Chapter 16 Chapter 5 Distribution Share-3

Common sense tends to hold that income and wealth, and the good things in life in general, should be distributed according to moral deserts.Justice is only to be celebrated if it accords with virtue.While it is admitted that this ideal can never be fully realized, it is an adequate idea of ​​distributive justice, or at least an obvious principle, which society should strive to realize, so far as circumstances permit.Justice as fairness theory, however, rejects this notion.This principle would not have been selected in the original position.In this case, it seems impossible to prescribe the necessary criteria.Furthermore, the notion of virtue distribution fails to distinguish moral desert from legitimate expectations.Indeed, in participating in just arrangements, persons and groups have claims to one another as prescribed by accepted rules.They have done various things with the encouragement of existing arrangements, and now have certain rights, and the distributive share of justice is the recognition of these claims.Thus, a just arrangement gets people what they are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations based on social institutions.But what they are entitled to is not proportional to, nor transferable from, their intrinsic value.The principles of justice guide the basic structure and define the responsibilities and obligations of individuals, they do not deal with the issue of moral desert, therefore, the allocation of shares cannot be consistent with moral desert.

The preceding account of common-sense maxims and their role in purely procedural justice (Section 47) supports this point.For example, in setting wages, a competitive economy values ​​the principle of distribution by contribution.But we already know that the size of one's contribution (as estimated by one's marginal productivity) depends on supply and demand.There is no doubt that the moral worth of a man does not vary with the number of persons who can contribute the same talents, nor with the number of persons who happen to need what he can produce.No one would think that if the demand for a person's ability is less, or if this ability declines (as in the case of a singer), his moral desert will undergo a similar change.This point is completely obvious, and people have long agreed on it.It simply reflects the facts mentioned earlier (section 17).That is, it is a fixed point of our moral judgment, and a person's proper place in the distribution of natural assets is no more than his proper starting place in society.

Furthermore, none of these maxims of justice are designed to reward virtue.For example, rare gifts are rewarded to cover the cost of training, to encourage learning, and to direct talent where it will best advance the common good.The resulting distributive shares are not linked to moral values, since the inherent endowments of natural assets and their possible contingencies in their development and cultivation in the early stages of life are, from a moral point of view, arbitrarily Yes, the maxim that intuitively seems to come closest to rewarding moral desert is the maxim of distribution according to work, or probably according to voluntary labor.Once again, however, it seems obvious.The labor a man is willing to exert is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and by the options available to him.Other things being equal, people with better gifts are more likely to make conscious effort, so it is impossible not to consider giving them better treatment.The claim that rewards are due is unrealistic.There is no doubt that moral values ​​are neglected in so far as the maxims of emphasizing needs are concerned.The basic structure does not necessarily and does not balance the various maxims of justice in order to achieve the necessary agreement in the dark.The basic structure is guided by the two principles of justice which prescribe other ends entirely.

Another method can also reach the same conclusion.In the preceding comments it has not been stated that the concept of moral value differs from individual claims based on legitimate expectations.Suppose, therefore, that we formulate this concept and show that it has no relation to the distribution of shares.We can only consider a well-ordered society, that is, a society in which the institutions are just and this is recognized.Members of this society also have a strong sense of justice, a practical desire to obey existing rules and to give to each other what they are entitled to.In this case, we can think that everyone has the same moral value.We now formulate this notion in terms of the sense of justice, the desire to act on principles that might have been chosen in the original position (section 72).Obviously, according to this understanding, the equal moral value of people does not necessarily mean that the distribution shares are also equal.Everyone deserves what the principles of justice say he is entitled to, but these principles do not require equality in this respect.

The crucial point here is that the concept of moral value does not provide any fundamental principles of distributive justice.This is because the principle of justice concerning natural duties and duties can only be adopted after it has been recognized.Once these principles are in place, moral value can be defined as having a certain sense of justice; as we shall see later (section 66), the desire or inclination to act in accordance with the corresponding principles can characterize virtue.Therefore, the concept of moral value is not as important as the concept of right and justice, which does not play any role in determining the allocation of shares in real terms.This situation is analogous to the relationship between the substantive provisions on property and the law on theft.The property system was established for the priority independent social purpose, and with the property system, there are acts and offenses that violate the regulations and laws about property.Establishing a society to reward moral desert as a fundamental principle is like establishing a system of property to punish thieves.Therefore, the criterion of distribution by virtue cannot be selected in the original position.Since all parties concerned wish to promote their own conceptions of the good, there is no reason for them to arrange their institutions so that moral desert determines the share of distribution, even if they could find ready-made criteria for defining their conceptions of the good. .

