Chapter 18 Chapter VI Responsibilities and Obligations-2

I would now like to describe in general terms the theory of civil disobedience to illustrate the content of the principles of natural duty and duty.As I have already pointed out, the purpose of this theory is only to account for the special case of a society which approaches justice, that is, in most cases a well-ordered society.In such a society, however, certain serious violations of justice cannot be avoided.Since I believe that a state of approximation to justice requires a democratic institution, this theory deals with the role and suitability of civil resistance to legitimately established democratic authority.This theory does not apply to all other regimes, nor, except occasionally, to other types of dissent or resistance.It is not my intention to discuss this form of protest and belligerent action and defiance as a strategy to change or even overthrow an unjust and corrupt system.There is nothing wrong with such an action in this case.If any means used to achieve this end are justified, surely civil resistance is also justified.As I will show, the problem of civil disobedience arises only in a democracy that is more or less close to justice for citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the Constitution.The difficulty here is the conflict of responsibilities.At what point does the duty to obey laws made by a legislative majority (or to obey administrative regulations supported by that majority) cease to be binding in terms of the right to defend one's liberty and the duty to oppose injustice power?This question involves the nature and scope of the majority rule.For this reason, the question of civil disobedience becomes a crucial test of any theory of the moral foundations of democracy.

A constitutional theory of nonviolent resistance consists of three parts.First, it defines this type of dissent and distinguishes it from other forms of resistance to democratic authority.Other forms of resistance range from legal demonstrations to breaking the law in order to invoke precedent in court, to militant action and organized resistance.This theory clearly defines the place of nonviolent resistance within this realm of possibility.Second, the theory proposes various reasons for nonviolent resistance, and various conditions under which such action would be justified in a (more or less) just democracy.Finally, the theory should also explain the role that civil resistance plays in constitutional institutions and how appropriate this form of protest is in a free society.

Before I proceed to discuss these issues, I would like to remind everyone.We should not expect too much from any theory of civil resistance, even one formulated for particular circumstances.It is obvious that there can be no precise principles which can immediately determine the actual situation.Instead of this principle, there is simply a useful theory that prescribes a perspective that can be used to deal with the problem of civil resistance.It points out the various considerations and helps us to determine their proper emphasis in all cases of greater importance.If we think upon reflection that there is a theory about these issues that can clarify our vision and make our considered judgments more logical, then that is a good theory.The theory does what one might reasonably expect it to do in the present circumstances, namely, narrow the gap between the conscious beliefs of those who recognize the fundamental principles of a democratic society.

First, I will define civil disobedience as an overt, nonviolent, conscious, yet unlawful political action, usually for the purpose of changing government law or policy.By such an action a man appeals to the sense of justice of the majority of the community, and declares that, in his considered opinion, the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not at the moment respected.The first addition to this definition is that it does not require civil disobedience to undermine the law that is being opposed.It takes into account not only direct nonviolent resistance but also what some would call indirect nonviolent resistance.As a definition, it should, because there are sometimes good reasons not to violate laws or policies that are considered unjust.Instead, a person might use traffic violations or disobey laws about trespassing as a way to make a point.Therefore, if the government enacts a vague and severe statute to punish treason, it is not proper to use treason as a means of opposing this statute, and in any case the punishment may be worse than one has to prepare for. Accepted punishment is much harsher.In other cases, if the policy of the government concerns foreign affairs, or affects another part of the country, then such policy cannot be directly violated.A second addition to this definition is that acts of civil disobedience are actually seen as illegal, at least in the sense that those who take them are not simply doing so to provide a precedent for constitutional decisions ; even if this decree should be supported, they are still ready to oppose it.True, in a constitutional system, courts may end up siding with dissidents and declaring an objected law or policy unconstitutional.As a result, it often happens that it is somewhat difficult to determine whether actions against dissidents should be considered illegal or legal.But that's just one factor that complicates things.If those who use civil resistance against unjust laws end up overruled by the courts (no matter how much they hope that the courts may rule otherwise), they are not prepared to let it go.

It should also be noted that civil disobedience is a political action, not only in the sense that it is directed against the majority in power, but also because it is a political principle, that is, justice governing the constitution and institutions in general. Principles guide and justify action.In defending civil resistance, a person does not appeal to personal moral principles or religious teachings, which may coincide with and provide arguments for his claims; Violent resistance cannot be based solely on group interests or self-interest.Instead, one should appeal to the shared conception of justice that underlies the political order.It can be argued that in a reasonably just democracy there exists a general conception of justice by which citizens manage political affairs and interpret the constitution.The stubborn and intentional violation of the basic principles of this conception of justice at any time, especially the basic right to equal liberty, results in either submission or resistance.Minorities use the method of civil disobedience to force the majority to consider whether they wish their actions to be seen in this way, or whether, in terms of a shared sense of justice, they are willing to recognize the legitimate claims of the minority.

Another problem is that civil disobedience is an overt act.Not only must it be guided by open principles, but it must also be conducted openly.It is overt and open; it is not secret or veiled.One might liken it to public speaking, it is a form of opinion, an expression of deep conscious political conviction, so it takes place in a public forum.For this reason, and certainly for other reasons, nonviolent resistance is nonviolent.It avoids violence, especially against individuals, not because it abhors violence in principle, but because it is the final expression of one's position.Engaging in acts of violence that may cause harm is incompatible with nonviolent resistance as an expression.In fact, any interference with the civil liberties of others tends to obscure the nonviolent nature of one's actions.Sometimes, if this method of appeal fails to achieve its purpose, the idea of ​​​​violent resistance may arise later.However, civil resistance is an expression of conscious unshakable faith; although it may be a warning and exhortation, it is not a threat in itself.

There is another reason why nonviolent resistance is nonviolent.It expresses disobedience within the bounds of loyalty to the law, though that loyalty has reached the fringes of that bound.The law is broken, but the overtly nonviolent nature of the action, and one's willingness to accept the legal consequences of one's actions, express loyalty to the law.This fidelity to the law helps to demonstrate to the majority that such action is indeed politically conscious and honest, and that its purpose is to appeal to a public sense of justice.Being completely public and nonviolent, this guarantees one's sincerity, since it is not easy to convince another that one's actions are conscious, even to the actor himself.No doubt it is conceivable to imagine a legal system in which the conscious perception that the law is unjust can be used to justify non-observance of the law.People who trust each other enough to be honest can probably make the system work.But, as things stand, the system is unstable even when it comes close to justice.There is a price we must pay if we are to convince others that, from our considered point of view, our actions have sufficient moral basis in society's political beliefs.

