Chapter 14 Chapter 5 Distribution Share-1

In this chapter, I will proceed to discuss the second principle of justice and, in the context of the modern state, introduce institutional arrangements that meet the requirements of this principle.First, let me point out that principles of justice can be an integral part of political economy theory.The utilitarian tradition emphasizes this application, but we have to find out how far they have come in this regard.I would also stress that these principles embody certain ideals about social institutions, which will be important when we consider the value of associations in Part III of this book.In order to prepare for the ensuing discussion, I will also briefly talk about economic institutions, the role of markets and other issues.Next, I turn to the difficult question of intergenerational economy and justice.All important points will be considered in an intuitive way before some observations are made specifically on the problem of time preference and some further cases on priorities.After this, I also intend to point out that the importance of distributive shares can account for the status of common-sense maxims of justice.I will also study perfectionism and intuitionism as theories of distributive justice, so as to complete the comparison with other traditional views to a certain extent.At various points throughout this chapter I have spoken of the choice between a private property economy and a socialist system; from the point of view of a theory of justice alone, different basic structures seem to fit its principles.

My aim in this chapter is to see how these two principles of justice come about as a conception of political economy, that is, as criteria for evaluating economic arrangements and policies and their background institutions. Functional (welfare economics is usually stated in the same way. I will not use this name, because the word "welfare" suggests that the morality implied is utilitarian; "social choice" is much better, although In my opinion, its connotation is still too narrow).A theory of political economy must include an account of the public good grounded in some conception of justice.Such a theory should guide citizens' thinking as they consider economic and social policy issues.He should take the point of view of the constitutional convention or legislative stage and figure out how the principles of justice apply.Politics is concerned with the promotion of the good of the nation as a whole, and there is an urgent need for some standard for the just distribution of social benefits.

I have emphasized from the outset that the concept of justice as fairness applies to the basic structure of society.It is a conception of justice that classifies social formations as closed systems.Some kind of decision about these background arrangements is important and unavoidable.Indeed, the cumulative impact of social and economic legislation will define the basic structure.Furthermore, social institutions determine the needs and desires that its citizens will ultimately have.It partly defines who they are, but also what they wish to be.Economic institutions are thus not only a prescribed means of satisfying present needs but also a means of generating and shaping future needs.The way people work together to satisfy their present desires affects what they desire and become in the future.These things, of course, are quite obvious, and have always been recognized.Economists as diverse as Marshall and Marx took these things very seriously.Since economic arrangements have these effects, and the facts must have, the choice of these institutions involves a certain view about the human good and the design of institutions to achieve it.Therefore, there are not only economic but also moral and political reasons for making such a choice.Efficiency considerations are only one, and often a secondary, basis for a decision.Of course, such a decision may not be made publicly; it may be made behind the scenes.Too often, without thinking, we acquiesce to the moral and political views implied by the status quo, or allow problems to be resolved by competing social and economic forces that happen to be successful.But political economy must study this question, even if it comes to the conclusion that it is best left to the course of events.

At first glance, the impact of social institutions on human needs and people's perceptions of themselves raises a clear objection to the notion of contract.One might think that this conception of justice rests on existing individual goals and adjusts the social order with principles that those who are governed by those goals might choose.How, then, can such a theory identify Archimedean points that can be used to evaluate the basic structure itself?It seems that there may be no other way than to evaluate the institution in terms of some ideal conception which the man has acquired on a perfectionist or a priori basis.But, as the description of the original position and Kant's interpretations show, we must not lose sight of the very specific nature of this position and the sphere of action of the principles employed in it.Only the most general assumptions are made about the ends of the parties, that is, that the parties are interested in the basic goods of society, in other things that people presumably would want if they wanted anything else.Admittedly, theories about these goods cannot be separated from certain psychological premises, which may prove to be incorrect.But in any case, this kind of thinking must define some kind of good that people generally want as part of a reasonable plan of life that includes the widest variety of ends possible.Thus, to base a conception of justice on the assumption that the parties want these goods is not to associate this conception of justice with a particular pattern of human interests, which may be of some kind produced by specific institutional arrangements.In fact.A theory of justice does contain some kind of theory of the good, but on a broad scale this does not prejudge the choice of what people wish to be.

Once principles of justice have been derived, however, contractarianism imposes certain limits on the conception of the good.These constraints arise from the primacy of justice over efficiency, and from the primacy of liberty over social and economic interests (assuming this order is recognized).I said earlier (section 6) that these priorities mean that the need for what is inherently unjust, or which cannot be satisfied except by violating just arrangements, is unimportant.There is no point in satisfying these needs, the social system should require people to abandon them.In addition, one also has to consider stability issues.Just institutions must prove themselves worthy of support.That is to say, its arrangements must produce in its members a corresponding sense of justice, an actual desire to act for just reasons in accordance with its rules.Thus, the need for stability and the norms that encourage people to give up desires that are inconsistent with the principles of justice impose further constraints on the system.Not only must these institutions be just, but they must also promote the virtues of justice in those who participate in them.In this sense, principles of justice prescribe ideals preferred by individuals, which social and economic arrangements must respect.Finally, the arguments for rooting ideals in the principles of our work show that the two principles of justice require certain institutions.These two principles stipulate a certain ideal basic structure, or the outline of a certain ideal basic structure, which should be the evolutionary result of the reform process.

