed, as it presumably arises once just institutions are firmly established and recognized as just.A little more to discuss the principles of moral psychology; I will emphasize that these are the principles of correlation, and relate this to the problem of relative stability.At the end of this chapter, we will study the problem of natural attributes. With these attributes, people get the guarantee of equality and justice. At the same time, it is these attributes that stipulate the natural basis of equality.

From the outset (section 1), I described a well-ordered society as one designed to promote the good in its members and effectively governed by a general conception of justice.Thus, in this society, everyone recognizes and knows that others recognize the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions conform to these principles and are known to conform to these principles.The theory of justice as fairness is put forward to fit this conception of society.Those in the original position must assume that the chosen principles are public, and so their evaluation of conceptions of justice must be based on their likely role as generally accepted standards (Section 23).Some conceptions of justice may be quite valid if they are known and observed by some, or even all, but as long as this is not well known, they are excluded by the publicity condition.We should also point out that some principles are endorsed as genuinely general beliefs about man and his place in society, and therefore the conception of justice employed is acceptable only on the basis of these facts.There is no need to back up its principles with theological or a priori theory, nor to conceive of another world which compensates and corrects the inequalities the two principles permit in this world.Whether we know it or not, conceptions of justice must be justified by the circumstances of our lives.

A well-ordered society is also governed by its general conception of justice.This fact implies that the members of the society have a strong, often practical, desire to act as required by the principles of justice.Because a well-ordered society persists in time, its conception of justice is presumably stable, that is, if the institutions are just (as defined by this conception of justice), then those who participate in these arrangements gain A corresponding sense of justice and a desire to do what it takes to uphold these arrangements.If a certain conception of justice tends to produce a stronger sense of justice and is more likely to overcome destructive tendencies, and if the system recognized by this conception of justice produces only weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly, then this conception of justice The view of justice is more stable than other views of justice.The stability of a conception of justice depends on the balance of motives: the sense of justice it fosters and the goals it encourages must generally overcome the inclination to injustice.In order to estimate the stability of the conception of justice (and the well-ordered society it prescribes), one must analyze the relative strength of these opposing tendencies.

Stability is clearly a desirable feature of morality.Other things being equal, people in the original position will adopt a more stable arrangement of principles.However attractive a conception of justice may appear for other reasons, if the principles of moral psychology prevent it from arousing the desire to act in accordance with it, then it is a seriously flawed conception of justice.Therefore, when further demonstrating that justice is the principle of fairness, I want to prove that this view of justice is more stable than other alternative views of justice.For the most part, the stability argument is in addition to the reasons given so far (except for those in section 29).I wish to examine this concept in greater detail, not only for its own sake, but also in order to prepare the ground for discussion of other issues such as the basis of equality and the primacy of liberty.

Of course, the stability criterion is not decisive.In fact, some moral theories dismiss this standard altogether, at least in some interpretations of it.Bentham, for example, is said to have sometimes advocated not only the traditional principle of utility but also the principle of psychological egoism.But if it were a psychological law that people only cared about their own interests, then it would be impossible for them to have some practical sense of justice (the sense of justice dictated by the principle of utility).The best that an ideal legislator can do is to design some social arrangements so that citizens, motivated by self or group interests, realize that their actions should be in line with the practice of maximizing the total amount of welfare.According to this view, the resulting alignment of interests is entirely artificial: it depends on the method of reasoning, and individuals adhere to institutional arrangements solely as a means of dealing with their respective interests.

This discrepancy between the principles of right and justice and human motivation is unusual, though salutary as a limiting reason.Most traditional theories hold that what is called human nature is, at least in part, a desire to act justly that we acquire when we live under and benefit from just institutions.If this view is correct, then the conception of justice is suitable for people's psychological disposition.Moreover, if it turns out that the desire to act justly is governed by a rational plan of life, then it is in accordance with our part of the good to act justly.In this case, the conception of justice is consistent with the notion of the good, and the whole theory is appropriate.The task of this chapter is to show how the theory of justice as fairness provides its own arguments, and to show that because it is more consistent with the principles of moral psychology, it has greater stability than other traditional theories.To this end, I will briefly describe how a man can acquire a sense of justice and other moral sentiments in a well-ordered society.Finally, we shall have to discuss some rather abstract psychological issues; but I will always assume that general facts about the world, including basic psychological principles, are already known to man in the original position and serve as the basis for his decisions .Reflecting on these issues, I examine here how these facts affect the original protocol.

Perhaps misunderstandings can be prevented if I make a few comments about the concepts of balance and stability.These two concepts are theoretically and mathematically open to debate, but I intend to use them intuitively.Perhaps it should be noted first that they apply to a certain regime.In other words, this is a system in a state of balance. As long as it is not impacted by external forces and reaches a state that remains unchanged from beginning to end, it is a stable system.In order to define precisely a state of equilibrium, the system must be carefully delimited and its defining features clearly stated.Three things are obligatory: first, to find the institution, and to distinguish between internal and external forces; The form of expression; the third is to specify the laws that link these states.

Some institutions have no equilibria, while others have many equilibria.These issues depend on the nature of the institution.Whenever the deviation from the equilibrium caused by external disturbances brings into play some forces within the system, and if the external shock is not too great, these forces tend to restore the equilibrium state, then the equilibrium is stable.Conversely, an equilibrium is unstable if a movement away from it excites forces within the system that lead to even greater shifts.Institutions are stabilized to varying degrees depending on the internal forces available to bring them back into balance.Since practically all social institutions are subject to some sort of disturbance, we may suppose that if the deviation from the chosen equilibrium position of these institutions caused by the usual disturbance induces forces strong enough to After a considerable period of time, the equilibrium is restored, or a state close to equilibrium is reached, then these institutions are actually stable.These provisions are unfortunately vague, but should be useful for our thesis.

