Chapter 21 Chapter 7 Good is Reasonable-3

I have mentioned on several different occasions that perhaps the most important basic good is the good of self-esteem.What we have to figure out is that the notion that good is reasonable explains why this is so.We may define self-esteem as having two aspects.First, as we pointed out earlier (section 29), self-esteem includes a person's sense of self-worth, his unshakable belief that his own conceptions of the good and his plans for life are worthwhile.Secondly, self-esteem also means a person's confidence in his own ability, so long as he can do it, he will realize his intention.If we feel that our plans are of little value, we will not carry them out with pleasure or enjoyment in carrying them out.If we are unable to get rid of failure and lack self-confidence, we will not continue to work hard.It is therefore clear why self-respect is a primary good.Without self-esteem, nothing seems worth doing, and even if something is worth doing, we lack the will to make the effort to do it.All desires and activities become empty and meaningless, and we become insensitive and suspicious.Therefore, the parties in the original position always want to prevent at all costs the social conditions that destroy self-esteem.The fact that the principle of justice is fairness favors self-respect more than any other is a good reason for their adoption.

The notion of good as reasonable allows us to account more fully for those circumstances in which the first aspect of self-esteem, our sense of self-worth, is maintained.These situations are basically two-fold: (1) having a reasonable life plan, especially one consistent with Aristotelian principles; (2) finding ourselves and our actions appreciated and validated by others, and these People are equally respected, and it is equally a pleasure to be with them.I suppose, therefore, that a man's plan of life lacks a certain attraction if it does not call upon his natural faculties in an interesting manner.If activities do not conform to Aristotelian principles, they can appear dull and dull, preventing us from feeling competent or that they are worth doing.When a person's abilities are fully realized and organized in a suitably complex and nuanced way, he tends to feel more confident about his own worth.

But a by-product of the Aristotelian principle affects the degree to which our actions are recognized and liked by others.It is certainly true to say that we cannot sustain the belief that our efforts are worthwhile unless they are appreciated by our colleagues, but it is equally true that only what we do arouses the admiration or appreciation of others. If they are happy, they will value our efforts.Thus, activities that display complex and subtle talents and demonstrate discrimination and ingenuity are valued not only by the man himself, but also by those around him.Moreover, the more a man realizes that his way of life is worth achieving, the more likely he is to welcome our achievements.A person who is full of confidence in himself will not hesitate to appreciate others.Taken together, these arguments are that the condition of men's respect for themselves and for each other seems to require that their common projects be both reasonable and complementary: projects that call upon them to develop their cultivated faculties and inspire each with a sense of superiority. , which together form a program of events that is appreciated and liked by all.

However, one might argue that these conditions are generally impossible to achieve.One might think that this is possible only in limited groups of highly gifted beings united in pursuit of common artistic, scientific, and social ends.It seems impossible to establish a lasting foundation of self-esteem throughout society.However, this inference is wrong.The application of Aristotelian principles is always concerned with the individual, and thus with his natural assets and particular position.Each has his own group(s) in which activities that are reasonable to him are publicly confirmed by others, and it is usually enough to be able to do this.In this way, we gain a sense that what we do in our daily lives is worth doing.In addition, relationships that tend to be associated strengthen the second dimension of self-esteem, as this connection tends to reduce the likelihood of failure and helps prevent a sense of lack of confidence in oneself when the unexpected happens.Of course, people have different abilities, and what is interesting to some may not be interesting to others.At any rate, however, a well-ordered society will have societies and groups of all kinds, each with its own ideals commensurate with their aspirations and talents.From the perspective of perfectionism theory, the activities of many groups may not show a high degree of merit.But it doesn't matter.What is important is that the internal life of these groups is properly adjusted to the abilities and needs of the group members, thus providing a solid basis for the group members' sense of value.Even if an absolute level of achievement could be specified, such a level would be irrelevant.But in any case, we as citizens should reject the standard of the highest good as a political principle, and, for the sake of justice, should avoid any evaluation of the relative value of each other's ways of life (section 50).It is therefore necessary that every man should belong to at least one community of common interest in which he finds his efforts validated by his fellow workers.For the most part, this assurance is sufficient as long as citizens respect each other's purposes in public life and adjudicate their political claims in a manner that is equally conducive to self-respect.It is this background condition that the principles of justice uphold.The parties in the original position do not adopt the principle of the highest good, because abandoning this standard paves the way for the recognition of the goodness of all activities that realize the Aristotelian principles (and are consistent with the principles of justice).This democratic spirit in judging each other's goals is the basis of self-respect in a well-ordered society.