In a well-ordered society, individuals acquire a claim to a share of the social product by doing something that existing arrangements encourage them to do.The resulting legitimate expectations are, so to speak, the flip side of the principles of fairness and the natural duty of justice.Just as a man has a duty to uphold just arrangements, and if he has accepted a position in these arrangements, he is also bound to do his part, so a man who abides by such arrangements and does his part Power, he also has the right to demand that others treat him accordingly.They deserve to meet his legitimate expectations.Thus, if there is a just economic arrangement, these claims of the individual can be adequately addressed by reference to what practice in this area regards as relevant rules and norms (with their respective emphases).We have seen that it is not true to say that the distributive share of justice rewards individuals according to their moral worth.But what we can say is that, according to tradition, a just arrangement treats everyone fairly: that is, it distributes to everyone what everyone is entitled to, according to its own rules.The principles of justice applicable to institutions and individuals dictate that it is fair to do so.

It should be noted, however, that although one's claims are conditioned by existing rules, we can still distinguish entitlement from deserving in an amoral but well-known sense.For example, after a game, people often say that the loser should have won.Here, one does not say that the victors have no right to claim that they are champions, or that all spoils go to the victors, but that the losers exert to a greater extent the skills and abilities inspired by the game, and it is Playing this kind of skill and ability makes the game fascinating.therefore.The loser should have won at all, and only lost due to bad luck or other accidental circumstances that brought the game down.Likewise, even the best economic arrangements do not necessarily lead to better outcomes.The actual requirements of the individual will inevitably deviate more or less from what the arrangement is intended to take into account.For example, some people who are in a favorable position do not necessarily have more ideal skills and abilities than others.All this is obvious.There are two kinds of requirements here: one is the requirement that the existing arrangement requires us to respect given the personal contribution and the outcome of the matter, and the other is the requirement that may arise under more ideal circumstances.But the problem here is that, even if we could really distinguish between the two demands; this does not at all imply that the allocated shares should be consistent with moral values.Even when the best happens, there is still no tendency for distribution to coincide with virtue.

No doubt one might still think that allocations should be at least as far as practicable in conformity with moral values.They may think that, unless those who are better off are of superior moral character, it would be an insult to our sense of justice that they should be better off.This view may arise from the inexplicable contrast of distributive justice to that of punishment.Indeed, in a reasonably well-ordered society, those who are punished for violating just laws generally do wrong.This is because the purpose of criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties, those that prohibit us from injuring another person's life or limb, or depriving him of his liberty or property, and punishment serves this purpose.Basic natural duty is not simply an arrangement of taxes and other burdens, for the purpose of which is to value certain actions and in this way direct mutually beneficial behavior.It would be much better if the conduct prohibited by the criminal law never occurred.A tendency to transgressive behavior is thus a sign of bad character, and in a just society only those who commit such transgressions will be punished by the law.

The distribution of economic and social benefits is clearly quite different.It can be said that this distribution arrangement is not an antithesis of criminal law.One is to punish certain illegal acts, and the other is to reward moral values.The role of unequal distribution shares is to cover the cost of training and education, to attract people to places and groups where they are most needed from a social point of view, and so on.Assuming that each person recognizes that the motives of self-interest and group interest are properly tempered by some sense of justice as legitimate, then each person will choose to do those things that are most consistent with his own goals.Differences in wages, earnings, and job benefits merely affect these choices so that the resulting outcomes are consistent with efficiency and justice.In a well-ordered society, there is generally no need for criminal law except for security issues.Criminal justice issues, for the most part, fall within the realm of partial compliance theory, whereas the account of apportionment shares falls within the realm of strict compliance theory, and thus consideration of ideal arrangements.To say that distributive justice and punishing justice are opposed to each other is utterly deceitful, since it provides a rationale for distributive shares which does not actually exist.

Although I have often compared principles of justice to utilitarianism, I have not yet addressed the problem of mixed conceptions of justice.We recall that this conception of justice was regulated when the criterion of utility and others were substituted for the second principle of justice (§ 21).I must now examine these alternative conceptions of justice, especially since many may feel that, anyway, the principles of justice appear to impose rather strict conditions, and so these conceptions of justice are more reasonable than the principles of justice. .But it is important to point out at once that all hybrid conceptions of justice recognize the first principles of justice, and thus the primacy of the right to equal liberty.None of these views is utilitarian, because even if the principle of utility is substituted for the second principle of justice, or some part of it, such as the difference principle, the notion of utility remains in a subordinate position.Thus, as long as one of the main goals of justice as fairness is to create a theory that can replace the traditional doctrine of utility, even if we end up admitting a hybrid conception of justice rather than the two principles of justice, this goal is Still achievable.Moreover, given the importance of the first principles of justice, these alternative conceptions of justice seem to retain the essential features of contractarianism.