The gist of this insight is that justice as fairness is not dictated by existing needs and interests.It identifies an Archimedean point from which to evaluate social institutions without resorting to a priori insights.The long-term goals of society are determined in accordance with the main directions of the society, regardless of the specific wishes and needs of the members of the society at that time.Since the system should cultivate the virtue of justice and require people to give up desires and aspirations that run counter to this virtue, an ideal concept of justice is stipulated.Of course, the speed of change and the specific reforms required at any given time depend on conditions at the time.But the concept of justice, the general form of a just society, and the corresponding personal ideals do not have similar dependencies.The question of whether people's desire to play the role of superior or subordinate is not great enough to warrant acceptance of authoritarian regimes, or whether people's knowledge of other people's religious practices is not disturbing enough to deny the right to liberty of conscience is nonexistent.We need not ask whether, under reasonably favorable conditions, the economic interests of a technocratic, yet authoritarian system are great enough to justify the sacrifice of basic liberties.These opinions naturally hold that the general assumptions upon which the principles of justice are chosen are correct.But if these assumptions are correct, then the problem has been solved by these principles.Certain institutional forms are rooted in conceptions of justice.This view shares a common feature with perfectionism in that they both prescribe a personal ideal that limits the pursuit of existing desires.In this regard, both justice as fairness and perfectionism are opposed to utilitarianism.

Since utilitarianism makes no distinctions about the nature of desires and all satisfactions have some meaning, there are no criteria for choosing certain desire systems or personal ideals.In any case, from a theoretical point of view, this is incorrect.Utilitarians can always argue that, given current social conditions and people's real interests, and how those interests develop under one alternative institutional arrangement or another, then the need to encourage one model rather than another This pattern of needs is likely to result in a larger net balance (or higher average) of satisfaction.Utilitarians choose personal ideals on this basis.Certain perceptions and desires tend to lower overall (or average) happiness by being less compatible with fruitful social cooperation.Moral values ​​are, broadly speaking, those dispositions and practical desires generally available to increase the aggregate of welfare.It may therefore be a mistake to assert that the principle of utility is not a basis for choosing one's ideals, however difficult it may be to apply the principle in practice.However, this choice does depend on existing desires and the social circumstances of the time and their natural continuation into the future.Such primitive circumstances may seriously affect the notions of the human good that should be encouraged.The difference is that both justice as fairness and perfectionism independently define three ideal concepts of the individual and of basic structure, so that not only certain desires and inclinations are necessarily discouraged, but this influence of the original environment eventually will also disappear.As far as utilitarianism is concerned, we cannot be sure what will happen.Since its first principles contain no ideals, our starting point can often affect the path we will take.

The basic meaning here can be summarized as follows: Although the concept of justice as fairness has the characteristics of individualism, the two principles of justice do not depend on existing desires or the social environment at that time.We can thus obtain a conception of the basic structure of justice, and a personal ideal that can go hand in hand with this conception, and which can be used as a criterion for evaluating institutions and directing general social reform.In order to find an Archimedean point, it is not necessary to resort to an a priori or perfectionist principle.By assuming the existence of certain general desires, such as those for the primary good of society, and basing them on agreements possible in a properly specified original position, we can arrive at the necessary independence.The original position is characterized by the possibility of consensus; the thinking of any one represents the thinking of all.Moreover, the same applies to the considered judgments of citizens in a well-ordered society governed effectively by the principles of justice.A well-ordered society is a homogeneous society in so far as all have a similar sense of justice.Political debate requires this kind of moral agreement.

It can be argued that the assumption of consensus is peculiar to idealistic political philosophy.However, since the assumption of consensus applies to the contractual view, this assumption no longer has any idealistic character.This condition is an integral part of the procedural view of the original position, and thus implies a restriction on certain arguments.It thus determines the content of a theory of justice, that is, those principles which are consistent with our considered judgments.Both Hume and Adam Smith believed that if people were to adopt a certain point of view, that of the impartial spectator, they would end up with the same belief.A utilitarian society can also be a well-ordered society.For the most part, the philosophical traditions, including intuitionism, have always held that there is some suitable point of view from which one can hope to arrive at agreement on moral questions, at least among rational minds with similarly adequate knowledge. This is the case among people.Or, if unanimity of opinion is impossible, once this view is adopted, the differences in judgment are greatly reduced.Different interpretations of this point of view, different interpretations of what we call the original position, give rise to different moral theories.In this sense, the notion of agreement among rational people is embedded in the entire tradition of moral philosophy.

What characterizes the concept of justice as fairness is the way it accounts for the original situation, that is, the circumstances in which the condition of consensus emerges.Since a Kantian interpretation of the original position can be given, this conception of justice is in fact closely related to idealism.Kant tries to provide a philosophical basis for Rousseau's concept of universal will; and the theory of justice also tries to provide a natural procedural explanation for Kant's concept of the kingdom of ends, as well as the concepts of self-discipline and absolute imperative (Section 40).In this way, the basic structure of Kant's doctrine is separated from its abstract environment, so that this structure can be understood more clearly and can be proposed with less objection.