Civilian resistance is defined as somewhere between legal protest and jurisprudence on the one hand, and conscientious disobedience and resistance of all kinds on the other.In so far as it is possible, it represents a form of dissent on the verge of loyalty to the law.Understood in this way, civil resistance is clearly different from combative or disruptive action; it is far from organized violent resistance.Take Militant, for example, who is far more strongly opposed to the current political system.He does not admit that the current political system is close to justice or a reasonably just system; he believes that this system has either greatly deviated from the principles it professes, or it is pursuing a completely wrong conception of justice.Although his actions are conscious in themselves, he is not appealing to the sense of justice of the majority (or those with actual political power) because he believes their sense of justice is wrong or ineffective of.Instead, he seeks to strike down prevailing notions of justice, or to force a movement in the direction he wishes, with well-planned belligerent acts of sabotage and resistance.Thus, the militant may try to avoid punishment because he is not prepared to face the legal consequences of his transgression; not only does this allow him to take advantage of forces he considers unreliable, but it also shows that he recognizes what he opposes. Constitutional legitimacy.In this sense, belligerent action falls outside the realm of allegiance to the law, but embodies a deeper opposition to the legal order.The basic structure of society is perceived to be unjust, or to have strayed far from its own professed ideals, and one must strive to prepare for radical, even revolutionary change.And to do that, the public must be made aware that fundamental reforms are imperative.Combative actions and other forms of resistance are undoubtedly justified in certain circumstances.However, I am not going to discuss these cases.I have said that my purpose in this matter is limited, namely, to develop a conception of civil resistance and its function in a constitutional system that approaches justice.

Although I have distinguished civil resistance from conscientious disobedience, I have not yet addressed the latter concept.Now let me explain.It must be recognized, however, that to distinguish between the two concepts is to define civil resistance more narrowly than is traditionally defined; for it is customary to see civil resistance in a broader sense as non-compliance for righteous reasons. Any action of the law, at least if it is not conducted in secret and does not involve the use of force.Solow's essay is representative, if not authoritative, in expressing the traditional meaning of civilized resistance.I think that once the definition of conscientious disobedience is examined, the usefulness of civil disobedience narrowly becomes apparent.

Conscientious disobedience is failure to obey a more or less direct legal imperative or administrative order.It was disobedience because an order was issued against us, and it was clear to the authorities whether we accepted the order given the nature of the situation at the time.The refusal of early Christians to enforce certain decrees of pious behavior in pagan nations and the refusal of members of the International Bible Study Society to salute the flag are typical examples.There are other examples, such as a pacifist's reluctance to serve in the military, or a soldier's reluctance to obey an order that he considers to be a clear violation of the spirit of humanity applicable to war.Or, still using Solow's example, refusing to pay taxes because paying taxes would make the taxpayer an instrument of grave injustice against another.Let us assume that a man's actions are already known to the authorities, no matter how much he may in some cases wish to conceal them.If his actions can be sneaky, then maybe he can talk about conscientious avoidance instead of conscientious disobedience.Covert violations of fugitive slave hunting laws are examples of conscientious circumvention.

