Chapter 20 Chapter 7 Good is Reasonable-2

I have already pointed out that the simpler principle of rational choice (the principle of calculation) is not sufficient to evaluate plans.They are sometimes not applicable because the so-called compatible plan may not exist, or the means of realizing the plan may not be uncertain.Or often we are confronted with an overwhelming number of one type of projects.In these cases, further reasonableness criteria may of course be invoked, some of which I discuss below.But I am going to assume that, while principles of sound can center our judgment and provide guidelines for careful consideration, we ultimately have to make the choice ourselves, that is, the choice often rests on our immediate self-knowledge that we not only know what we want , but also to know how much we need them.Sometimes it is unavoidable to estimate the relative intensity of our desires.Principles of reason can help us do this, but they do not always routinely determine such estimates.Of course, there is also a formal principle that seems to provide a general answer.This is the principle of adopting the plan that maximizes the desired net balance of satisfaction.Or, if the criterion is to be stated less in terms of hedonism (even if broader), it is to direct a person towards the course of action most likely to achieve his most important ends.But this principle also fails to provide us with any definite procedure by which we can make a decision.It is obviously left to the decision-maker himself to decide what he needs most, to judge for himself the relative importance of his several aims.

Here, imitating a concept of Sidgwick, I propose the concept of prudent rationality.Sidgwick's explanation of the general good of a person's future is that if the results of the various courses of action available to the person are, as far as the present point of view is concerned, accurately foreseen and fully realized in imagination , then this kind of good is roughly the good he hopes and seeks.A person's goodness is an imaginary combination of certain impulsive forces, which is the result of deliberate deliberation for the satisfaction of certain conditions.Combining Sidgwick's ideas with the choice of plans, we can say that a man's rational plans are those he might choose with deliberate rationality (once the principles of calculation and other principles of rational choice are established, it becomes one of those plans that conform to these principles).These are the plans which may have been selected as a result of careful consideration by the decision-maker, in the light of all the relevant facts, of reconsidering the probable circumstances of their execution, to determine the one which best fulfills his more fundamental desires. course of action.

According to the rule of prudent reasonableness, it is assumed that calculations and reasoning are correct and that facts are correctly estimated.I'm also assuming that the decider doesn't have any misunderstandings about what he actually needs.For the most part anyway, when he has achieved his aim, he does not feel that he no longer needs it, but wishes he had been doing something else.Furthermore, it is assumed that the decision maker's knowledge of his position and the consequences of carrying out each plan is accurate and complete.None of the relevant circumstances that should be considered has been omitted.Thus, a man's best plan is the plan he might adopt given his full knowledge.This is his objectively rational plan, which determines his actual goodness.Of course, as things stand, our knowledge of what will happen if we adopt a certain plan is usually incomplete.We often don't know what our reasonable plans are, at most we can only have a reasonable belief about our goodness, and sometimes we can only guess.But if the decision maker does his best to do what a rational person with the knowledge available to him can do, then the plan he adopts is subjectively reasonable.His choice may have been a bad choice, but, if so, it was because of an understandable error in his beliefs or lack of knowledge, not because he made hasty and unreliable assertions or Not because he can't figure out what his actual needs are.In this case a man should not be confused by any discrepancy between his apparent good and his actual good.The notion of prudent reasonableness is clearly complex, having many elements combined.Here, I am not going to enumerate all the ways in which the thought process can go wrong.One can, if necessary, classify the kinds of mistakes that can be made, the kinds of tests that a decision-maker can use to know whether he has enough knowledge, and so on.It should be noted, however, that a rational person will not normally continue to think hard until he has found the best plan to choose from.He will often be satisfied if he has come up with a satisfactory plan (or auxiliary plan), that is, a plan that meets various minimum conditions.Rational thinking, like any other thinking, is an activity in itself, and the extent to which one should think rationally is governed by rational decision.The formal rule is that we should think to such an extent that the possible benefits from improving our plans are entirely worth the time and effort we have expended in thinking.Once we consider the cost of serious thinking, there is no reason for us to worry about finding the best plan, the one we might choose if we had perfect knowledge.If the possible rewards of further calculations and more knowledge are not worth the effort, it is perfectly reasonable to adopt a satisfactory plan.There is not even anything irrational about an aversion to serious thinking, if one is prepared to accept the consequences of one's choices.The rule that good is reasonable does not attach any special value to the decision-making process.The importance of careful thought to a decision maker will probably vary from person to person.However, if a man suffers misfortune from his unwillingness to consider what is the best (or a desirable) thing to do, he is doing the unreasonable on purpose, because just by thinking about it, he would admit that he should have thought of avoiding this misfortune.