Another similarity with idealism is that the concept of justice as fairness attaches great importance to the value of associations, and how this happens depends on Kant's interpretation.I will discuss this issue in Part Three of this book.The basic idea here is that we hope to use a concept of justice based on individualism to explain social values ​​and the inherent goodness of institutions, associations, and group activities.Especially for the sake of clarity, we do not wish to rely upon a vague notion of association, nor to assume that society is an organic whole which has a life of its own which is distinct from and superior to that of all its members in relation to each other. life in.Therefore, the contract view of the original state was first proposed.The idea is rather simple, and the question of rational choice it raises is relatively clear.However individualistic this notion may seem, in the end we have to use it to explain the value of community.Otherwise, a theory of justice cannot be valid.In order to do this, we need an account that connects the basic good of self-respect to those parts of the theory that have been elaborated.At present, however, I do not intend to discuss these issues, but to proceed to consider the further implications of these two principles of justice for the economic aspects of the basic structure. It is important to remember that our topic is a theory of justice and not economics (however crude that theory may be).We are only concerned with certain moral issues of political economy.For example, I'm going to ask: What is the appropriate rate to save in the long run?How should the background system of taxation and property be arranged?Or, at what level should minimum social security be determined?The purpose of raising these questions is not to explain what kind of economic theory is used to explain the functions of these systems, let alone to add any opinions on this point.It is clearly inappropriate to intend to do so here.Some crude parts of economic theory are quoted here merely to illustrate the content of the principles of justice.If economic theory is used incorrectly, or if accepted doctrine is itself wrong, I hope this does not undermine the purpose of a theory of justice.But, as we have seen, ethical principles are determined by general facts, and therefore a theory of justice as applied to the basic structure contains an account of these arrangements.If we are to test morality, certain assumptions must be made and their consequences clearly stated.These assumptions are necessarily inaccurate and simplistic, but this may not matter if they enable us to reveal the content of the principles of justice.And if, in all cases, the difference principle leads to acceptable conclusions, we shall be content.In short, some problems of political economy are discussed only in order to find practical aspects of the theory of justice as fairness.I discuss these issues from the perspective from which citizens are trying to judge the justice of the economic system. In order to avoid misunderstandings and to point out some major problems, I first want to make some comments on the economic system.Political economy has an important relationship with the public sector and idiosyncratic forms of the background system, as the system uses taxation and property rights, market structures, etc. to regulate economic activity.The economic system dictates what is produced and by what means, who gets it, what contribution it is paid for, and how much of society's resources are devoted to saving and replenishing the public good.Ideally these questions should be arranged in such a way as to conform to the two principles of justice.But we have to ask: can this be done?In particular, what do these principles require? First, it is useful to distinguish between the two cases of the public sector; otherwise, it would obscure the distinction between private property economic systems and socialist systems.The first case has to do with ownership of the means of production.This tradition is characterized by the much larger public sector (measured by state corporations as a share of total output and managed by state officials or workers' councils) under socialism.In a private property economy the number of state corporations can be very small and in any case limited to the special cases of public utilities and transportation. Another quite different feature of the public sector is the proportion of the total resources of society devoted to supplementing the public good.The difference between the