I shall later relate these questions to the concept of social association and the place of principles of justice in the human good (§79-82).Here I want to discuss the basic good of self-esteem and the connection between merit and shame, and consider when shame can become a morality other than a natural emotion.Now, shame can be described as the feeling someone has when their self-esteem is hurt or shattered.Shame is painful because it shows the loss of the most precious things.However, it must be noted that shame is different from regret.Regret is an emotion that occurs when any good is lost, such as when we do something harmful to ourselves through carelessness.In illustrating regret, we look at missed opportunities and wasted means.But we may regret doing things that we are ashamed of, and even regretting failing to realize a life plan that established the foundation for our self-esteem.As a result, we may also experience regret due to our lack of sense of self-worth.Regret is a general emotion that arises from the loss or absence of something we thought was good for us, while shame is the emotion that arises from a blow to our self-esteem (a particular kind of good).

Regret and shame are both self-respecting, but shame means that it has a particularly intimate relationship to who we are and to those we look to to affirm our sense of self-worth.Shame is also sometimes a moral feeling that needs to be justified by principles of righteousness.We must find an explanation for these facts.Let us distinguish what is good to us first (to the possessor) from our own attributes which are good to us as well as to others.These two categories do not cover all situations, but they point out relevant differences.For example, certain commodities and certain kinds of goods (proper goods) are presumably only good to those who possess and use them, and only indirectly to others.On the other hand, imagination and tact, beauty and grace, and other natural assets and faculties of the man, are also goods in others: if properly developed and rightly used, they are not only our own, but our own. Also enjoyed by our colleagues.They constitute the means by which human beings carry out complementary activities in which they join hands and take pleasure in the fulfillment of their own natures and the mutual fulfillment of theirs.Goods of this kind constitute human virtues: they are the human traits and abilities that everyone (including ourselves) can reasonably claim from us.Merits are good, from our point of view, because they enable us to carry out a more satisfactory life plan that enhances our sense of superiority.At the same time, these attributes are also appreciated by those we work with who like us and what we do, which also contributes to our self-esteem.These virtues are thus a condition of human flourishing; they are good from everyone's point of view.These facts relate them to the conditions of self-esteem and illustrate their relationship to our beliefs about our self-worth.

Consider first natural shame.It does not arise, or at least not directly, from the loss or lack of proper goodness, but from the injury to our self-esteem that we do not have or cannot make use of.Lack of what was good to me in the first place may be a cause of regret rather than shame.For example, a person may feel ashamed of being unattractive or mentally retarded.Generally speaking, having these attributes is not voluntary, so they don’t make us anything to blame; but given the relationship between shame and self-esteem, they can still be depressing, quite simply.With these defects, our way of life will inevitably have a fly in the ointment, and other people's appreciation of us will also be discounted.Natural shame, therefore, is caused by our own shortcomings, or by actions and attributes that symbolize our shortcomings, because they indicate that we have lost or do not have those attributes that we and others would think we should have.However, this statement needs to be qualified.It is our life plans that determine what we are ashamed of, so shame has to do with our aspirations, what we try to do, and who we like to work with.A man who has no talent for music does not strive to be a musician, and he is not ashamed of not being able to do so.In fact, it's not a matter of talent at all, at least not when satisfactory groups can be formed by doing other things.We should therefore say that, considered in our life plans, we are often ashamed of those flaws in ourselves and the failures of our actions, which show that we have lost or do not have those things that are more important to us in the execution of ourselves. Indispensable advantages of the cooperative goal.

