Chapter 17 Chapter VI Responsibilities and Obligations-1
In the previous two chapters I discussed principles of justice as they apply to institutions.I would now like to discuss the principles of natural duty and duty as they apply to individuals.The first two sections of this chapter examine the reasons why these principles might have been chosen in the original position and their stabilizing effects on social cooperation.There is also a brief discussion of the issue of conventions and the principles of compliance.For the most part, however, I shall examine what these principles mean for a theory of political responsibility and duty within the constitutional context.From the standpoint of a theory of justice, this seems the best way of illustrating the meaning and content of these principles.In particular, the special case of civil disobedience is sketched, linking it to the problem of the majority rule and the justification for obeying unjust laws.To show the special role civil resistance plays in stabilizing a near-just democracy, civil resistance is also contrasted with other forms of non-compliance, such as conscientious disobedience.
In the previous chapter (Sections 18-19) I briefly described the principles of responsibility and duty as they apply to individuals.Now, I must consider why these principles were chosen in their original state.They are an integral part of the conception of right, and they define our institutional relationships and how we owe each other.The concept of justice as fairness is incomplete until these principles are stated.
From the point of view of justice theory, the most important natural duty is the duty to uphold and promote just institutions.This duty has two components: first, if there are just institutions and they apply to us, we should obey them and do our part against them; second, if there are no just institutions , we should help to establish just arrangements, at least when there are few sacrifices on our part.It follows, therefore, that if the basic structure of society is just, or is as just as one might reasonably expect it to be under the circumstances, then every individual has a natural duty to do what is required of him.Regardless of whether everyone's actions are voluntary or not, he is obliged to do things.Now our question is: why this principle and not some other might be adopted.As in the case of institutions, let us assume that the parties cannot test all possible principles that might be proposed.The many possible principles are ambiguous, and there may not be any optimal choice among them.To avoid these difficulties, I assume again that a choice can be made from a small number of traditional and well-known principles.For the sake of speeding things up, for the sake of illustration and comparison, I intend here only to mention the utilitarian alternative, thereby greatly simplifying the exposition.
Now, since the principles that apply to institutions have been adopted, it is quite simple to choose principles that apply to individuals.Taken together with the two principles of justice, these possible alternatives are immediately narrowed to a logical conception of duty and duty.Such limitations must be of particular importance to those principles which define our institutional ties.Let us therefore suppose that the persons in the original position, having agreed to the two principles of justice, are ready to consider the principle of choice of utility (two different cases) as a criterion of personal action.Even if there were no contradictions in this assumption, the adoption of utilitarian principles would lead to an illogical conception of right.Standards that apply to institutions and individuals do not mesh well with each other.This is especially evident in situations where one's social status is governed by principles of justice.Consider, for example, a case where a citizen decides how to vote for a political party, or a case where a legislator does not know whether he should approve a law or not.Suppose these persons are members of a well-ordered society which has adopted the two principles of justice for institutions and the principle of utility for individuals.How should they act?As a rational citizen or legislator, it seems that a man should support that party, and that statute which is most in accordance with the two principles of justice, that is to say, he should vote according to this, And vigorously persuade others to do the same, and so on.The existence of institutions affects certain modes of action of individuals in accordance with accepted rules.Thus, the principles that apply to institutions affect the actions of individuals who occupy positions in institutional arrangements.But these people must also think that their actions are governed by the principle of utility.In this case, if the victory of a certain party or the passage of a regulation is highly likely to maximize the net balance (or average) of satisfaction, then the rational citizen or legislator should favor that party or this regulation.The choice of the principle of utility as the standard applicable to the individual ends up being the opposite.In order to avoid this contradiction it is necessary to choose a principle which can properly cooperate with the two principles of justice, at least so long as the individual occupies a place in the system.Only in the non-institutional context can the utilitarian view be consistent with what has been agreed upon.Although the principle of utility may have a place in certain appropriately limited circumstances, it cannot be used as a general statement of duties and obligations.
The easiest thing to do, therefore, is to use the two principles of justice as part of a conception of right applicable to the individual.We may formulate the natural duty of justice as a duty to support and promote arrangements consistent with these principles; and we thus obtain a principle consistent with the standards applied to institutions.There is still another problem: if the parties in the original position so claim, compliance with the regime of justice is conditional on some voluntary action by them, for example, on the fact that they have recognized the Could they have done better if they agreed to abide by these arrangements?A principle with such a condition immediately seems more in line with the notion of a contract that emphasizes the promise of liberty and the protection of liberty rights.But in reality, that proviso may come to nothing.From the lexical sequence of the two principles of justice, the full complement of equal liberty is guaranteed.Any further assurances in this regard are unnecessary.In addition, all parties have every reason to ensure the stability of the just system, and the easiest and most direct way to do so is to accept the conditions of upholding and obeying the just system, regardless of whether a person's actions are voluntary or not.
These comments can be made more forceful by revisiting our previous discussion of the public good (section 42).We have pointed out that, in a well-ordered society, citizens generally have some practical sense of justice, and that public knowledge of this is a very great social asset.This knowledge tends to have a stabilizing effect on just social arrangements.Even where the isolated decision problem is solved and there are reasonably large-scale arrangements that produce the public good, there are still two tendencies that lead to instability.From the point of view of self-interest, everyone always wants to evade his own responsibilities.He has benefited from the public good anyway; even if the marginal social value of the dollars he spends on taxes is substantially greater than the value of the marginal dollars he spends on himself, only a small fraction of it contributes to his own benefit .These tendencies, arising out of selfishness, lead to the first instability.But even with some sense of justice, people are likely to obey a cooperative cause because they believe that others will do their part.That being the case, citizens may also want to avoid making their own contributions if they believe or have reason to suspect that others are not making their own contributions.These tendencies, arising out of fear of the fidelity of others, lead to a second instability.This instability is especially likely to be exacerbated if one party obeys the rules and the other does not, leading to danger.It is this difficulty which makes disarmament agreements so difficult; and even just men, in view of the mutual apprehension, cannot help being placed in perpetual hostility.We have seen that the so-called guarantee of compliance is the elimination of the first temptation to maintain stability; and since this is achieved through public institutions, the second temptation also disappears, at least in a well-ordered society. up.
