Chapter 15 Chapter 5 Distribution Share-2

Now, we must consider the issue of intergenerational justice.The difficulties this question raises are needless to say.It puts any ethical theory to a severe, if not overwhelming, test.Nevertheless, an account of the concept of justice as fairness is likely to be incomplete without some discussion of this important issue.The reason why this problem occurs in the current situation.It is because the question of whether the entire social system and a competitive economy with an appropriate system as a background can meet the requirements of the two principles of justice remains unresolved.Whether or not this problem can be solved, however, will necessarily depend to some extent on the extent to which minimum social security should be achieved.But this is related to the degree to which the current generation should respect the demands of the next generation.

So far I have said nothing about the question of how great a minimum social security should be.According to common sense, people may say that the appropriate level of social security depends on the average wealth of the country, and at the same time, when the average wealth increases, the minimum social security should also be increased when other conditions are equal.Or one could also say that the appropriate level of social security is determined by customary expectations.But these opinions are unsatisfactory.The first opinion is inaccurate because it does not show how the minimum social security is determined by average wealth, and it also ignores some other relevant aspects such as distribution; the second opinion does not provide an account of when customary expectations themselves are reasonable any standard.However, once one accepts the difference principle, it follows from this that maximizing the expectations of the least advantaged group, taking wages into account, is the standard that minimum social security should achieve.Adjustments to the transfer component (for example, the amount of the additional income tax) can increase or decrease the future benefits of the less disadvantaged, raising or lowering their index of the primary good (measured by wages plus the transfer component), thereby Get the desired result.

At first glance, however, it appears that the difference principle requires a high minimum social security.It is natural to suppose that the greater wealth of the better off should be scaled down until at last everyone has about the same income.But this is a misconception, although it may be applicable in special cases.Appropriate expectations for the application of the difference principle are the expectations of those least benefited with long-term prospects that are carried over to future generations.Each generation should not only preserve the interests of culture and civilization, and keep intact the institutions of justice already established, but should also save at each period an appropriate amount of accumulation of capital in kind.This saving of capital can take different forms, ranging from net investment in machinery and equipment or other means of production, to investment in academics and education.Assuming for a moment that there is a just saving principle that tells us what the amount of investment should be, then the standard of minimum social security is determined.For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the social security floor is regulated on the basis of transfers paid by proportional expenditure (or income) taxes.In this case, increasing the minimum social security will inevitably increase the proportion of consumption (or income) tax.As this part of the tax increases, there will presumably be a limit beyond which one of two problems arises, either that adequate savings cannot be achieved, or that the larger tax greatly hinders economic efficiency, Instead of improving, the prospects of the most disadvantaged of the current generation have begun to deteriorate.In either case, the correct minimum social security is provided.The difference principle has been fulfilled and there is no need for any additional taxation.

Having made these arguments for specifying a social security minimum, we can turn to the question of intergenerational justice.Finding a just principle of saving is one aspect of the problem.However, I do not think that, at any rate, it is at present possible to lay down definite rules for the proper proportion of savings.How the burden of accumulating capital and raising the level of civilization and culture should be distributed between two generations seems impossible to have any definite answer.It does not follow, however, that we cannot propose certain scopes for exploiting important ethical constraints.I said that a moral theory states a point of view on which to evaluate policy; at the same time, a proposed answer may be wrong even if no alternative theory is readily available. One point may often be clear.It seems obvious, for example, that in the matter of intergenerational justice the traditional principle of utility has led one astray.If one regards the size of the population as variable, and presupposes a high marginal productivity of capital and very long time horizons, then maximizing aggregate utility leads to an excessively high rate of accumulation (at least in in the near future).Since, from a moral point of view, there is no reason to discount future welfare on the basis of pure time preference, the conclusion is more likely that the greater good for future generations more than compensates for the present sacrifice.This may prove to be true if only by virtue of greater capital and better technology it becomes possible to maintain a considerable population.For example, utilitarian theory might instruct us to demand that poorer generations make significant sacrifices at the expense of far wealthier offspring.But this calculation of benefit balances the loss of some with the gain of others, so that it seems even more difficult to justify to people of different ages than to contemporaries.Even if we were unable to prescribe a correct saving principle, we should be able to avoid such extremes.

Contractarianism, however, looks at the problem from the point of view of the original position.The parties do not know to which generation they belong, nor what produces the same result, namely, the stage of civilization in which their society is.He could not say whether this stage was poor or relatively rich, mainly agricultural or already industrialized, etc.In these respects the veil of ignorance is intact.People in the primitive position would then ask themselves how far they would be willing to save at each stage of development, assuming that other generations were to save at the same rate.That is, if the rates they suggest are intended to adjust the overall magnitude of accumulation, then they should consider whether they would be willing to save at any known stage of civilization.They must, therefore, in fact choose a just principle of saving which would fix the appropriate rate of accumulation for each stage of development.Changes in the savings rate presumably depend on social conditions.If the people are poor enough to save, a lower saving rate should be prescribed; whereas in a richer society, where the actual burden is less, a higher saving can reasonably be expected.Finally, once the institutions of justice are firmly established, the prescribed net accumulation falls to zero.At this time, society fulfills its just responsibilities by maintaining just institutions and protecting the material foundations of these institutions.Of course, the just principle of saving applies when society treats saving as a matter of justice.If citizens want to save for all sorts of grand schemes, that's a different story.