Now back to the issue of moral shame.We just have to combine the statement about the concept of a good person (see the previous section) with the previous argument about the nature of shame.A man is therefore liable to moral shame if he values, as his own, those virtues which his plan of life requires and encourages.He sees these virtues, or at least some of them, as attributes that his colleagues require of him, as well as attributes that he requires of himself.Possessing these qualities, and expressing them in his own actions, is one of his stated aims, and is thus considered a condition of his being valued and respected by those with whom he wishes to associate himself.Actions and characters which show or expose his own lack of these attributes may then give rise to shame, as may knowledge or recollection of these deficiencies.Since shame arises from a sense of self-deprecation, we must explain why moral shame can be viewed in this way.First, Kant's interpretation of primordial status is that the desire to do what is right and just is the primary way of expressing their nature as free and equal rational beings.It follows from the Aristotelian principle that this expression of their nature constitutes an essential element of their goodness.Combined with this account of moral worth, we then arrive at the statement that virtue is also human excellence.These advantages are good both from our own point of view and from the point of view of others.To be absent from these virtues would be detrimental not only to our self-respect but also to the esteem of our fellows.Therefore, pointing out these flaws will hurt our self-esteem, and at the same time, it will cause us to feel ashamed.

It is instructive to examine the difference between moral shame and guilt.Although both may be caused by the same action, they cannot be explained in the same way (§ 73).For example, one can imagine a person who is deceitful and cowardly, so that he feels both guilty and ashamed.He feels guilty because his actions violated his sense of rightness and justice.He unjustly advances his own interests.It is the violation of the rights of others. If he has a friendship and working relationship with the victimized parties, his sense of guilt will be even stronger.He anticipates the disgust and righteous indignation others will feel at his actions, and he dreads their justified anger and the possibility of revenge.However, he was also ashamed because his behavior showed that he had failed to realize the good of self-denial, and that those colleagues whom he looked to for affirming his sense of self-worth had found him to be a worthless person.He was worried that they would abandon him, look down on him, make him a laughing stock.He betrayed by his conduct his lack of the moral virtues which he cherished and sought after.

We see, therefore, that all these advantages, which are our own, which we bring to the affairs of social life, are to be had, without which we might be liable to shame.But some virtues are associated with shame in a special way, because they specifically indicate our failure to achieve self-denial and its attendant virtues, such as strength, courage, and self-control.Mistakes that show a lack of these qualities, in particular, can cause us painful feelings of shame.So while the principles of right and justice are used to account for actions that tend to make us feel ashamed and guilty, our focus is different for each feeling.For one sense we are chiefly confined to the violation of the just rights of others and the damage we have done to them, and to their disgust and righteous indignation should they discover our conduct.For another sense, what we see is our loss of self-esteem and inability to achieve our own goals: we worry that others may not respect us as much, we feel bad for ourselves by failing to live up to our ideals. Feeling disappointed, so our sense of self-deprecation also arises from this.Clearly, both moral shame and moral guilt involve our relationships with others, and each situation demonstrates our recognition of basic principles of rightness and justice.Still, these feelings take place within the range of different points of view, since views of our situation are inherently very different.