The implication of these arguments is that basing our political relations on some principle of duty may complicate the question of ensuring compliance.Citizens may not be obliged even to a just constitution unless they have recognized and are prepared to continue to recognize its benefits.Moreover, such recognition must in some appropriate sense be voluntary.But what is the proper meaning?It is difficult to find a plausible account of the political system into which we are born and begin our lives.Even if such an account could be made, citizens might doubt each other whether they had such an obligation, or simply believe that they did not.The common belief that all men are bound to just arrangements would become less firm, and it might be necessary to rely more heavily on the coercive power of the rulers in order to achieve stability.However, there is no reason to take such a risk.The most appropriate course of action for the parties in the original position is, therefore, to recognize the natural duty of justice.Given the value of some general and practical sense of justice, it is important that the principles of individual responsibility be simple and clear, and that they guarantee the stability of just arrangements.I think, therefore, that it is the natural duty of justice, rather than the principle of utility, which may be agreed upon, and which, from the point of view of a theory of justice, is the basic condition imposed upon the individual.The principle of duty, while meeting this condition, was not an alternative, but only a supplementary one.
Of course, there are other natural responsibilities.Some of these natural duties have been mentioned earlier (v. 19).Rather than discussing them all, it may be more instructive to examine a few of them, beginning with the duty of mutual respect not mentioned earlier.This duty is to show a person the respect he deserves as a moral subject, that is, a person who possesses a sense of justice and a conception of the good (characteristics that may, in some cases, just potential, but I'm not going to discuss such complications here; see Section 77).Mutual respect is manifested in several ways: in our willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view, in terms of their conceptions of the good; and in our readiness to explain our own reason for action.
These two aspects correspond to the two aspects of moral character.Reasons should be given, if necessary, to those concerned; reasons should be given honestly, in the belief that they are justified by a conception of justice which takes into account the good of each and is mutually acceptable.Respecting another human being as a moral subject is thus an effort to understand his aims and interests from his point of view, and to present to him reasons which enable him to accept restrictions on his behaviour.Let us assume that since another person wishes to regulate his actions according to principles that everyone can agree on, he should be familiar with the relevant facts that illustrate the limitations in this respect. Respect is also expressed in willingness to do a little favor. Not because of how much practical value they have, but because they aptly express our understanding of another person's feelings and desires.Why, then, is this responsibility recognized?The reason for this is this: Although the parties in the original position were not interested in each other's interests, they knew that they needed the respect of their fellow men in society to gain confidence in themselves.Their self-esteem and the confidence they have in the value of their goal system cannot withstand the indifference, let alone the contempt, of others.Everyone living in a society benefits if the duty to respect one another is recognized.It is less detrimental to self-interest than maintaining a sense of self-worth.
The same argument applies to other natural responsibilities.For example, consider the duty to help each other.Kant thinks, and others think with him, that the reason for invoking this responsibility is that it may happen that we need help from others, and that to deny this principle is to deny us help from others.Though on some special occasions we are required to do things which are not in our own interest, on the whole we are at least as good as we would be in a longer period of time under normal circumstances.In each individual instance, the gain to the needy far outweighs the loss to those who must help him, and if it is assumed that the chances of being a beneficiary are no greater than those of being a man who must help others How much less opportunity, then this principle is clearly in our interest.But this is not the only, or even the most important, argument in favor of a duty to help each other.A good reason for accepting this responsibility is its pervasive impact on the quality of everyday life.We live in a society where we can count on others to help us when we encounter difficulties.A general awareness of this is of great value in itself.Even if it turns out that we don't need this kind of help at all, and that we sometimes need to help others, it makes no difference.On a narrow interpretation, the balance of interests may not matter.The chief measure of the value of this principle is not how much actual help we receive, but whether we feel trust in the goodwill of others, and whether we know that the help we need is readily available.Indeed, one only has to imagine what a society would be if such responsibility were known to be abandoned?Thus, although natural duty is not the peculiar case of one principle (as I assume), the same reasoning is undoubtedly true of many natural duties, so long as one considers the underlying attitude which natural duty represents.As soon as we try to picture social life as one in which no one has the slightest desire to act in accordance with these responsibilities, we see that this picture can indicate indifference, if not contempt, for man, and this Attitudes can make our sense of self-worth impossible.Once again, we should point out that propaganda plays a major role.
The reasons in favor of accepting any natural duty are quite obvious, viewed in themselves.At least one thing is obvious, and that is that these responsibilities are in any case preferable to no similar requirements at all.While the regulation and systematic arrangement of these responsibilities is inappropriate, there can be no doubt that they may be recognized.The real difficulty lies in specifying them more fully, and is also concerned with the question of priority: if these duties conflict with each other, or with obligations, or with the good that may be achieved by actions extraneous to duty, how can the How are they balanced?There are no obvious rules to follow for solving these problems.We cannot say, for example, that duty takes precedence in lexical order over actions other than duties, or over obligations.Nor can we simply use utilitarian principles in order to get things done.The claims made to the individual are often antagonistic, probably almost as often as when the criterion of utility applied to the individual is adopted; and, we know that.This clarification is ruled out by leading to an irrelevant conception of right.I don't know how this problem should be solved, or even if it can be solved systematically by coming up with some useful practical rules.The theory that applies to the basic structure actually seems to be simpler.Since we are dealing with a general arrangement of general rules, so long as we take this more comprehensive long-term view, we can rely on some aggregate procedure to wipe out the meaning of the complex factors of a particular case.Therefore, I do not intend to discuss these priority issues very fully in this book.What I have done is to study a few special cases in relation to civil resistance and conscientious disobedience in the context of what I shall call near-just institutions.A satisfactory account of these problems is at best a beginning; but it can give us some idea of the obstacles we face, and help to focus our intuitive judgments on the right problems.
