Chapter 19 Chapter 7 Good is Reasonable-1

For this final part of the book, I shall proceed as follows.First, I will introduce in more detail the theory of the good that has been used to account for the basic goods and interests of man in the original position.Since the latter argument requires a more comprehensive view, the theory must have a firmer foundation.The next chapter is mainly concerned with the acquisition of moral psychology and feelings of justice.Once these issues have been dealt with, we can discuss the relative stability of justice as fairness and argue in the final chapter that justice and good are consistent in a sense to be specified, at least in a well-ordered This is the case in the social environment.Finally, I will show how theories of justice are related to social values ​​and the good of communities.In this part, at times, the general direction of exposition may seem less clear, and the transitions from one issue to another may seem abrupt.It may be helpful to remember that our primary goal is to pave the way for solving stability and consistency problems, and for accounting for social values ​​and just goodness.

So far we have talked very little about the concept of goodness.This concept was briefly mentioned earlier when I pointed out that a man's goodness is determined by the plan of life which is most reasonable for him under fairly favorable conditions (section 15).I have since assumed that, in a well-ordered society, citizens' conceptions of their own good are consistent with accepted principles of right, and reserve a proper place for primary goods.But the concept of good is only used in a rather incomplete sense.In fact, I intend to draw a distinction between these two theories of the good.The reason for this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right takes precedence over the concept of good.Unlike teleology, something is good only if it conforms to a way of life consistent with existing principles of right.But to establish these principles one must rely on some conception of the good, since we need to make assumptions about the motives of the parties in the original position.As these assumptions must not in any way prejudice the primacy of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in favor of principles of justice is restricted to a few of the most important aspects which are immediately apparent.This explanation of the good is what I call an incomplete theory, and its purpose is to ensure that the premise of the necessary basic good can lead to the principle of justice. Once this theory is put forward and the basic good is explained, We can then use the principles of justice to advance what I shall call a comprehensive theory of the good.

To illustrate these problems, let us recall where the theory of the good has come into play.First, it is used to define who are the least favored members of society.The Difference Principle holds that this can be done.Admittedly, the theory need not prescribe a fundamental measure of welfare.We do not need to know to what extent the unluckiest are disadvantaged, since once this group has been singled out we can (from a suitable point of view) consider that their order of selection determines the peculiar arrangement of the basic structure (p. 15).Still, we have to be able to identify this group of people.Furthermore, welfare indices and representative people's expectations are accounted for in terms of primary goods.No matter what else they want, rational individuals want something as a necessary condition for the fulfillment of their life plans.Other things being equal, they would rather choose a more extensive liberty and opportunity than a more limited one, and would rather choose a larger share of wealth and income than a smaller one. income share.It seems fairly clear that these things are good.But I have also said that self-esteem and an unshakable confidence in each individual's sense of self-worth are perhaps the most important of the basic goods.This opinion has been used to argue in favor of the two principles of justice (§ 29).therefore.Preliminary determinations of expectations in reference to such things as liberty and wealth alone are provisional; other kinds of primary goods must also be included, and these raise further problems.This obviously requires an account of the good; and such an account would probably be an incomplete theory.

Also, a certain view of goodness is used to justify the theory of justice as fairness against various objections.It might be said, for example, that people in the original position know so little about their own situation that it is impossible to come to a reasonable agreement on the principles of justice.Since they do not know what their goals are, they may feel that their plans are utterly undermined by the principles they subscribe to.So how can they make sound decisions?It might be answered that the rationality of a man's choices does not depend on how much he knows, but only on how reasonable his inferences are based on the knowledge he has, however imperfect it may be.Our decisions are perfectly justified, provided we face up to our circumstances and do our best.Thus, the parties are actually able to make rational decisions, and some alternative conceptions of justice are undoubtedly better than others.Still, the incomplete theories of the good that the parties are supposed to accept suggest that they should strive for their own liberty and self-respect.And in order to further their ends (whatever they may be), they generally require more, not less, of the other primary goods.Thus, in reaching an original agreement, the parties must assume that their conceptions of the good have some framework, and this is sufficient to enable them to choose principles on a rational basis.

