Chapter 8 Chapter 3 Original State-1

In this chapter, I discuss the preferred philosophical term for the initial state.I call this statement the original state.First, I will briefly describe the nature of the arguments in favor of certain conceptions of justice and show how alternative conceptions of justice can be presented so that parties can choose among a well-defined set of traditional conceptions of justice.I then describe the conditions that mark this initial position under several headings: the environment of justice, the formal constraints on the concept of right, the veil of ignorance, and the rationality of the contracting parties.in each case.I have tried to show why, from a philosophical point of view, the features chosen for this preferred version are plausible.Next, before considering the relative merits of these conceptions of justice, it is necessary to examine the natural limits of reasoning that produce the two principles of justice and the principle of average utility.I think these two principles of justice will be recognized, and some main arguments will be given in support of this thesis.In order to clarify the differences between the various conceptions of justice, this chapter will conclude by revisiting the classical principle of utility.

The intuitive notion of justice as fairness would regard the basic principles of justice as the goals of an original agreement in an appropriately specified initial situation.These are the principles which reasonable persons, concerned with advancing their own interests, may accept in this state of equality in order to determine the terms of their union.It must therefore be noted that the two principles of justice are solutions to the problem of choice posed in the original position.In order to do this, one must affirm that, taking into account the circumstances of the parties and their knowledge of the situation, their beliefs and interests, some agreement on these principles is for each individual to achieve his goals according to the options available to him Best way.

Obviously, no one can get everything he wants; the mere presence of others prevents him from doing it.The absolute best thing for any man is to let everyone else join him in promoting his own conception of the good.No matter what the outcome is.Or, failing that, requires all others to act justly, while he himself has a right not to act as he wills.These manifestations of egoism are rejected because others will never agree to the conditions of association.Yet two principles of justice seem to be a reasonable solution.In fact, I would like to point out that these two principles are each man's best answer to the corresponding demands of others.In this sense, choosing this conception of justice is a unique solution to the problem posed in the original position.

Arguing in this way, one is following a well-known procedure in social theory.That is, what is described here is a simplified situation in which rational individuals with certain goals and interconnected in certain ways should, based on their knowledge of the environment, respond in certain ways to Various courses of action to choose from.What these individuals will do can only be known by rigorous deductive reasoning from assumptions made about their beliefs and interests, their situation, and the opportunities available to them.Their actions, in Balledo's words, are the result of inclinations and hindrances.For example, according to price theory, an equilibrium between competitive markets can be said to arise when many individuals, each working for his own benefit, give up to one another what they are most able to give up in exchange for what they most desire .Equilibrium is the result of free agreement among willing merchants.For each individual his best position is that which he can attain by free exchange consistent with the rights and liberties of others to promote their own interests in like manner.It is for this reason that this state is an equilibrium, an equilibrium which persists at the time even if there are no further changes.There is no incentive for anyone to change it.If this state is deviated from, the tendency to restore equilibrium comes into play.This balance is stable.

Of course, to say that a certain state is balanced, or even stable, does not necessarily mean that this state is legitimate or just.It simply means that given people's estimate of their state, they will act effectively to maintain that state.Apparently, the balance between hatred and hostility might also be a stable one; each might think that any possible change would be for the worse.At best each can do for himself, perhaps, to achieve a state of less injustice than of the greater good.The moral evaluation of a state of equilibrium depends on the background conditions that determine that state.It is at this point that the original position view embodies the unique characteristics of moral theory.If price theory attempts to explain market activity by assuming dispositions that actually operate, the best philosophical explanation of the original position embodies what are supposed to be reasonable conditions imposed on the principle of choice.Unlike social theory, the purpose of this explanation is to describe the state of affairs so that the principles that might be chosen (whatever they turn out to be) are acceptable from a moral point of view.The original position is defined as follows: it is the status quo in which any agreement is fair.In this state, all parties are treated equally as moral subjects, and this result is not determined by random accidents, nor by the relative balance of social forces.In this way, the theory of justice as fairness can make use of the concept of pure procedural justice from the outset.