It may be appropriate at this point to point to the well-known difference between liability ceteris paribus (so-called manifest liability) and responsibility when it is fully considered (similar differences apply to obligations).This concept was proposed by Ross, and we can use his concept as the main basis.Thus, the full set of principles that would have been chosen in the original position were assumed to be known, which could include principles that apply to institutions and individuals, and, of course, trade-offs if these principles apply to quite different aspects in a particular case Rules of precedence for these principles.I further assume that this comprehensive conception of right is limited: it includes a limited number of principles and priority rules.Although moral principles (institutional and individual virtues) are in some sense infinite, or infinitely broad, this comprehensive conception of right is roughly complete, that is, the moral considerations it does not include Secondary in most cases.In general, they can be ignored without serious risk of errors.As the concept of right is presented more fully, the meaning of those moral reasons that are not accounted for becomes trivial.There is, however, a principle not unlike this comprehensive conception of right (a limited but complete conception of right in a defined sense), which manifests its completeness and, if we will, a commanding agent The principle of taking an action which, rationally judged according to the whole set of principles (including the rules of precedence), is the proper one (or the best one) of all the ones he might take.Here, I suppose, the rules of precedence are sufficient to resolve conflicts between principles, or at least to indicate the correct way of prioritizing them.Except in a few cases, we obviously cannot yet account for these rules; but since we can make these judgments, it follows that useful rules exist (unless the intuitionists are right, unless they are mere descriptions).In short, the set of principles guides us to act on relevant and appropriate reasons (reasons specified by the set of principles) that we can or should find.
With these provisions in mind, it can be seen that the terms "ceteris paribus" or "all things considered" (and other related expressions) indicate the extent to which judgments are based on this set of principles.There is a general argument which often dictates how we should act, provided that the conditions of the former are fulfilled, but it cannot be shown by a single principle.On the contrary, some basic principles single out relevant features of certain moral situations, which can be exemplified to help make certain ethical judgments and provide reasons for making such judgments.A correct judgment depends on all relevant characteristics, since these characteristics are confirmed and verified by a complete conception of right.If we say that, all things considered, a matter is our responsibility, we mean that we consider ourselves to have investigated every one of these aspects of the matter; or else we mean that we know ( or have reason to believe) the results of this broader survey.On the contrary, if we call a certain claim a duty ceteris paribus (so-called manifest duty), we are showing that we have so far considered only certain Secondary reasons for making certain judgments.I generally don't intend to point out the difference between something that is one's responsibility (or obligation) other things being equal, and something that is one's responsibility after all things are considered.To understand what things mean, you can often rely on the context.
These arguments, I think, express the basic gist of Roth's concept of apparent responsibility.What is important is that the appendatives "ceteris paribus" and "all things considered" (and, of course, "obvious") are not subjects of separate propositions, let alone predicates of actions.Rather, what they express is a relation between propositions.are a relation between a judgment and its grounds; or, as I said before, they express a relation between a judgment and a part or set of principles.This explanation takes into account the gist of Roth's concept.For he introduces the concept as a means of stating fundamental principles in order to provide, in particular cases, the reasons prescribed by those principles for opposing courses of action (as they often do, in fact). , without bringing us into conflict.Kant has a traditional doctrine, or Rose thinks it is Kant's doctrine, which is to divide the principles applicable to individuals into two categories, namely, those about perfect duties and those about incomplete duties, and then divide them by vocabulary The sequence is arranged so that principles of the first kind take precedence over (in my words) principles of the second kind.However, it is generally not only wrong to say that incomplete duties (such as those concerning charity) should always give way to perfect duties (such as those concerning loyalty), but the question whether perfect duties may conflict, We didn't get an answer either.Perhaps Kant's theory has some solution; but in any case, he leaves the question aside.A convenient way is to use the concept Roth uses for this purpose.To say this is of course not to accept his argument that the basic principles are self-evident.This argument concerns how these principles are known, and where they might have come from.The question does not depend on how a number of principles fit together on the basis of a set of reasons and help to make particular judgments about responsibilities and obligations.
While there are various principles of natural duty, all obligations arise from the principle of equity (as laid down in Section 18).We will recall that this principle holds that a person voluntarily accepts the benefits of an institutional arrangement, or takes advantage of an opportunity provided by an institutional arrangement to further his own interests, and if the institution is just or fair, that is, , is in line with the two principles of justice, then this person is obliged to do his part in accordance with the rules of the system.As already pointed out, the intuitive concept here is that if several persons engage in a mutually beneficial cooperative enterprise according to certain rules, and thus voluntarily restrict their own liberty, then the persons subject to such restrictions have the right to claim And the beneficiary acquiesces to the same restrictions.We should not benefit from the cooperative efforts of others if we fail to do our part.
It should not be forgotten that the principle of fairness has two parts: one part states how we acquire obligations, that is, by doing various things voluntarily; , if not perfectly just, at least as justly as the circumstances might reasonably expect.The purpose of this second clause is to ensure that obligations arise only if certain background conditions are fulfilled.Acquiescence or even consent to a system that is manifestly unjust cannot create obligations.The consensus is that a blackmailed promise was never a promise in the first place.But unjust social arrangements are themselves blackmail, even violence, and agreeing to them is not the same as being bound by them.So this condition is put forward because it may be the insistence of all parties in the original state.
Before discussing the source of this principle, one problem must be solved.It may be objected that there is no need for a principle of fairness when there is a ready-made principle of natural duty.Duties can be described in terms of natural duties of justice, since if a person makes use of an institutional arrangement, then the rules of that institution apply to him, and thus the duties of justice are valid.This argument is actually quite correct.We can invoke duty of justice to explain duty whenever we want.Just think of the necessary voluntary actions as actions used to freely extend our natural responsibilities.Although the arrangement in question was previously not applicable to us.And we have no duty but not to try to destroy this arrangement, but now we extend the constraints of natural duty by our actions.There are, however, institutions, or aspects of them, which we are born with which govern all our activities and which must therefore apply to us.There are also institutions which apply to us because we are free to do certain things as a reasonable means of furthering our own ends.A distinction between the two regimes seems appropriate.Thus we have a natural duty to obey the constitution, or to obey the fundamental laws governing property (assuming they are just), and on the other hand we have a duty to perform duties concerning the offices we have acquired, or an obligation to comply with the regulations of a group or event in which we have joined.It is sometimes justified to give different consideration to duties and responsibilities if they conflict simply by virtue of the way in which they arise.At least in some cases, the casual assumption of an obligation must affect the evaluation of the obligation if it conflicts with other moral requirements.It is also true that better-positioned members of society are more likely than other members of society to have political obligations as distinct from political responsibilities, since these are, in general, the best able to obtain political office and to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the constitutional system.They are therefore subject to even stricter constraints on the arrangements of just institutions.To show this, and also to highlight the way in which many constraints are accepted at will, the principle of fairness is useful.This principle should allow us to formulate a different account of responsibility and obligation.The word "duty" will therefore be reserved for the moral requirements derived from the principle of fairness, while the other requirements are called "natural duties."