On the basis of this account of prudent rationality, I conceive of a certain capacity possessed by the decision-maker: he knows the general characteristics of his present and future needs, he is able to estimate the relative intensity of his desires, and he can Decide when necessary what is his actual need.In addition, he can imagine the various options available to him and place a logical order on them: given any two known plans, he can figure out which one he prefers, or whether he prefers one or the other. Not interested, and whether this preference is transferable.Once a plan has been chosen, he can persevere with it, resisting current temptations and distractions that hinder its execution.These assumptions are consistent with the well-known notion of rationality (Section 25) that I have been using.It is not my intention here to delve into all these aspects of what is reasonable.It seems more useful to mention briefly some methods of identifying our ends, since these often help us to estimate the relative intensity of our desires.Note that our whole purpose is to realize a rational plan (or auxiliary plan), and that certain features of desire obviously make this impossible.For example, there are ends which we cannot achieve, and therefore descriptions of these ends are meaningless, or contradict absolutely true facts.Since pai is a transcendental number, it is meaningless to prove that it is an algebraic number.Of course, in trying to prove the theorem, a mathematician may discover many important facts along the way, and this achievement may compensate him for his efforts.But to the extent that his purpose is to prove a falsehood, his plan will be criticized; once he realizes this, he no longer has this purpose.The same holds true for desires that arise from our incorrect beliefs.It cannot be wholly denied that erroneous opinions, for example as a useful delusion, can have a salutary effect and enable us to carry on with our plans.Even so, the desires sustained by these beliefs are also irrational, because their fallacies make the execution of plans impossible, or prevent better plans from being adopted (here I should point out that, according to the incomplete value derives from the relation of these facts to the successful execution of a rational plan. At least so far there has been no evidence that intrinsic value arises from having correct beliefs).

We can also examine the situations in which we acquire our desires, and conclude that some of our objects are in various ways inappropriate.For example, a certain desire may arise from an overgeneralization or from a more or less accidental association.This is especially the case if, due to our youth, our inexperience and immaturity for making the necessary corrections, we become increasingly averse to serious thinking.Other needs, made especially urgent by overreactions to previous stages of severe deprivation or yearning, may become inordinate.These processes, and the disturbing effects they have on the normal development of our desire systems, are not the subject of our study here.They do, however, make certain decisive observations as important means of reflection.Knowing the causes of our needs often makes it very clear to us that we really want some things more than others.As certain objectives appear less important to scrutiny, or even lose their appeal altogether, others may step in, placing themselves in unmistakable prominence, providing ample opportunity for selecting them. basis.It is, of course, conceivable that notwithstanding the unfortunate conditions under which some of our desires and our aversion to serious thought have developed, these conditions may nonetheless be suitable or greatly facilitate the realization of rational plans.If that's the case, it turns out they're perfectly justified after all.

Finally, there are some time-relational principles that can also be used to select plans, I have already mentioned the delay principle.This principle holds that, other things being equal, sound planning requires us not to rush into action until the relevant facts are clearly known.We have also considered the reasons for denying Nazi time preference (Section 45).We should look at our lives as a whole, as if the activities of some reasonable goal are consistent in time.Mere location in time, or some distance from the present, is not a reason to prefer one moment over another.Future objects cannot be dismissed merely because they are future, though we may regard them as less important if there is reason to believe that, in view of their relation to other things, their realization is unlikely.With the inherent importance we ascribe to different parts of our lives, every moment should be the same.The value of the different parts of our lives depends on the whole plan itself, so long as we can ascertain the whole plan, and not be affected by accidents which we may now foresee.

Two other principles apply throughout the entire form of the plan.One such principle is the principle of continuity.It reminds us that since a plan is a chronological sequence of activities, successive activities must influence each other.The whole scheme has a certain unity, with one dominant theme.It can be said that there is no separate utility function for each stage.Not only must the mutual influence of the various stages be considered, but presumably large ups and downs should also be avoided.A second, closely related principle holds that it is the benefits of rising expectations that we should consider, at least not the benefits of greatly falling expectations.Life has various stages, and each stage ideally has its own special tasks and pleasures.Other things being equal, we should arrange things well in the earlier stages so that we can have a happy life in the later stages.For the most part, it seems as if expectations should always be rising.If an estimate of the value of an activity relative to its own stage is made (assuming this can be done), we may try to account for this in terms of relatively stronger expected pleasure than remembered pleasure. choose.Even if pleasures are equal in aggregate according to partial estimates, rising expectations still provide an important measure of satisfaction.But even leaving this factor aside, it seems preferable to plan for rising expectations, at least not for falling expectations, since later activities are often able to embody the achievements and pleasures of a whole life and combine them into a Logical structure in a way that plans about lowering expectations don't.

Following these arguments about the means of serious thought and about time, I have endeavored to supplement Sidgwick's conception of one's goodness.In short, our goodness is determined by the plan of life we ​​adopt with sufficient deliberation and reason, if future conditions can be accurately foreseen, and brought to a full realization in the imagination.In this sense, the issues we have just discussed are related to the question of what is reasonable.Here, it is worth emphasizing that a reasonable plan is one that may be chosen if certain conditions are met.Standards of goodness are as hypothetical as those of justice.If the question arises whether it is in our good to do something, the answer depends on how far it is in accordance with plans that might be chosen with deliberate rationality.

It is a characteristic of a sound plan that one does not change one's mind in carrying it out and wish that one had done something else.A reasonable man would not be so disgusted by the foreseen consequences that he regrets adopting the plan.The absence of such regret is not enough to justify a plan.There may be another plan at our disposal, which we shall find to be a much better one if we consider it.However, if our information is correct and our awareness of the relevant aspects of the consequences is complete, we will not regret having adopted a reasonable plan even if it is not, in absolute terms, a good one.In this case, the plan is objectively reasonable.Of course, we may also regret other things, such as having to live under circumstances in which a happy life was impossible.It's not hard to imagine that we might wish we hadn't been born.We have been born with the best plan, which, if judged by some ideal, might have been the worst plan, but we do not regret it.A rational person may regret that he has adopted a subjectively sound plan, not because he thinks his choice has anything to criticize, but because he did what seemed best at the time. but if his beliefs later prove wrong, with unfortunate results, it is through no fault of his own.There is no reason to blame yourself.Which plan is the best or even better plan is impossible to know.