According to the above, it is obviously much more difficult to disagree with mixed conceptions of justice than to disagree with the principle of success.Many authors seem to concede a different utilitarian view, even if this one is not clearly expressed for balancing and coordinating social interests, and they clearly presuppose a fixed and unchanging constitutional system that guarantees a minimum of basic liberties .In this way, they actually believe in some kind of mixed theory, so that the strong arguments for liberty cannot be used as before.Therefore, the main question here is: When both the second principle of justice and the principle of utility are governed by the principle of equal liberty, what reasons can still be used to express favor of the second principle of justice and not in favor of the principle of success.We need to examine the reasons for rejecting the utility standard even in this case, though obviously not as obvious as the reasons for rejecting the traditional and average utility principles. First, a hybrid conception of justice that is quite close to the principle of justice may be considered: that is, the view that arises when the principle of average utility, subject to some minimum social security, is used in place of the difference principle, all else being equal. .The difficulty here is the same as that encountered by intuitionist theory in general: how to choose the minimum social security and adapt it to changing conditions?Anyone who makes use of the two principles of justice appears to be weighing the trade-offs between maximizing average utility and maintaining an adequate minimum of social security.If we pay attention only to his considered judgments and not to his reasons for making them, then his valuation is indistinguishable from that of someone following this mixed conception of justice.There is, I think, ample latitude here to determine the level of minimum social security in different circumstances to achieve the above results.So how do we know that a person who adopts this mixed view does not in fact rely on the difference principle?Of course, he is unaware that he is practicing the difference principle, and may in fact even refuse to accept it if he is suggested to do so.But the level of the necessary minimum social security, which limits the principle of average utility, leads to exactly the same kind of results as would have been expected had he followed that standard.Moreover, he could not explain why he chose this minimum social security; the most he could say was that he made what seemed to him the most reasonable decision.It would be too much to think that the person is actually using the difference principle, since his judgment may meet some other criterion.It is true, however, that his sense of justice remains to be proven.The behind-the-scenes options left open for determining the appropriate minimum social security levels leave this question open. Something similar can be said about other hybrid theories.For example, one may decide to establish some distributional condition, either by itself or in combination with some appropriately chosen minimum social security.Limit the principle of averages.For example, one could replace the difference principle with a criterion that maximizes the average utility, but with fractions (or multiples) of the standard deviation of the final distribution removed.Since this deviation is smallest when everyone obtains the same utility, the criterion of maximizing average utility expresses greater concern for those who benefit less than the principle of average utility.However, the intuitive character of this view is also obvious, since we must ask how the fraction (or multiple) of the standard deviation should be chosen, and how this parameter varies with the mean itself.There may again be a problem with the difference principle here.This hybrid view mirrors other intuitive notions that command us to pursue multiple goals.This mixed view holds that both greater average welfare and more equal distribution are desirable goals if some minimum standard is maintained.If one system is better in every respect, it is clearly preferable to another. However, different political views measure these goals differently, so we need to have standards for determining the relative importance