Since the principle of fairness will be referred to in relation to political affairs in later sections, I intend to discuss here its relationship to commitment.As for the principle of fidelity, that is but a special case of the application of the principle of fairness to the custom of social commitment.Arguments in favor of this start with the view that commitment is an action prescribed by a system of public rules.As in the case of the general regime, these rules are a set of fundamental conventions.Like the rules of the game, they specify certain activities and prescribe certain actions.As far as commitments are concerned, the ground rules are guidelines for using the phrase "I promise to do something."This pretty much means that if a person says the phrase "I promise to do something" under the right circumstances, then he should do it, unless there are certain circumstances that preclude him from doing it .We can think of this rule as the rule about commitment; we can also think of it as embodying the whole habit of commitment.The rule itself is not a moral principle, but a fundamental convention.In this respect it is equal to laws and regulations, equal to the rules of the game; it exists in society as much as they do, and men are more or less constantly bound to act according to it.
The manner in which the promise rule states the appropriate circumstances in which promises may be made and certain circumstances in which promises may not be made determines whether the custom of promises embodied in the rule is just.For example, in order to make a binding promise; one must be of a reasonable state of mind, must be fully conscious, must know what such legally binding words mean.How to use it to make promises, etc.Furthermore, the utterance must be uttered freely or voluntarily by a person without being threatened or coerced.It's as if he's in a pretty fair bargaining position when he says that.If such legally binding words are spoken by a man in his sleep, or in delirium, or if he is compelled to make the promise, or if he is deliberately kept from his knowledge, he shall It is not necessary to carry out what he said.In general, the circumstances of commitment or non-commitment must be regulated in order to preserve the equal liberty of the parties and to make the custom of commitment a reasonable means by which people can come to mutually beneficial cooperative agreements and make such agreements keep it steady.There are many complications that cannot be accounted for here, which are unavoidable.Presumably it suffices to say that the principles of justice apply to other institutions as well as to the custom of commitment.Therefore, in order to protect the right to equal liberty, it is necessary to restrict the so-called suitable circumstances.It may be extremely unreasonable to agree in a primitive state to be bound by words spoken in sleep or under compulsion.No doubt this is so unreasonable that we tend to exclude this and other possibilities as incompatible with the notion (meaning) of commitment.However, I do not intend to treat promises as customs that are just by definition, because doing so blurs the distinction between the rules of promise and obligations arising from principles of fairness.Just as there are many different contract laws, there are also many different promises.Whether a particular habit of commitment known to a person or group of people is just is still to be determined by principles of justice.