public good and the individual good raises a series of complex issues, but the main concept here is that the public good has two characteristics, indivisibility and publicity.That is to say, there are many individuals, or a public, as it were, who desire more or less of this good, but who must each have an equal amount if they are to enjoy it.The amount of good produced is not divisible like that of an individual, nor can it be made more or less by the individual according to his inclinations.There are different kinds of public goods, different degrees of indivisibility, and different numbers of the public concerned who enjoy them.The public good in extreme cases is completely indivisible to society as a whole.A classic example is defense against (illegitimate) foreign attack.All citizens must receive an equal amount of this good, and they must not be protected differently according to their wishes.The consequence of indivisibility and publicness in such cases is that the provision of the public good must be arranged through the political process, not through the market.How much of the public good is to be produced, and how much is financed for it, must be determined by legislation.All citizens receive the same amount of good, in the sense that the distribution problem does not exist, so the cost of distribution is zero. The different characteristics of the public good derive from these two characteristics.First of all, there is a problem of only enjoying rights but not obligations.Wherever the public is large and includes many persons, every one cannot but be tempted to evade his duty.This is because, no matter what a person does, his actions have no significant effect on the total amount of good produced.He sees the collective actions of others as given actions anyway.If a public good arises, his enjoyment of it is not diminished by his failure to contribute.If no public good is produced, his action will in no way change the situation.A citizen, whether he has paid his taxes or not, is afforded the same protection against foreign invasion.Therefore, no political deals and automatic agreements will develop in this extreme situation. It follows that the arrangement and financing of the public good must be taken over by the state, and some binding regulation requiring the contribution of all must be enforced.Even if all citizens were willing to contribute, they would probably do so only if they were sure that others would contribute as well.Thus, even if citizens have agreed to act collectively, rather than seeing the given actions of others as those of isolated individuals, there is still the task of binding this agreement.A sense of justice leads us to certain just arrangements.And cause us to do our part in believing that others, or a substantial majority, will do their part in these arrangements.Under normal circumstances, however, reasonable assurances in this respect can only be made if there is a binding regulation that is effectively enforced.Assuming that the common good is in everyone's interest, and that all may agree to arrange for this good, the use of coercion is perfectly justified from everyone's point of view.Many traditional activities of government can be explained in this way if they can be justified.Even if everyone is motivated by the same sense of justice, the need for regulation by the state will still exist.The character of the basic public good necessitates collective agreements, and all must be assured that these agreements will be kept. Another aspect of the public good situation is the problem of externalities.Since the goods are public and indivisible, the production of these goods will bring benefits and losses to some people, and the person who arranges these goods or decides to produce these goods may not be responsible for such benefits and losses. will not be considered.Thus, in extreme cases, if only a fraction of citizens pay taxes to pay for the public good, the whole of society is still affected by the items of the good provided.Those who agree to taxation, however, may disregard such consequences, so that the total amount of public expenditure may not be the same as when all benefits and losses are considered.As far as the ordinary situation is concerned, this indivisibility is not complete, and the number of the public is relatively small.If someone is vaccinated against an infectious disease, it is self-interested and beneficial to others; although this method of preventing disease will not get him any compensation, but if all benefits are weighed, it may