To sum up these arguments, we need to use what we call an incomplete theory of the good to account for rational choices over primary goods, and to formulate the notion of rationality that underlies the principle of choice in the original position.This theory is essential in order to demonstrate the necessary premises for the generation of principles of justice.But a fuller account of the good is essential in order to prepare for other issues to be discussed.The regulation of acts of charity and extraduties therefore rests on this theory.The same is true of prescribing people's moral worth.This is the third major ethical concept, to which we must find a place within the confines of the contractual view.Finally, one question we will have to consider is whether being a good person is a good thing for that person, and if not generally a good thing, under what circumstances.I think that, at least in some circumstances, such as in a well-ordered society or something close to justice, it will turn out that being a good person is indeed a good.This point is closely related to the good of justice and the consistency of a certain moral theory.We need an account of the good that makes this clear.What is characteristic of this comprehensive theory, as I said, is that it assumes that the principles of justice are secured and that these principles are then used to define other moral concepts including the concept of good.Once we have the principles of justification, we have recourse to them to account for the concept of moral value and the good of moral merit.A reasonable life plan determines what is good for a person, and it can also be said to determine the value of life.In fact, even such plans are themselves governed by principles of justice.But in order to avoid circularity, we must obviously distinguish between incomplete and comprehensive theories, and always remember which theory we are relying on.

Finally, if we are to explain the stability of social values ​​and justice, we must give a broader interpretation of the good.For example, it is a basic psychological principle that we have a tendency to love those who obviously love us, those who obviously intend to promote our good.In this regard, our good includes not only the primary good, but also the final end.Furthermore, to account for social values, we need a theory that accounts for some active good, especially the good that each person voluntarily acts according to a general conception of justice in affirming their social institutions.As we consider these questions, we can act in terms of comprehensive theory.Sometimes we also study the processes by which the sense of justice and moral sentiments are acquired; or we note especially that collective action in a just society is also good.There is no reason not to make use of a comprehensive theory of the good, since the conception of justice is valid.

However, if we ask whether a sense of justice is also a good, this important question is clearly conditioned by an incomplete theory of the good.What we want to know is whether it is also a good (in an incomplete sense) for those who are members of a well-ordered society to have and maintain some sense of justice.No doubt, if the sentiment of justice is also a good, it is only in this particular case.If, according to the incomplete theory, it turns out that having a sense of justice is indeed a good, then a well-ordered society is as stable as one can hope.Not only does the society produce its own supportive moral attitudes, but, from their point of view, rational beings with such attitudes value their position independently within the limits of justice. This attitude is also desirable.This co-ordination between justice and good I call unity; I shall examine this relation when I proceed to discuss the good of justice (§ 86).

It seems best not to proceed at once to discuss how the concept of rationality can be applied to the problem of planning of life, but first to consider some simpler examples to illustrate the formulations I will use.Doing so will reveal several features necessary for a clear understanding of its meaning.Therefore, I assume that this regulation has the following three stages (for the sake of simplicity, these stages are proposed to make good use of this concept, not to use the concept of better comparison): (1) Know the use of several X, or anticipated use, etc. (whatever proviso is appropriate), if A possesses that attribute (to a greater degree than a general or standard X) that A can reasonably claim from some X, then A is For a good X1(2) given K's (here someone) environment, capabilities and life plan (his system goals), taking into account what he intends to do with some X, or something like that, if A is a good X for K if A has the attributes that K can reasonably demand from some X; (3) is the same as (2), but with the additional condition that K's life plan, or That part of the plan which is relevant to the present situation is reasonable in itself.What is meant by the rationality of a life plan is yet to be determined and left for later discussion.But, as stated above, once we establish that an item has properties of the kind that a person with a reasonable plan for living could reasonably claim, we are showing that the item is good for him.If certain kinds of things meet this condition for ordinary people, then these things are also human goods.Finally, we also want reassurance that liberty and opportunity and our sense of self-worth fall into this category as well.

Now, a few comments on the first two stages of this regulation.Whenever it is necessary to take into account the relevant features of a person's situation in accordance with this rule, we tend to pass from the first stage to the second.Generally speaking, these characteristics are his interests, abilities and environment.Although the principle of rational choice has not yet been formulated, the everyday concept seems to be quite clear so far.On the whole, the mere mention of a good good conveys a fairly accurate meaning, provided that the interests and circumstances of the persons concerned with the possession of the good are sufficiently similar to allow for the determination of accepted standards, that the first The meaning of the stage description.If these conditions are met, then saying something is good conveys useful knowledge.We have enough common experience or knowledge of these things to recognize desirable features exemplified by some general or standard object.Often there are also traditional standards based on commercial or other usages specifying these attributes.No doubt we can learn how these standards evolved and how they were determined by studying various examples.The most important point, however, is that these criteria are determined by the properties of the objects in question and our experience with them; therefore, we say Some things are good without further elaboration.Basic value judgments are judgments made from the point of view of people whose interests, abilities, and circumstances are known.We can abstract with confidence the particular circumstances of any one individual only if similar conditions permit.If any complications arise, if what is to be selected is to be adapted to specific needs and circumstances, we turn to the second stage of this definition.Our value judgments should be adapted to the above factors as required by this stage.