It is therefore evident that this original state is a purely hypothetical one.There need not be anything like it anymore, although we can consciously model reflections on all sides within the limits it suggests.This view of the original position is not meant to explain human behavior, but merely attempts to explain our moral judgments and helps explain that we have some sense of justice.Justice as fairness is a theory of our moral feelings as indicated by our reflectively balanced and considered judgments.This feeling probably influences our thoughts and actions to some degree.Thus, although the view of the original state is part of the theory of behavior, it does not by any means mean that there are other real states similar to it.It is necessary that such principles as may be accepted play an essential role in our moral reasoning and behaviour.

It should also be noted that the acceptance or failure of these principles is not something that can be speculated about like some psychological law or probability.It would be better for me to point out that acknowledging these principles is the only option consistent with a full description of the original state.The ultimate purpose of such an argument is to make itself a strictly inferential one.Of course, people in the primitive position have a certain psychology because people make assumptions about their beliefs and interests.These assumptions come along with other premises that account for this initial state, but it is clear that the arguments from these premises can be entirely inferential, as some political and economic theories demonstrate.We should strive to create a moral geometry that is truly rigorous.Unfortunately, the reasoning I'm about to draw falls far short of this, as it is highly intuitive throughout.

Conclusion.I have said that there are many possible interpretations of the initial position, according to the opinions of the parties to the covenant, according to the beliefs and interests they are said to have, according to what alternatives are available to them, etc. , the original state view will be different.In this sense, there are many different theories of contracts.Justice as fairness theory is just one of them.But the question of the correctness of a theory can only be settled by pointing out that there is an interpretation of the initial position which best expresses the hitherto generally accepted conditions for the choice of principles, while at the same time This choice in turn leads to a view of the original position that can be used to account for our considered judgments of reflective equilibrium.I will take this best or standard interpretation as the original state.Predictably, every traditional conception of justice has an interpretation of the initial position according to which their principles are the best solution.For example, some interpretations lead to the classical principle of utility as well as to the principle of average utility.We will refer to these different interpretations of the initial state from time to time.so.The method of contract theory provides a general analytical method for the comparative study of various conceptions of justice.Attempts have been made to show the conditions involved in the contractual state according to which the principles of the conception of justice might be chosen.It is in this way that fundamental assumptions are made on which these conceptions of justice seem to be based.But if an explanation is philosophically best, if its principles account for our considered judgments; then we also have the means of proving the validity of such a theory.It is impossible to know whether such an explanation exists at the outset, but at least we know what to look for.

Let us now turn from the discussion of methods to the description of the original state.First, I will ask the question about the choices available to the person in the original position.Of course, it is better to say that they have to choose among various possible conceptions of justice.An obvious difficulty is how to explain these conceptions of justice so that people in the original position can recognize them.However, even if these conceptions of justice could be specified, there is no guarantee that the parties in the original position will make the best choice; principles that may be best may be ignored, and in fact, the so-called best choice may not exist : It is conceivable that for every conception of justice, there is another conception of justice that is better than it.Even if there were some optimal option, it would seem difficult to say that the intelligences of the parties would surely lead them to think of this optimal option, or even a more plausible conception of justice.On careful reflection, some solutions to the problem of choice may be quite clear; but it is quite another thing to say that the parties were able to make such a choice by deliberation.So while two principles of justice may be better than those we know about justice, a set of principles that has not been formulated so far may be better.

In order to deal with this problem, I intend to take the following approach.I shall regard the small number of traditional conceptions of justice, such as those discussed in Chapter 1, and several other possible conceptions of justice as indicated by the two principles of justice, simply as of.Then, I assume that this set of conceptions of justice is brought before the parties, and they are asked to agree that, among the enumerated conceptions of justice, there is one conception of justice that is the best.We can assume that this decision is made through a series of pairwise comparisons.Thus, once all agree that these two principles should be chosen, compared with every other alternative, then this may indicate that the two principles are desirable.In this chapter, for the most part.I shall both consider the question of the choice between the two principles of justice and the two principles of utility (classical utility and equivalence).The comparison with perfectionism and hybrid theory will be discussed later.In this way I have tried to show that these two principles might be selected from this body of conceptions of justice.