be beneficial to the local community. is worth it.There are, of course, notable examples of public hazards, such as industrial pollution and the erosion of the natural environment.The market generally does not account for these costs, so that the goods produced are sold at prices well below their marginal social cost.Private accounting and social accounting are disconnected, and the market doesn't signal that.A fundamental task of law and government is to enact necessary corrective measures. Therefore, it is obvious that the indivisibility and public nature of certain basic goods, as well as the external effects and temptations they generate, determine that collective agreements must be organized and implemented by the state.It is a superficial view that political rule is based solely on the tendency of people to be selfish and unrighteous.For even among just men, so long as the good is indivisible for many, their actions determined in isolation from each other do not produce this general good.Some kind of collective arrangement is necessary, and each wants to be assured that it will be kept if he will do his part.In a large community, do not think that the enforcement of a collective agreement is superfluous if people have mutual trust in each other's integrity.In a well-ordered society, the necessary sanctions would undoubtedly be mild, perhaps not imposed at all.Even in this case, however, the presence of such means is a normal condition of human life. In these arguments, I have distinguished between the problems of isolating decisions and ensuring compliance.If the outcome of many individual decisions taken in isolation is worse for each than some other course of action, then his decisions are perfectly justified even by taking the actions of others as given.What arises in this case is the first type of problem.This is nothing but a general case of the prisoner's dilemma, exemplified by Hobbes' original position.The problem with isolated decisions is to account for the situation, and to figure out what is the best binding collective guarantee from the point of view of all.The issue of ensuring compliance is different.The purpose here is to assure those who are collaborating that the mutual agreement is being enforced.Each individual's readiness to contribute is contingent upon the contributions of others.Therefore, in order to have public confidence in a design which is superior from everyone's point of view, or, if not, at any rate superior to that which is practicable, provision must be made for the enforcement of fines and penalties. some means.Here the presence of an effective ruler, or even a general confidence in his abilities, can play a decisive role. One last question on the public good.Because the proportion of social resources used to generate public goods and the public ownership of production means are two completely different issues, there is no necessary connection between them.A private property economic system may allocate a large portion of national income for such purposes, while a socialist society may allocate a small portion of national income for such purposes, and vice versa.There are a variety of public goods, from military equipment to health care facilities and more.After governments have politically agreed to deploy and finance these projects, they can be purchased from the private sector or state-run companies.What specific public goods are to be produced.And what measures are taken to limit the nuisance depends on the society concerned.This is not a question of institutional principles, but a question of political sociology, which also includes the ways in which institutions affect the balance of political interests. After briefly considering the two aspects of the public sector, I would like to make some final remarks on the extent to which economic arrangements may depend on a market system in which prices are freely determined by supply and demand.Several situations need to be distinguished.All regimes generally use markets to distribute the actual production of consumer goods.Any other method would create administrative headaches, and only in exceptional cases would rationing and other means be resorted to.But under a free market system, the output of goods is also governed by the variety and quantity of items that households prefer to buy in the market.Commodities that yield greater than normal profits are produced in larger quantities until the overproduction is cut off.Under socialism, the preferences or collective decisions of planners tend to play a larger