of these goals.The truth is: even when we acknowledge this goal, we usually don't quite agree.It must be admitted that any reasonable and comprehensive conception of justice involves a fairly detailed evaluation of goals.In everyday life, we are often content to enumerate commonsense norms and policy goals and then think that, on specific issues, we must weigh them against prevailing conditions at the time.While this is a reasonably practical opinion, it does not suggest some definite conception of justice.In effect, it is tantamount to teaching a man to use these goals as guidelines, and to make his own judgments as far as possible on the basis of them.Only a policy that is more desirable in all aspects is undoubtedly a more desirable policy.The difference principle, by contrast, is a more accurate notion because it rates combinations of goals according to how well they promote the prospects of those least benefited. Thus, although the difference principle seems at once to be a somewhat idiosyncratic idea, if it is combined with other principles of justice, it may still be a criterion of judgment, a background principle against which our ordinary judgments express The degree of importance that comes out, because these judgments will be combined with various mixed principles.Our habit of relying on intuitions governed by lesser standards may obscure the existence of more fundamental principles that account for the utility of these standards of judgment.Whether the two principles of justice, and the difference principle in particular, account for our judgments of distributive justice can of course only be done by stating at some length the consequences produced by these principles, and at the same time indicating the extent to which we are prepared to recognize them indicated importance.These results do not in any way contradict our considered beliefs.Certainly there will be no contradiction whatsoever with those judgments which are also fixed points, judgments which we seem unwilling to revise under any foreseeable circumstances.Otherwise, the two principles would not be fully acceptable and would have to be modified in some way. But our day-to-day views do not necessarily lead to any very clear answers to the question of how to balance competing goals.If this is the case, the main question is whether we would agree with a much more rigorous account of our conception of justice embodied by these two principles.If we are to maintain certain fixed points, we must choose the best way to flesh out our conception of justice and extend it to more situations.These two principles of justice are perhaps not so opposed to our intuitive beliefs as to provide a more concrete principle for problems which common sense is unfamiliar with and which common sense cannot resolve.Thus, although the difference principle strikes us at first sight as inconceivable, careful reflection on what it means when properly limited may lead us to believe that it either corresponds to our considered An acceptable way to illustrate these beliefs in light of new situations. From these perspectives, we can point out that appeals to the common good are a political contract in democratic societies.No political party would openly admit to calling for legislation that would be detrimental to any recognized social group.But how to understand this agreement?Of course, this is not just a matter of utilitarian principles, so we cannot assume that the government affects everyone's interests in the same way.Since it is impossible to interpret more than one point of view as broadly as possible.Given the climate of a democratic society, then, it is only natural that special attention be paid to the interests of the most disadvantaged, to further improve their long-term prospects in the manner best consistent with equal rights to liberty and fair opportunity.We have great confidence in the justice of certain policies which at least seem to be heading in such a direction that this section of society would be worse off if they were not fully implemented.These policies have always been just, if not quite just.Thus, once we face up to the need to adopt some fairly comprehensive conception of justice, the difference principle can be seen as a reasonable extension of the political convention in a democratic