Of course, the institution concerned here refers to the basic structure of a well-ordered society corresponding to different conceptions of justice.What concerns us is when this complex of political, economic, and social institutions conforms to the proper principles of justice, and when those who participate in the complex generally know that it conforms to the proper principles of justice.We must endeavor to estimate the relative stability of these institutions.Now I assume that the scope of these arrangements is delimited in terms of the concept of a self-sufficient national society.This presumption will not be outdated until the principles of justice applicable to international law (section 58) arise, but I do not intend to discuss the wider question of international law further.It is also necessary to point out that, as things stand, balance and stability should be regulated in terms of basic structural justice and the moral conduct of individuals.The stability of justice does not mean that the institutions and habits of a well-ordered society will not change.In fact, such a society would presumably contain great diversity and adopt some different arrangements from time to time.In this case, stability means that no matter how the system changes, they are still just, or close to it, because they can be adjusted according to the new social environment.Inevitable deviations from justice are effectively corrected, or limited within permissible limits by forces within the system.Among these forces, I believe that the common sense of justice of the members of society plays a fundamental role.To some extent, therefore, moral sentiments are necessary to ensure the stability of the fundamental structure from the point of view of justice.

Now, I return to the question of how these feelings were formed.Broadly speaking, there are two main traditional arguments on this question.The first type of argument is historically produced by empirical doctrine and can be found in the writings of Hume and Sidgwick.A more recent development of this tradition can be represented by social learning theory.One of its main arguments is that the goal of moral training is to provide the missing motivations: the desire to do good for the sake of doing good and the desire not to do bad.Righteous conduct is generally beneficial to others and society (this is dictated by the principle of utility), and we usually lack a practical motive for such conduct, while wrong conduct is generally harmful to others and society , we usually have a sufficient motivation for this behavior.Society must try to compensate for this deficiency.The approval and disapproval of parents and other authorities can do this, for they can reward and punish, as necessary, by liking and disliking, up to pleasure and pain.Finally, through various psychological processes, we acquire the desire to do only good and not evil.Another argument is that the desire to conform to moral standards often arises early in life, before we fully understand the rationale for those standards.In fact, some people may never understand the basis for these criteria in utilitarian principles.The consequence is that our later moral sentiments are liable to be stamped with the early training which more or less roughly formed our nature.

Freud's theory parallels this view in many important respects.He believes that the process by which children develop moral attitudes is centered on the situation of the Oedipus complex and the profound conflicts it produces.The moral code upheld by an authoritative person (here, the parents) is accepted by the child as the best way to relieve his worries, so the resulting attitude represented by the superego may be strict and loving. The attitude of punishing people reflects the repression of the Oedipus emotional stage.Thus, Freud's account demonstrates two things: first, a crucial role of moral learning occurs early in life before the rational grounds of morality can be understood; Mental processes marked by conflict and repression acquire new motivation.Indeed, Freud's teachings illustrate these features vividly.It follows that our untested moral attitudes in early life are likely to have Irrational and unreasonable in some major ways.Moral progress in later life is partly the result of correcting these attitudes in accordance with principles which we at last admit to be true. Another traditional argument for moral learning arises from rationalist thought and is illustrated by Rousseau and Kant, and sometimes by Mill and, more recently, by Piaget.Moral learning is not so much to provide the lack of motivation as to allow our innate intellectual and emotional capacities to develop naturally and freely.Once the capacity for understanding has matured and people begin to recognize their place in society and to accept the views of others, they are able to make correct