Putting these observations together, we have a guiding principle, that no matter what the final results of a man's plans, he should never blame himself, as he should always behave.If he sees himself as a man who has always been, he can say that at every moment of his life he does what rational balance requires, or at least allows.So any risk he took must have been worth it, and even if the worst he could have foreseen had happened, he could still be sure that what he had done was beyond reproach.He doesn't regret his choice, at least not even if he later thought it might have been more reasonable not to have done so at the time.This principle certainly does not prevent us from resorting to means that lead to misfortune.Nothing can protect us from the ambiguity and limitations of our knowledge, and nothing can guarantee us to find the best solution available to us.Acting with prudent rationality can only ensure that our actions are above reproach, that we are accountable to ourselves as long-standing human beings.In fact, we should not be surprised if someone says that he doesn't care about other people's affairs (which, let's assume, isn't very often the case) and that he doesn't care how his actions today will be viewed by him in the future.If a person rejects both his own demands and the interests of others in the future, he is not only irresponsible to them, but also irresponsible to himself.He doesn't see himself as a continuous being.

From this point of view, the principle of self-responsibility is similar to the principle of justification: one should adjust one's own requirements in different periods, so that one can confirm the plans that have been adopted and are being adopted in each period.For example, a man of one period must never express dissatisfaction with the actions of a man of another period.Of course, this principle does not preclude voluntary endurance of hardship and suffering; but it must be immediately acceptable in view of the good expected or realized.From the point of view of the primordial position, the appropriateness of taking responsibility for oneself seems quite clear.Since the concept of prudent rationality applies to this issue, it means that the parties will not be held accountable if the most unfortunate possibility turns out to be the case, and the application of the concept may result in self-reproach. agreed with this view of justice.They should try to avoid such regrets.The principle of justice as fairness seems to fit this requirement better than other ideas, as we can see from the previous discussion of the burden of commitment (Section 29). One last comment on good is reasonable.It may be objected that this concept implies that one should be constantly planning and calculating.But this interpretation is based on misunderstanding.The primary purpose of this theory is to provide a criterion for judging a person's goodness.This standard should be set primarily by reference to reasonable schemes which may be chosen with sufficient prudential rationality.The hypothetical nature of this provision must be borne in mind.A happy life is not a life of deciding whether you should do this or that.This stipulation alone makes it almost impossible to discuss the content of a reasonable plan or the specific activities that make up the content of a plan.A person, or even a society as a whole, can achieve happiness that is brought about entirely by spontaneous tendencies.Nor is it unthinkable.By chance and good luck, some people may just happen to just naturally meet with that kind of life style which they may accept with prudent rationality.For the most part, though, we're not so lucky, and if we don't think about ourselves as long-lived beings, we're almost certain to regret our course of action.Even when a man does manage to rely on his natural impulses without incurring misfortune, we still need to know his idea of ​​the good in order to estimate whether he is actually lucky.He may think he is lucky, but he may be