In order to reveal the structural features of the contract view, we shall now mention some comparisons between the two concepts of right and good.Because these two concepts enable us to account for moral values, they are two fundamental concepts of a theory of justice.The structure of an ethical theory is determined by how it relates these two concepts and how it defines their differences.Pointing out these few problems can show the salient features of the theory of justice as fairness. One difference is that, while principles of justice (and principles of right in general) are principles that might be chosen in the original position, principles of rational choice and standards of prudent rationality are not chosen at all.The first task of a theory of justice is to define the original position, so that the resulting principles express the correct conception of justice from a philosophical point of view.That is, the typical character of the original position should embody reasonable constraints on the evidence for asserting the acceptance of certain principles, and the principles that are endorsed should correspond to our considered beliefs about justice in reflective equilibrium.Similar problems do not arise, however, for a theory of the good.First, there was no need to agree on the principle of rational choice.Because everyone is free to plan his life according to his own wishes (as long as his plans are consistent with the principles of justice), the standard of rationality is not required to be uniform.The whole assumption of a theory of justice is that, following an incomplete account of the good, the apparent criterion of rational choice suffices to account for the choice of primary goods, and that this difference in the concept of rationality does not affect the principles of justice. Even so, I have always assumed that certain principles are indeed recognized, and that these criteria can also be enumerated in place of the concept of rationality.We can also add some different principles and standards to this series of principles and standards if we want.For example, there is disagreement about what is the best way to deal with uncertainty.There is no reason, however, not to regard the planner as doing his own thing in the circumstances.Thus, any plausible principle of choice in situations of uncertainty may be added to those above, as long as there are no conclusive arguments against it.Only in an incomplete theory of the good do we have to worry about these questions.Here the concept of rationality must be explained so that the universal desire for primary goods can be identified and the choice of principles of justice explained.But even in this case I have shown that the adopted conception of justice is unaffected by conflicting interpretations of rationality.But in any case, once the principles of justice are selected, and we are acting in accordance with a comprehensive theory of the good, there is no need to define the good so as to impose uniformity on all the standards of rational choice.In fact, this practice of insisting on uniformity may be in contradiction with the concept of justice as fairness, which guarantees the freedom of choice given to individuals and groups on the basis of a justice system. The second difference between right and good is that people's ideas of what is good vary in important ways, which is generally a good thing, but not for right.In a well-ordered society, the citizens have the same right principles and try to obtain the same judgments on specific issues.These principles are to establish a final order in the conflicting claims that men make upon each other, and it is essential that this order proves to be the same from the point of view of each, regardless of the actual How difficult it is for everyone to accept this order.On the other hand, people discover their own goodness in different ways, and many things that are good for one person may not be good for another.Moreover, there is no haste to obtain accepted judgments as to what is the good of certain particular persons.The reasons that make such an agreement necessary in matters of justice do not exist for value judgments.Even when we take another person's point of view and try to estimate his probable interests, we do so as so-called counselors.We try to put ourselves in the other person's shoes, to assume that we share his goals and needs, and thus try to see things from his point of view.Except in the case of paternalism, we only provide opinions on request, but even if there are disputes about our advice and our opinions are not followed, there is no problem of violating the law. Thus, in a well-ordered society, where individual plans of life are varied, that is, they emphasize different ends, people are free to determine their own good, and the opinions of others are regarded as nothing more than Advice only.This diversity of ideas about the good is a good thing in itself, that is, it is reasonable for members of a well-ordered society to demand that their plans differ.The reason for this is obvious.People have different talents and abilities, and it is impossible for any individual or any group of people to be omniscient and omnipotent.So not only do we benefit from this complementary nature of our bred hobbies, but we also take pleasure in each other's activities.It seems that a part of ourselves that we have no time to cultivate has been cultivated by others.We have been obliged to devote ourselves to other things, to a fraction of what we would otherwise be doing (§ 79).But with justice the situation is quite different: here we need not only common principles, but also quite similar methods of applying these principles to particular cases, so that a final order can be established for conflicting claims.A judgment of justice is an advisory opinion only in exceptional circumstances. A third difference is that many applications of the principles of justice are subject to a veil of ignorance, whereas an estimate of a person's goodness may depend on a full knowledge of the facts.For example, not only do principles of justice, as we already know, have to be chosen without some specific knowledge, but if these principles are used to design constitutions and basic social arrangements, to choose laws and policies, we also Subject to the same, though less stringent, restrictions.The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, ideally legislators and voters, must also adopt a point of view by which they know only the appropriate general facts.On the contrary, a man should from the outset adapt his conception of the good to his concrete situation.A rational life plan takes into account our particular abilities, interests, and circumstances, and is therefore, of