role in determining the direction of production.Both the private property system and the socialist system generally allow free choice of occupation and place of work.Only under a centralized system of either kind is this liberty openly interfered with. Finally, an essential feature of economic arrangements is the extent to which markets are used to determine the rate of savings and the direction of investment, and the share of national wealth devoted to conservation and to the removal of irreparable damage to the welfare of future generations.There are several possibilities here.Collective decisions can determine the saving rate, while the direction of investment is largely left to individual companies competing for capital. Whether it is a socialist society or a private property society, it may be important to prevent irreversible damage and to conserve natural resources and protect the environment. of great concern.But any society can do very badly at this. It is therefore clear that there is no intrinsic connection between the use of the free market and private ownership of the means of production.The idea that competitive prices under normal circumstances are fair and reasonable goes back at least to medieval times.Although the notion that a market economy is in some sense the best design has been studied with utmost care by so-called bourgeois economists, this is only a historical accident, since, at least in theory, socialist regimes It is also possible to take advantage of this system.One of the advantages is efficiency.In some cases, competitive prices determine what goods are produced, and at the same time competitive prices allocate resources to production in such a way that firms choose the best method of production and household purchases result in an optimal allocation of goods.There is no longer any resulting rearrangement of the economic structure that would make one household better off (because of its preferred commodity) without making the other worse off.There cannot be any further mutually beneficial transaction; nor is there any practicable method of production which increases the production of one desirable good without requiring a decrease in the production of another desirable good.If this is not the case, it can be to the advantage of some without the loss of anyone else.The theory of general equilibrium shows how, under the right conditions, information provided by prices enables economic factors to work in concert to achieve this outcome.Perfect competition is an ideal way to achieve efficiency.Of course, the necessary conditions are very special conditions, and the full realization of these conditions is unique in the real world.In addition, market failures and imperfections are often severe, so remedial adjustments must be made by the distribution sector (see Section 43).Monopoly constraints, lack of information, external economic factors and diseconomic factors, etc., must be recognized and corrected.As far as the public good is concerned, the market is completely ineffective.But these issues are not necessarily relevant to us here.These idealized arrangements are mentioned in order to clarify the relevant concepts of pure procedural justice.This notion of ideal can then be used to evaluate existing arrangements and as a framework for pointing out reforms that should be undertaken. Another and more important advantage of the market system is that it is compatible with equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity under the necessary background system.Citizens are free to choose their profession.There is no reason at all for forced and centralized labor.Competitive arrangements produce differentials in income, but without such differentials it is in fact difficult to know how, in general at any rate, it is possible to avoid certain aspects of a centralized society that are at odds with liberty.In addition, market institutions diffuse the exercise of economic power.Regardless of the intrinsic nature of firms, whether they are private or public, whether they are run by entrepreneurs or managers elected by workers, they take the prices of output and inputs as given, and plan accordingly.If markets were truly competitive, firms would not engage in price wars or other struggles for market power.The government regulates certain elements under its control in accordance with political decisions arrived at through democratic means.Such as the total investment amount, the interest rate and the amount of money, etc., to control the economic situation.All-encompassing