I'll leave time preference and priority issues to the next few sections.For the moment, I just want to point out the main features of the contractarian approach.In the first place, the original position now achieves the same result, though it is evident that the just saving principle cannot be fully democratically adopted.Since no one knows to which generation he belongs, each sees the matter from his own point of view, reasonably regulated by the principles employed.Since the same principles are always selected, the generations are virtually represented in the original state.This would result in an ideal democratic decision, fully adapted to the requirements of each generation, and thus in line with the maxim of "nothing to hang on to if it matters to you".Furthermore, it should be clear that every generation (except perhaps the first) would benefit if a reasonable saving rate was maintained.It is in the interest of subsequent generations that the process of accumulation should only begin and continue.Each generation bequeaths to the next a considerable amount of capital in kind (it should be remembered here that this capital is not only factories, machinery, etc., but the knowledge, culture, and technology and skills that enable fair value).This capital is used to compensate for what was received by previous generations so that future generations can live better lives in a more just society.Only the first generation did not benefit, because although they started the whole process of accumulation, they did not share in the fruits of their savings.But since we assume that a given generation is concerned with their immediate offspring, as, for example, with a father's concern for his sons, the just saving principle, or rather some limits to it, May be admitted.

It is another characteristic of contractarianism to prescribe a just social state as the goal of the entire accumulation process.This feature arises from the fact that the ideal conception of the basic structure of justice is rooted in the principle of original position choice.In this respect justice as fairness is quite different from the utilitarian view (Section 41).Think of the just saving principle as an agreement between generations to share fairly the responsibility for achieving and maintaining a just society.The purpose of the savings process is predetermined, although only a rough outline of this purpose can be discerned.More detailed aspects will be determined in time by the specific circumstances that arise.But under no circumstances can we continue to expand this purpose without limit.In fact, it is for this reason that agreement on the principles of justice applicable to the system must be reached before agreement on the savings principle can be reached, even though the savings principle will constrain the difference principle.These principles tell us what to strive for.The saving principle is an interpretation in the original position of the previously recognized natural duty to maintain and develop institutions of justice.In this case, the ethical question is also a question of reaching agreement throughout the history of society on the way to do justice to all generations.What seems fair to man in the original position, as in other cases, provides for justice in this case.

However, the significance of this recent social phase should not be misunderstood.While each generation has to do its part to bring about this state of justice (once it has been achieved, there is no longer any need for pure saving), it cannot be thought that this alone has made the whole of history possible. meaning and purpose.Instead, each generation has its own appropriate goals.They, like individuals, are not subordinate to each other.The life of a people is seen as a cooperative arrangement throughout historical periods.It is to be guided by a conception of justice that coordinates the cooperation of its contemporaries.No generation is more demanding than any other.In attempting to estimate a reasonable saving rate, people in the original position ask what is reasonable for successive generations to demand from each other at each stage of development.They try to piece together a just savings plan by balancing how much they might be willing at each stage to save for their offspring against what they might feel entitled to demand from their predecessors.So if they envision themselves as the father's generation, they should be mindful of what they might think they are entitled to from their fathers in order to determine how much they should save for their sons.If they make an estimate that seems fair and reasonable in both respects, with due consideration given to improving their own circumstances, then a reasonable saving rate (or magnitude of the saving rate) for that period is clearly defined, once all We have achieved this in all stages, and we have also stipulated the principle of just savings.So long as this principle is followed, successive generations cannot complain about each other; indeed, no generation can find fault with any other, however remote the interval.

The most recent stage of needing to save is not a very affluent stage.This insight may deserve some weight.For some purposes, greater wealth may not be superfluous; in fact, the average income may not be very high in absolute terms.Justice does not require previous generations to save only in order to enrich future generations.It requires saving because saving is a condition for the full realization of a just system and a fair value of liberty.If there is more accumulation, it is for other reasons.It would be a mistake to think that a just and good society must necessarily be the product of a high material standard of living.What people want is meaningful labor in free association with others that regulates their mutual relations on the basis of the basic institutions of justice.To achieve this state, great wealth is not required.In fact.Beyond a certain point, wealth is more likely to become a practical encumbrance; at best, a meaningless distraction, if not an unindulgent and spiritually empty one (of course, about The definition of labor of meaning is a problem in itself. Although it is not a problem of justice, it will also be commented on in section 79).

We shall now state that just saving is characterized by the principle of reciprocity.Generally speaking, this principle applies as long as there is an exchange of benefits, as long as each party gives the other some benefit as fair remuneration.However, in the course of history, although each generation has benefited from the savings of the previous generation, no generation has given back to the previous generation.In following the savings principle, each generation contributes to the next and benefits from the previous.The first few generations will probably get little of anything, and the last ones will get the most and give the least, living at a stage in history when there is no need to promote further savings.This may seem unjust.Hezeng said that the development of human beings is an unfair order of the times, because the later generations benefit from the labor of the predecessors without paying the same price.According to Kant, it is inexplicable that the previous generation bears a burden only for the sake of the next generation, only to allow the last generation to be lucky enough to reap the benefits.This feeling, while perfectly natural, is false.Although the relationship between the generations is a special one, it does not lead to insurmountable difficulties.