assessments of the mutual interests that provide for the fair conditions of social cooperation.We have an innate sympathy for others, we have an innate susceptibility to sympathy and self-controlled pleasure, and once we have a clear understanding of our relation to our fellow man on a fairly general point of view, This ability to empathize and feel provides the basis for expressing our moral feelings.Thus, this traditional argument sees moral feelings as a natural consequence of being fully aware of our sociality. Müller expresses the view that the arrangements of a just society suit us so well that whatever is manifestly socially desirable is accepted as carnal.An indispensable condition of such a society is that everyone should be considerate of others on the basis of mutually acceptable principles of reciprocity.We suffer when our feelings are alien to those of our fellows; and this social tendency in due course furnishes a solid foundation for moral feelings.Mill adds that being accountable to principles of justice in our dealings with others does not hinder the development of our nature.Doing so fulfills our social feelings, and at the same time enables us to rein in our narrow impulses by facing the greater good.If we are restrained, not because we injure the good of others, but only because they are unhappy, or because of their domineering position to us--only in this case, the development of our nature will hindered.If moral injunctions are justified by the claims of justice of others, then such restraints do us no harm, but we should regard them as consistent with our good.Moral learning is not entirely a matter of acquiring new motivations, for these arise automatically once our intellectual and emotional capacity for expression have developed as necessary.It follows from this that maturity must be waited for in order to fully comprehend morality; the child's understanding of morality is always primitive, and the peculiarities of his morality are lost at a later stage.The traditional argument of rationalism paints a more rosy picture, since it holds that the principles of right and justice come from our nature and are not inconsistent with our goodness, while another account does not seem to contain such guarantees. It is not my intention to comment on the relative merits of these two views of moral learning.Undoubtedly, there is much that is right about both, and it seems preferable to try to combine them naturally.It must be emphasized that morality is an extremely complex structure of principles, ideals, and maxims, containing elements of thought, action, and emotion.Of course, many other aspects of learning are involved in the development of moral values, ranging from reinforcement and classical conditioning to highly abstract reasoning and precise understanding of typical patterns, and so on.Every kind of learning presumably has its necessary tasks at some point.In the following sections (Sections 70-72) I shall briefly describe the process of moral development as it may occur in a well-ordered society that is realizing the principles of justice, that is, fairness.My only concern is this particular case.It is my purpose, therefore, to point out the principal steps by which a man grows up in this particular form of well-ordered society by which he knows and loves the principles of justice.These steps, I think, are marked by the main structural features of a comprehensive design of principles, ideals, and maxims applicable to social arrangements.What I will show is that we must distinguish between authoritative, corporate, and principled morality.An account of moral development is linked throughout with a conception of justice to be learned, and thus presupposes the plausibility, if not the correctness, of this theory. In order to prevent misunderstanding, here is a little commentary, as I did before with regard to economic theory (section 42).We hope that the psychological account of moral learning is correct and thus consistent with existing knowledge.But it is of course impossible to take the details into account; at most I can only describe the main outlines.It must be remembered that the purpose of the following discussion is to examine the question of stability and to compare the psychological roots of various conceptions of justice.A crucial point is how general facts about moral psychology affect the choice of principles in the original position.No insurmountable difficulty arises unless the psychological account is flawed and calls into question the recognition of principles of justice rather than of standards of utility.I also hope that further use of psychological theory will not prove to be too far off topic.Of particular importance among these questions is the account of the grounds of equality. I call the first stage in the sequence of moral development the moral stage of authority.Although