mistaken; and in order to resolve this we must examine the choice of assumptions which he might reasonably have made, and the possible Appropriate estimates are given for any benefits received.I have pointed out earlier that the value of the activity of decision-making is itself subject to reasonable estimation.How much effort we should put into making a decision, like so many other things, depends on the situation.The good-is-reasonable rule holds that the question is for the person to decide in light of what is likely to happen in his situation. The determinations of the good are purely formal determinations.It merely shows that a man's goodness determines his rational plan of life, which he chooses with deliberate rationality from among an infinite number of plans.Although the notion of prudent rationality and the principle of rational choice rest on some rather complex concepts, we still cannot infer from the mere provision of rational planning what ends might be encouraged by such plans.In order to draw conclusions concerning these purposes it is necessary to note certain general facts. First, human desires and needs, their relative urgency and recurring cycles, and the stages of development in which they are influenced by psychological and other circumstances, are all broadly characterized.Next, the plan must be adapted to the requirements of the capacities of the persons, to their degree of maturity and tendency, and to the highest degree of training and education which they have received for this or that purpose.In addition, I would like to propose a basic principle of motivation, which I call the Aristotelian principle.Finally, a general fact about the interdependence of societies must also be considered.The basic structure of society, by rewarding the contributions of its members to the common good in a manner consistent with justice, must encourage and support some projects more than others.Considering these probabilities narrows the range of alternative plans and makes the problem of decision in any case quite clear in some respects.No doubt, as we shall see, some arbitrariness remains, but the priority of right limits it so that it no longer becomes a problem from the point of view of justice (§ 68). The general facts about human needs and abilities are perhaps quite clear, so I shall assume here that commonsense knowledge is sufficient to solve our problems.However, before proceeding to discuss the Aristotelian principles, I should briefly state the problem of the constraints on the human good (as I shall call them) and justice.Taking into account the provisions of rational planning, we may regard these goods as those activities and purposes which have any character which makes them suitable to occupy a, if not the main, part of our lives. important position.Since, according to a comprehensive theory of the good, a rational plan must conform to the principles of justice, the human good is subject to the same restrictions.In this way, the well-known values ​​of personal affection and friendship, meaningful work and social cooperation, the pursuit of knowledge and the shaping and yearning for the good are not only prominent in our rational plans, but also In most cases, they can also be enhanced in the way justice allows.Admittedly, in order to achieve and maintain these values ​​we are often compelled to act unjustly; but the attainment of these ends has nothing to do with inherent injustice.Unlike the desire to deceive and denigrate others, doing injustice is not included in the account of human good (section 66). The social interdependence of these values ​​is manifested in the fact that not only are they good for those who share them, but they may also enhance the good of others.In accomplishing these ends we generally contribute to the rational plans of our fellows.In this sense, they are complementary goods; that is why they are singled out for special recommendation.To recommend something is to praise it, to describe in terms of emphasis