direct planning is unnecessary.Individual households and firms are free to make their own decisions, as long as such decisions are consistent with prevailing economic conditions. While pointing out that market arrangements do not run counter to the socialist system, it is crucial to distinguish between the distribution function and the sales function of price.The distributive function is associated with the use of prices to achieve economic efficiency, while the sales function is associated with prices determining the income received as compensation for individual contributions.It is entirely logical that socialist regimes set interest rates in order to allocate resources to investment projects, to calculate the cost of using capital and leasing scarce natural assets such as land and forests.In fact, this is what must be done if these means of production are to be used to their fullest.Even if these assets are dropped from the sky rather than the result of human effort, they are still productive as long as they combine with other factors to produce a greater output.But it does not follow from this that there must be private individuals who, as owners of these assets, receive the money converted from these assets.Rather, these accounting prices are indicators for developing a valid economic activity schedule.Except for the fact that there are all kinds of labor.Prices and personal incomes under the socialist system cannot adapt.But the state has increased income from natural and collective assets, and therefore, the prices of these assets do not have any sales function. 因此，必须承认市场体制是私有财产制度和社会主义制度所共有的，同列也必须把价格的分配功能和销售功能区别开来。由于在社会主义制度下生产资料和自然资源都是公有的，所以它们的销售功能就大大地受到了限制，而私有财产制度则在不同程度上利用价格来达到这两个目的。在这两种制度及其许多中间形态中，哪一种制度或形态能最充分满足正义的要求，这一点我认为无法事先确定。对这个问题大概不会有任何带普遍性的答案，因为这个问题在很大程度上决定于每一个国家的传统、体制和社会力量及其具体的历史情况。正义理论不包括这些问题。但它所能做到的是简略地描绘出一种可以有变通余地的正义的经济制度的轮廓。这样，任何特定情况下的政治判断都要着眼于哪种变通在实践中极有可能产生最好的作用。某种正义观是任何此种政治判断的一个不可缺少的组成部分，但光有正义观还是不够的。 下面几节中概述的理想安排大量利用了市场安排。我认为，只有这样，才能把分配问题当作纯粹程序正义的一种情况来处理。此外，我们也得到了效率的好处，并保护了自由选择职业的重要自由权。一开始我就假定所谓制度就是拥有财产的民主制度，因为这种情况人们可能是比较熟悉的。但是，正如我已经指出的那样，这不是要在特定情况下对制度的选择预先作出判断。当然，这也并不意味着现存的生产资料私有制的社会不会受到严重的不正义行为之害。因为，某种可能是正义的、理想的、财产占有的民主制度的存在，并不意味着这种制度的某些历史形态都是正义的，或者甚至是可以容忍的。社会主义制度当然也是如此。 分配正义的主要问题是选择社会制度。正义的原则适用于社会基本结构，并规定怎样把社会的主要体制结合成一种安排。我们已经知道，正义即公平这个概念是要用纯粹程序正义这个概念来处理特殊情况中的随机事件。不管事情的结果如何，社会制度的安排都应能够使由此而产生的分配是正义的。为了达到这个目的，必须在适当的政治体制和法律体制的环境中来调整社会和经济过程。没有对这些背景体制的适当安排，分配过程所产生的结果就不会是正义的，也不会有背景的公平性。我将简略地描述一下这些背景体制，把它们看作是在一个允许私人占有资本和自然资源的、经过适当组织的民主国家中可能存在的体制。这些安排是人们所熟知的，但弄清楚它们是如何符合于正义的两个原则的，这也许是有益的。至于在社会主义制度下如何改进安排的问题，这将要在下文作简略的考虑。 首先，我假定，基本结构是由保证平等公民自由权的正义宪法规定的（这在前一章已有述及）。良心自由权和思想自由被认为是理所当然的，而政治自由权的公平价值也是得到维护的。在环境许可的情况下，政治过程是作为选择政府和制定正义立法的正义程序来安排的。同时我还假定，存在着公平的（不同于形式上的）机会均等。这就是说，除了维持通常的那种社会基本资金外，政府还通过补贴私立学校或建立某种公立学校制度，以努力保持具有类似天赋和动机的人得到公平的教育和文化机会。政府同时还在经济活动和自由选择职业方面实行和保障机会均等。要做到这一点，就要对公司和私人团体的行为实行监督，防止建立垄断性的限制以及形成对实现更佳状态的障碍。最后，政府还要维持最低限度的社会保障，例如，或者对家庭进行补贴，为病人和失业者支付特别费用，或者更有计划地采用诸如收入级差补贴（即所谓负所得税）等手段。 在建立这些背景体制时，可以把政府看作分为四个部门。每一个部门包含不同的机构或这些机构的活动，负责维护某些社会和经济条件。这些部门与通常的政府机构不相重叠，而应被看作是不同的职能部门。例如，分配部门是要保持价格体系的切实的竞争能力，并防止形成不合理的市场支配力。如果不能使市场具有更大的竞争能力，使之符合效率要求和地理及家庭爱好情况，这种支配力就不会存在。分配部门还有一个责任，就是通过适当的税收和补贴，通过改变对财产权的规定，来发现和纠正比较明显的背离效率的现象，而这种现象则是由于价格不能准确地测定社会效益和成本而引起的。为此目的，可以利用适当的税收和补贴，也可以修改关于财产权的范围和规定。另一方面，稳定部门则努力实现合理的充分就业，就是说，使希望工作的人能够找到工作，并使对职业的自由选择和财政部署得到强烈的有效需求的支持。这两个部门一般将一起来维持市场经济的效率。 维持最低限度的社会保障是调拨部门的责任。这种最低限度的保障应该确定在什么水平上，这是我在以后将要考虑的问题；但在目前，只要讲几点一般的意见就行了。这里基本的概念是，这个部门的活动重视需要问题，并确定了这些需要相对于其他要求的恰当重点。竞争性的价格制度是不考虑需要的，因此它不可能是唯一的分配手段。社会制度的各部分之间必须进行某种分工，才能满足常识性的正义准则的要求。不同的体制满足不同的要求。管理得当的竞争性市场保证自由选择职业，并导致有效地利用资源和向家庭分配商品。这些市场重视与工资和收入相联系的传统准则，而调拨部门则保证一定水平的福利和尊重对需要的要求。最后，我们还将讨论这些常识性的准则，以及这些准则在各种体制范围内是如何产生的。与此有关的一点是，某些准则常常与特定的体制发生联系。至于这些准则如何取得平衡，这要由整个背景制度来决定。既然正义的原则规定了整个结构，它们也就规定了准则之间的平衡。因此，一般来说，这种平衡将会随着根本政治观念的不同而有所不同。 显然，分配份额是否正义决定于背景体制，决定于这些体制对总收入、工资以及其他收入加上转让款项的分配方式。从竞争出发来决定总收入，理所当然要遭到强烈的反对，因为这样做就是无视对需要和适当生活水准的要求。从立法阶段的观点看，确保自己和自己的后代不受市场的这些意外事件的影响，是合理的。事实上，差别原则大概就是这样要求的。但是，一旦用调拨办法提供了适当的最低限度的社会保障，那么，总收入的其余部分由价格制度来决定就可能是完全公平的，假定这样做在一定程度上有效并且不受垄断限制的影响，同时，不合理的外部效应也已经被消除。此外，用这种办法来处理对需要的要求，比试图用最低工资标准等办法来调节收入似乎更为有效。对每一个部门只分配彼此相适应的任务，是一种较好的办法。因为市场不适于用来满足对需要的要求，所以要用一种不同的安排来解决这些任务。因此，正义的原则能否得到实现，取决于地位最不利的人的总收入（工资加调拨款项）是否最大限度地提高了他们的长远期望（这种期望要符合对平等自由权和公平的机会均等的限制）。 最后，还有一个分配部门。分配部门的任务是通过税收和对财产权的必要调整，以维持分配份额的一种大致的正义性。这个部门可以有两个不同的方面。首先，它征收一系列遗产税和赠与税，并对遗赠权规定若干限制。这类征税和规定，目的不是为了增加岁入（使政府获得财源），而是为了逐步而不断地纠正财富的分配状况，并防止权力集中以致损害政治自由权的公平价值和公平的机会均等。例如，对受惠者可以应用累进税原则。如果要使平等自由权的公平价值得到维护，这样做就可以促进财产的广泛分散，而这种分散是一种必不可少的条件。不平等的财富继承不过同不平等的智力继承一样，本来就都是不正义的。诚然，前者大概易受社会的控制；但至关重要的问题是，以这两者为基础的不平等应该尽可能地符合差别原则。因此，倘若由此而产生的这种不平等符合最不幸的人的利益。