A few examples may be taken from some representative different classes of things, such as artifacts, parts of the human body, and occupations and tasks.Examining these examples will illustrate the above argument.In the case of artefacts, a good watch is one that has those characteristics that can reasonably be expected of a watch.A watch obviously has several other desirable characteristics besides accurate time keeping.For example, it must not be too heavy.These characteristics seem to have to be weighed and given an appropriate focus in the overall evaluation.Here, I am not going to examine how this is done.However, it is worth noting that if we regard the determination of the good in the traditional sense as a method of analysis, that is, as an explanation of the concept of identity, if we assume that a watch is by definition a It is analytic to say that a good watch is a thing that keeps time, and that rationality is defined as the adoption of effective means to achieve one's ends.Establishing this fact depends entirely on logical accuracy and conceptual clarity.But I do not want to take the determination of the good in this sense, but as a general maxim by which to create alternative modes of expression by which to say what we say after reflection, so I The above statement is not considered to be analytical.In fact, for the purposes of our present topic, I intend to avoid the question altogether, and simply regard certain facts about watches (or the like) as common knowledge.There is no reason to ask whether statements showing these facts are analytical.It is therefore certainly true that a good watch keeps time, and this agreement with everyday facts is sufficient to justify the rule.

Also, in the phrase "a good X" the letter "x" is apparently often replaced by various noun phrases as the case may be.Therefore, it is usually not enough to say good tables, because we often need a more detailed classification.We were also asked to rate watches, stopwatches, etc., and even watches to match a certain evening dress.In all these cases special interests have produced certain appropriate classifications and criteria.These complications are all inferred from the circumstances and mentioned unequivocally if it seems necessary.For things that are not artifacts, it usually takes a little more work to explain what a person means, because just mentioning the thing doesn't make it understandable.For example, the statement that Wild Carter is a good mountain might need to be supplemented with the fact that it is a good mountain for skiing.As another example, the phrase It's a good night may also need explanation: It's a good night for stargazing because it's a cloudless, dark night.Some words need to be added appropriately.Consider this example: if we compare the statement that a corpse is a good corpse with the statement that this is a good anatomical corpse, the meaning of the first statement is unclear, whereas If something is mentioned as a cadaver for dissection, that is telling you its use in anatomical research.A good cadaver for dissection is presumably a cadaver with the attributes (whatever those attributes) that can reasonably be required for the purpose.It may be noted in passing that we can understand at least part of what it means to call something good even if we do not know the desirable characteristics of the item being evaluated. There is one point of view that always stands out here.Although this view need not be explicitly stated, an artifact, an organ of the human body, or a task is evaluated in terms of it.This view is characterized by identifying those whose interests are directly relevant to making a judgment and then describing their interest in the item.For example, with respect to parts of the body (organs of the various systems of the body), we generally take the point of view of the person in question, and assume that his interests are normal ones.Therefore, if a man wishes to see clearly, and hear well, good eyes and ears are eyes and ears which