It is a natural fact that the generations go on and on, and that the actual exchange of interests between the generations takes place in only one direction.We can do something for our posterity; our posterity can do nothing for us.This situation cannot be changed, so the question of justice is non-existent.What is just and what is unjust depends on how institutions deal with natural constraints and how institutions are built to take advantage of historical possibilities.Obviously, if the generations are to benefit (except perhaps the first), they must choose a just saving principle, which, if followed, will make it possible for each generation to benefit from the previous generation, while Do your part for the next generation.The only mutually beneficial exchange between each generation is the actual exchange, that is, the compensatory adjustment that can be made in the original position in formulating the just savings principle.But I imagine each generation has made this adjustment for itself, and how any generation is made to look after the interests of all is a matter of veil of ignorance and other limitations. It is now clear why the difference principle does not apply to the saving problem.Subsequent generations cannot improve the situation of the least fortunate of the first generation.This principle does not apply, and it seems likely that it might even mean that there is no question of saving at all.Therefore, the problem of saving must be dealt with differently.If we assume that the original position included representatives of actual generations, then the veil of ignorance may make changing motivation assumptions unnecessary.But, as we noted earlier (section 24), it is better to enter this interpretation now.Men in the primitive position thus know that they are contemporaries, and therefore have no reason to agree to any savings, were they not at least concerned about their immediate descendants.Of course, they don't know which generation they belong to, but that doesn't matter.No matter whether the previous generation saved or not, none of the parties can change this fact.It seems best to reserve entry into this explanation for now; the motivational conditions are adjusted accordingly.The parties are seen as the face of the family line, with an emotional bond maintained between successive generations.This adjustment seems quite natural, and it has been done in the argument for equal liberty (Section 33).Although the saving problem presents a special case, the representation of justice remains unchanged.The intergenerational standard of justice is also the standard that might have been selected in the original state. We must now combine the just principle of saving with the two principles of justice.This combination is achieved as long as it is assumed that the principle of saving is determined from the point of view of the most disadvantaged in each generation.It is the representatives of this continuous group of people who define the rate of accumulation by means of actual adjustments.They actually try to limit the application of the difference principle.In any generation, their expectations are maximized in terms of savings that can be identified.Thus, a full account of the difference principle includes the saving principle as a limiting factor.If the first principle of justice and the principle of fair opportunity limit the application of the difference principle within each generation, the saving principle limits the application of the difference principle between generations. Of course, the fact that less benefited people save does not necessarily mean that they are actively involved in the investment process.On the contrary, their saving is generally an expression of their assent to the economic and other arrangements necessary for proper accumulation.Saving is achieved as long as it is recognized that policies aimed at raising the standard of living of the descendants of the most disadvantaged are a political judgment, thereby forgoing immediate gains that could be obtained.By supporting these arrangements, the necessary savings can be achieved, and no representative of any generation of the most disadvantaged can complain that another generation is not doing its part.At the same time, it should be pointed out that for a long period of time, especially in the early stage, the general