Conscientious disobedience (or conscientious circumvention) differs from nonviolent resistance in several ways.First, conscientious disobedience is not a way of appealing to the majority's sense of justice.Of course, such operations are generally not carried out secretly, since it is often impossible to cover them anyway.A person may simply refuse to obey an order or to obey a legal prohibition on grounds of conscience.He is not appealing to society's beliefs, and in this sense conscientious disobedience is not an act in the public forum.Those who are prepared to disobey acknowledge that the basis for mutual understanding may not exist; they are not looking for an occasion for disobedience as a means of asserting their position.Instead, they bide their time, hoping that the necessity of disobedience will not arise.They are not as optimistic as those engaged in civil disobedience, and they may not have any hope of changing laws or policies.This situation may not allow them time to take their position, or they still do not have any chance of getting the majority to accept their demands. Conscientious disobedience is not necessarily based on political principles; it may be based on religious or other principles that are incompatible with the constitutional order.Civil resistance is an appeal to some shared conception of justice, whereas conscientious disobedience may be justified otherwise.Suppose, for example, that the early Christians justified their refusal to observe the religious customs of the Roman Empire on grounds not of justice, but only of violation of their religious beliefs, then their argument was not political; War is at least sanctioned by the conception of justice underlying the constitutional system, and the pacifist view is not, by the same qualification, political.However, conscientious disobedience can also be based on political principles.A man may disapprove of a law, thinking it so unjust that it is quite impossible to obey it.This may be the case if the law orders us to be the instruments of enslaving another, or requires us to keep others enslaved.These circumstances clearly violate accepted political principles. It is difficult to find the right course of action when one appeals to religious principles in order to refuse actions that seem to be required by principles of political justice.Assuming there is a just war, are pacifists entitled to exemption from military service in such wars?Or, can the state impose certain penalties for non-compliance with the law?It is always tempting to say that the law must always respect the dictates of conscience, but this cannot be true.As we have seen in the case of the intolerant, the legal order must direct the pursuit of religious interests in order to realize the principle of equal liberty; to take an extreme example, the legal order may necessarily prohibit religions such as killing for sacrifice Habit.Any theory of justice must deal with those who disagree with it on its own terms.A well-ordered society, or a society approaching justice, aims at maintaining and strengthening just institutions.If a religion is not adequately represented, it is presumably because it violates the equal liberty of others.Generally speaking, the degree of tolerance for hostile moral values ​​depends on the degree to which these moral values ​​can find equal status within a system of just liberties. If pacifism is to be respected and not just tolerated, it must be said that it is fairly consistent with principles of justice, with the main exception being its attitude to participation in just wars (here it is assumed that wars of self-defense are also justified in certain circumstances) .Socially accepted political principles bear some resemblance to those publicly proclaimed by pacifists.They all abhor war, the use of force, and all believe that as moral subjects they should be equal.Some countries, especially big ones, frequently engage in wars for no apparent reason, and frequently use the state apparatus to suppress dissidents.Given this situation, respect for pacifism serves to alert citizens to the injustices that governments often do in their name.Even if the pacifist is not all right, his intentional warnings and protests may have the effect of making the principles of justice on the whole more secure, not less secure.It is conceivable that pacifism, as a natural deviation from sound principles, compensates for the weakness shown by men in carrying out their proclamations. It should be noted that, as far as practical matters are concerned, civil resistance is not significantly different from conscientious disobedience.Moreover, the same action (or series of actions) may have strong elements of both.While each has its own certainty, they are compared in order to illustrate what nonviolent resistance means and the way in which it functions in a democratic society.Given the nature of this course of action as a special political requirement, it can usually be justified only after some other steps have been taken within the confines of the legal system.By contrast, this requirement is often inapplicable to clear cases of legitimate conscientious disobedience.In a free society, no one can be compelled to enforce religious laws that violate the right to equal liberty, as the early Christians were, nor can a soldier obey an order that is inherently harmful while awaiting an appeal to a higher authority.These arguments then raise the question of the justifications for nonviolent resistance. With these differences in mind, I