have the attributes which he can reasonably demand from his own eyes and ears.The same is true of animals and plants: if we say that they have a good coat or a good set of roots, we seem to adopt the point of view of the animal or plant.Of course, it would be unnatural to say that, especially with regard to plants.on the other hand.Perhaps there are other points of view in which it may be more natural to illustrate these judgments.But the fact that this provision may be more appropriate in some cases than in others need not disturb us unduly, so long as it suits the purposes of a theory of justice.Now let's talk about the occupation category.In some cases, however, although desirable attributes are those of persons and occupations, those whose views we take are not occupations appropriate to them.A good physician, therefore, is one who possesses such skills and abilities as his patients can reasonably demand from a physician.The skill and ability belong to the doctor, but the interest in restoring health by which the doctor is judged is that of the patient.These examples show that opinions vary from case to case, and that the rules of goodness do not contain any general formula by which opinions can be determined.These questions should be explained according to the occasion, or inferred according to the specific situation. Furthermore, nothing is necessarily good, or morally right, from the point of view used to judge things as good or bad.You can say that a man is a good spy, or a good assassin, without approving of his skill.Applying this rule to this example, we can take it to mean that the person in question possesses the kind of attributes that could reasonably be required of a spy or assassin, if one considers what spies and assassins are going to do. things.That doesn't mean it's right to ask spies and assassins to do what they do.Usually, spies and assassins are employed only by governments and conspirators and the like.We judge the skill and talent of spies and assassins only from the point of view of governments and conspirators.Whether a spy or an assassin is a good man is another question entirely; to answer it we have to evaluate the cause for which he works and his motives for doing so. Yet this moral neutrality with regard to the determination of the good is exactly what we should expect.The concept of rationality itself is not yet an adequate basis for the concept of right; in contract theory, the concept of right arises from another direction.Furthermore, the principles of right and justice must be employed if a concept of what is morally good is to be developed.It is not difficult to see that, for many professions and tasks, moral principles have an important place in specifying the properties of meaning.For example, a good judge has a strong desire to uphold justice and to handle cases impartially in accordance with the law.He had the judicial virtues his position required: he was impartial, able to evaluate the evidence fairly, without prejudice or driven by personal considerations.These properties may not be enough, but in general they are essential.Describing the attributes of a good husband or wife, a good friend or a good colleague, and so on and so on, depends on a theory of virtue, and therefore must also be preceded by principles of right.These questions fall within the scope of a comprehensive theory.In order for the rule that good is reasonable to apply to the concept of moral value, it turns out that virtue is that attribute that people can reasonably claim from each other when they adopt the requisite point of view.I intend to prove in due course that this is the case (section 66). To supplement the explanation of the incomplete theory, I would like to say a few words about the meaning of value judgments.These issues are not central to our study, but a few remarks can prevent misunderstandings.Perhaps the main question is whether the use of language embodied in these judgments is descriptive or prescriptive.Unfortunately, the concepts