course, determined by our social status and natural assets.There is no reason against adapting rational plans to these contingencies, since the principles of justice have been selected and limit what these plans are, what ends they encourage, and the means by which they are employed.But in the evaluation of justice it is only at the judicial and administrative stage that all restrictions on knowledge are abandoned, and the particular case is decided on the basis of all relevant facts. From these comparisons, we can further clarify an important difference between contractarianism and utilitarianism.Since the principle of utility is to maximize the good, that is, the satisfaction of rational desires, we should regard the current choice and the possibility of continuing to make this choice in the future as a given, and then strive for the maximum net balance of satisfaction.But we have seen that decisions about rational planning are ambiguous in many important respects (Section 64).The more obvious and easier-to-apply principles of rational choice do not define the best plan; a great deal remains to be decided.This ambiguity is unproblematic for justice-as-fairness theories, since the details of planning do not in any way interfere with what is right or just.Whatever our specific circumstances, our way of life must be consistent with independently acquired principles of justice.Arbitrary features of the plan of life therefore do not affect these principles, nor the way the basic structure is arranged.This ambiguity in the concept of rationality does not turn itself into a legitimate claim that people can make against one another.Just prioritizing prevents this. Utilitarians, on the other hand, must acknowledge the theoretical possibility that the structure of choice that arises from this ambiguity may lead to what is commonly thought of as injustice.Suppose, for example, that a large portion of society is averse to certain religious or sexual practices and sees them as a nuisance.The feeling is so strong that it is not enough to keep these habits out of sight; the mere thought of such a thing going on is enough to excite anger and hatred in most men.Even if such an attitude is morally unreasonable, there seems to be no reliable way of rejecting it.Therefore, the pursuit of the greatest satisfaction of desire.It may also justify some harsh repressive measures against actions that do no harm to society.In order to justify the individual's right to liberty in such circumstances, the utilitarian must show that, in the given circumstances, the true balance of interests is in the long run on the side of liberty; this argument may or may not be successful. However, with regard to the theory of justice as fairness, this problem is absolutely non-existent.If the strong beliefs of the majority are in fact nothing but pure preferences, without any basis in the previously affirmed principles of justice, then they are unimportant in the first place.This emotional gratification is of no value, and cannot be compared with the importance of the claim of equal liberty.To express dissatisfaction with the actions and beliefs of others, we must demonstrate that their actions harmed us, or that we were treated unjustly by the system that empowered them to act.That is to say, we must appeal to those principles which we might admit in the original position.Compared with these principles, neither the intensity of the feeling nor the fact that most people have it is nothing.From a contractarian point of view, therefore, the grounds for liberty are completely irrelevant to existing choices.In fact, we can think of principles of justice as an agreement not to take certain feelings into account when evaluating the actions of others.I pointed out earlier (section 50) that these questions are well-known components of traditional theory of liberty.To point out that this ambiguity in a comprehensive theory of the good is justifiable, I refer to these issues again.This ambiguity can overwhelm a person because it tells him nothing about how to decide.But since the aim of justice is not to maximize the realization of rational plans, the content of justice is in no way affected.Of course, there is no denying that prevailing social attitudes tie the hands of politicians.The conviction and fanaticism of the majority would make it impossible to preserve the rights of liberty.But yielding to these practical needs is not the same thing as accepting the justification that if these feelings are strong enough to exceed any that could have taken their place, then they also win the decision.The contractarian view, by contrast, demands that we achieve just institutions as soon as circumstances permit, regardless of people's current moods.Some definite arrangement of the ideal system is already contained in its principles of justice (section 41). From these comparisons, in justice as fairness theory.The two concepts of right and good clearly have strikingly different characteristics.These differences arise from the structure of contract theory and the consequent primacy of right and justice.I do not mean, however, that the common usage of the words "just" and "good" (and words related to them) reflect these differences.Although our ordinary speech often helps to illustrate these two concepts, such a comparison is not necessary to confirm the correctness of the contract theory.Instead, it suffices to say just two questions.First, there is a way for our considered judgments to form a theory of justice, so that the beliefs corresponding to these beliefs turn out to be true by reflective balance, expressing judgments we can accept.Second, once we understand the theory, we can admit that these explanations illustrate exactly what we now, after careful consideration, wish to maintain.Even though we do not generally use such alternative judgments, perhaps because they are too cumbersome or might be misleading, or whatnot, we are prepared to admit that they cover essentially all that has to be said.Of course, this substitute judgment does not mean what the ordinary judgment that goes with it says.As to the extent to which this is the case, that's a question I'm not going to investigate.Moreover, the existence of such alternative judgments, which predates philosophical speculation, may indicate a more or less deviation from our original moral judgments.Some change must have taken place anyway, as philosophical criticism and philosophical presumption have caused us to revise and expand our views.But what matters is whether justice as fairness, better than any other theory we currently know, ultimately leads to a real explanation of our considered judgments and provides a way of expressing what we want to affirm .