some aspects of the morality of authority are preserved in later stages for special occasions, we may regard this primitive form of morality as the morality of children.I presume that the sense of justice is gradually acquired by these young members of society as they grow up.The necessity of passing on from generation to generation and educating children in moral attitudes (however simple), is one of the conditions of human life. I will now assume that the basic structure of a well-ordered society includes some form of family, and thus assume that children are from the outset under the legitimate authority of their parents.Of course, with further research, the system of the family may be problematic, and an arrangement in a certain place may actually be preferable.However, the account of the morality of authority can presumably be adjusted, if necessary, to accommodate these different arrangements.In short, it is characteristic of the child's condition that he is incapable of evaluating the correctness of the maxims and prohibitions set before him by persons of authority (in this case his parents).He lacks the knowledge and understanding by which to challenge their guidance.In fact, the child lacks a conception of justification entirely, which he acquires much later.It is therefore unlikely that he had good reason to doubt the propriety of parental injunctions.But since we assume that the society is well-ordered, to avoid unnecessary complications, we can also assume that these maxims are basically correct.They correspond to a reasonable interpretation of the responsibilities imposed by the principles of justice on the family. We may assume that parents love their children, and that the child will then come to love and trust his parents.How did this change in children come about?To answer this question, I posit the following psychological principle: Children will only begin to love their parents if the parents first clearly love the child.The dynamics of the child's actions are therefore first of all certain instincts and desires, and his ends are governed (if at all) by legitimate selfishness (in a rather limited sense).Although the child has the potential for love, his love for his parents is a new desire arising from his recognition that they obviously love him and that he benefits from their act of expressing love. . The love of the parents for the child is manifested in the fact that they have obvious intentions to care for him, to do things for him according to his reasonable self-love tendencies, and to realize these intentions.Their love manifests itself in liking to see him in front of his eyes, in his sense of competence and self-esteem.They encouraged him to work hard at the various tasks of his formative years and welcomed his independence.In short, loving another person means not only caring for his wants and needs, but also affirming his sense of self-worth.In this way, the love of parents for children is finally exchanged for the love of children.The child's love does not help to justify the fact that he does not love his parents as a means to his original selfish ends.With this purpose, it is conceivable that he could act as if he loved them, but he would not change his original desire in doing so.According to the above-mentioned psychological principles, the apparent love of the parents for the child will in time produce a new feeling. Several methods can be used to further analyze some of the elements of this psychological law.For example, the child's acknowledgment of his parents' love for him is unlikely to directly prompt the child to return love to his parents.We may assume several other steps as follows: When the love of the parents for the child is recognized by the child by their manifest intentions, the child is convinced of his worth as a human being.He thus realizes that, for his own sake, he is valued by what he considers to be the great and powerful people in his world.He has learned that parental love is unconditional; that they like to see him in their presence and his innocent behavior, and that they don't like him because he plays by the rules and does what's right for others.At some point, the child comes to trust his parents and his surroundings.This was the beginning of his life, allowing him to test his maturing abilities, during which he was always supported by the love and encouragement of his parents.Gradually he acquires skills and develops a sense of competence that demonstrates his self-esteem.It is during this whole process that the child's love for his parents develops.He associates them with his success and joy in maintaining his world, with his sense of self-worth.From this arises his love for them. Now we must consider how the child's love and trust are manifested.Here, the characteristics of authority positions must be remembered.The child has no standards of