concept of justice may be applicable, rather than these two principles of justice in the sequence.But the same concepts still apply, which I'm not going to discuss specifically. Some of the chief features of the just savings principle are thus briefly stated.Now we can understand that people of different generations have responsibilities and obligations to each other just like their contemporaries.The present generation is not free to do what it pleases, but is bound by principles which might have been chosen in the original state in order to prescribe justice among men of different ages.Moreover, men have a natural duty to maintain and develop institutions of justice, and for this purpose civilization needs to be raised to a certain level.To extend these responsibilities and obligations may seem like a far-fetched use of contract theory at first glance.However, these claims may be recognized in the original position, so that justice as fairness applies to these issues without any change in its basic concept. I had assumed that people in the original position had no pure time preference in choosing the saving principle.We must consider the reasons for this assumption.Personally, it is a characteristic of rationality to avoid pure time preference.Sidgwick believed that rationality meant an impartial concern expressed in all aspects of our lives.The location in time is different, and things happen in sequence, but this difference alone cannot be a reasonable basis for favoring one over another.Of course, we may give more weight to present or near future interests because of their greater certainty or probability, and we should also consider that our position and ability to obtain certain enjoyments may changes that occur.But none of these issues prove that we can prefer less present benefits to more future benefits simply because the present temporal location is closer to us (Section 64). However, Sidgwick argues that the notions of the general good and the individual good are fundamentally the same.He believed that the good of one person is devised by comparing and synthesizing the different good that successively occurred in each period, and likewise, the general good is devised by comparing and synthesizing the good of many different individuals.The relation of the parts to the whole and the interrelationships of the parts, which are similar in every case, are based on the synthetic utilitarian principle.The saving principle for social justice, therefore, must not be affected by pure time preference, since, as ever, the different positions in time of individuals and generations do not in themselves justify treating them differently. Since the principle of justice in justice as fairness is not an extension of the principle of one's rational choice, the argument against time preference must be an argument of another nature.The problem can be resolved by reference to the original position; but once viewed from this point of view, we come to the same conclusion.There is no reason for the parties to place any weight on a purely temporal location.They must choose a savings rate for each civilization stage.If they distinguish recent periods from earlier periods because future conditions seem less important to the present, then present conditions will also appear to be less important in the future.While any decision must be made now, there is no reason for them to take advantage of the situation: it is better for today to overlook the future than for the future to overlook today.The situation is symmetrical, with one choice as arbitrary as the other.Man in the original position accepts the views of each period as governed by the veil of ignorance.They see this symmetry so clearly that they will not agree with any principle that places more or less emphasis on the more recent.Only in this way can they reach an agreement that is consistent from all points of view, because to recognize the principle of time preference is to allow people in different positions in time to follow different emphases based only on this randomness. Assess each other's requirements. As in the case of reasonable prudence, objection to pure time preference is not inconsistent with valuing unreliability and changing circumstances; nor does it exclude the use of interest rates (whether in a socialist economy or in a Limited capital is