society. When I point out that the hybrid conception of justice has an intuitive character, I do not mean that this is an unambiguous reason to disapprove of this conception of justice.I have already said (section 7) that this combination of principles must be of great practical value.Undoubtedly, these conceptions of justice find plausible criteria by which to evaluate policy, and given the proper contextual institutions, they can guide us to the correct conclusions.For example, if one accepts a mixed conception of justice in order to maximize average welfare as a fraction (or multiple) of standard deviations removed, one would presumably favor fair equality of opportunity, since everyone has more equal opportunity , which appears to both raise average welfare (through increased efficiency) and reduce inequality.In this case, the idea used in place of the difference principle provides evidence for another part of the second principle.Furthermore, we obviously inevitably have to rely on our gut judgment at some point.The difficulty with mixed conceptions of justice is that they may make use of these judgments too early to provide a clear alternative to the difference principle.If there is no procedure for specifying appropriate weights (or parameters), then the balance may actually be determined by principles of justice, unless, of course, those principles lead to conclusions we cannot accept.If this happens, some mixed conception of justice, though dependent on intuition, may be preferable, especially if it helps to introduce order and coherence into our deliberate beliefs. is more desirable. Another consideration in favor of the difference principle is that it is relatively easy to explain and apply.In fact, for some, part of the appeal of hybrid standards is that they can be used to avoid the more acute requirements of the difference principle.Nothing could be easier than to figure out what will advance the interests of the most disadvantaged.Using an index of primary goods, this group can be pointed out; policy problems can also be solved by simply asking how relevant representative people in appropriate positions would choose.But the vagueness of the concept of average (or aggregate) welfare is annoying to the point where the utilitarian principle comes into play.Some kind of estimation must be made of the utility functions of different representative persons, and an interpersonal correspondence established between them, and so on.To do this, the problems are so large, and the preliminary estimates are so parsimonious, that widely divergent opinions may appear equally desirable to different people.Some may argue that one group gains more than the other loses, while others may reject this claim.No one can say what underlying principles account for these differences, or how they can be resolved.It is easier for those in powerful social positions to use unjust means to advance their own interests without being exposed as manifest transgression.All this is of course so obvious that ethical principles are always considered to be vague.Having said that, they are not all equally ambiguous, and one of the advantages of the two principles of justice is that they are relatively explicit about what is required of an ethical principle, and what must be done in order to meet the standard of the ethical principle. One might think that the shortcoming of the ambiguity of the utilitarian principle could be overcome by a better account of how welfare is measured and aggregated.I don't want to dwell on these much-discussed technical issues, because the more important objections to utilitarianism are of another level.But briefly addressing these issues makes contract theory clear.There are several methods that can be used to establish the interpersonal utility scale.One of these approaches (at least going back to Edgeworth) is to assume that one can only recognize a limited level of utility.It is said that people are not interested in how choices are made at the same level of differential treatment, and that the cardinal measure of the utilitarian difference between any two choices is defined by the number of identifiable levels that distinguish the two choices of.The resulting base value must be extremely high, high enough to achieve a positive one-time conversion.To