criticism of his own, because he is not yet capable of rejecting certain norms on rational grounds.If he loves and trusts his parents, he will necessarily accept their prohibitions.He will also try to imitate them, thinking that they are indeed worthy of respect, and abide by the principles they teach.Let us suppose that they embody profound learning and strength, and thus provide a strong example of what is required of children.The child thus accepts their judgment of him, and in violating their prohibitions the child tends to judge himself as they do.At the same time, of course, his desires go beyond what is permitted, otherwise, there would be no need for these norms.As a result, children feel that their parents' norms are constraints and may disobey them.He will see, after all, that there is no reason to abide by these constraints; they are themselves arbitrary rules, and he has no primal inclination to do what others tell him to do.If, however, he really loves his parents and trusts them, he is inclined to take the same attitude towards his own faults as they should if he is tempted to do so.He will be inclined to admit his transgression and seek a settlement.A sense of guilt (of authority) is expressed in these tendencies.Without these tendencies, and others related, the sense of guilt would not exist.But it is also true that the absence of this guilt can indicate a lack of love and trust.Given the nature of authoritative positions and the principles of moral psychology that link moral attitudes to natural attitudes, love and trust can create a sense of guilt when parental injunctions are not obeyed.It cannot be denied that, in the case of children, it is sometimes difficult to separate the feeling of guilt from the fear of punishment, and especially of losing the love of the parents.The child lacks concepts with which to understand moral differences, and this is reflected in his behavior.I have assumed, however, that even in the case of children we can still distinguish guilt (of authority) from fear and apprehension. According to this general description of the development of authoritative morality, it seems that the conditions conducive to children's learning of authoritative morality are as follows: First, parents must love the child and become objects worthy of his admiration.In this way, they evoke in him a sense of self-worth and a desire to be like them.Second, they must announce clear and understandable (and certainly reasonable) provisions appropriate to the child's level of understanding.In addition, they should explain the reasons for the prohibition in a way that these children can understand.At the same time, if these prohibitions also apply to them, they must also abide by them.Parents should model the morality they inculcate and, over time, articulate the underlying principles of that morality.This is necessary not only to arouse the child's disposition to accept these principles later, but also to inform the child how to interpret them in particular cases.In the absence of these conditions, and especially if the parental prohibitions are not only severe and unjust, but enforced by means of punishment or even corporal sanction, moral development probably would not have taken place.The authoritative morality of the child consists in his willingness, without foreseeing rewards and punishments, to obey certain maxims, which not only appear to him to be essentially arbitrary, but which do not at any time depend on his authority. Primitive tendencies.If he acquires the desire to obey these prohibitions, it is because he believes that they have been proposed to him by powerful persons, whom he loves and trusts, and who obey them.He thus concludes that these prohibitions express certain ways of behaving that characterize the kind of person he wishes to be.None of these processes can occur without love, without role models, without guidance, and certainly not in a loveless relationship maintained by coercive threats and acts of revenge. The child's morality of authority is primitive because it consists, for the most part, of a set of maxims beyond his comprehension of the wider arrangement of justness and justice in which The various provisions presented to him are justified.Even a developed morality of authority, from which the grounds of these prescriptions can be learned, exhibits many of the same characteristics, and contains the same good and evil.Here is a typical figure of authority, who is loved and trusted, or at least considered commensurate with his position, and whose maxim is one's duty to obey absolutely.It is not our business to consider the consequences, it is the business of those in authority.The precious virtues are obedience, humility, and loyalty to authority figures; the chief vices are disobedience, willfulness, and indiscretion.We should do what is expected and not ask questions, because