intend to examine the circumstances under which civilized resistance is justified.For the sake of brevity, I will limit the discussion to domestic institutions, and thus to the inherent injustices of a given society.This limitation is somewhat excessive, but it can be relaxed a little by discussing the different issue of conscientious disobedience in relation to the humanitarianism that applies to war.First, I will propose the plausible conditions for engaging in nonviolent resistance, and then relate these conditions more systematically to the status of nonviolent resistance in a state of near justice.Of course, the enumeration of those conditions should be regarded as hypothetical; there will undoubtedly be situations in which they do not apply, and thus alternative arguments for civil resistance may be provided. The first concerns which injustices are suitable objects of civil resistance.If one sees this resistance as a political action appealing to a sense of social justice, then, other things being equal, it seems reasonable if it is limited to a few incidents of great and manifest injustice, And it would be better if it were limited to preventing the elimination of other injustices.For this reason there is a basis for restricting civil resistance to serious violations of the first principle of justice, the principle of equal liberty, and to flagrant violations of the second principle of justice. The second part is the conduct of the principle of fair equal opportunity.Of course, it is not always easy to tell whether these principles have been realized.However, if we see these principles as guarantees of fundamental liberties, it is often obvious that these liberties are not being respected at the moment.These principles, after all, impose certain strict conditions that must be clearly embodied in the system.Thus, when certain minorities are denied the right to vote and to hold public office, to own property and to move, or when certain religious groups are suppressed and others denied opportunities, these injustices affect all It's obvious to people.The social arrangement manifests these injustices palpably, if not in words, through accepted customs.Identifying these injustices, therefore, does not require an informed examination of the functioning of institutions. Violations of the difference principle, by contrast, are more difficult to ascertain.There is usually a wide range of conflicting and justified opinions as to whether this principle has been realized.Its so so.Because this principle is inherently applicable to economic and social institutions and social policies.The choice of these institutions and policies is determined not only by a wealth of statistical and other information but also by theoretical and speculative convictions, to which shrewd judgment and clear hunches are added.Because of the complexity of these issues, it is difficult to check the influence of self-interest and prejudice; even if we can do this to ourselves, it is another matter to convince others of our sincerity.Thus, for example, unless the apparent purpose of a tax law is to undermine or diminish some basic right to equal liberty, civil resistance cannot usually be used against such a law.Appeals to the public's sense of justice are ambiguous.These issues are best left to the political process if the necessary equal liberties are guaranteed.That being the case, some reasonable compromise could probably be reached.Thus, violations of the principle of equal liberty are more appropriate targets for civil resistance.This principle defines the common place of equal citizens in the constitutional system and is thus the basis of the political order.If this principle is fully realized, it may be assumed that other injustices, however stubborn and serious they may be, will not get out of hand. Yet another condition of nonviolent resistance is as follows.We can assume that formal appeals to the political majority have been made in good faith, but to no avail.Legal remedies ultimately failed.For example, existing political parties have demonstrated their indifference to minority demands, or have finally demonstrated their reluctance to cater to minority demands.Efforts to get the law repealed have been ignored, and legitimate protests and demonstrations have been unsuccessful.Since civil resistance is a last resort, we should be convinced that it is necessary.Note, however, that we have not said that all legal means have been exhausted.In any case, further appeals can be made; freedom of expression is always possible.But if past actions have shown the majority to be apathetic or insensitive, it can be justified to assume that further efforts will be fruitless, thus satisfying the second condition of justifiable civil resistance.However, this condition is also an assumption.Some