determine the inter-personal measure, one can assume that the differences between adjacent levels are the same for all, and that the differences between levels are also the same.With this interpersonal correspondence rule, the calculation is very simple.When comparing various options, we determined how many layers each individual's choices had, and then summed them up, taking both positive and negative amounts into account. This notion of cardinal utility has notorious difficulties.There are obvious practical problems here, and at the same time, testing a person's level of discrimination depends on the choices actually available.Leaving this aside, it also seems impossible to justify the assumption that the social utility of passing from one level to another is the same for all.On the one hand, the process may also take account of changes involving differential treatment like those described above, because people feel differential treatment differently, some more than others; on the other hand, the process may be more Consider carefully the changes experienced by those who appear to be producing more discrimination.Of course, it would be wrong to underestimate the power of human attitudes, and especially to over-reward the ability to see that a person's characteristics necessarily vary with his temperament and upbringing.In fact, the whole process seems random.It also has the advantage, however, of illustrating how the principle of utility might be able to include implicit ethical assumptions in the methods chosen for determining the necessary measure of utility.The concepts of happiness and well-being are not very well-defined concepts, so even in order to specify some appropriate cardinal measure, we may have to look at moral theories that use this concept. The Neumann-Morgenstern rule encountered similar difficulties.It can be pointed out that if a person's choice of risky prospects meets certain necessary conditions, then his decision can be regarded as maximizing the expected utility, so that there are as many choices as possible. How much utility.He seems to be guided in his selection by the mathematical expectation of these utility numbers; and the degree of this transfer of utility is so high that a positive conversion can be achieved.Of course, it cannot be considered that this person made use of some transfer of utilitarianism when making his own decision.The number of utilitarians does not guide his choice, nor does it provide some sort of first-person deliberative procedure.On the contrary, assuming that one's choice of prospects satisfies the requirements of certain conditions, observant mathematicians can at least theoretically calculate how many utilities characterize those choices that maximize expected utilitarian.So far, nothing more can be said about the standard on which the actual process of consideration or the individual depends; and all that can be said about what characterizes the method of choice expressed or embodied by the utilitarian number. Now if we assume that we can determine a cardinal utility for each individual, how can we establish interpersonal measures?A common scheme is the zero-one rule: assign the value of an individual's worst position to zero and his best position to one.This rule seems reasonable at present, maybe it expresses the concept that each person can only have at most one share in another way.However, there are other comparable symmetric schemes, such as taking the value of zero for the worst choice and taking the value of one for the total utility from various choices.These two rules seem to be equally just, since the former starts from everyone's equal maximum utility, and the latter from everyone's equal average utility; but the two may lead to different social decisions.Moreover, these schemes require virtually all persons to have a similar capacity for gratification, which appears to be an extraordinary price to pay simply for specifying an interpersonal measure.These rules clearly formulate the concept of welfare in a particular way, since the concept of welfare in general seems to allow for differences, that is, different interpretations of the concept of welfare are equally if not more common sense.For example, the zero-one rule means that when other conditions are equal, educating people to have