of descriptive and prescriptive usage are blurred, but I'm going to cut to the chase and talk about the main issues right away.All parties seem to agree on the following two general facts.First, words such as "good" and "bad" are generally used to give advice and opinions, to give praise and flattery, and so on.Of course, these words are not always used in this way, because they can also appear in conditional statements, orders, questions and other words that do not have any actual meaning.Their role, however, in giving advice and opinion, and in praise and flattery, is peculiar to them.Second, the evaluation criteria vary from case to case.Housing requirements are not clothing requirements.A satisfactory specification of good must conform to the above two facts. I now intend to formulate a descriptive theory simply as consisting of the following pair of propositions.First of all, although the evaluation criteria are different according to different evaluation objects, the word "good" has a fixed meaning (or meaning), and in the practical application of philosophy, it is often regarded as a descriptive predicate Belongs to a category.In fact, this fixed meaning enables us to understand why and how the criteria of evaluation vary from case to case.Another proposition is whether it is appropriate to use the word "good" (and words related to it) in giving advice and advice and in giving praise, which is accounted for by this fixed meaning together with a general theory of meaning .I will presume that this theory, in Austin's opinion, includes accounts of speech acts and of non-conventional meanings of words.The descriptive theory holds that the fixed descriptive meaning of the word "good" means that, if it is actually used correctly, it is used to express praise, to advise, and so on.There is no need to assign a special meaning to the word if it is not accounted for by the fixed meaning of "good" and the general theory of speech behavior. In this sense, the stipulation that good is reasonable is a descriptive theory.In prescribed fashion, it states two general facts that everyone admits. The fixed and unchanging meaning of "good" is characterized by its determination in different stages.To say something is good, therefore, is to say that it possesses the properties that can reasonably be expected of a thing of its kind, plus some additional account as the case may be.According to this rule, it is easy to explain why the evaluation criteria vary from case to case.We need things for different purposes, so it is obviously reasonable to value them according to different characteristics.It would help if the meaning of "good" was meant to be similar to that of function notation.We can thus regard this determination as endowing each class of things with a set of properties by which each thing of this class is to be evaluated, that is, those properties which can reasonably be required of things of this class. In addition, the note on good being reasonable explains why the word "good" appears in words such as advice or advice and praise and approval.For example, when someone asks us for advice, he wants to know our opinion which course of action is best for him.He wants to know what we think he can reasonably do.A climber advises another climber on what equipment to use and which route to take when climbing a difficult slope.In this way, this mountain climber is standing on the standpoint of another mountain climber, introducing what he thinks is a reasonable solution. In these words that are regarded as advice, the meaning of "good" and related expressions has not changed. It is specific Circumstances turn our words into advice, although the meaning of our words remains the same. For example, people who climb mountains have a duty to help each other, so they also have a duty to offer considered advice in an emergency. In this Circumstances. Their words become advice. Our words may, and in some cases must, be taken as advice and advice, as far as circumstances permit. In