同时也可以与自由权和公平的机会均等并行不悖，那么，继承就是可以允许的。按照前面所作的规定，所谓公平的机会均等是指这样的一套体制，它们保证使具有同样动机的人得到同样的教育和文化机会，并根据与有关任务和工作相当的才能和努力，使各种职位向所有人开放。如果财富的不平等超过了一定限度，这些体制就要受到损害；同样，政治自由权也就往往失去其价值，而代议制政府也就往往徒具虚名。分配部门的税收和法规就是为了防止超过这种限度。当然，这种限度究竟有多大，这是一个由理论、良知和直接预感指导的政治判断问题，至少在广泛的范围内是如此。对于这种问题，正义理论没有什么特别的东西可说。正义理论的目的是要提出规定背景体制的原则。 分配部门的第二个方面，是为增加正义所需要的岁入而作出的税收安排。社会资源必须交给政府以便它可以提供公共善，使调拨款项成为实现差别原则的必要手段。这个问题是分配部门的问题，因为税收负担必须公平分派，并着眼于建立正义的安排。撇开许多复杂的情况不谈，值得一提的是，某种比例支出税可能是最佳税收安排的组成部分。首先，从常识性的正义准则这个高度上来看，它比所得税（任何种类的所得税）更为可取，因为它是按照一个人从现有的共同善中得到多少份额来征税，而不是按照他作出多少贡献来征税（这里假定收入是合理挣得的）。另外，对总消费的比例税（假定每年征收一次）可以包括对受抚养的家属通常有的那种减免，等等；而且它对所有的人都是一视同仁（仍然假定收入是合理挣得的）。因此，只有在累进税率从正义的第一个原则和公平的机会均等来看，对于维护基本结构的正义性实属必要，并从而防止了可能破坏相应体制的财产和权力集中的情况下，利用累进税率才可能是一种比较好的办法。遵循这一规定，可能有助于指出政策问题中的某种重大差别。如果比例税由于对刺激作用妨碍较少竟也证明是比较有效的，那么，如果又能够作出一种切实可行的安排，这也许会使赞成比例税的理由变得确然无疑。和前面一样，这些问题也是政治判断问题。而不是正义理论的一部分。总之，为了说明正义的这两个原则的内容，我们在这里把这种比例税看作是一个井然有序的社会的一种理想安排的一部分。但不能因此而就认为，如果现存的体制是不正义的，那么，急剧提高的累进税在任何情况下都不能算是正当的。实际上，我们通常不得不在几种不正义的或欠佳的安排中进行选择；这样，我们要找到最少不正义的安排，就得依靠非理想理论。有时，这种安排将会包括完全正义的制度可能会排斥的措施和政策。最佳的有效安排可能包含一种有缺陷的平衡，即为抵偿不正义而作出的调整，从这个意义上说，两个错误何以造成一个正确。 分配部门的这两个部分来自正义的两个原则。（在必要时）按累进税率对遗产和收入征税，以及从法律上对财产权加以规定，是为了保障财产占有的民主制中平等自由权体制和这些体制所确立的权利的公平价值。比例开支（或所得）税，是为了提供收入，用来产生公共善、建立调拨部门和确立教育等方面的公平的机会均等，以便实现正义的第二个原则。迄今还一直不曾提到传统的征税标准，如按照所得到的利益或支付能力来征税。在谈论常识性的准则时把它和开支税联系起来，是一种次要的考虑。这些标准的范围是由正义原则规定的。如果把分配份额问题看作就是背景体制的设计问题，那么，不管传统的准则在某些限定的情况下可能是多么适当，它们也仍然被看作是没有任何独立的力量的。如果不这样假定，那就不能算是充分全面地看问题（见下面第47节）。同样显而易见的是，分配部门的设计并不包含功利主义者关于个人功利的一般假定。例如，征收遗产税和累进所得税所依据的思想，不是个人都有符合边际功利递减原则的同样的功利函数。当然，分配部门的目的不是最大限度地提高满足的净差额，而是为了建立正义的背景体制。关于功利函数分布的疑虑是不相干的。这是一个要由功利主义者解决的问题，而不是要由契约论解决的问题。 到目前为止，我始终假定，政府各部门的目标是要建立一种民主的制度，在这种制度下，土地和资本即使可能不是被平等地占有，也是被广泛地占有，社会的划分不是要让一个相当小的社会部门去控制生产资源的支配权。如果做到这一点，并且分配份额又符合正义原则，那么就可以对付社会主义者对市场经济的许多批评了。但显然至少在理论上，自由主义的社会主义制度也能满足正义的这两个原则。我们只需假定，生产资料是公有的，公司是由工人委员会或其任命的代理人管理的。根据规章民主地作出的集体决定，决定了这种经济的一般特征，如储蓄率和社会生产用于基本的公共善所占的比例。鉴于由此产生的经济环境，受市场力支配的公司的所作所为在很大程度上一如既往。虽然背景体制将会采取不同的形式。尤其对分配部门来说是这样，但从原则上说，没有理由认为正义的分配份额是不能实现的。正义理论本身对两种制度中的任何一种制度都不存偏爱。我们已经知道，对于特定的民族来说，决定哪一种制度是最好的制度，这取决于该民族的环境、体制和历史传统。 有些社会主义者一直反列所有的市场体制，认为它们生来就是堕落的，他们一直希望建立一种主要以社会的和利他主义的关心作为人们动力的经济。关于第一点，市场的确不是一种理想的安排，但如有了必要的背景体制，所谓工资奴隶制度的最坏方面就会被排除。问题于是就成了对一些可能的替代办法进行比较的问题。由官僚机构（在由社会控制的制度下。它必然会发展起来，不管这种制度是由中央集中指挥的，还是由产业联合会达成的协议来指导的）来管理经济活动，总的来说会比用价格手段（假定这始终是必要的基础）来管理经济活动更为正义，这一点看来是不大可能的。当然，竞争性安排的管理细节是不受个人感情影响的，而是自动产生的；这种安排的特定结果并不表示个人有意识的决定。但在许多方面，这正是这种安排的优点；同时，利用市场制度也并不意味着人类失去了适当的自主性。一个民主的社会在看到依靠价格的好处时可能会愿意这样去做，从而愿意维护正义所需要的背景体制。这种政治决定，和对这些背景安排的管理一样，可能是经过充分考虑的，完全独立自主的。 此外，正义理论还对社会动机和利他主义动机的作用规定了明确的限制。它假定，个人和团体竞相提出了自己的要求，同时，虽然他们愿意采取正义的行动，但他们并不准备放弃自己的利益。毋庸赘言，这种假定并不意味着人们像通常所说的那样都是自私的。相反，如果在一个社会里，所有的人都能实现他们的全面的善，或者在这个社会里，并不存在互相冲突的要求，而所有人的需要又都安排得当，毋需强制作出协调一致的活动计划，那么，从某种意义上说，这个社会就是一个超正义的社会。在任何时候，它都不再需要求助于正当原则和正义原则了。我所要讨论的不是这种理想的情况，不管这种情况可能是多么合人心意。不过，我们应该指出，即使在这里，正义理论也具有一种重要的理论作用；它规定了一些情况，在这些情况下，个人的目标和要求的自然结合不是强制形成的，也不是主观臆想的，而是表示了与理想的善相一致的一种真正的和谐。我不能对这些问题进行更多的研究。这里的主要论点是，正义原则是与完全不同类型的制度并行不悖的。 最后还有一个问题需要考虑。让我们假定，以上关于背景体制的说明对我们的论题已经够用了，同时，正义的两个原则也已为政府规定了一系列明确的活动，并从法律上对财产和税收计划作出了规定。就这一点来说，公共开支总额和必要的收入来源也得到了明确的规定，而由此产生的对收入和财富的分配也都是正义的（进一步情况参见下面第44节和第47节）。但不能因此就说，公民不能决定提出更多的公共开支。如果相当多的人发现公共善的边际利益大于可以通过市场得到的善的边际利益，那么，适当的做法就是为政府找到提供这种边际利益的办法。既然假定收入和财富的分配是正义的，那么指导原则也就变了。因此，我们可以假定，政府还有第五个部门，即交换部门，这个部门由一个留心社会各界及其对公共善的不同爱好的代表机构组成。它由宪法授权，专门考虑那些规定政府可以进行哪些与正义的要求无关的活动的议案，而这些议案只有在它们符合威克塞尔的全体一致标准的情况下才能获得通过。这就是说，除非同时对负担费用的手段取得协议，否则就不能就任何公共开支作出决定，而这种协议即使不是全体一致的，那么也要接近于全体一致。提出一项新的公共活动的动议，必须包含一个或多个可供选择的分担费用的安排。威克塞尔主张，如果公共的善就是对社会资源的有效利用，那么就必须作出某种安排，以便在各种纳税人之间分配那种将会得到一致同意的超额税。如果没有这种计划，那么，所建议的开支就是一种浪费，因而是不能接受的。于是，交换部门就按照效率原则发挥了作用，并且实际上建立了一种特殊的交易机构，在市场机制失灵的地方安排公共善和公共服务。然而，这里必须补充说，贯彻这种主张存在实际的困难。即使撇开表决策略和隐瞒不同爱好的问题不谈，讨价还价能力的差异以及收入的影响等等也可能会妨碍有效结果的出现。仅仅是一种大致的和近似的解决办法，也许是可能有的。但我不打算讨论这些问题。 为了防止误解，有必要谈几点看法。首先，正如威克塞尔着重指出的那样，全体一致的标准认为，对收入和财富的现有分配方式是正义的，对财产权的现有规定也是正义的。没有这个重要的限制条款，那么这个标准就可能会具有效率原则的全部缺点，因为它只是表明了这个原则适用于公共开支的情况。如果满足了这个条件，那么全体一致的原则就是有效的。利用国家机器强迫某些公民为自己所不需要的但却是另一些公民想要得到的利益去纳税，并不比强迫他们去替别人偿还私人开支更有道理。因此，利益标准现在就变得适用了，而在以前它是不适用的；这样，希望有更多的各种公共开支的人就要利用交换部门，来弄清楚是否可以商定这种必不可少的税收。和国家预算不同，交换部门的预算规模是由最后商定的开支决定的。从理论上说，社团成员可以一起来购买公共善，直到公共善的边际价值等于个人的善的边际价值。 应该指出，交换部门包括一个独立的代表机构。这样做是为了强调这种安排的基础是利益原则，而不是正义原则。由于背景体制的观念可以帮助我们对正义进行深思熟虑的判断，所以无知之幕适用于立法阶段。交换部门只是一种交易安排。这里不存在对知识的任何限制（除了为使这种安排变得更为有效而规定的限制），因为是否要限制取决于公民是否了解他们对公共的和个人的善的相对估价。同时我们还应该指出，交换部门中的代表（以及由他们代表的公民）完全是受他们的利益支配的。而在介绍其他部门时，我们假定正义原则只有在掌握了普遍知识的基础上才能应用于体制。我们想要弄清楚的是，为了实现正义观，受到无知之幕的适当限制的有理性的立法者，从这个意义上说也就是公正无私的立法者，可能会制定什么样的法律。理想的立法者不是为了自己的利益而投票。因此，严格地说，交换部门这个概念并不是四个阶段顺序的组成部分。尽管如此，也仍然有可能把政府活动和维护正义的背景体制所必须的开支以及由利益原则产生的开支混为一谈。我认为，如果考虑到这些部门的不同，正义即公平的观念也就变得更为可取了。当然，这两种政府活动常常是难以区别的，而某些公共善似乎都可以归入这两种活动范畴。我这里撇开这些活动不谈，而希望理论上的区别对我们眼前的论题来说已经足够清楚了。