allocated for investment.Precisely, the limitation is that, according to the fundamental principles of justice, we cannot treat different generations differently merely because of their chronological succession.The regulation of the original position is to be able to produce correct principles in this respect.On the individual level, pure time preference is irrational: it means that the individual does not see all periods as equally integral to life.Societally speaking, pure time preference is unjust: it means (never paying attention to the more general example of the future) that living people use their position in time to further their own interests. Thus, the contract view, like Sidgwick's, rejects the recognition of time preference as a basis for social choice.If the living allow themselves to be driven by such considerations, they may be doing their predecessors and posterity a disservice.However, this argument seems to be in conflict with democratic principles, which are often said to require that social policy be determined in accordance with the wishes of the current generation.Of course, it has also been argued that the implications of such preferences need to be clarified and determined in light of the appropriate circumstances.Collective saving for the future has many of the characteristics of a public good, and it is in this context that the problem of so-called isolated decisions and guaranteed compliance arises.But assuming that this difficulty can be overcome, and that the informed collective judgments of the present generation are requisitely known, it can be argued that, even where public judgments are manifestly wrong, the The democratic view also disapproves of government intervention for the sake of future generations. Whether this argument is correct depends on how it is interpreted.As a description of a democratic constitution, that's justifiable.Once the public will is clearly expressed in legislation and social policy, the government is not a democratic government if it ignores this will.The government has no right to cancel voters' opinions on the amount of savings.If a democracy is justified, then having that kind of power in the government usually leads to more injustice overall.We should choose constitutional arrangements according to the extent to which they produce just and effective legislation.A democrat is one who thinks that a democratic constitution best meets this standard.But his conception of justice includes preparing for the demands of justice in future generations.Even as a practical matter of choosing a system, voters should have the final say; simply because this is more likely to be true than the right of the government to ignore the wishes of voters.However, since a just constitution is an imperfect procedural justice even under favorable conditions, the people may still make wrong decisions.They may cause irreversible damage, thereby permanently and severely detrimental to other generations, where under other regimes such mistakes might have been prevented.Moreover, according to this same conception of justice that underlies democratic institutions, injustice may be quite obvious and demonstrable.In fact, some principles of this conception of justice may be more or less clear in the Constitution, and are often cited by the judiciary and informed public opinion in interpreting the Constitution. In this case, therefore, there may be no reason why a democrat should not oppose the public will by appropriate means of disobedience, or, even if he were a government official, should not evade it.While people believe in the soundness of the Constitution and accept the duty to uphold it, they can reject the duty to obey a particular law where the collective judgment is sufficiently unjust.Public decisions about the level of saving are by no means sacrosanct; the time-preferential tendencies of such decisions should not be given special respect.In fact, such decisions are all the more questionable if there are no damaged parties, namely future generations.A man cannot but be a democrat unless he thinks that some other and better form of government is possible, and works for its realization.As long as a person does not believe this to be the case, but believes that appropriate forms of disobedience, such as civil resistance or acts of conscientious disobedience, are necessary