situations may be so extreme that there may be no responsibility to use legitimate means of political confrontation in the first place.For example, if the legislature enacts some absurd law that violates the right to equal liberty, such as prohibiting the religion of a small and helpless minority, we certainly cannot expect that sect to use the usual political process to oppose the law.In fact, even civil resistance seems overly tame in most cases that have declared themselves unjust and openly hostile targets for their indiscriminate power. The third and final condition I'll discuss can be quite complex.This condition exists because while the previous two conditions are often sufficient to justify civil resistance, they are not always the case.In some cases, the natural duty of justice may require some kind of limitation.We can see this from the following situation.If a minority has reason to engage in civil resistance, any other minority in a correspondingly similar situation will also have reason to do so.Using the preceding two conditions as a measure of correspondingly similar situations, we can say that, other things being equal, two minorities who have suffered the same degree of injustice for the same length of time, and who are equally sincere and formally If their political appeals have also failed to work, then they are also justified in engaging in nonviolent resistance.However, it is conceivable, if unlikely, that many groups would have equally valid reasons (in the sense just defined) for civil resistance, but if they all did so, the immediate Serious confusion would arise, which would very likely undermine the efficacy of a just constitution.Here I am assuming that nonviolent resistance has a scope within which it can be conducted without ultimately undermining respect for the law and the Constitution, with consequences that would be unfortunate for all.There is also a limit to the ability to deal with such differences in the public forum; the appeals that nonviolent resistance groups wish to make can be distorted, and their appeal to the majority's sense of justice can be ignored.For one or both of these reasons, the utility of civil resistance as a form of protest diminishes beyond certain limits; those contemplating civil resistance must consider these limits. From a theoretical point of view, the ideal solution would require all minorities to work together in a political coalition that would allow for an overall adjustment of differences.Consider the following nature of the situation: There are many groups, each equally entitled to civil resistance.Moreover, they all wish to exercise this right, and each group has equally good reasons; but if they all do so, it may do lasting injury to the just constitution to which they all admit a natural duty.There are many equally strong claims, which cannot be satisfied if taken together, and some reasonable scheme should be employed, by which they may all be justly considered.Take, for a simple example, the claim to an indivisible and finite good.If the number of persons with the same reasonable claim is too large, then rotation or lottery may be a fair solution.But here, this approach is completely unrealistic.There seems to be a need for a political understanding here between the various minorities suffering from injustice.They can fulfill their responsibilities to the democratic system by coordinating their actions so that each minority has an opportunity to exercise its rights without exceeding the limits prescribed for civil resistance.Of course, arranging such an alliance is difficult, but with visionary leadership it does not appear impossible. There is no doubt that the situation just envisaged is a special one, and it is probable that the above considerations will not be an obstacle to legitimate civil resistance.It is unlikely that many groups would be equally entitled to resist in this way while acknowledging a duty to a just constitution.It should be noted, however, that an injured minority will always want to consider its claim as well-founded as that of any other minority; therefore, even if the reasons groups use to engage in civil resistance are not equally convincing, often It is wise to assume that their requirements are the most indistinguishable.The scenario envisaged seems more likely to occur if this criterion is adopted.This situation also helps to show that the exercise of the right to disobey, like the exercise of rights in general, is sometimes limited by others who have the same right.Exercising this right by everyone would have harmful consequences for all, so there needs to be some kind of equitable solution. Assume that in accordance with these three conditions, a person has the right to use civil resistance to appeal his case.The injustice he opposes is a clear