to do otherwise would be to express suspicion and mistrust, to express a certain arrogance and suspicion.Clearly, the morality of authority must be subordinated to the principles of right and justice, since these alone can determine when such extreme demands or similar restrictions are justified.The child's morality of authority is temporary, an inevitable consequence of his special status and limited understanding.Moreover, the theological sameness is a special case which, from the point of view of the principle of equal liberty, does not apply to the basic structure of society (section 33).The morality of authority, therefore, has only a limited role in basic social arrangements, only insofar as the extraordinary requirements of the customary practice in question make it necessary to give authority to some to lead and to command. This morality is justified only when the conditions are met.In all cases, the scope of this morality is determined by principles of justice. The second stage of moral development is the moral stage of the group.This stage involves a wide range of circumstances depending on the group in question, and can even include entire national societies.Whereas the child's authoritative morality consists primarily of a set of norms, the content of group morality is determined by moral standards applicable to the individual's role in the various groups to which he belongs.These standards include common-sense rules of morality and their adaptation to a man's particular position; they are impressed on him by the approval or disapproval of persons in authority or other members of the group .Thus, at this stage, the family itself is seen as a small group, usually represented by a well-defined hierarchy in which each member has certain rights and duties.As the child grows up, he is taught the standards of conduct appropriate to a man in his position.The virtues of a good son or daughter are illustrated, or at least communicated, through the expectations expressed by the parents in approval and disapproval.Likewise, there are groups such as schools and neighborhoods, and short-term forms of cooperation such as games and competitions with peers, but they are not made secondary because they are short-term cooperation.As one adapts to these arrangements, one learns the virtues of being a good student and classmate, the ideals of being a good athlete and a good partner.This moral outlook extends to ideals adopted later in life, and thus to one's various identities and occupations in adulthood, one's position in one's family, and even one's position as a member of society.What determines the content of these ideals are various notions of the good wife and husband, the good friend and the good citizen.The morality of the group thus consists of many ideals, each formulated in a manner appropriate to the respective position and role.As we progress through life in order of status, our understanding of morality grows.The corresponding ideal order calls for ever-increasing intellectual judgment and greater moral discernment.Clearly, some ideals are more comprehensive than others, and make quite different demands on the individual.As we shall see, having to conform to certain ideals necessarily leads to a principled morality. The roles or positions in question here are those of groups, and therefore every concrete ideal is presumably accounted for in the context of the aims and intentions of these groups.In due course a man develops an idea of ​​the whole system of cooperation which defines the group and the ends it serves.He knows that others are divided by their position in the cooperative arrangement.So he finally learns to adopt their point of view and see things from their point of view.To see problems in terms of various points of view and to see them together as aspects of a cooperative arrangement requires the development of intelligence, and the acquisition of a group morality (represented by some ideal structure ), it seems plausible to say that it is on the basis of this development of intelligence.In fact, if I examine this morality, the set of necessary capacities is quite complex.First, we must acknowledge that there are different viewpoints, that other people's viewpoints are different from our own.但我们不但必须知道他们对事物的看法不同，而且还必须知道他们具有不同的要求和目的，具有不同的计划和动机；同时，我们也必须知道怎样从他们的言行和面部表情中去推测这些事实。其次，我们还必须发现这些观点的决定性特征，发现别人的主要要求和欲望是什么，他们的主要信念和看法是什么。只有这样，我们才能理解和评价他们的行动、意图和动机。除非我们能够发现这些主要因素，否则我们就不能把我们自己置于另一个人的地位，就不能弄清楚如果处于他的地位我们会怎样去做。为了弄清楚这些问题，我们当然必须知道别人的真正观点是什么。但最后，即使我们已经对另一个人的情况有了了解，我们也仍然需要参照他的情况来适当地调整我们自己的行动。 最起码地做到这几点，至少对成人来说是容易的事，但对儿童来说可就困难了。毫无疑问，这部分地说明了为什么儿童的原始的权威道德准则通常是通过外部行为来表现的，为什么儿童在评价行为时多半忽略了动机和意图。儿童还没有掌握了解别人人格的艺术，即认识他们的信仰、意图和感情的艺术，因此，即使他知道上面说的那几点，他也不能对他们的行为作出解释。此外，他把自己置于他们的地位的能力还仍然是单纯的，而且可能把他引入歧途。因此，这些从最后的道德观点来看如此重要的因素，没有在最初阶段予以考虑，这是毫不奇怪的。但是，随着我们承担了一系列具有更复杂的权利和义务安排的、要求更高的角色，这些因素就逐步得到了考虑。