and reasonable means of correcting a democratically enacted policy, then his conduct is consistent with the recognition of democratic consistent with the Constitution.I will discuss this issue in more detail in the next chapter.The essential point at the moment is this: Like all other social decisions, the collective will to prepare for the future is subject to principles of justice.The nature of the situation does not make it exceptional. It should be pointed out that the denial of pure time preference is a basic principle, and it is not inconsistent with admitting that reducing the emphasis on the future can improve other flawed judgment criteria to a certain extent.For example, I have said that utilitarian principles can lead to an extremely high saving rate, making previous generations unduly hard.This consequence can be corrected to some extent by lowering the welfare of those living in the future.Since the welfare of future generations can be considered less important, there is no need to save as much as before.At the same time, it is also possible to vary the necessary accumulation by adjusting the parameters of the required utility function.I cannot discuss these issues here.Unfortunately, I can only express the opinion that these means only mitigate the consequences of wrong principles.The situation is in some respects similar to that of an institutional view that combines the utilitarian criterion with the principle of equality (see Section 7).In that case, if either of the two principles taken alone turns out to be unacceptable, then the standard of equality, given due weight, can be used to modify the standard of utility.In this way, by analogy, after proposing the concept that the appropriate saving rate is the saving rate that always maximizes the social utility (that is, reaches some kind of maximum points), we can make the welfare of future generations less important. A plausible result is obtained; and the most appropriate degree of reducing the emphasis on the welfare of future generations may depend on the rate of population growth, on the productivity of capital, and so on.What we are doing is adjusting certain parameters in order to come to a conclusion that is more in line with our intuitive judgment.We may find that these modifications to the principle of utility are necessary in order to achieve intergenerational justice.Of course, time preference might be a better approach in this case; but I think it shows that we are starting from a wrong point of view.The situation here is different from the system view mentioned above.Time preference, unlike the principle of equality, does not have any inherent ethical appeal.The adoption of time preference is nothing more than a purely ad hoc means of alleviating the consequences of the utilitarian criterion. The saving problem of justice can be used to further illustrate the priority problem of justice.A feature of contractarianism is that it places an upper limit on how much a given generation can be asked to save for the welfare of future generations.The saving principle of justice becomes a limit to the rate of accumulation.Every age will do its part to realize what is necessary for just institutions and an equitable value of liberty; but no more can be demanded.It may be objected that higher savings rates can be required, especially if the benefits are large and imply long-term development.One might even argue that inequality of wealth and power, which violates the second principle of justice, might be justified if the ensuing economies and benefits are considerable.In support of their point, they can point to examples where we seem to admit such inequalities and rates of accumulation for the benefit of future generations.For example, Keynes said that the huge accumulation of capital before World War I could never have occurred in a society where wealth was evenly distributed.Nineteenth-century social arrangements, he said, placed more income in the hands of those who were less likely to spend it.The newly rich are not born to consume a lot. What they like is not the enjoyment of direct consumption, but the power generated by investment.It is this inequity in the distribution of wealth that makes possible the rapid accumulation of capital and, to some extent, the constant improvement in the general standard of living of everyone.It