violation of equal civil liberties, or a violation of equal opportunity, which has for a considerable period of time been more or less in spite of formal political opposition. Deliberately enforced, any difficulties arising from the question of fairness are thus resolved.These conditions are not all-encompassing; the possibility of harming allegedly innocent third parties must also be considered.But I assume that these conditions cover the main points.Of course, there remains the question of the wisdom or prudence of exercising such a right.Now, having ascertained this right, a man can decide the question according to the situation, which he could not do before.We can act within our rights, but we would be unwise to do so if our actions only invite harsh retaliation from the majority.Of course, a retaliatory crackdown on legitimate dissent is unlikely in a state approaching justice, but it is important that such action be properly planned so that it can be addressed to society at large. powerful appeal.Since civil disobedience is a form of appeal in the public forum, care must be taken to make it understandable.Therefore, the exercise of the right of civil disobedience, like the exercise of any other right, must be planned so that it helps to achieve one's goals or those of those who are willing to help.A theory of justice has nothing concrete to say about these practical considerations.In short, questions of strategy and tactics are determined by the individual circumstances.But what a theory of justice should say is when these questions are properly raised. In making this account of the reasons for civil resistance, however, I have not yet mentioned the principle of fairness.The natural duty to justice is the primary basis of our political relationship to constitutional institutions.We have pointed out earlier (Section 52) that only social members who benefit more may have a clear political obligation different from political responsibility.Their better position enables them to obtain public office, and they have easier access to the political system.In this way, they have an obligation to ordinary citizens to maintain a just constitution.But members of subordinate minorities, such as those who have good reasons for civil resistance, generally have no such political obligation.This is not to say, however, that the principle of fairness does not impose important obligations on them.For not only do many claims to private life flow from this principle, but it comes into play as soon as individuals or groups come together for a common political purpose.Just as we acquire obligations to others if we join with others in various civic groups, so those who take part in political action have obligations to each other.Thus, although the political obligations of dissidents to citizens are generally problematic, relationships of loyalty and fidelity develop among them as they strive to advance their causes.Generally speaking, free association under a just constitution creates obligations if the purpose of the association is legitimate and its arrangements reasonable.Such obligations are of such great significance that they limit the actions of individuals in many respects.But they are distinct from the duty to obey a just constitution.I am only discussing the problem of civil resistance in terms of the duty to justice; a more comprehensive view will show the status of these different conditions. In examining the grounds for nonviolent resistance, I have assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the laws and policies being opposed have to do with domestic affairs.It is natural to ask to what extent the theory of political responsibility applies to questions of foreign policy.In order for this theory to be applicable to foreign policy, it is necessary to extend the theory of justice to international law.I'll try to figure out how this can be done.In order to define the concept, I will briefly examine the grounds for conscientious disobedience for participation in certain acts of war or military service.I assume that this disobedience is based on political principles.Rather than being based on religious or other principles, the principles invoked as justification are those which form the basis of the constitutional conception of justice.Our problem, then, is how to relate the political principles of justice regulating state behavior to contractarianism, and to explain the moral basis of international law from this point of view. Let us assume that we have arrived at the principles of justice applicable to social units and basic structures.It is also conceivable that the principles of natural duties and duties applicable to individuals have also been adopted.例如，原始状态中的人已经同意了所有的正当原则，因为这些原则适用于他们自己的社会以及作为社会成员的他们自己。现在，我们可以引申关于原始状态的解释，并把各方看作不同同家的代表，他们必须一起来选择各个基本原则，以便裁定国家间互相冲突的要求。