相应的理想要求我们按照关于基本结构的观念所具有的含义，从更多角度去观察事物。 为了全面起见，我已提到了智力发展的这些方面。我不能更详尽地去考虑这些问题，但我应该指出，它们在获得道德观点的过程中处于重要的地位。对了解别人人格的艺术的掌握程度，必然会影响一个人在道德上的敏感性；而理解社会合作的错综复杂的情况，也是同样重要的。但光有这些能力还是不够的。有的人的计划纯粹是操纵性的，他一心为了自己的利益而利用别人，如果说他并没有压倒一切的力量，那么他大概也同样具有这些技巧。劝诱手段和小动作需要同样的智能。因此，我们必须研究我们是怎样忠诚于我们的同伴以及后来又忠诚于一般的社会安排的。可以考察这样一个团体：它的普遍规则众所周知是正义的。参加这个安排的人受到友好和互相信任关系的约束，他们相信彼此都会尽责。这一切是怎么发生的呢？我们可以假定，这种感觉和态度是由于加入了这个团体才产生的。因此，如果一个人表现出他具有同情的能力，是由于他根据第一条心理学法则而学会了忠诚，那么，由于他的同伴显然打算去履行他们的责任和义务，他就对他们产生了友好感和信赖感。这个原则是又一条心理学法则。随着人们在一段时间内一个一个地或一批一批地（人数受到适当的限制）加入了这个团体，而如果加入团体较久的其他一些人又能克尽己责并遵循关于自己地位的理想，那么他们就学会了这种忠诚。因此，如果参加某种社会合作制度的人经常按照维护它的正义的（或公平的）规则的明显意图来行动，那么友好和互相信任的关系就势必会在他们中间发展起来，从而使他们更坚定不移地遵守这种安排。 一旦确立了这种关系，如果一个人未能尽责，他往往就会有（对团体的）犯罪感。这种感觉在各个方面都表现了出来，例如，如果造成了对别人的损害，这种犯罪感就表现为愿意为这种损害进行弥补（补偿），愿意承认自己所做的事是不公正的（错误的），并为此而道歉。犯罪感也表现在承认惩罚和指责是理所当然的，也表现在当别人同样未能尽责时发现比较难以对他们表示恼怒和愤慨。没有这些倾向，可能就是表明没有友好和互相信任的关系，表明准备在和别人交往时无视得到公认并被所有的人用来裁定他们的分歧的关于合法期望的标准和依据。没有这种犯罪感的人，不会对落在别人身上的负担而感到问心有愧，也不会由于背信使别人受骗上当而感到不安。但是，只要存在友好和信任关系，不能履行一个人的责任和义务往往会引起这种抑制作用和反作用。如果没有这种感情上的约束，同情和互相信任最多不过是一种表面现象。正如在第一阶段对父母的某些自然态度发展起来一样，这里的友好和信任关系也在同伴之间发展了起来。在每一种情况下，某些自然态度构成了相应的道德感的基础：缺乏这种感觉，可能就是表明缺乏这种态度。 第二条心理学法则大概同第一条心理学法则一样是不可移易的。既然一个团体的各种安排被承认是正义的（同时正义原则的更复杂的作用得到了了解并被用来把理想规定得恰如其份），从而保证这个团体的全部成员从团体的活动中得到好处，并且知道他们得到了好处，那么，别人尽职这种行为就被认为是符合每个人的利益的。这里，遵守一个人的义务和责任的明显意图被看作是一种诚意，而承认这一点反过来又唤起了友好和信任感。到适当的时候，人人克尽己责的交互作用相互增强，直至达到某种平衡。但我们也可以假定，这个团体的新成员承认某些道德典范，即在各方面都得到称赞并高度地表现了与自己地位相称的理想的一些人。这些人显示了技巧和能力以及性格和气质的优点，而这一切吸引了我们，唤起了我们的欲望，使我们也想像他们那样，能够去做同样的事。产生这种效法欲望，一部分是由于把他们的属性看作是他们具有更多特权的地位的必备条件，但这也是亚里士多德原则的一种附带作用，因为我们喜欢看到更复杂更巧妙的活动表现，而这种表现往往会引起我们自己也去做这些事的欲望。因此，如果那些富有吸引力和令人钦佩的人，带着明显的意图，实现了一个正义团体的形形色色角色的理想，那么，这些理想就有可能为亲眼看到它们实现的那些人所接受。这些观念被看作是一种诚意，而他们所代表的活动也被表明是一种别人同样能够赏识的人类优点。上述两种心理过程和以前一样又出现了：别人按照确认我们福利的明显意图办事，与此同时，他们也表现了办事的才能和方法，从而吸引了我们，并唤起我们模仿他们的欲望。 团体的道德表现为许多形式，因所说的团体和角色的不同而不同。这些形式代表了许多复杂的层次。但是，如果我们从主要社会体制规定的、要求比较高的职位来考虑，正义原则就会被承认是对基本结构起了调节作用，并成为许多重要理想的内容。实际上，这些原则适用于人人都有的公民角色，因为每一个人，不仅仅是参加公共生活的那些人，都应该有关于共同善的政治观点。因此，我们可以假定有一种团体的道德，按照这种道德，社会的全体成员彼此都把对方看作是平等的人，看作是朋友和同事，大家一起加入一种众所周知是符合所有人利益并接受共同正义观指导的合作制度。这种道德的内容特点表现为合作的美德，即正义和公平、忠诚和信任、正直和大公无私这些美德。具有代表性的恶习就是贪婪和不公平、不诚实和欺诈、成见和偏私。在团体的成员中，沾染上这些毛病，往往会引起—方（对团体）的犯罪感和另一方的不满和义愤。只要我们忠诚于在一种正义的（或公平的）安排中同我们合作的那些人，这些道德态度是必然会存在的。 如果一个人获得了比通过平等公民的理想表现出来的形式更复杂的团体道德，那么他必定对正义原则有了某种了解。他还显示了一种忠诚于许多具体的人和团体的感情，而且他愿意遵守适用于他的各种地位并通过社会的赞同和不赞同而得到维持的道德标准。他在和别人一起成为团体的成员并一心想要实行这些道德观之后，他所关心的就是如何为他的行动和目标赢得别人的承认。虽然这个人对正义原则有了了解，但至少在一定时间内，他遵守这些原则的动机似乎主要来自他对别人的友好和同情关系，来自他对取得广大社会认可的关心。现在，我想研究一下一个人忠诚于这些最高原则本身所经历的过程，这样，就像他在团体道德的早期阶段可能希望成为一个好人一样，现在他希望成为一个正义的人。去正义地行动和促进正义体制的观念，开始对他产生了吸引力，这种吸引力同以前的次要理想所具有的吸引力相类似。 在对这种原则的道德可能会怎样发生这一点进行推测时（这里所说的原则是指诸如在原始状态中得到考虑的那些基本原则），我们应该指出，团体的道德十分自然地导致了对正义标准的了解。无论如何在一个井然有序的社会里，不仅这些标准规定了普遍的正义观，而且对政治事务有兴趣的公民以及拥有立法、司法和其他类似职位的人，必须经常地应用和解释这些原则。他们必须经常地采用别人的观点，这不仅是为了弄清楚他们将需要什么和可能做什么，而且也是为了在相互竞争的要求之间取得平衡，为了对团体道德的各种次要理想进行调整。实行正义原则，需要我们去采用四阶段序列（第31节）所规定的观点。我们应按照不同情况，采用制宪会议的观点，或立法机关的观点，或诸如此类的观点。最后，一个人就会掌握这些原则，了解它们所保证的价值以及它们使人人都得到好处的方式。这样，通过第三条心理学法则，就使这些原则得到了承认。这条法则说明，一旦爱和信赖的态度以及友好感情和互相信任的态度按照前面的两条心理学法则宣告产生，那么，承认我们自己以及我们所关心的那些人就是某种既定的并且持续存在的正义体制的受益者，往往会使我们产生相应的正义感。一旦我们认识到符合正义原则的社会安排如何促进了我们的善和促进了同我们一起加入团体的那些人的善，我们就产生了一种应用这些原则并按这些原则办事的欲望。到适当的时候，我们就能对正义的人类合作的理想进行正确的评价了。 正义感至少表现在两个方面。首先，它使我们承认适用于我们并使我们和我们的同伴从中得益的正义体制。我们希望尽自己的一份力量来维护这些安排。即使我们不会受到我们通过具体的伙伴之情的联系而予以利用的那些人的约束，但如果我们不履行自己的责任和义务，我们往往也会产生犯罪感。也许他们还不曾有足够的机会来表明他们愿意尽力的明显意图，因而根据第二条心理学法则，他们不是同情的对象。另一方面，所说的体制安排可能十分庞大，还不能普遍地建立起具体的约束。总之，把全体公民约束在一起，一般不是通过个人之间的同情关系，而是通过对普遍正义原则的承认。虽然每一个公民是某些公民的朋友，但任何一个公民绝不是所有公民的朋友。不过，他们对正义的共同忠诚，提供了他们可以用来裁定他们的分歧的一种统一的观点。其次，正义感产生了一种为建立（至少不是反对）正义体制，为按照正义的要求改革现存体制而努力的意愿。为了促进正义的安排，我们希望按照自然责任来办事。这种意愿不仅仅对确认我们的善的那些特定安排起了支持作用，它还为了更大团体的善而设法把这些安排所体现的观念扩大应用于其他情况。 当我们违反了我们的正义感时，我们就根据正义原则来说明我们的犯罪感。因此，对这种犯罪感的说明完全不同于对权威和团体的犯罪感的说明。现在，全面的道德发展已经实现，我们第一次体会到了严格意义上的犯罪感；这种情况也适用于所有其他道德感情。就儿童的情况来说，他还不能理解道德理想的观念以及意图与动机的关系，因此，（对原则的）犯罪感的合适背景是不存在的。就团体的道德来说，道德感基本上决定于对特定个人或团体的友好和信任关系，而道德行为的根据在很大程度上是要得到同伴们的赞同的。即使在这种道德要求的更高阶段，情况也可能仍然如此。如果个人按照自己的公民角色，充分了解了正义原则的内容，那就可以使他们按照这些原则来办事，其所以如此，主要是由于他们对一些特定个人负有义务，对自己的社会产生了忠诚。然而，一旦某种原则的道德得到了承认，道德态度就不再唯一地同特定个人和团体的福利和认可发生联系，而是决定于不顾这些偶然情况而选定的正当观。我们的道德感情表明，它们是不以我们世界的偶然情况而转移的，而这一点的意义在介绍原始状态及康德对原始状态的解释时已有说明。 但是，即使道德态度从这个意义上说是不以偶然情况而转移的，我们对特定个人和团体的自然忠诚仍然占有一种适当的地位。因为在原则的道德范围内，早先产生的（对团体的）犯罪感和不满情绪以及对其他道德感的违反行为，现在引起了从严格意义上来说的犯罪感。在说明一个人的情绪时已经提到了相关的原则。然而，在存在友好和相互信任的自然关系时，这些道德感要比不存在这种关系时强烈。甚至在原则的道德阶段，现有的忠诚加深了犯罪感和义愤，或所要求的诸如此类的感情。假定这种加深是理所当然的，那么，违反这些自然关系就是错误的。如果我们假定，合理的犯罪感（即按照真正的或合理的信念应用正确的道德观而产生的犯罪感）意味着我们的过错，而更大的犯罪感意味着更大的过错，那么，背信和辜负友谊等行为当然要特别予以禁止。如果违反对特定个人和团体的这种关系激起了更强烈的道德感，那就说明这种违反行为更严重。当然，欺诈和不忠永远是错误的，是同自然责任与义务背道而驰的。但是，它们未必总是同样错误的。在爱和友好的感情已经形成的情况下，它们的错误就更为严重，而这方面的考虑关系到制定恰当的优先规则问题。 我们终于产生了要按照某种正当和正义观办事的欲望，这初看起来似乎显得奇怪。道德原则怎么会约束我们的感情呢？正义即公平理论为这个问题提供了几个答案。首先，正如我们所知道的那样（第25节），道德原则必然有某种内容。由于它们是由有理性的人选择来裁定互不相让的要求的，所以它们就规定了促进人类利益的商定办法。评价体制和行动的立足点就是它们能否达到这些目的；因此，像一个人每逢星期二不得抬头看天这种毫无意义的原则，就被看作是莫名其妙的不合理的限制而被抛弃。在原始状态中，有理性的人没有任何理由要去承认这种标准。其次，情况仍然是，只要人类之爱继续存在，正义感也会继续存在。我曾在前面（第30节）指出，如果爱的许多对象互相对立，善行义举也会不知所措。这就需要正义原则的指导。正义感和人类之爱的不同在于：后者是份外之事，不属于道德要求的范围。