and appreciation the attributes that make it a good thing (something that can reasonably be demanded).These facts about interdependence are further reasons for incorporating recognized values ​​into long-term planning.If we wish to command the respect and goodwill of others, or at least to avoid their hostility and contempt, these plans of life are often desirable, because they further not only our own aims, but theirs as well. Returning now to the subject before us.We recall that the Aristotelian principle reads as follows: other things being equal, people prefer to use their actual faculties (their innate and acquired faculties), and the more this liking is achieved, the more The more you have, or in other words, the more complicated this ability becomes.The intuitive concept here is that if people are more skilled at doing something, the more they enjoy doing it, and if there are two activities they can do equally well, they will always choose the one that requires more comprehensive, more The activity of complex, sharper discrimination.For example, chess is a more complex and subtle game than checkers, and algebra is more complex than elementary arithmetic.The principle, therefore, says that if someone is good at both, he would generally prefer chess to checkers, and algebra to arithmetic.We need not explain here why the Aristotelian principle is true.Complex activities are more interesting presumably because they satisfy the desire to experience change and novelty and leave room for invention.They also generate the joy and surprise of anticipation, and the whole form of the event, its structural development, is also often fascinating and beautiful.Moreover, simpler activities fail to reveal individual style and individual expression, while complex activities permit and even require it, for how can it be possible that everyone engages in a complex activity in the same way?It seems inevitable that we should do things according to our natural inclinations, according to our past experience, if we are to find our own way.Each of these traits is well documented in chess, and even chess grandmasters have their own particular style of play.Whether these insights are illustrations of Aristotelian principles or detailed descriptions of their implications is not my intention to discuss.I think that nothing crucial to a theory of the good is determined by this question. It is obvious that the Aristotelian principle contains a different compatible principle.The most obvious example of a more complex ability, to say the least, is the activity to be compared that includes all the skills and discriminations of the other activities plus some others.We can still only prescribe a preferred order, since each of the several activities may require capabilities not used in all the others.This order is the best we can get, and we can keep it until we have some more accurate theory and measure of complexity that will allow us to analyze and compare seemingly different activities.However, I'm not going to discuss this issue here, but just assume that our intuition about complexity will serve our needs. The Aristotelian principle is a motivational principle.It accounts for many of our major desires, and explains why we are constantly controlling the course of our activities in order to appear to like doing certain things and dislike others.Furthermore, it expresses a psychological law governing changes in our desire patterns.The principle thus implies that as a person's abilities develop over time (and this development is brought about by psychological and biological maturation, such as the development of the nervous system in childhood), as he develops these abilities and learns How to use them, sooner or later he will choose more complex activities, since he is now able to perform these activities that require his newly realized faculties.The simpler events he used to enjoy doing no longer amuse or engage him so much.If we ask why we are willing to endure the hardships