按照这种原始状态观，我假定这些代表得不到各种有关知识。虽然他们知道，他们代表着不同的国家，每个国家都在人类生活的正常情况下生活，但他们对他们自己的社会，对本国与他国相比的权势和力量等具体情况一无所知，他们也不知道他们在自己社会中的地位。同样，缔约各方，在这里也就是各国的代表，只可以有为保护自己的利益而进行合理选择的足够知识，但这种知识也不能太多，不能多到可以让其中较幸运的人利用他们的特殊地位。这种原始状态对各国都是公平的；它使历史命运的偶然性和偏见不能发生作用。国际正义就是由可能在经过这样解释的原始状态中得到选择的原则决定的。这些原则是政治原则，因为它们指导着一国对他国的公开政策。 我只能指出可能会得到承认的原则。但无论如何不会有惊人的东西，因为我认为，得到选择的原则可能就是众所周知的原则。国际法的基本原则就是平等原则。组成国家的独立民族都有某些基本的平等权利。这个原则同宪法制度下公民的平等权利有类似之处。这种国家平等的一个结果就是自决原则，即一个民族在没有外国干预的情况下决定自己事务的权利。另一个结果是抵抗外来进攻的自卫权利，包括为保卫这一权利而结成防御联盟的权利。还有一个原则是，条约如果符合国际关系中的所有其他指导原则，则应予遵守。因此，经过适当解释的自卫条约是可以有约束力的，但不正当进攻的合作协议从一开始就是没有约束力的。 这些原则规定了国家何时才具有正义的战争目标，按照传统的说法，即规定国家的战争权利。但还有—些规定国家可以用来进行战争的手段的原则，即战争法规。即使在正义战争中，某些暴力形式也是严格禁止的；只要一个国家的战争权利是可疑的和不能肯定的，对它可能使用的战争手段的限制就更加严格。合法的自卫战争中可以容许的行动，尽管是必要的行动，但在一种比较难以确定的情况下也可能被断然拒绝。战争的目的是正义的和平，因此战争所使用的手段决不能破坏和平的可能性，决不能助长危及我们自己和整个人类的对人类生活的蔑视。为此，战争行为应该受到限制和修正。各国的代表可能会认识到，承认对战争手段的这些限制，最符合他们的从原始状态来看的国家利益。这是因为，一个正义国家的国家利益是由业已得到承认的正义原则规定的。因此，这样一个国家的目标首先是保持和维护它的正义体制以及使这种体制得以存在的条件。它不为获得世界权力或民族光荣的欲望所驱使；它也不是为了获得经济利益或领土而进行战争。这些目的是与规定社会合法利益的正义观背道而驰的，不管它们在国家的实际行为中多么盛行一时。因此，承认了这些理由。再假定人们会选择体现了保护人类生活的自然责任的传统禁令，这似乎是合理的。 如果战时的良心不服从诉诸这些原则，那是以某种政治观为依据的，而不一定是以宗教观念或其他观念为依据的。这种形式的不服从可能不是一种政治行动，因为它不是在公共讲坛上进行的，但它是从构成宪法基础并指导对宪法进行解释的那种正义理论出发的。此外，法律秩序本身大概也以条约的形式，至少承认了某些国际法原则的有效性。因此，如果一个士兵被命令去从事某些非法的战争行动，而如果他有理由从良心上认为适用于战争行为的原则明显地遭到了违反，他就可以不服从这种命令。他可以认为，从全面考虑，他的自然责任就是不要让自己成为别人从事严重不正义行为和做坏事的工具，而他的这种责任胜过了他的服从责任。我不能在这里讨论哪些情况明显违反了这些原则。有些情况分明是尽人皆知的，指出这一点大概也就够了。至关重要的一点是，良心不服从的理由引用了可以用契约论来说明的政治原则。我认为，可以把正义理论加以发展，使它也适用于这种情况。 一个多少有点不同的问题是，在某个特定的战争期间，一个人是否应该服兵役。答案可能不但要决定于战争行为，而且也要决定于战争目的。为了把这种情况说得明确一点，让我们假定，征兵正在进行，个人必须考虑是否要遵守他的服兵役的法律责任这个问题。现在，我要假定，既然征兵是一种严重妨碍平等公民基本自由权的行为，那么，能够证明征兵的正确性的，就只有国家安全的需要，其他任何需要都不是那么令人信服的。在一个井然有序的社会中（或在一个接近于正义的社会中），国家安全的需要是由维护正义体制这个目的决定的。只有为了保卫自由权本身的需要，征兵才是可以允许的，这里所说的自由权不但包括了这个社会的公民的自由权，而且也包括其他社会的人的自由权。因此，如果说，一支征集来的军队不大可能成为不正当的对外冒险的工具，那么，仅仅根据这一点，也可以证明它是正当的，尽管征兵侵犯了公民的平等自由权。但无论如何，自由权优先（假定优先的序列是适用的）的概念要求只有在保障自由权实属必要的情况下才能利用征兵的办法。从立法机关（这个问题的合适阶段）的观点看，只有这个理由才能为征兵这个办法辩护。公民赞同把这种安排看作分摊国防负担的一种公平方法。当然，任何个人必须面对的危险，一部分是意外和历史偶然事件的结果，但无论如何，在一个井然有序的社会里，这种不幸来自外部，即来自不正当的外来进攻。正义的体制不可能完全消灭这种苦难。最多它们只能做到努力保证遭受这种人为不幸的危险由全体社会成员在他们的一生中或多或少地平均分担，并在挑选应召服役的人时，不会产生任何可以避免的阶级偏见。 因此，可以设想一个存在征兵的民主社会。在某次战争中，一个人可能以战争的目的是不正义的为理由，从良心上拒绝遵守他的服兵役的责任。战争所谋求的目标可能是攫取经济利益或扩大国家强权。公民的基本自由权决不能为了实现这些目的而受到妨碍。当然，为了这种理由而破坏其他社会的自由权，也是不正义的，是与国际法背道而驰的。因此，战争的正义目标是不存在的，而一个公民完全可以拒绝履行他的法律责任，这可能十分明显。国际法和适用于他自己的社会的正义原则，全都证明他的这种要求是正确的。有时候，不服从还有另外一个理由，这个理由不是着眼于战争目的，而是着眼于战争行为。一个公民可能会认为，一旦关于战争的道德规范显然在不断地遭到违反，他就有了一种拒绝服兵役的权利，理由是他有权确保自己尊重自己的自然责任。一旦他入了伍，并发现自己奉命去从事违反关于战争道德规范的行动，在这种情况下，他也许不能抗拒服从命令。事实上，如果战争的目的是相当可疑的，而接受公然不正义的命令的可能性又是相当大的，一个人可能就不但有权利而且也有责任不服从命令。事实上，一些国家尤其是一些大国的战争行为和战争目的，在某些情况下很可能是不正义的，这样，一个人就不得不断定，在可以预见的将来，他必须一概拒绝服兵役。如果这样来理解，某种有条件的和平主义也许就是一种完全合理的立场：正义战争的可能性可以承认，但不是在当前的情况下。 因此，所需要的不是一种一般的和平主义，而是一种区别对待的良心不服从，即在某些情况下拒绝从事战争。国家从来不是不愿承认和平主义并给予它一种特殊地位。在任何条件下拒绝参加所有战争，是一个天真的观点，势必仍是一种宗派主义。正如教士的独身生活不会对婚姻的神圣性构成威胁一样，和平主义也不会对国家的权威构成威胁。免去对和平主义者的种种清规戒律，国家似乎可以表现出某种宽宏大量。但在民族之间的正义原则应用于某些战争时，以这些原则为基础的良心不服从就是另外一回事了。因为这种不服从是对政府的战争借口的一种有意冒犯，如果扩大开来，不正义战争最后也许就不可能继续下去。鉴于国家权力常有的掠夺目的，鉴于人们遵从政府战争决定的倾向，抗拒国家战争要求的普遍意愿就更加必要了。 非暴力抵抗理论的第三个目的是说明它在宪法制度内的作用，并说明它与民主政体的关系。和通常一样，我假定所谈的社会是一个接近于正义的社会；这就是说，它具有某种形式的民主政治，虽然严重的不正义仍然可能存在。在这个社会里，我假定，在大多数情况下，正义原则都被公认为自由而平等的人们的自愿合作的基本条伴。因此，一个人进行非暴力抵抗，就是打算诉诸大多数人的正义感，毫不含糊地提醒他们，根据他的实事求是和深思熟虑的看法，自由合作的条件正在遭到破坏。我们正在呼吁别人重新考虑，请他们设身处地地为我们着想，并承认他们不能指望我们无限期地默认他们强加给我们的条件。 不过，这种呼吁的力量决定于社会的民主观念，而这个社会是平等的人们之间的一种合作制度。如果人们不是这样来看待社会，那么这种抗议方式也许就不适当。例如，如果把基本法看作是反映了自然秩序，如果认为统治者是作为上帝特选的代理人靠神权来统治的，那么他的国民也就只有俯首乞求的权利了。他们可以向统治者请命，但一旦他们的申诉被否定了，他们就不能不服从。而如果不服从，那可能就是反抗最后的道德权威（不仅仅是法律权威）。这不是说统治者就不会犯错误，而只是说统治者的错误不是由他的国民来纠正。但如果认为社会就是平等的人们之间的合作安排，那么，受到严重不正义行为损害的人就用不着屈服。事实上，非暴力抵抗（以及良心不服从）是对宪法制度的一种稳定手段，虽然顾名思义，它是一种非法手段。同自由而定期的选举以及受权解释宪法（不一定是书面解释）的独立司法制度之类情况一样，适当克制地并按照正确判断来利用非暴力抵抗，有助于维护和加强正义的体制。在忠诚于法律的范围内反抗不正义行为，非暴力抵抗可以用来防止背离正义的行动，即使发生了这种行动，也可予以纠正。从事正当的非暴力抵抗的一种普遍倾向，导致了一个井然有序的社会或接近于正义的社会的稳定。 有必要按照原始状态中人们的观点来考察一下这种理论。有两个相关的问题是他们必须考虑的。第一个问题是，在选定了适用于个人的原则之后，他们必须提出一些准则，用以估计自然责任和义务的力量，尤其是遵守正义宪法及其基本程序之一即过半数规则程序的责任的力量。第二个问题是，要找到一些合理的原则，用以处理不正义的情况，或处理正义原则只是部分得到遵守这种情况。考虑到体现一个接近于正义的社会特征的种种假定，各方看来会赞成明确规定非暴力抵抗何时才是正当的那些论据（前面已经讨论过了）。他们可能会认为，这些标准明确规定了这种反抗形式何时是适当的。这就表明了在一种重要的特殊情况下正义的自然责任的重要程度。同时，这种责任不但促进了人们的相互尊重，而且也提高了他们的自尊，从而有助于在整个社会增进实现正义的机会。正如契约论着重指出的那样，正义原则是平等的人们之间自愿合作的原则。拒绝对另一个人施行正义，要么就是拒绝承认他是一个平等的人（对于这个人，我们准备按照我们在一种公平的平等状态中可能选择的原则来限制我们的行动），要么就是表明为了我们自己的利益而利用天定命运和偶然事件的一种意愿。不管是哪一种情况，有意的不正义行为不是造成屈服，就是招致反抗。屈服激起了人们对那些维持不正义的人的蔑视，并使人们进一步看清了他们的目的，而反抗则割断了社会的联系。在一段合适的时间内，公民们以正常的方式考虑了合理的政治要求，如果在这之后出现了侵犯基本自由权的行为，他们就应该用非暴力抵抗来表示反对。在这种情况下，这些自由权看来不是更加不巩固而是更加巩固了。为此，各方可能会接受对正当的非暴力抵抗所规定的条件，把这种抵抗作为一种办法，在忠诚于法律的范围内，为保证正义宪法的稳定而确立一种最后的手段。虽然这种行为方式严格说来是违反法律的，但从道德上说，它却是维护宪法制度的一种正确方法。 按照一种更全面的考虑，对良心不服从（仍然假定是在一种接近于正义的状态下的良心不服从）的应该有的条件，大概也可以作同样的说明。但我不打算在这里讨论这些条件。我只想着重指出：关于非暴力抵抗的宪法理论完全决定于正义观。甚至这种行动的公开性和非暴力特征也要根据这一点来说明。这一点同样适用于对良心不服从的说明，虽然它需要对契约论进行更深入的详细描述。到目前为止，除政治原则外，还不曾提出其他原则；宗教观或和平主义观是不重要的。虽然进行非暴力抵抗的人常常为这方面的信仰所驱使，但它们和非暴力抵抗之间没有必要的联系。