was this, in Keynes's view, that provided the main justification for the capitalist system.If the rich spent their new wealth on themselves, the system would be deemed outrageous and abandoned.Of course, there are more efficient and just ways to improve welfare and cultural levels than those described by Keynes.Only under exceptional circumstances, including the frugality of the capitalist class as opposed to the indulgence of the aristocratic class, did society obtain capital for investment by giving the rich more wealth than they thought they could rightly spend.But the fundamental point here is that Keynes's argument, whether its premises are correct or not, can be turned entirely in the service of improving the conditions of the working class.While conditions for the working class appear to be difficult, Keynes would presumably have argued that, despite the many glaring injustices of the capitalist system, it is not really possible to remove such injustices and improve the conditions of the less advantaged. did it.Under other arrangements, workers may be even worse off.We need not consider whether these arguments are true.Suffice it to say that, contrary to what one might think, Keynes was not saying that the suffering of the poor was justified for the greater good of future generations.This point is consistent with the priority of justice over utility, and it is also consistent with the greater total amount of interests.不论什么时候，只要在储蓄问题上违反正义的限制，就都必须指出这样的情况：不违反这种限制，结果就可能会使那些遭受不正义的人遭受更大的损害。这种情况类似于业已在自由权优先题目下所讨论的情况（见第39节）。 显然，凯恩斯心目中的不平等同样违反了公平的机会均等原则。因此，这就使我不得不考虑应该用什么样的论据来为违反这一标准的行为辩护，并考虑怎样来提出适当的优先规则。许多作者认为，公平的机会均等可能会产生严重的后果。他们认为，某种等级制的社会结构以及一个具有普遍传统特点的统治阶级，对于公共善来说是必不可少的。执掌政权的人应该对自己社会的宪法传统富有经验，并从小受到这种传统的教育，他们的有保障的地位给他们带来的特权和享受减少了他们的野心。否则风险就会太大，那些缺乏文化和信仰的人就会互相争夺，为一己的狭隘目标来控制国家的权力。因此，伯克认为，统治阶层的那些大家族用他们政治统治的聪明才智，为一代代的普遍福利作出了贡献。黑格尔认为，诸如长子继承权之类的对机会均等的限制是至关重要的，由于地主阶级不受国家、利润追求和文明社会中种种随机事件的影响，所以这种限制可以保障特别适合于政治统治的地主阶级。特权家族和财产安排使深受其惠的人准备为了全社会的利益而采取一种比较明确的普遍利益的观点。当然，人们毋需赞成诸如等级森严的制度这类东西；人们可以相反地认为，对保持统治阶级的活力来说，至关重要的是，具有非凡才能的人应能进入这个阶级并得到全面的承认。但这个限制性条款是与否认公平机会原则相一致的。 为了与公平机会优先于差别原则保持一致，如果像伯克和黑格尔似乎论证的那样，认为包括受惠最少者在内的整个社会都得益于对机会均等的某些限制，那是不够的。我们还必须认为，消灭这些不平等的企图，可能会与社会制度发生冲突并妨碍经济的运转，从长远来看，这无论如何会使地位不利的人的机会受到甚至更多的限制。公平机会优先同自由权优先这个平行的例子一样，意味着我们必须强烈要求把机会给予那些机会较少的人。我们必须坚持使他们能够得到在其他情况下不能得到的更广泛的较称心合意的选择。只有在情况证明抛弃词汇序列并进而根据直觉来解决公平机会与社会和经济利益的矛盾是正确的时候，所谓全社会都得利这种不太明确的要求才可以说得过去。这些情况可能会也可能不会要求我们抛弃正义原则的词汇序列。这两个序列可以在不同的时间发生作用。 我不打算进一步讨论这些复杂情况。但我们应该指出，虽然家庭内的生活和教养大概也和其他任何事情一样，影响着儿童的动机和他从教育获得好处的能力，从而又影响着他们的生活前景，但这些影响并不一定就与公平的机会均等相矛盾。即使在一个符合正义的两个原则的井然有序的社会里，家庭也可能成为个人之间平等机会的障碍。因为正如我已经规定的那样，正义的第二个原则仅仅要求社会各部分中具有类似天赋和动机的人具有同等的生活前景。如果在社会同一部分中的家庭之间在如何发展儿童的志向问题上存在着差异，那么，虽然社会各部分之间的公平的机会均等可能实现，但个人之间的平等机会却不会实现。这种可能性提出了机会均等的概念能在多大程度上适用的问题；但我要把这个问题留到后面（第77节）去讨论。这里我只打算说这样一点，即遵循差别原则及其所提出的优先规则，可以减少实现完全的机会均等的紧迫性。 至于是否有合理的论据可以否定公平的机会均等原则而赞成一种等级制的阶级结构，我不打算研究这个问题。这些问题不属于正义理论的范围。与此有关的一点是，虽然这些论点有时看起来似乎是自圆其说并且是虚伪的，但由于是按照差别原则及其所遵循的词汇序列来对这种正义观进行解释的，所以当这些论点体现了普遍的正义观时，它们也就具有了正确的形式。其他人或整个社会享有更大的利益总量，并不能证明违反公平的机会均等是正当的。但即使消灭了这种不平等，这种要求（不管是否正确）也必定会使社会中地位最不利的那部分人的机会受到进一步的限制。人们将认为这些不平等不是不正义的，因为全面实现正义原则的条件还不存在。 在指出了关于优先的这些情况之后，我现在打算最后说明一下适用于体制的两个正义原则。为了完备起见，我将作一全面的说明，包括以前系统提出的一些观点。 正义的第一个原则： Every person shall have an equal right to the broadest and equal total system of fundamental liberties consistent with a similar system of liberties enjoyed by all. 正义的第二个原则： 社会和经济不平等的安排应能使它们 （1）符合地位最不利的人的最大利益，符合正义的储蓄原则，以及 （2）在公平的机会均等的条件下与向所有人开放的官职和职务联系起来。 第一条优先规则（自由权优先）： The principles of justice should be arranged in lexical order, so that liberty can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself. 这里有两种情况： （1）不太广泛的自由权应能使人人享有的自由权总体系得到加强； （2）不太平等的自由权必须是具有较少自由权的那些人能够接受的。 第二条优先规则（正义优先于效率和福利）： 正义的第二个原则在词汇序列上优先于效率原则和最大限度提高利益总量的原则；而公平机会优先于差别原则。这里有两种情况： （1）机会的不平等必须扩大具有较少机会的那些人的机会； （2）过高的储蓄率必须在总体上能减轻为此而受苦的人的负担。 一般概念： 所有的社会基本善——自由权和机会、收入和财富以及自尊的基础——都应予以平等地分配，除非任何此类善的不平等分配符合受惠最少者的利益。 应该说明的是，这些原则和优先规则无疑都是不完全的，无疑需要从其他方面予以修正，但我不打算把对这些原则的说明弄得更加复杂。这里只要指出这样一点就可以了：如果我们最后得出了非理想理论，我们也不是直接退回到普遍的正义观上去。这两个原则的词汇序列以及这种序列所含有的价值，提出了在许多情况下都似乎相当合理的优先规则。我曾试图通过不同的例子来说明怎样利用这些规则，并指出它们的似乎合理性。例如，在理想理论中，正义原则的排列次序反映并指导了如何把这些原则应用于非理想的情况。它指出哪些限制需要首先处理。普遍正义观的缺点是，它缺乏序列中这两个原则的明确结构。在非理想理论的比较极端和比较复杂的例子中，也许除此别无选择。适用于非理想情况的一些规则的优先，在某个问题上将会行不通；而且事实上我们也许根本就找不到任何圆满的答案。但我们必须努力尽量地摧迟算帐的日子，同时努力把社会安排好，使这个日子永远不会到来。 对符合正义两原则的体制进行系统的概括描述，这个任务至此已经完成了。正义的储蓄率一旦确定，或者储蓄的适当限度一旦得到明确的规定，我们就有了调整最低限度社会保障水平的标准。对基本的公共善的调拨额和收益额的安排，应能按照规定的储蓄和维护平等自由权的要求来提高受惠最少者的期望。