of exercise and study, the reason may be (if we set aside external rewards and punishments) that we have achieved some kind of achievement in our studies in the past, and now we are enjoying the activity. Let us, once we have acquired greater faculties of every kind, expect even greater satisfactions.There is also a side effect to the Aristotelian principle.When we see others exercise their trained faculties, the manifestations of him excite our admiration and arouse a desire to do the same ourselves.We want to be able to use our inherent latent abilities as those who can use them. So how much we learn, how well we cultivate our innate abilities, seems to depend on how great these abilities are and how difficult it is to realize them.It could be said that, as the activity becomes harder and more difficult, there is a race between the growing satisfaction of exercising greater practical ability and the growing tension of learning.Assuming that natural ability is limitless, and training can make it more difficult and endless, then the actual ability can probably be raised to a certain level, but if the level is further improved beyond this limit, then the benefits obtained Just offset by the burden of practice and study necessary to reach and maintain this level.These two forces cancel each other out, and an equilibrium is reached, at which point the effort for greater practical power comes to an end.It follows that if the enjoyment of an activity increases too slowly in relation to an increasing ability (which, let us assume, indicates a lower level of innate ability), then we give up early on adapting to it. greater learning effort.In this case we never engage in some of the more complex activities, nor acquire the desires which result from such participation. If the Aristotelian principle is accepted as a natural fact, then, taking into account other assumptions, it will generally be reasonable to acquire and develop mature abilities.The best or satisfactory plan is almost certainly the one that more or less provides for this.Not only is there a tendency to move in the direction required by the Aristotelian principles, but the apparent fact of social interdependence and the nature of our narrow interests incline us to do so.A rational plan--always bounded by the principles of right--enables a man, so far as circumstances permit, to make the best use of his practical faculties.Moreover, his fellows may support such activities as advancing the common good, and may take pleasure in such activities which exhibit human merit.A new desire then arises to gain the respect and admiration of others, and by this time the activities approved by the Aristotelian principle are equally good for others. In order to prevent misunderstanding of this principle, several issues must be kept in mind.First, it states a disposition, not a constant pattern of selection, and so, like all dispositions, can be disregarded.Countervailing tendencies can hinder the development of practical abilities and the selection of more complex activities.Worry about psychological and social obstacles and dangers that affect capacity development and future achievement may outweigh original inclinations.We must take these facts into account when interpreting this principle.However, if it is a useful theoretical concept, then the tendency it suggests should be relatively strong and not easily counteracted.I think that is the case, and that it has to be given enough place in the design of social institutions, otherwise people will feel that their culture and their way of life are dry and empty.Their energy and enthusiasm drain as their lives become a tiresome routine.What seems to bear proof of this is that the forms of life which absorb the energies of men, whether they be religious prayers or purely practical, even games and pastimes, develop almost endlessly their complexities.As social habits and cooperative activities are established with the help of the imagination of many people, they also