With these arguments as background, we can introduce two definitions.First of all, a sincere promise is a promise produced according to the promise rule under the condition that the promise rule embodied in the promise rule is justice.A person makes a sincere promise as soon as he says the words "I promise to do something" in the proper circumstances prescribed by the customs of just commitment.Second, the principle of loyalty is the principle that enables sincere promises to be kept.As pointed out earlier, it is crucial to distinguish the rule of commitment from the principle of loyalty.The promise rule is nothing more than a basic convention, while the loyalty principle is a moral principle, which is the result of the fairness principle.Assume that a habit of commitment to justice exists.Thus, when a person makes a commitment, saying the words "I promise to do sth" under the right circumstances, he is consciously enforcing the rules of commitment and recognizing the benefits of a just arrangement.Let us assume that there is no obligation to make a promise; one is free to make or not to make a promise.But since the custom of promise is assumed to be just, the principle of fairness applies, so that a person should do what the rule of promise says, that is, he should do something.The obligation to keep promises is a consequence of the principle of fairness.
I have said that when one makes a commitment, one is practicing a habit of social commitment and acknowledging the possible benefits of that habit.What are these benefits?How do commitment habits work?To answer this question, we might assume that the general reason for commitment is to establish and stabilize small cooperative arrangements or a particular pattern of interaction.The role of the promise is similar to that which Hobbes ascribed to the monarch.Just as the sovereign publicly maintained an efficient procedure of punishment, and thus maintained and stabilized the system of social cooperation, so, without coercive arrangements, men established and stabilized their private undertakings by committing themselves to one another.Starting and maintaining such a business is often difficult.This is especially evident in the case of a covenant, that is, in which one must act before the other.Because the person may believe that the other party will not perform their duties, this arrangement will never work.Even if people who act late actually follow through on their actions, they are still prone to the second type of instability mentioned above.In such a case there may be no other means of assuring the first mover than by making a promise to the first mover, that is, by imposing an obligation on a person to carry out his action at a later date.Such an arrangement can only be secured by a commitment to the first mover, so that both parties can benefit from their cooperation.承诺习惯正是为了这个目的而存在的；因此，虽然我们通常把道德要求看作是加给我们的约束，但有时候这种约束却是我们为了自己的利益而有意加给自己的。这样，承诺就成了一种在有意承担义务的公开意图下作出的行动，因为此时此地这种义务的存在有助于实现人们的目标。我们希望存在这种义务，也希望大家都知道存在这种义务，同时我们还希望别人知道，我们承认这种约束，并打算遵守这种约束。我们一旦为此而利用了承诺习惯，也就负有了某种义务，即按照公平原则去做我们答应做的事。