accepting the legitimate theory already outlined, this fixed description Sexual meanings, together with general reasons for why people should ask others for advice, account for these peculiar uses of 'good.' At no point should we resort to specific types of prescriptive or emotive meanings. It may be objected to the above argument that a theory of the non-customary meaning of words admits all claims made by some for a prescriptive or emotive theory of meaning.If so, there might not be any difference of opinion.I do not deny that knowledge of the non-customary meanings of various uses of "good" and of the use of the word in words of praise or advice, etc., One cannot agree that something is good in the sense that it is true that something is good and at the same time disagree with its non-customary meaning (assuming such a meaning exists in the particular case), in the sense that a certain non-customary The meaning is the main meaning of "good".The question is how to account for these facts. Therefore, the descriptive theory holds that "good" is used together with the meaning of praise or advice, which is its characteristic, and it is so because of the descriptive meaning given to it by this regulation. The descriptive meaning of "good" is not simply a series of lists of attributes, that is, a list of everything that differs according to habit or preference, but, in the way this formula illustrates, according to the out of reasonable demands.To understand why the word "good" (and words related to it) are used in these verbal acts is therefore to understand, in part, this fixed meaning.Likewise, because of the descriptive meaning of "good," certain non-customary meanings become its main meaning, just as the senses of factual statements are appropriate to certain utterances because of their descriptive meaning.If the statement that something is best for us is offered as advice, and we agree with it, and if we are rational, we will in fact accept the advice , and act upon it.The debate, if any, has nothing to do with these accepted facts, but only with the status of the descriptive meaning of "good" in accounting them.Descriptive theory holds that, when combined with general theories about linguistic behavior, the specification of "good" provides a sufficient account of these facts.There is no reason to introduce a distinct meaning. So far I have dealt only with the first stage of the determination of the good, at which point the question of the plausibility of ends supposedly known has not been raised.The statement that a thing is a good X for K is taken to be tantamount to saying that the thing has properties of the kind that K can reasonably demand from some X, given K's interests and aims.However, we often have to assess the rationality of a person's desires, and if this rule is to apply to a theory of justice, it must be expanded to include this basic case.The basic concept of the third stage is the application of the provisions of the good to the plan of life.A man's rational plan determines his goodness.Royce's idea is that a person can be seen as a person who lives according to a certain plan.Here, I slightly change this idea.According to Royce, a person shows who he is by describing his purpose and career, that is, what he intends to do with his life.If the plan is a rational one, then I can say that the man's conception of the good to himself is equally rational.In his case the actual good and the apparent good are identical.Likewise, his interests and aims are legitimate, and it is therefore proper to regard them as the end point for making judgments corresponding to the first two stages of this determination.This opinion is quite straightforward, but unfortunately it is a bit tedious to elaborate.In order to simplify the matter, I intend to start with a pair of provisions, and then describe and comment on them in the following sections. This pair is defined as follows: First, a person's plan of life is reasonable if (1) it is a plan that conforms to the principles