increasingly give rise to a complex series of activities and new ways of doing things.This process is advanced by the enjoyment of natural and free movement, which seems to be demonstrated by the spontaneous play of children and animals showing all the same characteristics. Another insight is that this principle does not presume that a particular activity should be chosen.It simply says that, other things being equal, the activities we choose are determined by a larger and more complex actual capacity.More precisely, assume that we can arrange several activities into a relational chain according to compatibility relations.That is, activity n employs all the skills of activity n-1 and some other skills.不过，让我们假定，这种链多得不计其数，而链上的每个环节又都不相同；此外，无数的链可能都是从同一个活动开始，这个活动代表着使它得以形成和变得丰富起来的不同方式。亚里士多德原则说，无论何时，只要一个人从事属于某个链上的（也许是属于几个链上的）某种活动，他往往会沿着这个链向上移动。一般来说，他会选择第n项活动，而不会选择第n－1项活动。他的能力越是有待实现，他越是觉得学习和训练的负担不那么繁重，这种倾向也就越强烈。大概他会选择具有运用较高能力而又最不费力的最大前景的某个链或某些链向上攀登。一个人所走的实际道路，即他认为最有趣的一些活动的结合，决定于他的爱好、才能和他的社会环境，也决定于他的同伴所赞赏和鼓励的东西。因此，自然资产和社会机会明显地影响着一个人最后所选择的那些链。这个原则本身仅仅认定有一种要沿着任何被选择的链攀登的倾向。它并不是认为一个合理的计划应包含任何特定目标，也并不意味着任何特定的社会形态。 我们还可以假定（虽然这样做可能并非必要），每项活动属于某个链。其所以如此，是因为人的智慧能够而且通常会为每项活动找到一个能使各种技能和辨别力日益得到发展的连续不断的链。然而，如果上去得更高将会耗尽为提高或维持某个被选定的链的水平所必要的资源，那么，我们就停止沿着链向上攀登。对这里所说的资源应作广义的理解，时间和精力也是最重要的资源。例如，为什么我们系鞋带或打领带都宁愿直截了当地去做，而通常不对这些日常行动搞什么繁文缛节，其原因就在于此。每一天只有这么多小时，这就使我们不能竭尽我们的能力沿着我们可以得到的所有的链向上攀登。但是：一个在牢房里的囚犯也许会不惜花时间去做一些日常琐事，并想出种种办法去做；而如果他不是囚犯，他是不会为这种事去伤脑筋的。正常的标准是，一个有理性的人选择了一个他所喜欢的（符合正义原则的）活动模式，然后沿着每一个链前进，直到对预定计划的任何可能的改变都不能使情况有所改善为止。这个总的标准当然不是告诉我们怎样去作决定，而是着重指出时间和精力资源都是有限的，并说明为什么某些活动被忽略，而另一些活动则受到了重视，虽然从我们从事活动的方式来看，没有得到重视的那些活动是仍然有进一步发展的余地的。 不过，有人可能会反对说，没有理由假定亚里士多德原则是正确的。它同关于自我实现的理想主义观念有某种类似之处，因此，它也和这个观念一样，可能有点像某个哲学家的原则很少得到赞同那种味道。但它似乎为许多日常生活事实所证明，并为儿童和某些高等动物的行为所证明。此外，它似乎还可以用进化论来说明。自然选择大概也偏爱可以适用这个原则的那些生物。亚里士多德说，人有求知的欲望。大概我们就是通过某种自然发展来获得这种欲望的，如果这个原则是正确的，那么，只要更复杂、要求更高的任何活动是我们力所能及的，它实际上就是从事这种活动的欲望。人喜欢获得丰富多采的经验，所以他们喜欢新奇的和意想不到的东西，喜欢这种活动为发挥他们的发明创造精神而提供的机会。自发活动的多样性表明了我们喜欢想象和创造性的幻想。因此，亚里士多德原则认为，人多半不仅受到肉体需要之乐的驱使，而且也要受到纯粹由于喜欢而去做某件事的欲望的驱使，至少在紧急迫切的需要得到满足的情况下是这样。这些被人喜欢的活动有许多标志，从进行这些活动的方式方法，到后来一次次进行的反复性，无所不有。事实上，我们从事这些活动并没有什么明显的报酬，我们让自己从事这些活动，其本身往往可以作为做其他事情的报酬。由于亚里士多德原则是人的现有欲望的一个特征，所以合理的计划必须对它加以考虑。进化论的解释即使是正确的，也肯定不能成为证明我们本性的这一方面的理由。事实上，所谓理由问题是不存在的。问题毋宁是：如果这个原则按照我们所知道的情况来说明人性，那么，对它的鼓励和支持应该到什么程度，同时在制定合理的生活计划时，又应该怎样来处理它？ 亚里士多德原则在关于善的理论中的作用是：它表明了一个心理学上的深刻事实，这个事实和其他的一般事实以及合理计划观一起，说明了我们深思熟虑的价值判断。通常被看作人类善的那些东西，最后应该证明是那些在合理计划中占据主要地位的目的和活动。这个原则是指导这些判断的背景知识的一部分。如果它是正确的，并得出符合我们对好与坏的看法（通过反思平衡）的最后结论，它就在道德理论中取得了应有的地位。即使这个观念对某些人是不适用的，合理的长期计划的概念还是适用的。我们能够基本上和以前一样弄清楚对他们来说什么是好的。因此，设想有这么一个人，他的唯一乐趣是在各种几何形状的空地上如公园广场和修剪整齐的草坪上数草叶子。他在其他方面都很聪明，实际上具有不平常的能力，因为他能靠解决数学难题收取报酬来维持生活。关于善的规定使我们不得不承认，这个人的善事实上就是数草叶子，或者说得更准确些，他的善是由一个特别突出这个活动的计划决定的。自然，我们可能会感到惊奇，竟会有这种人存在。面对他这个例子，我们可以来检验一下其他一些假定。也许，他特别神经过敏，从早年开始就讨厌与人交往，所以他数草叶子就是为了避免同别人打交道。但如果我们承认，他的本性就是喜欢这种活动，而不喜欢任何其他活动，同时又没有什么切实可行的办法来改变他的状况，那么，他的合理计划肯定就是以这种活动为中心的。对他来说，这就是目的，这个目的支配他的行动计划，而这一点也就证明了这个目的对他来说就是好的。我提出这个异想天开的例子只想表明，用一个人的合理计划来说明关于他的善的规定的正确性；并不要求亚里士多德原则准确无误。我认为，即使这个原则证明是不准确的，或完全不起作用，这个规定也仍然是令人满意的。但是，设想出这个原则，我们似乎就能说明，从实际情况来看，什么事被认为对人是好的。此外，由于这个原则和自尊这个基本善有关系，它最后证明了在作为正义即公平观的基础的道德心理中占据中心位置（第67节）。 我们曾经规定，一个人的善就是顺利执行一种合理的生活计划，他的次要的善也是这个计划的组成部分。在作出了这样的规定之后，我们就能够介绍另一些规定了。这样，关于善的概念就可以适用于在道德心理上占据重要位置的其他对象了。但在这样做之前，我们应该特别提出以下假定；基本善可以用关于善的不全面理论来说明。这就是说，我假定不管其他还需要得到些什么，需要得到这些善是合理的，因为一般来说，它们对于制定和执行任何合理的生活计划都是必不可少的。原始状态中的人是被假定为接受这种关于善的观念的，所以，他们认为，他们希望得到更大的自由权和机会，希望得到实现他们的目的的更广泛的手段，这是理所当然的。考虑到这些目标，同时也考虑到获得自尊这一基本善这个目标（第67节），他们在原始状态中就对他们能够得到的这种正义观作出了评价。 自由权和机会，收入和财富，尤其是自尊，都是基本善，这一点事实上必须用不全面理论来说明。对正义原则的限制，不能被用来制定作为对原始状态的说明的组成部分的基本善一览表。其理由当然是：这个一览表是导致选择正当原则的一个前提。用正当原则来说明这张一览表，可能是一种循环论证。因此，我们必须假定，能够说明基本善一览表的，是好即合理这个观念结合关于人的需要和能力的一般事实、这些需要和能力的特有阶段和它们的养成条件、亚里士多德原则，以及社会互相依存的必要性。在任何时候，我们都不能求助于对正义的限制。但是，一旦我们对能以这种办法得到基本善一览表而感到满意，那么，在所有的对关于善的规定的进一步应用中，就可以自由地引用正当的限制。我不想在这里为赞成基本善一览表的理由进行论证，因为它们的主张似乎相当清楚。然而，我将不时回到这个问题上来，尤其要联系自尊这个基本善。在下面的讨论中，我将把这个一览表看作是既定的，并将运用关于善的全面理论。对这个理论的检验标准是；它应该符合我们在反思平衡中所作出的深思熟虑的价值判断。 赞成关于善的理论的两个基本理由仍需考虑。我们必须弄清楚这个规定对人和社会是否都能适用。在这一节里，我将讨论关于人的情况，而把关于一个好的社会的问题留到最后一章去讨论，因为到那时，正义即公平理论的各个部分都可以拿来应用了。