在说明如何利用承诺（或缔结盟约）来创立并稳定某些形式的合作这个问题时，我主要采用了普里查德的观点。他的论述包含了全部要点。和他一样，我也曾假定，每个人都知道或至少有理由相信对方都具有某种正义感，因而也就是有了一种要履行自己的真诚义务的通常实际的欲望。没有这种相互信任，光靠口头承诺，那就会一事无成。然而，在一个井然有序的社会里，还存在着这样一种理解：如果社会成员作出了承诺，那就说明他们相互承认彼此都有使自己承担某种义务的意图，都有一种认为这个义务会得到兑现的合理信念。正是这种相互承认和共同理解使某种安排得以创立，并始终保持它的存在。
至于某种共同的正义观（包括公平原则和自然责任）以及对人们愿意按照这种正义观行动这一点的普遍意识，在多大程度上成了一种巨大的集体财富，这是毋需多说的。我已经指出了从保证遵守问题的观点来看的许多优点。不过，同样显而易见的是，人们由于彼此信任，可以利用他们对这些原则的普遍承认来大大扩大互利合作安排的范围和价值。因此，从原始状态的观点来看，各方赞成公平原则，这显然是合理的。可以按照与选择自由相一致的方法，同时又在不至于不必要地增加道德要求的情况下，把这个原则用来保障这些事业。同时，如果有公平原则，我们就可以明白，为什么会存在一种作为在双方互利的情况下规定义务的方法的承诺习惯。这种安排显然是符合共同利益的。我将认为，这些考虑为赞成公平原则提供了充分的论据。
在着手讨论政治责任和义务这个问题之前，还有几点是我应该予以指出的。首先；正如关于承诺的讨论所表明的那样，契约论认为，任何道德要求都不是单单由于体制的存在而产生的。甚至承诺规则也不能靠它自身来产生道德义务。为了说明信用义务，我们必须把公平原则当作前提。这样，同大多数伦理学理论一样，正义即公平理论也认为，自然责任和义务完全是靠伦理原则产生的。这些原则是可能在原始状态中得到选择的原则。这些标准同现有的有关事实情况一起，决定了我们的义务和责任，并挑选出所认为的道德理由。一个（正确的）道德理由，就是一个或多个这样的原则认为可以用来帮助作出判断的一种事实。正确的道德决定如果适用于它认为有关的全部事实，就是与这套原则的要求最相符合的决定。因此，由一个原则认定的理由，可能会为一个或多个其他原则认定的理由所赞同、拒绝甚至取消（使之无效）。不过，我认为，可以从全部事实中，在某种意义上大概就是无限的事实中，把有限的或可以考察的若干事实挑选出来作为对任何特定情况都有关的事实。这样，这整个方法就使我们能够在经过全面考虑后作出某种判断。
与此不同的是，确定体制的要求，确定来自社会习惯的要求，一般可以根据现有的规则，也可以根据对这些规则的解释方式。例如，如果法律的性质能够确定，那么作为公民，我们的法定责任和义务就要由法律的性质来决定。适用于比赛选手的标准决定于比赛规则。至于这些要求是否同道德责任和义务发生联系，那是另外一个问题。即使法官和其他人用来解释和应用法律的标准同正当原则及正义原则有相似之处，或者竟是同一个东西，情况也依然如此。例如，在一个井然有序的社会里，正义的两个原则可能被用来解释宪法中关于规定思想自由和良心自由以及保证得到法律同等保护的那些部分。虽然在这种情况下，如果法律符合它自身的标准，那么，在其他条件相等时，我们显然在道德上负有遵守它的义务，但是法律要求什么和正义要求什么，这仍然是明确的。把承诺规则和忠诚原则（由公平原则产生的一种特殊情况）合在一起的倾向是特别强大的。乍看起来，它们可能是同一个东西；但一个是由现有的基本公约规定的，另一个则是由可能在原始状态中得到选择的原则来说明的。这样，我们就可以把这两种标准区别开来。“责任”和“义务”这两个词对两种情况都可使用；但用法上的这种模糊不清应是非常容易解决的。
最后，我还想说一下，前面对忠诚原则的说明，回答了普理查德所提出的一个问题。他感到奇怪：既然没有任何事先的一般承诺，也没有关于遵守协议的协议，一个人光凭口头几句话（通过利用某种习惯），就使自己负有做某件事的义务，尤其是，如果使他受到约束的行动是公开去做的，而且他在这样做时又抱有他希望得到别人承认的关于履行这一义务的意图——那么，怎样才能解释这个事实呢？或者，就像普理查德所说的那样：既然存在着真诚的协议，那么这里指的某件事又是什么呢？这里所谓的某件事看来很像一种遵守协议的协议，然而，严格说来，它又不可能是一种协议（因为这种协议还没有达成）。有了作为一套公共基本规则的正义的承诺习惯，有了公平原则，对于信用义务的理论来说也就足够了。但两者都不意味着存在实际的遵守协议的事先的协议。采用公平原则纯粹是一种假设。我们所需要的只是这个原则可能会得到承认这个事实。至于其他问题，一旦我们认为，正义的承诺习惯不管最后可能是怎样形成的，只要它得到公认，那么，在已经描述过的这种合适的情况下，公平原则完全可以使那些利用它的人受到约束。例如，在普理查德看来，所谓的某件事很像一种事先的协议，但其实并不是，与这件事相当的，是结合关于公平原则的假设协议而在口头上作出的正义的承诺习惯。当然，另一种伦理学理论也可以不用原始状态观来推导出这个原则。在目前来说，我用不着坚持认为信用关系不能用别的什么方法来说明。相反，我想要指出的是，即使正义即公平理论使用了原始协议的概念，它仍然能够对普理查德的问题作出圆满的解答。
我们为什么要遵守按照正义的宪法制定出来的正义的法律，说明这个问题显然毫无困难。在这一方面，自然责任原则和公平原则都规定了必要的责任和义务。公民一般都要受到正义的责任的约束，那些担任了有利职务和职位的人，或者利用了某些机会来促进自己利益的人，更有责任按照公平原则去尽他们的本分。实际的问题是：我们在何种情况下以及在多大程度上必须遵守不正义的安排。不过，有时候据说我们决不是非要遵守不正义的安排不可。但是，这种说法是错误的。一般说来，法律的不正义性不能成为人们不遵守这个法律的充分理由，正如（由现有宪法规定的）立法的法定效力不能成为人们赞成这个立法的充分理由一样。如果社会的基本结构像当时情况下能够估计的那样是相当正义的，同时如果不正义的法律的不正义性又没有超过某种限度，那么我们就应该承认这些不正义的法律是有约束力的。在试图判明不正义的限度时，我们就是在探讨政治责任和义务这个更深刻的问题。这里的困难一部分是由于在这种情况下某些原则产生了冲突。有些原则赞成遵守，而另一些原则则要求我们不遵守。因此，必须用一种关于适当优先的概念来平衡政治责任和义务的各种要求。
然而，还有一个问题。我们知道，（词汇序列中的）正义原则属于理想理论（第39节）。原始状态中的人们认为，他们所承认的任何原则将会得到每一个人的严格遵守和奉行。因此，这样产生的正义原则就成了在有利条件下规定什么是完全正义的社会的原则。我们有了关于严格遵守的假定，我们也就有了某种理想的正义观。如果我们问，不正义的安排是否应该容忍，以及在什么情况下应该容忍，那么我们面临的就是一种不同的问题。在某些情况下，我们面临的是不正义问题，而不是必须适应自然的限制问题。如果这种理想的正义观确实完全适用于这些情况，那么它又是如何适用的，我们必须弄清这些问题。对这些问题的论述，属于非理想理论的部分遵守部分。除其他许多问题外，这一部分还包括惩罚和补偿正义理论以及正义战争和良心不服从、非暴力抵抗和武力抵抗等问题。这些都是政治生活中的重要问题，但到目前为止，正义即公平观还不曾直接应用于这些问题。不过，我不打算对这些问题进行全面的讨论。事实上，我只打算讨论部分遵守理论的一个片断，即非暴力抵抗和良心不服从问题。即使在这一方面，我也将假定这里所说的情况接近于正义的状态，就是说，社会的基本结构接近于正义，并适当考虑了当时情况下的合理期望。了解这一公认的特殊情况，可能有助于弄清楚更困难的问题。然而，为了考虑非暴力抵抗和良心不服从问题，我们首先必须讨论几个与政治责任和义务有关的问题。