of rational choice when they apply to all relevant features of his situation, and (2) Of those plans under this condition, it is the one which he may have chosen with sufficient prudence, that is, with full awareness of the relevant facts and with careful consideration of the consequences of the choice (prudent, reasonable This concept is discussed in the next section).Second, a man's interests and aims are reasonable if they are encouraged and secured by a plan which is reasonable to him.Note: In proposing the first provision, I suggested indirectly that a rational plan is probably only one of many possible plans that would conform to the principle of rational choice.This complication arises because the principles do not single out one plan as the best.Instead, we are faced with an infinite class of plans: every plan in this class is better than all plans not in this class, but if you pick any two plans in this class, which one Neither is better or worse than the other.Therefore, in order to determine a man's rational plan, I suppose that the plan he may choose with sufficient deliberate rationality is just the one of the very large class.Thus, when we criticize someone's plan, we point out that his plan either violates the principle of rational choice, or that it is not the plan he might adopt if he carefully evaluates his prospects in the light of all the knowledge about his situation. Before explaining the principle of rational choice, I should say a few things about the rather complex concept of rational planning.This is very important for the determination of the good, since a rational plan of life establishes a basic point of view from which to make all value judgments concerning a particular individual, and ultimately to bring them into harmony.If a person is (more or less) successfully carrying out a plan of life which he has drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and if he has reason to believe that his plan will be carried out, then, in fact, we can have Conditionally (section 83) he is considered happy.A man is happy when his plans are going well, when his greater wishes are being fulfilled, and when he is sure that his good fortune will last.Since differences in human endowment, circumstances, etc. determine that the plans that can be reasonably adopted vary from person to person, different people find happiness in doing different things.An account of supposedly favorable circumstances is necessary, for even the rational arrangement of one's activities may be a matter of the lesser of two evils, if the natural conditions are severe and the demands of others aggressive.The achievement of happiness, in the wider sense of a happy life, or a happy period in one's life, is probably often ascribed to a certain degree of good fortune. There are a few other issues with regard to long-term planning that should also be raised.The first problem has to do with temporal structure.No doubt a plan will provide some kind of preparation even for the most distant future, and for our death; but the farther back in time the plan becomes less specific.Precautions are provided for contingencies which may occur, and general precautions are provided, but the details are gradually added as more knowledge is acquired and our wants and needs are known more accurately.实际上，一个合理选择原则就是一个延迟原则：如果在将来我们可能希望做几件事之一但不知该做哪件，那么在其他条件相等时，我们现在就应该计划，使这几件事都有被选择的余地。我们绝不可以认为，一个合理的计划就是整个一生行动的详细蓝图。它是由一系列的计划组成的，比较具体的辅助计划要在适当的时候补充。 第二个问题与第一个问题有关。一个计划的结构不但反映了具体知识的缺乏，而且也反映了各个层次的欲望以同样的方式从比较笼统到不太笼统。一个计划的主要特点对实现比较长远的一般目标起了促进和保证作用。例如，一个合理的计划必须把基本善也考虑在内，因为不这样做，任何计划都不能实现；但各种相应的欲望会采取什么特别的形式，这通常是不能预知的，而只能因时制宜。这样，尽管我们知道，在任何一段时间内，我们永远会有饮食之欲，但只有等到那个时刻的来临，我们才能决定吃一顿包括这一道菜或那一道菜的饭。这些决定有赖于能够得到的选择，有赖于当时能够提供的菜单。 这样说来，制定计划就有几分像制定时间表了。我们努力把自己的活动按照某种时间顺序来安排。每一个活动进行一段时间，这样，一系列互相有关的欲望就能以一种有效而和谐的方式得到满足。把时间和精力的基本资源分配给活动，要按照它们予以满足的那些需要的强烈程度，按照它们对实现其他目标司能作出的贡献。审慎思考的目的是要找到能够最好地安排我们的活动并影响我们后来需要的构成的那种计划，以便可以把我们的目标和兴趣卓有成效地合并成一个行动安排。往往会妨碍其他目标或破坏进行其他活动的能力的欲望被剔除掉了，而本身令人愉快并有助于实现其他目标的欲望则得到了鼓励。