Admittedly, this is an unsatisfactory approach.It may be a better way if we can stipulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the only best concept of justice, and then propose a concept of justice that meets these conditions.People may finally be able to do this.However, at the moment I can't see how to avoid using some crude off-the-shelf method.Furthermore, using this method may point to a general solution to our problem.Thus it may turn out that, as we make these comparisons in turn, the parties will, by reason, select certain desirable features of the basic structure, and prove that these features have the highest and lowest natural properties.For example, it is reasonable to assume that people in the original position choose a society with the fullest equal rights to liberty.Suppose further that, while they choose social and economic advantages that promote the common good, they still insist on reducing the natural and social accidents that favor some against others.If these two characteristics are the only relevant ones, if the principle of equal liberty is the highest natural attribute of the first, and the difference principle (subject to fair equality of opportunity) is the highest natural attribute of the second, then, Priority issues aside, these two principles are the best solution.Nor does the fact that one cannot rely on presumptions to account for or enumerate possible conceptions of justice, or to say that the parties are bound to consider them, to draw this conclusion. It is probably not helpful to speculate further on these issues.At present, we do not intend to discuss the general question of the best solution.I have always confined my arguments to the less adequate one, that these two principles might be chosen from the conceptions of justice enumerated below. A．Two Principles of Justice (arranged in sequence) 1.the principle of the fullest equal liberty 2. (a) (Fair) Equal Opportunity Principle (b) Difference Principle B．Mixed conceptions of justice.Replace the concept of justice in A2 above 1.the principle of equal utility; or 2.Principle of average utility subject to any of the following: (a) some minimum attribute of society should be maintained, or (b) the overall distribution should not be too broad; or 3.Principle of average utility subject to either case in B2 and subject to fair equal opportunity C．classical teleological conception of justice 1.classical utilitarian principle 2.principle of average utility 3.principle of perfection D．intuitive conception of justice 1.Solve the contradiction between the total utility and the principle of equal distribution 2.Solving the Contradiction Between Average Utility and Remedy Principle 3.Resolving contradictions in a set of preliminary principles (principles of propriety) E．Egoistic conception of justice (See Section 23 for an explanation of why egoistic conception of justice is not, strictly speaking, an alternative conception of justice.) 1.Solely for me: Everyone is to serve my interests 2.Only enjoy the rights but not the duties: everyone will do justice, but if I will not, I will be excluded 3.General: Everyone can promote his own interests as he wishes. There is no doubt that the value of these traditional theories is sufficient to justify this arrangement.Regardless, studying such permutations is a useful way of exploring larger questions.Presumably, however, each of these conceptions of justice has its advantages and disadvantages; and there may be reasons for and against whichever conception of justice a person chooses.The susceptibility to criticism of a conception of justice is not necessarily a clear disapproval of it, and certain desirable features do not always end up being approved.As we shall see.The decision made by the person in the original position is based on the balance of various considerations.In this sense, an intuition grounded in a theory of justice has an appeal.However, how to consider all aspects of the situation, we can clearly see the advantages and disadvantages of the reasons.All the relevant reasons can be broken down and analyzed by an account of the original position, so that one conception of justice can be made manifestly preferable to another.Strictly speaking, such an argument is not yet a proof, at any rate not at present; but in the words of Muller.It can raise some considerations that can measure thinking ability. Most of the conceptions of justice enumerated above are self-explanatory.However, some brief comments on them may be instructive.Each conception of justice is expressed in a rather simple way, and each conception of justice is unconditionally applicable, that is, regardless of the circumstances and social conditions.None of these principles are dependent on some social condition or the other.One reason for saying this is to keep things simple.It might be easy to come up with a class of conceptions of justice, each of which is applicable only when there are special circumstances in which the conditions are all-encompassing and mutually exclusive.For example, a certain conception of justice may be applicable at one stage of a culture, while another conception of justice may be applicable at another stage of the culture.Such a set may itself be counted as a conception of justice; it may consist of a set of conceptions of justice arranged in pairs, each pair being a conception of justice appropriate to the circumstances in which it applies.But if such conceptions of justice are added to the previous list, our problem becomes very complicated, if not intractable.In addition, there is a reason for excluding this alternative conception of justice, since one cannot avoid asking what fundamental principles