首先，我们接受现行安排的责任或义务，有时显然可能会被滥用。这些要求决定于正当原则，因为正当原则可能证明，在某种情况下，从全面考虑，不遵守是有理的。不遵守是否正当，取决于法律和体制不正义的程度。不正义的法律并不都是一样的，政策和体制的情况也是如此。不正义可能产生于两种情况：现行安排可能在不同程度上背离了多少是正义的公认标准；或者，这种安排可能符合某个社会的正义观，或符合统治阶级的观点，但这种正义观本身可能是不合理的，而且在许多情况下可能是显然不正义的。我们知道，某些正义观比另一些正义观更为合理（见第49节）。虽然正义的两个原则以及自然责任和义务的有关原则，从前面一览表上一系列观点中确定了最合理的观点，但是其他原则也不是不合理的。事实上，某些混合正义观肯定完全适合于许多目的。作为一种大致的规则，某种正义观的合理性是和在原始状态中为了采用它而能够提出的论据的力量成正比的。当然，如果原始状态体现了应为选择原则而规定的并最终能够配合我们深思熟虑的判断的各种条件，这种标准就是十分自然的。
虽然区别现行体制可能是不正义的这两种情况是相当容易的，但是能否得到一种切实可行的理论，用以说明这两种情况如何影响我们的政治责任和义务，则是另外一回事了。如果法律和政策偏离了公认的标准，那么诉诸社会的正义感在某种程度上大概是可能的。我下面要论证的是，这种情形含有进行非暴力抵抗的意思。然而，如果通行的正义观没有遭到违反，那么情形就完全不同了。应该采取什么行动方针，这主要取决于公认的原则合理到什么程度，取决于能用什么手段来改变这个原则。毫无疑问，一个人可以设法同各种各样的混合正义观和直觉主义正义观共处，而如果对功利主义观点的解释不是过份严格的话，他还可以设法同功利主义观点共处。然而，在其他情况下，例如如果社会是受主张狭隘的阶级利益的原则支配的，一个人可能就无所依靠，而只能用某些可能有成功之望的办法来反对通行的正义观及其证明为正确的体制。
其次，我们还必须考虑以下问题，即在一种总之是接近正义的情况下，为什么通常有责任去遵守不正义的法律，而不仅仅是遵守正义的法律。尽管有些著述家对这个论点提出了疑问，但我相信大多数人是会接受这个论点的；只有少数人认为，对正义的任何偏离，不管是多么小的偏离，都会取消遵守现有规则的责任。那么，应如何说明这一点呢？由于正义的责任和公平原则以体制正义为先决条件，所以需要进一步的说明。如果我们假设一个接近正义的社会，它具有一种或多或少符合正义原则的生气勃勃的宪法制度，那么人们就能回答这个问题。因此，我假定，就大多数情况来说，社会制度是井然有序的，即使确实说不上是十分有秩序的，若是这样，那么，要不要遵守不正义的法律和政策的问题就不会产生。照此假定，前面把正义的宪法说成是不完全的程序正义的一个例子（第31节）就已作出了回答。
我们记得，在制宪会议上，各方的目的是要在各种正义的宪法（符合平等自由权原则的宪法）中找到一种从所谈到的社会的一般事实看极可能导致正义而有效立法的宪法。这种宪法被认为是正义的然而又是不完全的程序，其目的是要在情况许可时尽可能地确保产生正义的结果。说它不完全，是因为不存在任何合理的政治过程能确保根据它制定的法律一定是正义的。在政治事务中，完全的程序正义是不可能实现的。此外，宪法程序在很大程度上必须依赖于一定的表决形式。为简明起见，我假定，经过适当限制的一种不同的过半数规则是一种实际需要。然而，多数（或少数的联合）也必然会犯错误，即使不是由于缺乏知识和判断而犯错误，也会由于不公正和自私自利的观点而犯错误。尽管如此，我们维护正义体制的自然责任仍然要求我们去遵守不正义的法律和政策，或者，只要它们的不正义没有超过一定的限度，我们至少不应用非法手段去反对它们。由于我们必须拥护正义的宪法，所以我们必须赞同它的一个基本原则，即关于过半数规则的原则。因此，在一种接近正义的状态下，由于我们有拥护正义宪法的责任，所以我们通常也就有了遵守不正义法律的责任。考虑到人们的实际情况，这种责任可以发生作用的机会是很多的。
自然，契约论不免使我们感到奇怪：我们怎么会同意要求我们去遵守我们认为是不正义的法律的宪法统治？人们可能会问：既然我们是自由的，仍然没有受到束缚，那么我们怎么可能在理性上接受一种也许会决定不采纳我们的意见而实行别人意见的程序呢？一旦我们采用了制宪会议的观点，答案就十分清楚了。首先，在数目有限的可能会被接受的切实可行的程序中，没有一个程序会始终作出有利于我们的决定。其次、同意一个这样的程序，肯定要比根本没有协议来得可取。这种情况与原始状态的情况类似，因为在原始状态中，各方放弃了对只享受权利不尽义务的利己主义的任何希望；这种选择是每一个人的最佳（或次佳）选择（撇开一般性的限制不谈），但这对其他任何人来说显然是不能接受的。同样，虽然在制宪会议阶段，各方都受到正义原则的约束，但为了使宪法制度发挥作用，他们必须互相作出某种让步。即使他们怀有最良好的意图，他们对正义的看法也必定会互相冲突。因此，在选择宪法和采用某种过半数规则时，为了得到某种有效的立法程序的好处，各方都准备承受由于容忍彼此的知识和正义感的缺陷而可能产生的风险。管理民主制度别无他法。
然而，尽管各方接受了多数原则，但它们只是在一定的条件下才同意容忍不正义的法律的。大致说来，不正义所造成的负担归根到底要或多或少地平均分配给不同的社会集团，在任何具体情况下，不正义的政策所引起的苦难都不应过大。因此，对于许多年来一直受到不正义之苦的永久少数来说，这种遵守不正义法律的责任就成问题了。当然，对于否认我们自己的以及别人的基本自由权的做法，我们也不一定非要默认不可，因为这种要求不符合原始状态中正义的责任的含义，也不符合制宪会议上对多数人权利的理解。相反，只有在必须公平分担宪法制度不可避免的缺陷所造成的后果时，我们才使自己的行动服从于民主权威。接受这些苦难，就是承认并愿意在人类生活环境所规定的范围内进行活动。考虑到这个情况，我们于是就有了一种文明的自然责任而不去利用社会安排的缺点，作为我们不遵守这些安排的一种十分现成的借口，也不会为了促进自己的利益而去钻各种规章必然会有的空子。文明的责任要求充分承认体制的缺点和在利用体制时所受到的某些限制。如果不认识这种责任，互相信任就容易遭到破坏。因此，至少在一种接近于正义的状态下，如果不正义法律的不正义没有超过一定限度，人们通常都有一种遵守这些法律的责任（对某些人来说也是义务）。这个结论不像要求遵守正义法律的结论那样有力。然而，它确实使我们前进了一步，因为它涉及了更广泛的情况；而更重要的是，它使我们多少了解了在确定我们的政治责任时可能要问的问题。
根据以上论点，显而易见的是，不管对过半数规则的程序怎样规定和怎样限制，只要是作为一种程序性的手段，它就都只能占据一种从属的地位。这样说是直接以宪法旨在实现的政治目标为根据的，因而也是以正义的两个原则为根据的。我曾经认为，某种形式的过半数规则作为保证获得正义而有效的立法的现有的最佳手段是有道理的。它与平等自由权（第36节）相适应，并具有某种自然性质；因为如果也能有少数规则，那么要决定选举哪一个人就没有明显的标准可循，这样平等也就遭到了破坏。过半数规则的一个基本作用是，这种程序应能符合背景正义的条件。就这一点来说，这些条件也就是政治自由——言论和集会自由、参与政治事务的自由、用宪法手段影响立法过程的自由——以及保证这些自由的公平价值的条件。如果不存在这种背景的话，正义的第一个原则就不能实现；然而即使存在这种背景，也不能保证正义的立法就一定会获得通过。
因此，所谓多数的意志就是正确的这种观点是毫不相干的。事实上，传统的正义观没有一个持有这种理论，而是始终认为，表决的结果要服从政治原则。虽然在特定情况下，（经过适当规定和限制的）多数拥有立法的宪法权利，这是理所当然的，但这并不意味着这样制定的法律就是正义的。对过半数规则的实质所进行的争论，涉及怎样来对这个规则作出最合适的规定，以及宪法限制是否就是加强正义的全面平衡的有效而合理的手段。这些限制可能常常被顽固的少数用来维护他们的不正当利益。这是一个政治判断问题，不属于正义理论的范围。这里只要指出这样一点就行了：虽然公民仍通常使自己的行动服从民主权威，就是说，承认在其他条件相等时表决结果确立了一种有约束力的规则，但他们并没有使自己的判断也服从民主权威。