不过，许多哲学家一直宁愿接受某种不同的关于好即合理的规定，认为它可以适用于人工制品和任务，适用于友谊和感情之类的非道德的价值，适用于对知识的追求和对美的享受，等等。事实上，我曾着重指出，好即合理的基本原理是极其普通的，是一些信仰明显不同的哲学家的共同看法。然而，人们常常认为，这种关于善的观念代表了一种关于价值的工具理论或经济理论，而这种理论对说明道德价值并不适用。据说，如果我们把正义的或慈善的人说成是个道德好的人，这就涉及了一种不同的关于好的概念。不过，我想要说的是，一旦有了正当原则和正义原则，关于好即合理的全面理论事实上就能适用于这些判断。这个所谓的工具理论或经济理论为什么不能适用，其原因就在于，实际上不全面理论可以直接适用于道德价值问题。我们必须做的，就是把这个理论仅仅用作对产生正当原则和正义原则的原始状态的说明的一部分。这样，我们就可以毫无限制地应用关于善的全面理论，并能随意地把它用来说明好人和好社会这两种基本情况。通过原始状态把不全面理论发展成为全面理论，这是必不可少的步骤。 有几种办法可以使我们把这个规定扩大应用于道德价值问题，我认为至少其中一种办法可以很好地达到这个目的。首先，我们可以确定某种基本角色或地位，例如公民的角色或地位，然后就可以说，一个好人就是一个具有高于一般程度的属性的人，而这种属性是公民们彼此可以向对方合理要求的。这里的有关观点，就是一个公民用来对担任相同角色的其他公民进行评价的观点。其次，可以对好人这个概念作如下理解：它规定了某种普遍的或一般的评价标准，照此标准，一个好人就是一个对各种角色，尤其是被认为比较重要的角色，都有出色表现的人。最后，如果根据人们的几乎任何社会角色来对他们进行估价，那么还可能存在一些可以向他们合理要求的属性。让我们假定，这些属性（如果确实存在的活）是具有广泛基础的。可以用工具作为例子来证明这个概念。工具的基础广泛的属性是有效、耐用、便于维修，等等。对于几乎任何工具来说，这些特征都是可取的。基础的广泛程度较小的属性就是保持锋利、不生锈等等。某些工具是否具有这些属性，这个问题可能是不存在的。同样，一个好人和一个好医生或一个好农场主之类的人是不同的，他具有比一般人程度更高的基础广泛的属性（尚待规定），而这种属性是人们彼此可以向对方合理要来的。 最后一种意见好像立刻成了似乎最有道理的意见。它可以被用来把第一种意见作为一种特殊情况包括进来，并把第二种意见的直觉概念加以吸收。然而，在这样做时要碰到几个复杂情况。首先要认定合理地选择这种基础广泛的属性所根据的观点和这种选择所根据的假定。我要立即指出的是，基本的美德，即按关于正当的基本原则办事的强烈的、通常实际的欲望，当然也是基础广泛的属性。无论如何，只要我们假定我们所考虑的是一个井然有序的社会，或一个接近于正义状态的社会，这种情况看来必定是符合实际的，事实上我也将这样看。由于这种社会的基本结构是正义的，同时根据这个社会的普遍正义观而作出的安排是稳定的，这个社会的成员一般都会有适当的正义感和看到他们的体制得到肯定的欲望。但同样符合实际的是，只有在假定基本上正义原则得到了公认并且别人也同样按照它们来行动时，每个人都按照这些原则来行动才是合理的。因此，一个井然有序的社会的有代表性的成员将会发现他希望别人也具有基本美德，尤其是正义感。他的合理的生活计划符合正当的限制，因此他肯定会希望别人也承认这种限制。为了使这个结论绝对可靠，我们也希望肯定，在一个井然有序的社会里，已经获得某种正义感的那些人保持甚至增强这种道德感情是合理的。我打算在后面讨论一下这个问题（第86节）；我暂且假定情况如此。这样，在提出了所有这些假定之后，基本美德也是一个井然有序的社会中的成员彼此可以向对方合理要求的基础广泛的属性，这似乎是显而易见的。 还有一个复杂情况也必须考虑。还有其他一些属性大概也和美德一样基础广泛。例如智力和想象力、力量和耐力。事实上，某些最起码的属性是正当行为所必不可少的，因为如果没有判断力和想象力，甚至善心也可能引起损害。另一方面，除非理智和精力受到正义感和义务感的支配，否则它们可能只会加强一个人践踏别人合法要求的能力。毫无疑问，希望某些人在这些方面高人一等，从而危及正义的体制，这是不合理的。然而，从社会的观点看，在适当程度上具有这些自然资产显然是可取的；因此，在一定范围内，这些属性也是具有广泛基础的。这样说来，虽然美德被包括在基础广泛的属性中，但它们不是这一类中的唯一属性。 因此，有必要把美德与自然资产区别开来。我们可以把自然资产看作是通过教育和训练发展起来的自然能力，运用这些能力常常要按照某些特有的智力标准或其他标准，参考这些标准便可大致估计出这些能力。另一方面，美德又是指导我们按照某些正当原则来行动的思想感情和习惯态度。我们可以用相应原则把美德互相区别开来。因此，我假定，可以用业已得到确认的正义观把这些美德挑选出来；一旦这种正义观得到了理解，我们就可以靠它来对道德感情作出规定，并把它们从自然资产中划分出来。 因此，一个好人，或一个具有道德价值的人，就是具有高于一般程度的基础广泛的道德品格特征的人，而这种特征是原始状态中的人彼此可以向对方合理要求的。由于正义原则已经选定，而我们又承担了严格遵守这些原则的义务，每个人就都知道，他在社会上可以要求别人具有有助于恪守这些标准的道德感情。这样，我们可以换一种方法说，一个好人具有一个井然有序的社会成员可以向他们的同胞合理要求的那些道德品格特征。这些解释都没有提出什么新的道德观念，因此关于好即合理的规定就被扩大应用于人。正义理论把关于善的不全面说明作为一个从属部分，而全面理论加上正义理论；似乎就能对道德价值，即第三种主要的伦理概念作出令人满意的说明。 有些哲学家认为，由于一个取得了人的资格的人并不具有任何明确的角色和职责，同时又不是被当作一个工具和物品来对待，任何以好即合理为根据的规定肯定是不适用的。但是，正如我们已经看到的那样，提出这种规定而无须假定人具有某种特殊的角色，更无须假定人是为了某种不可告人的目的而被使用的物品，这是可能的。诚然，把这个规定扩大应用于道德价值情况，则要提出许多假定。我尤其要假定，成为某个社团的一个成员并参加多种形式的合作，是人的生活的一个条件。但这个假定太一般了，还不足以妥善解决正义论和道德价值之间的关系。事实上，正如我在前面所说的那样，利用社会的自然环境来说明我们深思熟虑的道德判断，这是完全正确的。从这个意义上说，关于道德哲学根本不存在任何先验的东西。作为讨论的总结，只要记住这样一点就行了；关于善的规定之所以适用于道德价值观念，是因为利用了已经获得的正义原则。此外，这些原则的具体内容和获得方式也是与此有关的。正义即公平的主要概念，即正义原则是有理性的人在一种平等的原始状态中可能一致同意的原则，为把关于善的规定扩大应用于道德上的好这些更大的问题准备了条件。 指出把关于善的概念扩大应用于其他情况的途径，似乎是可取的。这样做将会使我更有把握地把它应用于人。因此，让我们假定，每一个人都有一个决定他的善的合理的生活计划。现在，我们可以把一个好的行动（从慈善行动这个意义上说）规定为一个我们可以采取也可以不采取的行动，就是说，没有任何自然责任或义务的规定强迫我们去采取或不去采取这个行动，虽然这个行动促进了或旨在促进另一个人的善（他的合理计划）。进一步说，我们可以把一个好的行动（从仁慈行动这个意义上说）规定为一个为别人的善而采取的一个好的行动。一个慈善的行动增进了另一个人的善；而一个仁慈的行动又是按照使另一个人获得这种善的欲望而采取的。如果这个仁慈行动是一个给别人带来大量善的行动，同时，如果从行动者的较狭义的利益来估计，采取这种行动使他承受了相当大的损失和风险，那么这个行动就是职责以外的行动。一个对别人来说可能是很好的行动，尤其是一个保护别人免遭巨大伤害的行动，如果对行动者来说不是很大的牺牲和危险，那就是互助原则所要求的一种自然责任。因此，可以把职责以外的行动看作是一个人甚至在免除自然责任这一条件得到实现的情况下为另一个人的善而采取的行动。总的来说，职责以外的行动是在考虑了合理的私利后而某些免除责任的条件仍不能满足时便成为责任的那类行动。最后，为了从契约论角度对正当进行全面的说明，我们当然必须从原始状态的观点来弄清楚什么是合理的私利。但我不打算在这里进一步讨论这个问题。 最后，关于善的全面理论使我们能够区分不同的道德价值，或判明有没有道德价值。因此，我们可以把不正义的人、坏人或恶人区分开来。为了证明这一点，可以考虑一下这样的事实：有些人拼命追求过分的权力，即超过正义原则所允许的限度并能任意对别人运用的权威。就这种情况的每一种来说，都可以为了达到个人目的而不惜去做错事和不义之事。但不义之人是为了财富和安全之类的目的而谋求支配权的，这些目的如能加以适当限制就是合法的。坏人希望得到武断的权力，因为他喜欢由于行使这种权力而使他产生的那种优越感，同时他也想得到社会的称赞。他也有一种无节制地要做某些事的欲望，但对这些事如能加以适当限制，如能尊重别人并有克己意识，那就是好事。正是他用以实现他的野心的这种方式使他成了一个危险的人。恶人就不同了，他热衷于不正义的统治，完全是因为这种统治破坏了独立的人在平等的原始状态中可能同意的东西，因而掌握并显示这种权力，表明他的至尊和蔑视别人的自尊。他所追求的正是这种炫耀权力和侮辱别人。恶人的动机是出于对非正义的爱好：他以看到屈从于他的人的软弱无力和忍气吞声为乐，他对他们认为他存心使他们遭受屈辱而感到快意。一旦把正义理论和关于善的理论在我们所说的全面理论中结合起来，我们就能够作出这些区别以及其他区别。似乎没有理由担心不能对这些众多的不同的道德价值作出说明。