determine the conception of justice in this paired arrangement?Here I assume that some accepted ethics prescribes all the proper principles in light of every given condition.It is this unconditional principle that defines the conception of justice expressed by this pair arrangement.To add such conceptions of justice to the preceding list, therefore, is to add alternative conceptions of justice that cover their own foundations.It is for this reason, therefore, that I shall exclude such conceptions of justice.Accounting for the original position, enabling the parties to choose principles that apply unconditionally in any circumstance, also proves desirable.This fact is connected with Kant's interpretation of justice as fairness.But I leave this question for later discussion (section 40). Finally, one thing is obvious.Arguments in favor of these two principles, or in fact any conception of justice, are often concerned with enumerating some list of alternative conceptions of justice.If we change the table, the argument will also generally be different.Any similar argument holds true for all features of the original position.There can be an infinite number of initial states, so no doubt there can be an infinite number of theorems of moral geometry.Only a few initial positions are of any importance philosophically, since most of the different initial positions are irrelevant from a moral point of view.We should try to avoid side issues without ignoring the particular assumptions of the argument. We can describe a just environment as the normal conditions that make human cooperation possible and necessary.So, as I pointed out at the outset, while society is a mutually beneficial cooperative enterprise, it bears the peculiar hallmarks of coincidences and conflicts of interests.Since social cooperation makes it possible for all to live a better life than any single individual could possibly achieve, there arises a consensus of interest.Conflicts of interest arise because people, in pursuit of their goals, each want a larger share rather than a smaller one, and because they are not indifferent to how the greater benefits of their cooperation will be distributed.This requires principles for choosing among the various social arrangements for determining the distribution of such benefits, and for some agreement on the appropriate distribution.These requirements define the role of justice.The background conditions that produce these demands are the circumstances of justice. These conditions can be divided into two categories.The first is the objective environment that makes human cooperation possible and necessary.For example, many individuals co-exist within a certain geographical area at the same time.These individuals are roughly equal in physical and mental strength; or at least equal in their abilities, and no one of them can dominate the rest.They cannot withstand blows, and their plans often cannot be realized in the face of the combined strength of others.Finally, there is a condition of moderate deprivation which is said to be fairly common.Natural and other resources are not so plentiful that cooperative projects are superfluous; nor are conditions so severe that fruitful undertakings must be shut down.While mutually beneficial arrangements are feasible, the benefits they generate do not yet meet the demands made. The subjective environment is expressed in the relevant aspects of the cooperating subjects, that is, the people who work together.For example, although all parties have roughly the same needs and interests, or the needs and interests of the parties complement each other, making mutually beneficial cooperation between them possible, they also all have their own life plans.These projects, or conceptions of the good, give them different aims and intentions, and make conflicting claims on existing natural and social resources.Moreover, although the interests proposed by these plans are not considered to be in the interests of the ego, they are the interests of a self which believes that its conceptions of the good should be recognized, which for its own benefit Requests made should be met.I emphasize this aspect of the just environment by assuming that the parties are not interested in each other's interests.I also assume that people suffer from various deficiencies in knowledge, thought, and judgment.Their knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their powers of reasoning, memory, and attention are often limited, and their judgment may be distorted by fear, prejudice, and preoccupation with their own affairs.Some of these defects are due to moral lapses, selfishness, and negligence; but for the most part they are only part of man's natural condition.As a result, not only individuals have different life plans, but also various philosophical and religious beliefs, various political and social theories. I will call these conditions the environment of justice.Hume's account of these conditions is especially nuanced, and the foregoing overview does not add anything important to his much more comprehensive account.For the sake of brevity, I will often emphasize the condition of moderate deprivation (which belongs to the objective situation) and the condition of mutual indifference, or the individual's disinterest in each other's interests (which belongs to the subjective situation).Thus, it can be generalized that a just environment exists as long as mutually indifferent people make conflicting claims to the distribution of social benefits under conditions of moderate scarcity.Where such circumstances do not exist, there are no occasions for displaying the virtues of justice, just as there are no opportunities for