如果基本结构采取这种形式，那么由此而产生的任何分配就都将是正义的（或至少不是不正义的）。每个人都得到了那笔总收入（收益加调拨部分），按照公共规则体系，他是有权得到这笔收入的，他的合法期望就是建立在这个规则体系上的。 不过，正如我们在前面（第14节）所看到的那样，这种分配正义观的一个重要特征是，它含有很大的纯粹程序正义的成份。我们不想在关于特定个人的偏爱和要求这种知识的基础上来规定对善和服务的正义分配。从相当普遍的观点来看，这种知识被认为是毫不相干的；而且无论如何它都会带来一些复杂的问题，而这些问题是不能用一些堪称简单的原则来予以解决的，虽然人们也许会合理地同意这些原则。但是，如果要使纯粹程序正义这个概念能够适用，那就必须像我说过的那样建立并公正地管理一系列正义的背景体制。要依靠纯粹的程序正义，必须先使基本结构符合正义的两个原则。 对分配份额的这个描述，不过是进一步说明了一个人们所熟知的概念，即只要适当地建立起一种（切实可行的）竞争性的价格体系，并使之植根于正义的基本结构之中，那么收入和工资就会是公正的。只要有这两个条件就够了。从公平竞争的结果来推论，由此而产生的分配就是背景正义的例证。但我们需要考虑一下，这种观念是否符合我们关于什么是正义和不正义的直觉既念。我们尤其应该问一问，这种观念在多大程度上与常识性的正义准则相一致。看来我们好像完全忽略了这些意见。现在我想指出，这些意见是有道理的，它们的从属地位也是能够得到解释的。 这个问题可以用下面的方法来说明。穆勒正确地论证说，只要人们仍然停留在常识性准则的阶段，正义的这些准则就不可能一致。例如，就工资来说，按劳分配和按贡献分配就是相互排斥的两个相反的准则。而且，即使我们在某些方面给予它们以更多的重视，它们也无法决定怎样确定自己的相对价值。因此，常识性的准则并不表示一种关于公正的或合理的工资的有决定作用的理论。然而，也不能因此就像穆勒似乎假定的那样，认为人们只有采用功利主义原则才能找到一种令人满意的观念。某种更高的原则当然是需要的；但除了功利原则，还有其他原则可供选择。把其中的一个准则或这些准则的某种结合提升到一种首要原则的高度，如所谓各尽所能按需分配的原则，这甚至也是可能的。从正义理论的观点看，正义的两个原则规定了这种正确的更高标准。因此，这里的问题是：应该考虑一下，在一个井然有序的社会里会不会出现常识性的正义准则，而这些准则又是怎样得到适当的重视的。 可以考虑一下在一个以正义的基本结构为背景的完全竞争性经济中的工资情况。假定每家公司（无论是公营的还是私营的）必须按照长远的供求因素来调整它的工资额。公司的工资不能高得使它付不起，也不能低得使相当多的人由于可以得到其他机会而不愿意贡献自己的技能。平心而论，不同工作的相对吸引力从各方面看都会是相等的。因此，不同的正义准则究竟是怎样产生的，也就不难看出了。这些准则只是表明了一些工作的特点，而这些特点对市场供求的任何一方或双方都具有特殊的意义。公司对工人的需求，决定于劳动的边际生产率，就是说，决定于用该公司生产的商品的销售价格来测量的劳力单位的差益净值。这种差益对公司的价值。最终依赖于市场状况，依赖于家庭愿意用什么价格来购买各种商品。经验和训练，自然能力和专门知识，必然会获得重视。公司愿意向具有这些特点的人支付较多的工资，因为他们的生产率较高。这个事实说明了什么是按贡献分配的准则，并对这个准则给予更多的重视，于是，作为特殊情况，我们又有了按训练分配或按经验分配等等原则。但从供方的观点看，如果要使可能在以后作出贡献的人承担训练和延期费用，那就必须支付额外费用。不稳定的、条件艰苦而又危险的工作往往会得到较多的报酬。否则就不会有人愿意从事这些工作。这种情况产生了诸如按劳分配或按所承担的风险分配等等准则。即使假定人们都具有同样的自然能力，经济活动的需要也仍会产生这些准则。鉴于生产单位和求职者的目标是既定的，某些特点于是就变得有关了。在任何时候，公司的工资制度都必然会承认这些准则，同时，由于要留有调整时间，一般都要很据市场情况对这些准则给予必要的重视。 这一切似乎相当清楚了。还有几个问题更加重要。首先，不同的正义观有可能产生大致相同的常识性准则。因此，在一个由功利原则支配的社会里，以上所有准则都极可能会得到承认。只要经济代理人的目的是充分相似的，这些准则必然会引起人们的兴趣，而工资制度也会对它们予以明确的考虑。另一方面，这些准则受到重视的程度一般说来是不会相同的。正是这一点使正义观产生了差异。这里不仅会出现以其他方式实行工资制度的倾向，而且经济事态的长期趋势也几乎肯定会走上另一条发展道路。如果整个背景体制是受截然不同的正义观支配的，那么公司和工人必须适应的市场因素就不会是相同的。不同的供求平衡会保证使各种准则得到不同的考虑。因此，正义观之间的明显差异并不出现在常识性准则阶段，而是表现在这些准则始终具有的相对的、不断变比的重点上。关于合理的或正义的平衡，有一种习惯性的或传统的观念，在任何情况下都不能把这种观念看作是根本的观念，因为这种观念要取决于规定背景体制的原则，取决于它是否能按照这些原则的要求使自己适应当前的情况。 有一个例子也许能说明这个问题。假定一个社会的基本结构规定了公平的机会均等，而另一个社会却没有这样做。于是，在第一种社会中，以按训练和教育分配这种特殊形式表现出来的按贡献分配的准则所受重视的程度大概要小得多。即使我们像事实所表明的那样假定人们具有不同的自然能力，情况也可能如此。其所以如此，是因为在许许多多的人得到了训练和教育之益的情况下，第一种社会对合格人材的供应量也大得多。如果对新人的加入没有限制，或者如果教育借款（或补贴）市场有缺陷，那么天赋较佳的人得到的奖励就会少得多。受惠较多者和收入最低价级在收入方面的相对差别趋于接近；而在遵循差别原则时，这种趋势甚至更加强大。因此，按训练和教育分配的准则，在第一种社会要比在第二种社会较少受到重视，而按劳分配的准则则较多受到重视。当然，按照正义观的要求，社会条件改变了，准则之间的适当平衡一般也要随之而改变。正义原则长期始终一贯的应用，逐步改造了社会结构，使市场因素也发生了变化，从而重新确定了这些准则的重点。现有的平衡即便是正确的，也决不是神圣不可侵犯的。 此外，至关重要的是要牢记常识性准则的从属地位。要做到这一点有时很困难，因为这些准则是人们日常生活中所熟悉的，因而在我们的思想中可能占有主导的地位，如果说它们处于派生地位，那反而没有道理了。这些准则没有一个可以提高到一种基本原则的地位。每一个准则大概都是为了适应与某些特定体制相联系的一个有关特征而产生的，这个特征不过是许多特征中的一个，而这些体制也只是一种特殊的体制。把其中一个准则当作基本原则来采用，结果肯定会忽略了应该予以考虑的其他问题。而如果把所有准则或许多准则当作基本原则来对待，那也不会使系统性和明确性有所增加。常识性准则还是处于错误的普遍性水平上。为了找到合适的基本原则，我们决不能超越这些准则。无可否认，某些准则初看起来似乎是相当普遍的，例如，按贡献分配的准则在完全竞争性的经济中适用于许多分配情况。如果接受边际生产力决定分配的理论，每一个生产要素就要按它增加了多少产量来获得收入（假定生产资料是私有财产）。从这个意义上说，工人也就得到了他的劳动成果的全部价值，不多也不少。这一点立刻给我们造成了一种公平的印象。它受到一种传统观念的欢迎，这种观念就是：我们对自己的劳动成果拥有自然财产权。因此，对某些作者来说，按贡献分配这一准则作为一种正义原则，一直似乎是令人满意的。 然而，显而易见，情况并非如此。劳动力的边际产品取决于供求情况。个人的劳动贡献随着公司对个人技能的需求而变化，而对个人技能的需求又随着对公司产品的需求而变化。个人的贡献还受到可以贡献同样才能的人的人数的影响。因此，除非能适当地控制根本的市场力量及其所反映的对机会的利用率，否则就没有理由认为奉行这种按贡献分配的准则会产生正义的结果。而我们知道，这意味着整个基本结构是正义的。因此，除了按正义原则的要求作出背景安排，否则就无法给予这些正义准则以适当的重视。某些体制事实上可能突出了某些准则，例如就像竞争性经济突出了这个按贡献分配的准则那样。但是，孤立地考察对任何准则的运用，是推断不出最后分配的正义性来的。要根据整个制度来对这许多准则作出全面评价。例如，需要的准则是调拨部门决定的事；它决不能作为工资的准则。要对分配份额的正义性作出估价，我们就必须注意背景安排的全面作用，注意来自每个部分的收入和财富的比例。 有人可能会不同意前面对常识性准则的说明，不同意完全竞争性经济绝不可能得到实现这个关于纯粹程序正义的概念。生产要素事实上从来没有得到它们的边际产品，而且无论如何在现代条件下，一些工业很快就为一些大公司所控制。竞争充其量是不完全的，人们所得到的价值小于他们所作贡献的价值，从这个意义上说，他们是受剥削的。对这个问题的回答首先是：在任何情况下，在适当的背景体制中得到适当控制的竞争性经济的概念是一种理想的安排，它说明怎样才能实现正义的两个原则。它用来说明这些原则的内容，并提出一种办法，使私有制经济或社会主义制度都能符合这一正义观。即使现有条件永远不能满足这种理想的假定，我们还有某种关于什么是正义的观念。而且，我们还能更好地估计市场现有的种种缺陷究竟如何严重，并确定接近这种理想的最佳途径。 另一个问题是：所谓人们由于市场的缺陷而受到剥削，这是一种十分特殊的情况，就是说，按贡献分配的准则遭到了破坏，而所以发生这种情况，是由于价格体系不再有效。但我们已经知道，这个准则不过是许多次要准则中的一个，真正起作用的是整个制度的运转方式，是这些缺点是否从其他方面得到了补救。此外，既然没有得到实现的基本上是功利原则，人们还可以说，受剥削的是整个社会。但事实上，剥削这个概念用在这里是不合适的。它意味着背景制度的极不正义性，而与市场的低效率几乎没有任何关系。 最后，考虑到功利原则在正义即公平理论中的从属地位，即使必然无法做到使市场完善，那也不需特别担忧。更重要的是，在公平的机会均等的背景条件下，竞争性的安排为自由联合和个人选择职业提供了广阔的余地，同时，还使家庭的决定能够调节为私人用途而生产的商品。一个基本的必不可少的条件是，经济安排不可与自由权体制及自由联合发生矛盾。这样，如果市场是合理竞争的和开放的，那么纯粹程序正义的观念就是一种切实可行的观念。它比其他的传统理想似乎更切合实际，因为它的明确目的就是协调众多的可能标准，使之成为一个合乎逻辑的可行观念。