few desires and to be easily satisfied can produce greater social utility; and these people generally have relatively strong demands.They settle for less welfare, which presumably brings them closer to maximum utility.If one cannot accept this result and still wishes to adhere to the utilitarian view, other interpersonal measures must be found. In addition, we should also point out that although the Neumann-Morgenstern hypothesis states that people do not like to take risks, that is, participate in the actual process of taking risks, the resulting measures are still affected by their attitudes towards uncertainty. , and this uncertainty is dictated by the overall probability distribution.Thus, if this rule of utility is used in social decisions, people's sentiment for risk affects the standard of welfare which should be greatly enhanced.Once again we see that the conventions that dictate interpersonal comparisons have unintended moral consequences.As before, the measure of utility is affected by chance, which is morally random.This situation is quite different from that pointed out by Kant when he explained the theory of justice as fairness, because according to Kant, the ideal is deeply rooted in the principles of this theory, and the theory itself depends on human relations. The basic goods necessary for comparison. Therefore, it seems impossible to satisfactorily eliminate the ambiguity of the utilitarian principle simply by relying on some more precise measure of utilitarianism.On the contrary, if we study the customs required for interpersonal comparisons, we can see that there are different ways of specifying these comparisons.However, these methods involve some apparently different assumptions and thus presumably have quite different results.Among these regulations and corresponding rules, it is a moral issue which one is in line with the concept of justice.I think the meaning here is that interpersonal comparisons are determined by value judgments.While acknowledging the utilitarian principle is clearly a problem for moral theory, it is less obvious that methods of measuring welfare raise similar problems.Since there is more than one such method, the choice will also depend on how the measure is used; that is, ethical considerations will ultimately be decisive. Maine's take on the general utilitarian assumptions is quite appropriate here.He points out that these assumptions are clear once we realize that they are based on a code of legislative conduct, and that this, too, was Bentham's view.If this is a populous and fairly homogeneous society, and the legislation is a vigorous modern kind, the only principle that can guide legislation on a large scale is the principle of utility.The necessity of ignoring the differences between people, even the differences between people that actually exist, gives rise to the maxim of equality for all, as well as the principles of similarity and marginality.The customary practice of interpersonal comparison, of course, should be judged in this way.Contractarianism argues that once we realize this, we will also realize that the idea of ​​measuring and aggregating welfare is best dropped altogether.From the point of view of its original status, it is not part of any viable conception of social justice.Far more preferable, and at the same time much easier to apply, are these two principles of justice.从各方面考虑，即使从某种混合正义观的特定角度看，也仍然有理由去选择差别原则，或整个第二条原则，而不去选择功利原则。 迄今为止，我很少谈到至善原则。但在刚刚考虑了一些混合观点之后，我现在打算研究一下这个观念。有两种不同情况：在第一种情况下，它是目的论的唯一原则，目的论指导社会安排体制，规定个人的责任与义务，以便最大限度地扩大人类的优点在艺术、科学和文化方面所取得的成就。显然，这个原则的要求越高，有关的理想目标也就越高。尼采有时对苏格拉底和歌德之类伟大人物的生涯所给予的绝对重视是异乎寻常的。他在一些地方说，人类应该继续努力造就伟大人物。我们为造就人类的最高典范而努力，就是珍视我们自己的生命。第二种情况除了可以从其他一些人的著作中找到外，还可以从亚里士多德的著作中找到。这种情况所提出的主张要强烈得多。 这是一种比较适中的学说，其中至善原则被认为不过是直觉主义理论的若干标准中的一种标准。直觉要用这个原则来权衡其他原则。因此，怎样才能使这种观点成为至善论的观点，这决定于对人类优点和文化的要求重视到什么程度。例如，如果认为希腊人的哲学、科学和艺术成就本身证明了古代奴隶制度是正当的（假定这种制度对于这些成就是必要的），那么，这个观念无疑就是高度至善主义的。对至善的要求排除了对自由权的强烈主张。另一方面，人们可能仅仅为了在宪法政体下限制财富和收入的再分配而利用这个标准。在这种情况下，它起了抵消平均主义思想的作用。因此，如果这种分配对于满足受惠较少的那些人的基本需要是必不可少的，而这样做不过是减少了境况较好的那些人的享受和欢乐而已，那么人们就可以说，这种分配的确更为平等。但是，较不幸的人的较大幸福一般并不能证明削减为保存文化价值所必需的开支是正当的。这些生活方式比起较少的欢乐来具有更大的内在价值，不管有多少人在享受这种欢乐。在正常情况下，必须保留某种最低限度的社会资源，以便促进至善目标的实现。只有在这些主张与对基本需要的要求发生冲突的情况下，才会出现唯一的例外。因此，随着情况的不断改善，至善原则相对于欲望的更大满足的重要性也不断增加。毫无疑问，许多人接受的是具有直觉主义形式的至善主义。这种至善主义易于使人作出广泛的解释，从而似乎表达了一种比严格的至善主义理论合理得多的观点。 