因此，一个计划就是由按照某种层次而适当安排的辅助计划组成的，这个计划的最显著的特征就是考虑了互为补充的比较长远的目标和兴趣。由于能够预知的只是这些目标，兴趣的大致轮廓，为它们作准备的这些辅助计划的有效部分是随着我们的前进而最后独立确定的。在较低阶段进行的修正和改变，通常不会在整个结构中产生反响。如果这种计划观是正确的，那么我们就应该想到，生活中的美好事物大体上讲就是那些在合理计划中占据主要位置的活动和关系。而基本善最后应能证明就是这些东西，因为不管这个计划及其最后目的具有什么特别的性质，这些东西对于顺利地执行这种计划一般都是必不可少的。 遗憾的是，这些论点过于简略。但它们的目的完全是为了防止对合理计划概念产生比较明显的误解，并指出这个概念在关于善的理论中的地位。现在，我必须努力说明合理选择原则的含义。这些原则要通过列举才能得到，这样，它们最后就取代了合理性概念。一个人的地位的有关特征，是通过这些原则和计划必须与之相适应的人类生活一般条件来确定的。在这里，我要提一下人们最熟悉的、也似乎最少争论的关于合理性的那些方面。就目前来说，我将假定这种选择地位与短期问题有关。这个问题就是如何对预定要在较短期间执行的辅助计划的或多或少的最后细节进行补充，就像我们制定度假计划时要做的那样。比较大量的欲望可能不会受到重大的影响，虽然在这段时间内有些欲望自然能得到满足，而另一些则不能。 无论如何对短期问题来说，某些原则似乎是十分明确的，也是没有争论的。这些原则中的第一个原则就是有效手段原则。假定有一个必要的具体目标，同时假定所有可供选择的办法都是实现这个目标的手段，而这些手段在其他方面又都是不确定的。这个原则认为，我们应该采用能以最佳方式实现目标的那个选择办法。说得更完整一些：如果目标已知，一个人就应以最少的手段（不管是什么手段）去实现目标；或者，如果手段已知，一个人就应最大限度地去实现目标。这个原则也许是合理选择的最自然的标准。事实上，正如我将要在后面指出的那样，有某种倾向认为，审慎思考必须始终采用这种方式，归根到底它是由一个单一的最后目标支配的（第83节）。否则，就可以认为没有任何合理的办法能够使许多目标相互取得平衡。但是，我暂且撇开这个问题不谈。 合理选择的第二个原则是，如果执行一个（短期的）计划可以实现另一个计划的全部合意目标以及另外一个或多个进一步的目标，那么就应该去选择这个计划而不要去选择那另一个计划。佩里把这个标准称为兼容原则，我也将这样做。因此，我们应该采用这种比较能够兼容的计划，如果存在这种计划的话。举例来说：假定我们正在计划一次旅行，我们必须决定是去罗马还是去巴黎。两个地方都去看来不可能。如果经过认真的思考，显然我们能够在巴黎做我们希望在罗马做的一切，同时还能做些别的事情，那么我们就应该去巴黎。采用这个计划可以实现更多的一系列目标，凡是另一个计划可能实现的，它都能实现。然而，往往这两个计划没有一个会比另一个更能兼容；每一个只能实现另一个不能实现的某个目标。为了作出决定，我们要么必须采取某种别的原则，要么对我们的目标进行进一步的分析（第83节）。 第三个原则我们可以称之为较大可能性原则。假定可以用两个计划来实现的目标大致相同。这就可能会发生这样的情况：某些目标用这一个计划比用另一个计划可能有更多的实现机会，而同时在其余目标中无论哪一个目标实现的可能性都不会更少。例如，虽然一个人也许能够做他希望在罗马和巴黎做的一切，但他希望做的某些事情在巴黎做似乎更有可能成功，至于其余的事情则大致相仿。如果是这样，这个原则就认为他应该去巴黎。更大的成功的可能性偏向于某个计划，就像更能兼容的目的所做的那样。如果把这些原则结合起来使用，那么选择也就再清楚不过了。假定我们喜欢的是一幅提香的画而不是一幅丁托列托的画，而同时有两张奖券，第一张，提香的画中奖的机会较大，而第二张，丁托列托的画中奖的机会较大。这样，我们就必须选择第一张奖券。 迄今，我们一直考虑的问题是如何把合理选择应用于短期情况。现在，我想研究一下一种完全相反的情况，在这种情况下，我们必须采用一种长期计划，甚至是终生计划，就像我们在必须选择某个专业或职业时所做的那样。可以认为，必须作出这种决定，是一种完全由某种特定的文化形态提出的任务。在别的社会里，这种选择也许不会产生。但事实上，怎样来对待我们的生活这个问题是始终存在的，虽然某些社会比另一些社会更加明显地在某个不同的生活时期把选择强加给我们。根本不作任何计划，一切听其自然，这就是最大的决定。从理论上讲，这种决定仍然是一种计划，它可能合理，也可能不合理。如果接受长期计划的思想，那么按照将来各个时期可能产生的结果来对这种安排进行评价，这就似乎是显而易见的了。因此，这种情况下的兼容原则有如下述：如果某个长期计划为鼓励和满足另一个计划中的全部目标和兴趣，同时又为鼓励和满足某种进一步的目标和兴趣创造了条件，那么，对任何特定时期（或若干个时期）来说，这个计划就比另一个计划好。应该选择的就是这种比较能够兼容的计划（如果存在这个计划的话）：它包含了第一个计划的全部目标，同时还包括了至少另外一个目标。如果把这个原则同有效手段原则结合起来，那么，它们就能一起把合理性规定为：在其他条件相等时，选择能够实现我们的目标的较大手段，而如果这种愿望能够实现，则还要使广泛多样的兴趣得到发展。如果用不甚全面的计划也能有实现较大目标的同样机会，那么即使在我们无法肯定这些目标能够得到实现的情况下，较大可能性原则也仍然赞成上述选择。 把有效手段原则和较大可能性原则应用于长期情况，看来是相当合理的。但应用兼容原则可能就有问题了。就固定的短期目标系统来说，我们假定我们已经产生了欲望，于是我们就根据这个事实来考虑怎样尽最大可能使它们得到满足。但就长期选择来说，虽然我们还没有产生各种计划将会予以鼓励的欲望，但我们仍然要以这些进一步的目标能够得到实现这个设想为根据，来采用那个将会发展更广泛兴趣的计划。不过，一个人也许会说，既然他还没有产生这种范围更广泛的兴趣，那么，如果他没有决定对这些兴趣予以鼓励和满足，这也并没有使他失去什么。他可能认为，欲望的可能满足是一种毫不相干的考虑，因为他可以通过安排，使这种欲望永远不会产生。当然，他也许会说，更兼容的一系列兴趣会使他碰到更大的得不到满足的危险；但由于这个原则假定规模宏大的目标也同样有可能实现，他的这种反对理由也就被排除了。 有两种考虑似乎偏向于长期情况下的兼容原则。首先，假定一个人的幸福程度部分地决定于他的目标实现的比例，即他的计划完成的程度，由此可见，采用兼容原则往往会提高这个比例，从而扩大了一个人的幸福。只有在不那么兼容的计划中的全部目标已经得到了可靠的保证，才不会产生这种效果。另一种考虑是，按照亚里士多德原则（说明见下文第65节），我假定人都有一种要采用兼容原则的较高层次的欲望。他们喜欢范围更广泛的长期计划，因为执行这种计划大概要涉及更为复杂的综合能力。亚里士多德原则表明，在其他条件相等时，人喜欢运用他们的现实能力（他们的先天的或后天的能力），这种喜欢的程度越高，这种能力就实现得越多，或者说，这种能力就越复杂。如果一个人对做某件事比较熟练，他就会对做这件事感到乐趣，如果有两种活动他能干得同样好，他就会选择要求更高、更敏锐、更复杂的辨别能力的那种活动。实现规模宏大的目标，可以使杰出的才能得到充分发挥。因此，实现这种目标的欲望就成了亚里士多德原则的一个方面。这种欲望和按其他合理选择原则办事的更高层次的欲望一起，成了一种规定目标，正是这种目标使我们努力做到合理的审慎并接受它的结果。 上述论点中有许多问题需要进一步说明。例如，这三个原则一般地说显然都不足以评定可供我们选择的计划。手段也许不是不确定的，兼容的计划也许是不存在的，已经实现的目标也许不十分相同，等等。为了应用这些原则，我们在考虑自己的目标时，总想把它们描述一番，或多或少地计算一下这个或那个计划已经实现了多少个目标，或者估计一下有多少成功的可能性。由于这个缘故，我打算把这些标准叫做计算原则。这些原则并不要求进一步分析或改变我们的欲望，也不要求判断我们的需要的相对强烈程度。这些问题我要留到讨论审慎的合理性时再来研究。在结束这个初步的说明时，看来最好还是指出似乎相当清楚的一点，即我们能够对合理的生活计划进行选择。这就是说，我们现在可以决定我们以后将会有哪些欲望。 人们开始时也许会认为，这是不可能的。我们有时认为，我们的主要欲望至少是固定不变的，我们唯一要考虑的就是用什么手段来满足它们。当然，有一点显而易见：反复考虑使我们产生了我们以前不曾有过的某些欲望，例如利用某些手段的欲望，因为经过认真的思考；我们终于认识到这些手段对于实现我们的目的十分有用。此外，进行思考显然可以使我们把一种笼统的欲望变成比较具体的欲望，就像听音乐的欲望变成听某一音乐作品的欲望一样。但我们不妨假定，除了这些例外情况，我们现在想要得到什么，不是现在决定的。尽管如此，我们无疑仍然能够在现在决定去做某件事情，而我们知道这件事将会影响我们将来会有的那些欲望。在任何特定的时间里，有理性的人都是根据他们的地位和信仰来决定行动计划，而他们的地位和信仰又都是和他们当前的主要欲望以及合理选择原则联系在一起的。所以，我们是按照包括按合理原则办事的欲望在内的现有欲望来选择将来的欲望。当一个人决定要做什么样的人，例如决定从事什么职业或专业时，他也就是采用了某种具体的生活计划。他的选择迟早会使他获得关于需要和愿望的某种明确的模式（或没有此种模式），这种模式的某些方面是他所特有的，而另一些方面则是他选定的职业或生活方式所特有的。这些考虑似乎是相当明显的，就个人来说，它们完全具有相当于正义观的选择对社会基本结构所鼓励的那类目标和兴趣必然会产生的那种深刻的作用。对于要成为什么样的人的认识同样与承认正义的原则有关。