也不引起自然责任和义务原则所许可的豁免。然而，这两种感情的对象显然是密切相关的、在很大程度上都是由同一个正义观规定的。只要其中的一种感情似乎是自然的和可以理解的，那么另一种感情也会如此。此外，犯罪感和义愤是由于我们自己或第三方不正当地损害和剥夺了别人而引起的，我们的正义感同样也会因此而遭到损害。正义原则的内容说明了这一点。最后，康德对这些原则的解释表明，人们按照这些原则办事，就是表现了他们作为自由而平等的有理性的人的本性（第40节）。既然这样做是符合他们的善的，正义感就甚至更直接地以他们的福利为目标。它赞成那些使每一个人都能表现其共同本性的安排。事实上，如果没有某种共同的或部分一致的正义感，公民的友谊就不可能存在。因此，正义地去行动的欲望不是一种对与合理目标毫无关系的武断原则的盲目服从。 当然，我不应认为正义即公平理论是唯一的可以自然而然地对正义感作出解释的理论。正如西奇威克指出的那样，一个功利主义者决不认为自己仅仅是为了某种与人无关的法则而行动的，而是认为自己始终是为了得到他的某种同情的某个人或某些人的福利而行动的。功利主义的观点，当然还有至善论，符合能够说明正义感情的特征从而使其在心理学上可以理解的条件。一种理论首先要能描述一种理想的正义状态，即提出一种关于井然有序的社会的概念，从而使实现这种状态并维持其存在的愿望与我们的善相一致，并与我们的自然感情同其始终。完全正义的社会应是理想的一部分，有理性的人一旦对这种理想有了充分的知识和经验，就会对它比任何其他东西都更为向往。正义原则的内容、正义原则产生的方式以及道德发展的各个阶段全都表明，在正义即公平理论中，这种解释是如何成立的。 因此，所谓纯粹自觉行动的原则似乎是荒谬的。首先，这种原则认为，最高的道德动机就是去做正当的和正义的事的欲望，而这样做仅仅是由于它是正当的和正义的，任何其他说明都不恰当；其次，虽然其他动机无疑也有其道德价值，例如希望去做正当的事，是由于这样做可以增进人类的幸福，或是由于这样做必然会促进平等，但同仅仅是为了做正当的事而做正当的事的欲望相比，这些欲望的道德价值较少。罗斯认为，正当感是对某种特殊的（无法分析的）东西的欲望，因为某种特殊的（无法分析的）性质表明了作为我们的责任的某些行动的特征。其他具有道德价值的欲望，虽然实际上是对必定与正当的东西相联系的事物的欲望，但它们不是对这正当的东西本身的欲望。不过，按照这种解释，正当感就缺乏任何明显的理由；它就像喜欢菜而不喜欢咖啡一样。虽然这种喜欢是存在的，但要用它来规定社会基本结构却是完全靠不住的；同时，它与正当判断的合理依据有着一种侥幸的必然联系，而正是由于在这种联系的掩盖之下，它同样是靠不住的。 但对一个了解并接受契约论的人来说，正义感作为一种欲望，和按照有理性的人在原始状态中可能赞同的原则办事的欲望，并没有什么不同，因为这种原始状态使每一个人获得了作为一个道德的主体的平等代表权。它和按照表现人们作为平等而自由的有理性的人的本性的原则办事的欲望，也没有什么不同。正义原则同这些说明是一致的，这一点使我们能够对正义感作出某种可以接受的解释。我们借助于正义理论，懂得了道德感情怎样调节我们的生活，并通过关于道德原则的正式条件，把这个角色赋予它们。接受这些原则的指导，意味着我们希望按照一定的条件与别人共处，而这些条件从一种人人都可能认为是合理的观点来看，人人都会承认是公平的。在这个基础上进行合作的人们的理想，对我们的感情产生了一种自然的吸引力。 最后，我们还可以指出；原则的道德有两种形式，一种形式与正当和正义感相一致，另一种形式则与人类之爱和自制相一致。正如我们已经看到的那样，后者是份外的，而前者则不是。原则的道德在其关于正当和正义的通常形式中包含了权威道德和团体道德的优点。它规定了道德发展的最后阶段，在这个阶段，所有次要的理想终于得到了理解，并通过相当一般的原则形成了一种合乎逻辑的体系。其他道德的优点，要在更广泛安排的范围内才能得到说明和论证；它们各自的要求，要根据更全面的正义观所规定的优先次序来进行调整。份外的道德有两个方面，它们是由原则的道德要求被自愿超出的范围决定的。一方面，人类之爱表现在促进共同善方面，它大大超出了我们的自然责任和义务的范围。这种道德不是一般人的道德，它的特有的优点表现为善行、对别人的感情和要求的高度敏感、适当的谦卑和对自己的漠不关心。另一方面，最单纯的自制的道德，表现为从容不迫地去实现正当和正义的要求。如果个人在以严格的纪律和训练为先决条件的行动中表现出这种道德所特有的勇敢、大度和克己等优点，它就成了真正的份外的道德。个人要做到这一点，或者可以通过自由地取得为圆满地履行职责而要求具有这些优点的职务和地位，或者可以通过以符合正义的方式去寻求更高的目标而不囿于责任和义务的要求。因此，份外的道德，也就是圣徒和英雄的道德，同关于正当和正义的准则并不矛盾；它们的标志就是自己愿意接受与这些原则同其始终的目标，但又超出了这些原则所要求的范围。 在下面几节中，我要更详尽地讨论关于道德发展的三个阶段的几个问题。道德感情的概念、三条心理学法则的性质以及这些法则赖以存在的过程，都需要予以进一步的评述。关于这些问题的第一个问题，我应该说明的是，我要把“感情”这个比较古老的词汇用于永久有序的各种起支配作用的倾向，如正义感和人类之爱（第30节），同时也用于在一个人的生活中占据重要位置的对特定个人或团体的持久忠诚。这样，道德感情和自然感情就全都有了。我用得更广泛的，是“态度”这个词。同感情一样，态度也是一些有序的道德倾向或自然倾向，但就这些倾向来说，它们不一定那么具有支配作用或持久。最后，我还打算用“道德感觉”和“道德情绪”这两个短语来说明我们在特定场合所体验到的感觉和情绪。我希望阐明道德感情、道德态度和道德感觉同相应的道德原则之间的关系。 说明道德感情的主要特征的最好办法，也许是研究一下在试图说明这些特征的所出现的各种问题以及这些特征赖以显示的各种感觉。值得指出的是如何把这些特征互相区别开来，并把它们同有可能与之混淆不清的自然态度和感觉区别开来。因此，首先有以下几个问题：（1）如果在语言表达中也含有某种道德感觉及其各种重要的变化，那么，要用什么语言表达方式来予以表达？（2）某种特定感觉的特有的行为表现是什么，以及一个人显示自己的感觉的特有方式是什么？（3）与道德情绪联系在一起的特有知觉或动感（如果有的话）是什么？例如，当一个人发怒时，他可能会感到身上发热；他可能会哆嗦，并感到胃在收缩。他说话时可能会声音发抖；同时他也许会情不自禁地作出某些手势。如果对某种道德感觉来说确实存在这种特有的知觉和行为表现，那么它们还不能构成犯罪感、羞耻感、义愤感或诸如此类的感觉。这种特有的知觉和行为表现在某些情况下不一定也不足以使一个人感到有罪、羞耻或义愤。这并不否认，如果一个人竟由于犯罪感、羞耻感或义愤感而寝食不安，那么对这种不安的某些特有的知觉和行为表现也许就是必然的。但是，只要一个人老老实实地承认他感到有罪、羞耻或义愤，并承认他准备对他为什么会有这种感觉作出适当的解释（当然假定他认为这种解释是正确的），就常常足以使他产生这些感觉。 这最后一种考虑在把道德感觉互相区别开来并同其他情绪区别开来时引入了主要的问题，即（4）对产生道德感觉的必要的确定解释是什么？从对一种感觉到对另一种感觉，这些解释又如何不同？例如，当我们问一个人为什么他会有犯罪感时，我们想得到什么样的回答呢？当然，不是任何回答都是可以接受的。仅仅提到所期待的惩罚，那是不够的；这也许可以用来说明恐惧或忧虑，但不能用来说明犯罪感。同样，提到一个人由于过去的行动而使自己遭到损害或不幸，这只是说明了后悔感，而不是犯罪感，更不是悔恨感。当然，由于一些显而易见的原因，恐惧和忧虑常常伴随着犯罪感，但决不能把这些情绪同道德感觉混为一谈。因此，我们不应认为犯罪感就是恐惧、忧虑和后悔的一种莫名其妙的混合物。忧虑和恐惧根本不是道德感觉，而后悔只与关于我们自己的善的某种观点有关，它是由于不能以明智的方式促进我们的利益而引起的。甚至像神经过敏的犯罪感这类现象以及其他不符合标准情况的现象，都被认为是犯罪感，而不是仅仅由于这种对不符合标准的特别说明就被看作是不合理的恐惧和忧虑。在这种情况下，人们始终认为，更深入的心理研究将会揭示（或已经揭示了）与其他犯罪感相关的类似之处。 一般说来，个人在对其感觉进行说明时引用某种道德概念及其有关原则，这是道德感觉的一种必不可少的特征，也是把它们同自然态度区别开来的东西的一部分。他对自己感觉的说明，涉及一种公认的正确或错误。如果我们对此产生疑问，我们就有可能作为相反的例子提出种种不同的犯罪感来。这一点是容易理解的，因为最初的犯罪感就是对权威的犯罪感，而我们在长大成人后，不可能没有所谓残余的犯罪感。例如，一个在严格的教派中长大的人可能一直被教导说，看戏是错误的。虽然他现在不再相信这种说教，但他告诉我们说，他在看戏时仍然有犯罪感。但这不是应有的犯罪感，因为他不会向任何人道歉，也不会决心不再看戏，等等。事实上，他倒是应该说，他有某种不自在的知觉和感觉等等，就像他在产生犯罪感时所感觉到的那样。因此，假定契约观点是正确的，对某些道德感觉的说明就要依赖于可能在原始状态中得到选择的正当原则，而其他的道德感觉则与关于好的概念相联系。例如，一个人感到有罪，是因为他知道他所拿的超过了他应得的那一份（他应得的一份是由某种正义的安排规定的），或者是因为他没有公平地对待别人。或者，一个人感到羞耻，是因为他怯懦和没有说实话。他没有能按照自己决心要实现的道德价值观去行动（第68节）。把道德感觉互相区别开来的，是对它们的说明特地引用的那些原则和错误。就大多数情况来说，所有特有的知觉和行为表现都是相同的，都是心理上的失常，并具有这方面的共同特征。 值得指出的是，如果像通常那样对每种道德感觉都能给予适当的说明，那么同样的行动可能会同时产生不同的道德感觉。例如，一个进行欺骗的人可能会既感到有罪，又感到羞耻：他感到有罪，是因为他破坏了信任和不正当地推进自己的利益，他感到有罪，正是对别人所造成的损害的一种反应；他感到羞耻，是因为他利用这些手段就是向他自己（也向别人）证明了他是一个意志薄弱的不可信赖的人，是一个用不正当的见不得人的手段来促进自己目标的人。作这些说明，需要不同的原则和价值观，以便把相应的感觉区别开来；但这两种说明经常都是适用的。这里我们还可以补充说，在一个具有某种道德感觉的人看来，他的说明不必全都正确；他只要承认这种说明就足够了。因此，一个人可能错误地以为他所享的超过了他应得的那一份。他可能是没有罪的。尽管如此，他仍然会感到有罪，因为他的说明可以说是正确的，即使他的说明是错误的，但他所表达的信念是真诚的。 其次，还有一组问题是关于道德态度与行动的关系的：（5）一个具有某种特定感觉的人的特有的意图、努力和倾向是什么？什么事是他希望做的，或发觉是他不能做的？一个发怒的人的特点就是想要反击，或使他所恼怒的人的目的不能实现。一个人如果为犯罪感所困扰，就会希望在将来正确地行动，从而力求相应地改变自己的行为。他会愿意承认自己所做的事，并要求重做，也会愿意接受责备和处罚；同时，如果别人做错了事，他也会发现自己不大能够谴责他们。这种特殊情况将决定这些倾向中的哪种倾向会得到实观；而我们也可以假定，可能被诱发出来的这类倾向随个人道德的不同而不同。例如，随着团体道德的理想和作用变得更复杂和要求更高，犯罪感的典型表现和合适的说明显然就会完全不同；而这些感觉反过来也不同于和原则的道德有关的情绪。在正义即公平理论中，这些不同首先是由相应的道德观点的内容来说明的。准则、理想和原则的结构表明需要什么样的说明。 另外，我们还可以问：（6）一个具有某种特定感觉的人料想别人会产生什么样的情绪和反应？他怎样来预知他们将会对他作出反应，就像在他解释别人对他的行为时所