现在，我想讨论一下过半数规则这个原则在作为正义理论一部分的理想程序中所占有的地位。正义的宪法被规定为在制宪会议上得到正义的两个原则指导的有理性的代表可能一致同意的宪法。当我们证明某个宪法是正当的，我们就提出理由，说明根据这些条件它是可以接受的宪法。同样，正义的法律和政策就是在立法阶段受到正义宪法的限制，并自觉地努力把正义原则奉为标准的有理性的立法者可能制定的法律和政策。如果我们要批评某些法律和政策，我们就得努力证明，根据这种理想的程序，它们是不可能得到选择的。不过，甚至有理性的立法者常常也会得出不同的结论，因此有必要在理想的条件下进行表决。对知识的限制不会为达成协议提供保证，因为一般社会事实的趋向常常会模糊不清，难以估计。
如果我们努力设想理想的程序将如何实现，从而断定参与这一程序并执行其规定的大多数人将会赞成某项法律或政策，那么，这项法律或政策就是充分正义的，或至少不是不正义的。遵循这种理想程序而作出的决定不是一种妥协，不是试图促进自己目标的对立双方之间的一种交易。决不能把立法讨论看作是利益之争，而应看作是寻找正义原则所规定的最佳政策的努力。因此，作为正义理论的一部分，我假定，一个公正的立法者的唯一愿望，就是按照他所知道一般事实，在这方面作出正确的决定。他应该完全根据自己的判断来进行表决。表决的结果可以用来估计什么是最符合正义观的。
如果我们要问，多数的意见在多大程度上可能是正确的，那么理想程序显然就同汇集一批专家的意见以便获得最佳判断的统计问题有类似之处。这里所说的专家，就是有理性的立法者，由于他们是公正的，他们能够采取客观的看法。这种意见可以追溯到孔多塞，他认为，如果有代表性的立法者正确判断的可能性大于不正确判断的可能性，那么，有代表性的立法者正确判断的可能性增加了，多数表决是正确的概率亦随之而增加。因此，我们可能会情不自禁地认为，如果许多有理性的人想要模拟理想程序的条件，并据此进行推理和讨论，那么广大多数无论如何也会几乎肯定是正确的。这种看法可能是一种错误。我们不但必须肯定有代表性的立法者作出正确判断的机会大于作出错误判断的机会，而且各人的表决显然并非互不相干。既然他们的意见要受到讨论过程的影响，这种比较简单的概率推理就不能适用。
尽管如此，我们通常还是认为，在许多人之间完美进行的讨论，比其中任何个人的反复思考更有可能得到正确的结论（在必要时通过表决）。Why is this so?在日常生活中，和别人交换意见可以防止我们的片面性和扩大我们的眼界，可以使我们从他们的观点来认识事物，并使我们痛切地感到自己孤陋寡闻。但在这理想的过程中，无知之幕意味着这些立法者已经成了公正之人。讨论的好处在于：即使是有代表性的立法者，他们的知识和推理能力也都有局限。他们中任何个人不可能知道别人知道的每一件事，也不可能作出只有集体才能作出的论断。讨论是一种集思广益的方法。至少，总有一天，共同审议的作用必然会使事情得到改进。
因此，我们的问题是要通过对正义问题的公开审议，提出一种理想的宪法，也就是为利用这批人的较多的知识和较强的推理能力而精心设计的一系列规则，以便即使不能得到也要最大限度地接近正确的意见。然而，我不打算进一步研究这个问题。这里重要的一点是，这种理想化的程序是正义理论的一个组成部分。为了在某种程度上说明它的含义，我已经提到了它的一些特征。我们对这个可能在有利条件下得到实现的程序所持有的观念越明确，四阶段顺序对我们的思考所给予的指导也就越可靠。我们因此对如何按照关于社会的一般事实来评价法律和政策，就有了一种更准确的概念。我们常常可以从直觉上来很好地了解在立法阶段得到适当指导的审议将会产生什么结果这个问题。
这种理想的程序不同于理想的市场过程，指出这一点能进一步说明这种理想的程序。因此，如果传统的对完全竞争的假定是适用的，如果不存在外部经济或不经济，等等，那么一种有效的经济结构就会产生。理想的市场是有关效率的一种完全程序。理想的市场过程和得到有理性的公正无私的立法者指导的理想的政治过程不同，它的一个特点是，即使每个人都追求自己的利益，市场也能取得一种有效的结果。事实上，这种假定等于说，这就是经济代理人通常的行为方式。在为了最大限度地提高满足或利润而进行买卖时，家庭和公司都不是在作出判断，以便弄清楚从某种社会观点看，在资财得到了初步分配的情况下，什么是最有效的经济结构。相反，它们是在规则许可的情况下促进自己的目标，它们的任何判断都是根据它们自己的观点作出的。可以说，正是这整个市场体系作出了关于效率的判断，而这种判断的根据就是公司和家庭活动提供的许多不同的信息来源。这个体系提供了一个答案，虽然人们对这个问题一无所知，而且常常对之感到莫名其妙。
因此，尽管市场和选举有某些相似之处，但理想的市场过程和理想的立法程序在一些至关重要的方面是不同的。它们是为了实现截然不同的目的而设计出来的，前者导致效率，后者在可能的情况下导致正义。虽然理想的市场对它的目标来说是一种完全的过程，但即使是理想的立法机关也只是一种不完全的程序。似乎没有任何办法可以用来说明一种保证导致正义立法的切实可行的程序。这个事实的一个结果是，虽然一个公民在其他条件相等时可能不得不遵守业已制定的政策，但他并不是非要认为这些政策是正义的不可，如果他使自己的判断服从于表决结果，那是错误的。但就完全的市场体系来说，如果经济代理人有什么看法的话，他大概会认为，由此产生的结果当然是有效的。虽然家庭或公司得到了它希望得到的一切，但它必须承认，在进行了初步分配之后，一种有效率的形势已经形成了。但对涉及正义问题的立法过程的结果，却不能要求得到同样的承认。这是因为，虽然现行宪法的目的当然是应该尽可能地作出符合理想的立法程序的决定，但它们实际上必然达不到正义的要求。这不仅是因为它们和现行的市场一样，不能与它们的理想的对应物相一致，而且还因为这个对应物也就是不完全程序的对应物。正义的宪法必须在一定程度上依靠公民和立法者在应用正义原则时采取远大的眼光和使用高明的判断。允许他们采取一种狭隘的或突出集团利益的观点，然后控制立法过程，使它产生正义的结果，这看来是无法做到的。正义的宪法就是导致正义立法的程序；竞争性市场就是产生效率的程序。关于正义宪法的理论也就相当于关于竞争性市场的理论。但至少到目前为止，还没有这样一种关于正义宪法的理论。看来这可能意味着，只要政治行为像在任何有活力的社会中必定会发生的那样受到人们正义感的影响，只要正义的立法成了基本的社会目标（第76节），把经济理论应用于实际的宪法过程就有其严重的缺陷。毫无疑问，经济理论对这种理想的程序是不适用的。
上述看法可以通过进一步的对比来得到证明。在理想的市场过程中，受到重视的是人的欲望的相对的强烈程度。一个人可以把他的大部分收入花费在他更需要的东西上，这样，他就和其他买主一起，以他最喜欢的方式，促进了对资源的利用。市场为细微的分级调整创造了条件，以解决爱好的全面平衡和某些需要相对突出的问题。在理想的立法程序中，没有任何与此相当的东西。对于哪些法律和政策最符合正义原则问题，每个有理性的立法者都应该根据自己的意见来表决。怀有更大信心的人的意见，或那些让人知道他们如果成为少数将会感到十分不快的人的表决（第37节），没有得到也不应该得到特殊重视。这种表决规则当然是可以想象的，但没有理由要在理想的程序中采用这种规则。即使在有理性的公正无私的人们当中，对自己的意见怀有更大信心的人也不见得更可能是正确的。一些人可能比另一些人对问题的复杂性更为敏感。在为正义的立法规定标准时，应该特别重视深思熟虑的集体判断，因为这种判断是每一个人在理想的条件下尽最大努力应用正确原则的结果。当正义问题产生时。欲望的强烈程度或信念的力量是毫不相干的。
关于理想的立法过程和理想的市场过程的一些差别就讲这些。现在，我想谈谈利用过半数规则来实现政治解决这个问题。我们知道，采用过半数规则是因为它是实现正义原则事先规定的某些目标的最合理的办法。然而，这些原则究竟有什么要求，有时是不清楚的或不确定的。这未必总是因为它们的论据复杂难懂和模糊不清，或难以述评和估价。这些原则本身的性质允许有广泛的选择，而不是只有一种特定的选择。例如，储蓄率只是在一定范围内才得到明确规定的；而正义的储蓄原则的主要思想要排除某些极端情况。最后，在应用