可以把这种政治行动方式理解为向社会正义感呼吁的一种办法，理解为要求实行关于平等的人们之间合作的公认原则。它是向公民生活的道德基础的一种呼吁，因而它是一种政治行动，而不是一种宗教行动。它依赖于人们可以互相要求遵守的常识性的正义原则，而不是依赖于他们不能要求每一个人都接受的关于宗教信仰和宗教之爱的主张。当然，我不是说非政治观念就没有任何作用。事实上，它们也可以证明我们的判断，并帮助我们用由于其他原因而众所周知为正当的方式去行动。然而，构成宪法基础的不是这些原则，而是正义原则，即关于自由而平等的人们之间的社会合作的基本条件。作如此规定的非暴力抵抗不需要以宗派主义为基础，它是由体现民主社会的特点的普遍正义观产生的。作如此理解的非暴力抵抗的观念是自由政治理论的组成部分。 中世纪和近代的立宪政体的一个明显差异是，前者的法律至尊并没有为已经建立了的体制控制所保障。统治者用他的判断和敕令来反对社会的正义感，对他的制约在大多数情况下只限于整个社会或社会任何一部分的反抗权利。甚至这种权利似乎也没有被看作是一种共同行为，一个不正义的国王仅仅是被抛弃而已。因此，中世纪缺乏关于近代宪法政治的基本概念，即关于具有最后权威的主权人民和通过选举与议会以及其他宪法形式使这种权威制度化的概念。近代宪法政治观是建立在中世纪宪法政治观的基础上的，非暴力抵抗理论基本上也是用这种办法补充了关于宪法民主的纯粹法律概念。它试图提出一些可以用来对合法的法律权威表示异议的理由，这种办法固然是违法的，但却表达了对法律的忠诚和向民主制度的基本政治原则的强烈呼吁。因此，在立宪制度的合法形式之外，还可以加上某些非法的抗议方式，从用以指导这种异议的原则来看，这种抗议方式并没有违反民主宪法的目标。我已努力指出怎样用契约论来说明这些原则。 有人可能不同意这个关于非暴力抵抗的理论，认为它是不现实的。它是以多数人都有某种正义感为先决条件的，所以人们可能会反驳说，道德感情不是一种重要的政治力量。人们的动力就是各种利益，是获得权力、威望、财富等等的欲望。虽然他们精于提出道德论据来支持他们的要求，但情况变了，他们的看法也就与合乎逻辑的正义观不相符合了。on the contrary.在任何特定时间内，他们的意见只是一些临时的不成系统的意见，是为了促进某些利益而有意提出来的。毫无疑问，这种论点在很大程度上是正确的，它在某些社会里比在另一些社会里更正确。但至关重要的问题是反对正义感的各种倾向的相对力量问题，以及正义感是否强烈到可以用来发挥某种重大影响的问题。 有几句话也许使刚才的说明听起来似乎更加有理。首先，我始终假定我们所涉及的只是一种接近于正义的社会。这意味着这个社会有一种宪法制度和一种公认的正义观。当然，在任何特定情况下，某些人或集团可能总想要违反这个社会的原则，但代表他们的利益的集体意见，如能得到适当的引导，就能产生相当大的力量。这些原则被证明是自由而平等的人们之间必要的合作条件。如果能清楚地识别那些施行不正义的人，并使他们在广大社会中陷于孤立，那么社会上大部分人的信仰也许就会有足够的份量。或者，如果互相斗争的各方力量大致相等，那么不参加斗争的那些人的正义的意见就成了决定性因素。如果这种情况并不存在，那么非暴力抵抗是否明智无论如何也是十分成问题的。除非一个人能够诉诸广大社会的正义感，否则就只会激起多数人采取更加压制性的措施，如果对利益的考虑促使他们去这样做的话。法院应该考虑抗议者的行动的非暴力抵抗性质，考虑这种行动从构成宪法基础的政治原则看是无可非议的这一事实，并以此为根据，减轻以至在某些情况下中止法律制裁。然而，如果缺乏必要的背景，也许就会出现完全相反的情况。因此，我们必须承认，只有在相当大的程度上受某种正义感支配的社会里，正当的非暴力抵抗通常才是一种合理而有效的反对方式。 关于人们所说的正义感起作用的方式，可能会存在某种误解。人们可能认为，这种思想感情表现为真诚地宣布原则，表现为需要作出相当大的自我牺牲的行动。但这种假定要求太高。一个社会的正义感更可能表现在多数不能使自己采取压制少数的必要措施，不能以法律为借口来惩罚非暴力抵抗行动。不能把其他社会可能打算采用的无情手法当作实际的选择办法。因此，正义感以我们通常觉察不到的方式，影响着我们对政治生活的解释，我们对可能的行动方针的理解和我们反对别人的正当抗议的决心，等等。多数虽然握有较高的权力，但也许会放弃他们的立场，默认持异议者的建议；他们要施行正义的愿望削弱了他们保卫自己的不正当利益的能力。一旦人们认识到正义的感情发挥影响的微妙方式，尤其是认识到它使某些社会立场无法自圆其说的作用，它就会被看作是一种更加至关重要的政治力量。 我的这些论点就是假定，在一个接近于正义的社会里，同样的正义原则得到了普遍的承认。幸运的是，这个假定的有力超过了必要的程度。事实上，只要公民的正义观能够导致同样的政治判断，这些正义观就会有相当大的差异。这是可能的，因为不同的前提可以产生相同的结论。就这一点来说，我们也许可以称之为舆论部分一致而不是严格一致的情况是存在的。一般说来，公开表明的正义观的部分一致，足以使非暴力抵抗成为一种合理而审慎的政治反对方式。当然，这种部分一致无须十分完善，只要能满足某种相互关系的条件就足够了。双方大概都会认为，不管他们的正义观的差异有多大，他们的观点都有助于在眼前情况下作出同样的判断，即使易地以处，也会如此。但最后毕竟还有一个限度，超过这个限度，必要的判断一致就会遭到破坏，社会也会分裂为或多或少明显不同的部分，各自对基本的政治问题持不同见解。在这种舆论泾渭分明的情况下，非暴力抵抗的基础不复存在。例如，假定不相信宽容的人和一旦有了权力就不愿宽容别人的人，希望通过诉诸坚持平等自由权原则的多数人的正义感，来表示对自己的较少自由权的不满。虽然我们知道，承认这个原则的人在自由体制的安全许可的情况下应该宽容不宽容的人，但如果不宽容的人的地位变了，确立了自己的支配权力，反而用这种责任来提醒承认这个原则的人，这些人很可能会反感。这个多数必定会认为，他们对平等自由权的忠诚正被别人用来为实现不正义的目的服务。这种情况再次表明，共同的正义感是一种巨大的集体财富，需要许多人的合作来保持。可以把不宽容的人看作是只享受权利而不尽义务的人，他们谋求从正义的体制得到好处，而又不肯为维护这种体制尽自己的力量。虽然承认正义原则的人应该始终受到这些原则的指导，但在一个四分五裂的社会里，同在一个以团体利己主义为动力的社会里一样，非暴力抵抗的条件是不存在的。严格的舆论一致仍是不必要的，因为一定程度的舆论部分一致常常可以使相互关系的条件得到实现。 的确，利用非暴力抵抗也有一定的危险。赞成宪法体制以及对其司法解释的一个理由，是要规定一种对政治正义观的普遍解释，并对这种正义观的原则对社会问题的适用情况作出说明。在一定的程度上，宁可说法律和对法律的解释问题得到了解决，而不可说得到了正确的解决。因此，也可以这样说，以上说明并没有规定，在出现了诸如要证明非暴力抵抗是正当行为的情况时谁应该有发言权。如果鼓励每个人都去自己决定，并放弃对政治原则的普遍解释，那就会引起混乱。对这个问题的回答是，每个人的确都必须作出自己的决定。即使人们通常都要征求别人的意见，而且如果掌权者的禁令在他们看来是合理的，他们也会接受禁令，但他们始终对自己的行动负有责任。我们决不能脱卸自己的责任，而将罪责推给别人。对于任何符合民主宪法原则的关于政治责任和义务的理论来说，这一点都是成立的。公民是独立自主的，然而又对自己的行动负责（第78节）。如果说我们一般都认为我们应该遵守法律，这是因为我们的政治原则通常导致了这个结论。当然，在一种接近于正义的状态下，主张在没有充分的相反理由的情况下遵守法律的根据是存在的。个人的许多自由的经过审慎考虑的决定互相配合，造就了一种秩序井然的政治制度。 但是，虽然每个人都必须自己来决定当时情况是否证明非暴力抵抗是正当的，但不能因此就说，他可以随心所欲地作决定。我们作决定不是靠个人利益，而是靠我们的经过严格解释的政治忠诚。为了独立自主地和负责任地去行动，一个公民必须依靠所有作为解释宪法的基础并指导解释宪法的政治原则。他必须努力确定应该怎样把这些原则应用于当前情况。如果他在经过适当考虑后得出结论说，非暴力抵抗是正当的，并照此办理，那么他的行动就是光明磊落的。虽然他可能错了，但他不是随心所欲地行动。关于政治责任和义务的理论使我们能够划清这些界限。 在科学研究中得到的共同认识和结论，也有类似之处。在这里，每个人是独立自主的，又是负有责任的。我们应该按照公认的原则，依靠证据来估价理论和假说。权威著作诚然是有的，但它们是对各自作决定的许多人的意见的总结。没有作决定的最后权威，没有人人必须接受的官方解释，这并不会引起混乱，而是理论进步的一个条件。接受并应用合理原则的平等的人，不需要什么公认的权威。对由谁来决定这个问题的回答是：由大家来决定，每个人通过自己的思考来作出决定，这样，有了理智、礼让和好运，就常常可以得到很好的结果。 因此，在一个民主的社会里，每一个公民都有解释正义原则和按正义原则行动的责任，这是人所公认的。对于我们在道义上始终必须接受的这个原则，不可能有任何法定的或得到全社会承认的解释，即使是最高法院或立法机关作出的解释，情况也是如此。事实上，每一个宪法执行机构——立法机关、行政部门和法院——对于宪法以及赋予宪法以活力的政治理想，都作出了它自己的解释。虽然法院在裁决个别案件时可能具有最后发言权，但它免不了也要受到强大的政治影响，从而被迫对宪法重新作出解释。法院靠推理和论据来提出它的原则；它的宪法观即使能始终如一，也必须能使大多数公民相信其正确。终审上诉法院并不是法院，也不是行政部门或立法机关，而是整个选举团。从事非暴力抵抗的人以一种特殊方式上诉这个机关。只要公民的正义观能够取得足够的足以成事的一致，只要利用非暴力抵抗的条件得到尊重，就不会有产生混乱的危险。人们能够获得这种认识，并在基本的政治自由权得到维护的情况下尊重这些限制，这是包含在民主政体中的一种假定。分裂冲突的危险是无法完全避免的，正如人们不能排除激烈的科学论战的可能性一样。不过，如果正当的非暴力抵抗似乎威胁到公民的和谐一致，那么责任不是要由提抗议的人来负，而是要由滥用权威和权力从而证明这种反对有理的那些人来负。利用国家的强制性工具来维持明显不正义的体制，这本身就是人们早晚有权反对的一种非法力量。 关于正义原则的内容，我们的论点已如上述，对它的讨论至此结束。在本书的这一部分中，我的目的始终是描述符合这些原则的一种体制安排，并指出责任和义务是怎样产生的。这些事非做不可，以便弄清所提出的正义理论是否与我们深思熟虑的判断相一致，是否以一种可以接受的方式扩大了这种判断。我们有必要检查一下，这个理论是否规定了一种可行的政策观，是否有助于把我们的反思集中到最有关的和最基本的道德问题上来。这一部分的说明仍然是非常抽象的，但我希望，对于正义原则如何实际应用问题，我已提供了某种指导。然而，我们不应该忘记，这个理论所涉及的范围是有限的。在大多数情况下，我都试图提出一种理想的观念，只是偶尔才对非理想理论的各种不同情况进行评论。的确，优先规则表明在许多方面都起了指导作用，如果不对它们要求过高，它们可能是有用的。即使如此，多少得到详细研究的非理想理论的唯一问题，就是在接近于正义这种特殊情况下的非暴力抵抗问题。如果说，理想理论值得研究，根据我的假设，那大概是因为它是正义理论的基本部分，而且对非理想部分也是必不可少的。我打算进一步研究这些问题。我们仍然需要弄清楚正义理论是怎样深入人类的思想感情，并与我们的目的和追求联系在一起，以便完成这一理论。