在考虑至善原则何以会被否定这个问题之前，我想先谈一谈正义原则同至善论和功利主义这两种目的论之间的关系问题。我们可以把注重理想的原则规定为不是注重需要的原则。就是说，它们不是把需要与满足的总量及其在人们之间的分配方式看作唯一有关的特征。就这种特征来说，无论至善原则（两种情况中的任何一种）或正义原则都是注重理想原则的。它们不是从欲望的目标中抽象出来的，它们认为，如果欲望的满足是同样强烈的，而且是同样令人愉快的（边沁所说的意思是，在其他条件相等时，即使微不足道的东西也和诗歌一样美好），那么这种欲望的满足就具有同样的价值。我们已经知道（第41节），某种理想是深深植根于正义原则之中的，因此，与正义原则不相容的欲望的满足根本就没有任何价值。此外，我们还应该鼓励某些性格特征，尤其是某种正义感。因此，契约论类似于至善论，因为除了满足的净差额及其分配方式外，它还考虑了其他问题。事实上，正义原则甚至不提福利的总量及其分配问题，而只提自由权及其他基本财货的分配问题。同时，它们在没有引用关于人类优点的某种先验标准的情况下，设法对人的理想作出了规定。因此，契约观点是介于至善论与功利主义之间的一种观点。 在开始讨论至善论标准会不会被采用这个问题时，我们可以首先考虑一下严格的至善论观念，因为这里的问题比较明显、不过，为了能有一种明确的意识，这个标准必须提供某种方法，来评定各种不同成就和总合这些成就的价值。当然，这种估价也许不是十分准确的，但它应该准确到能够指导关于基本结构的各种主要决定。正是在这一点上，至善原则碰到了困难。尽管原始状态中的人对彼此的利益不感兴趣，但他们知道，他们具有（或可能具有）某些道德和宗教利益以及他们不能予以损害的其他文化目标。此外，他们还被假定具有不同的关于善的观念，并认为他们有权为了促进各自的目标而彼此迫使对方接受自己的要求。各方没有可以用来判断他们的权力实现程度或甚至欲望满足程度的共同的关于善的观念。他们没有可以用作选择体制的原则的某种商定的标准。承认任何这样的标准，实际上等于接受了一种可能导致次要的宗教自由权或其他自由权的原则，姑且不说这种原则会导致完全丧失促进一个人的许多精神目标的自由。即使关于人类优点的标准是相当明确的，各方也无法知道，他们的要求不会在至善这个更高的社会目标实现之前降低。因此，原始状态中的人所能达成的唯一协议，似乎是每个人都应享有与别人的类似自由权相一致的最大的平等自由权。有一种价值标准是用来规定什么可能是目的论的正义原则所极为重视的东西时，他们不能由于认可这种价值标准而拿自己的自由去冒险。这种情况完全不同于同意把某种基本善的指数作为人际比较的基础那种情况。这种指数在任何情况下都只起一种次要的作用，虽然基本善是人们为了实现自己的任何目的一般都会需要的东西，对这些善的需要并不能把一个人同另一个人区别开来。为了某种指数而接受这些善，当然不能建立某种衡量人类优点的标准。 因此，显而易见，与导致平等自由权原则的差不多同样的论据要求否定至善原则。但在提出这个论据时，我并没有认为，从日常生活的观点看，衡量人类优点的标准缺乏理性基础。显然，存在着一些评价创造性劳动的艺术和科学标准，至少在特定风格和思想传统的范围内是如此。一个人的工作比另一个人的工作好，这常常是没有问题的。事实上，如果用人们的工作和作品的优点来衡量，人们的自由和福利在价值上是大不相同的。这不但对实际表现是这样，而且对潜在表现也是这样。对内在价值显然是可以进行比较的；而且尽管至善标准不是一种正义原则，但价值判断在人类事务中占有重要的地位。这些判断未必就那么含糊不清，从而就一定不能作为分配权利的一种合适基础。相反，这个论据认为，各方由于目标不同，所以在原始状态的条件下没有理由要采用至善原则。 为了达到至善论的伦理标准，我们竟然不得不假定各方预先接受了某种自然责任，例如培养具有某种作风和美德的人的责任，以及促进知识追求和提高艺术修养的责任。但是，这种假定可能会大大改变对原始状态的解释。虽然正义即公平理论承认，在一个井然有序的社会里，人的优点的价值得到了认可，但人的才艺却要在自由结社原则所许可的范围内去追求。人们结合在一起，用组织宗教社团的同样办法，提高了他们的文化和艺术兴趣。他们不是以他们的活动具有更大的内在价值为借口，从而利用国家这个强制机关来为自己争得更大的自由权或更大的分配份额。人们不承认至善论是一种政治原则。社会资源对于支持致力于发展艺术、科学和文化事业的协会是必不可少的。因此，无论是作为已经作出的贡献的合理报酬，或者是根据公民自愿作出的这种自觉贡献，都应该得到这种社会资源，而这一切都是在正义的两个原则指导下的体制内进行的。 因此，根据契约论，公民的平等自由权不是以不同的人的目标具有同等的内在价值这一点为先决条件的，也不是以他们的自由和福利具有同等价值这一点为先决条件的。各方都是道德的主体，是具有协调一致的系统目标并对正义感有接受能力的有理性的人，这才是先决条件。既然各方都有必要的明确的属性，再要说他们同样都是道德的主体，这也许是多余的。只要我们愿意，我们可以说人们具有同等的尊严。这不过是说他们全都符合了由原始契约状态的解释所表达的关于道德的主体的资格的条件。既然他们在这方面是相等的，那就应该按照正义原则的要求（第77节）来对待他们。但是，这样说一点也不意味着他们的工作和成就都具有同样的优点。这样来考虑问题，就是把关于道德的主体的资格的概念和属于价值概念的人的各种才艺混为一谈了。 我刚才指出，人们具有同等价值这一点对于平等自由权并不是必要的。同时还应该指出的是，人们具有同等价值这一点也是不够的。基本权利的平等有时据说来自人们对于较高生活方式的接受能力；但为什么这样却并不清楚。内在价值是属于价值概念的一种概念，而平等自由权或其他某种原则是否恰当，则决定于正当观。至善标准坚持认为，基本结构中的权利分配应能做到最大限度地提高内在价值的总和。人们享有的权利和机会的结构，大概影响着他们实现自己的潜能和优点的程度。但不能因此就说，基本自由的平等分配是最好的解决办法。 这种情况与古典功利主义的情况有类似之处，我们需要某些与一般假设并行不悖的假设。因此，即使人的潜能是相同的，那么，除非权利的分配是由某种边际价值（这里是根据衡量优点的标准来估算的）递减原则决定的，否则平等权利就不可能得到保障。事实上，除非有丰富的资源，否则最能增加价值总量的也许就是有利于少数人的十分不平等的权利和机会。根据至善论的观点，如果有必要去产生更大的人类优点总量，那么那样做就不是不正义的。不过；边际价值递减原则虽然也许不至于和同等价值原则一样不可靠，但肯定是有问题的。几乎没有理由要假定；为鼓励和培养有高度才能的人而分配的权利和资源如果超过了有关范围内的某一点，对总体的贡献通常就会越来越少。相反，这种贡献在长时期内可能越来越大（或保持不变）。因此，至善原则为平等自由权提供了一种不可靠的基础，并且大概会远离差别原则。为主张平等所必需的这些假定，似乎极难自圆其说。为了给平等自由权找到一种坚实的基础，我们似乎必须抛弃包括至善论和功利主义的传统的目的论原则。 迄今我们已经对作为单一原则的目的论的至善论进行了讨论。由于这一不同情况，困难是极为明显的。这种直觉主义形式似乎合理得多，如果对至善的要求适当，那就不容易反对这些观点。它们同正义的两个原则的差异要小得多。尽管如此，同样的问题依旧产生了，因为任何直觉主义观点的每一个原则都必定会得到选择，而且，虽然这种选择所产生的后果在这种情况下可能并不十分重大，但要肯定至善原则就是衡量社会正义的标准，仍然不存在这样的基础。此外，把关于人类优点的标准用作政治原则，也是不确切的，在社会问题上运用这些标准必然会变化无常并带有某种特性，不管人们可能多么有理由在比较狭隘的传统范围内以及在思想界引用它们和承认它们。正因为如此（当然还有其他原因），正义即公平理论才要求我们指出，某些行为方式在能够得到限制之前便妨碍了别人的基本自由权，或者违反了某种义务或自然责任。因为在一些论据得不出这种结论时，人们总想以某种特定方式求助于至善论标准。例如，当有人说，不管某些人的愿望如何，仅仅为这些人本身着想，有些性关系也是堕落而可耻的，因而是应于禁止的，这往往是由于不能从正义原则的角度提出合理的理由，而退回到关于人类优点的概念。但在这些问题上，我们很可能要受到微妙的美学选择和对行动是否合宜的个人感觉的影响；而个人、阶级和集团的矛盾常常又是尖锐而不可调和的。由于这难以捉摸的种种情况影响了至善论标准和损害了个人自由权，所以似乎最好完全依赖具有比较明确结构的正义原则。因此，即使是具有直觉主义形式的至善论也会由于不能规定社会正义的合理基础而遭到抛弃。 最后，我们当然还要验证一下，在没有某种关于至善的标准的情况下的行为后果是否是可以接受的，因为立即可以看出，正义即公平理论似乎没有为注重理想的考虑提供足够的余地。此刻我唯一能够指出的是，用于艺术和科学的公共资金可以通过交换部门来提供（第43节）。就这一点来说，公民为对他们征收必要的税款问题而可能持有的理由是无限的。他们可能根据至善论原则来估计这些公共善的价值，因为在这种情况下，只有为了解决孤立决定和保证遵守问题，才可使用政府强制机器，而如果没有得到一个人的同意，是不能对他征税的。在这里，关于人类优点的标准是不能用作一种政治原则的。因此，一个井然有序的社会只要它愿意，就可能把它的相当一部分资源用于这种开支。然而，尽管可以用这种方法来满足对文化的要求，但正义原则不允许对大学、研究所或歌剧院和电影院进行补贴，虽然提出补贴的理由是这些机构具有内在价值，即使牺牲那些没有得到补偿利益的人的重大利益，也应对从事这方面工作的人予以支持。这方面的税收应该用来直接或间接地改善保证平等自由权的社会条件，并以适当方式增进地位最不利的人的长远利益，只有这样，税收才能证明是正当的。这就似乎认可了这些补贴的最无可争议的正义性，因此，无论如何在这类情况下并不存在对至善原则的任何明显需要。 我用以上这些话结束了关于正义原则如何运用于体制的讨论。显然，应该予以考虑的还有其他许多问题。可能还有其他形式的至善论，而且迄今也只是简略地研究了各个问题。我应该强调的是，我的意图只是为了说明契约论也许完全可以用作一种可供选择的道德观。如果我们检查一下它对体制所产生的结果，它似乎比传统的与之分庭抗礼的理论更准确地符合我们的常识性信念，并以一种合理的方法推知先前没有解决的问题。