displaying physical daring where there is no threat of injury to life and limb. It should be noted that there are several issues that need to be clarified.First, I will of course assume that the person in the original position knew that these circumstances of justice existed.This, of course, they think refers to their social conditions.Suppose also that each party is trying to bring about the realization of its own conception of the good, and that in doing so they are not bound by a pre-existing moral relationship to each other. However, the question arises: Do people in the original position also have obligations and responsibilities to third parties, such as their descendants?Recognition of such duties and responsibilities may be one way of dealing with intergenerational justice.But the purpose of justice as fairness theory is to deduce full responsibility and obligation on other terms; so this solution should be avoided.Instead, I'm going to make an assumption about motivation.The parties are seen as representing a continuum of claims, of what could be said to be an enduring moral force or institution.They don't have to worry forever about how long this moral force and system can last, but their own goodwill extends at least two generations.Representatives on temporally adjacent stages have overlapping interests.For example, we can regard each party as the head of the family, and thus think that they have some desire to promote the welfare of their next generation.As representatives of the various families, their interests are opposed to one another, as implied by the circumstances of justice.While I will generally adopt this interpretation, it is unnecessary to see each party as the head of the family.Crucially, everyone in the original position should be concerned with the welfare of someone in the next generation, assuming that they are concerned with different individuals in each case.Besides, as far as anyone in the next generation is concerned, someone in this generation cares about him.In this way, the interests of all are taken care of, and if the veil of ignorance is taken into account, the whole interest is linked. It should be noted that I make no restrictive assumptions about the parties' conceptions of the good, other than that they are reasonable long-term plans.Although these plans determine the goals and interests of a certain self, these goals and interests are not assumed to be egoistic or self-interested.Whether this is the case depends on what kind of goals one is after.If wealth, position, influence, and social prestige are the ultimate goals of a man, then his conception of the good is undoubtedly egoistic.His overriding interest is for himself, and not merely that of some ego, as is usually necessary.Thus, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, the parties involved will find that they have an intellectual and emotional connection, that they wish to advance the interests of others, and that they wish to see their own ends accomplished, and it is not true that we assume that Illogical.But the presumption of mutual indifference among men in the original position is to ensure that the principles of justice are not diverted by some powerful assumptions.Remember: the original position is meant to embody a condition that is universally shared but vulnerable to destruction.A conception of justice, therefore, should not presuppose a broad association of natural sentiments.According to this theory, one should try to make as few assumptions as possible. Finally, the assumption that the parties do not care about each other, and are unwilling to sacrifice their own interests for others, is intended to represent the behavior and motives of people when problems of justice arise.The lofty ideals of saints and heroes can be as hostile as any other interest.There is nothing more tragic than conflict in the pursuit of these ideals.Therefore, wherever there is a conflict of interests, wherever people feel each other entitled to impose their rights on others, justice is a practical virtue.In a society of saints who have agreed upon some common ideal (if such a society is possible), debates about justice do not take place.Each will labor selflessly for an end determined by their common religious convictions, and with this end (assuming it is clearly defined) all questions of right can be resolved.But a just environment is characteristic of human society.Accounting for these conditions does not require any particular theory of human motivation.Rather, the aim is to include in the description of the original situation the human relationships that provide the arena for questions of justice. The condition of the person in the original state reflects certain limitations.The choices they have, their knowledge of their environment are limited in every way.By limitations I mean limitations on the concept of right, since they apply to the choice of all ethical principles, not just the choice of principles of justice.These limitations may also apply if the parties can also recognize certain principles that apply to other virtues. First, I'll consider the constraints on various options.It seems reasonable to impose certain formal conditions on all conceptions of justice that may be included in the list offered to the parties.I do not think that these conditions arise from the concept of right, still less from moral implications.I refrain from resorting to an analysis of these concepts in matters of such vital importance.There are many constraints that can reasonably be associated with the concept of justification, and different choices can be made according to these constraints, and these choices can be regarded as the last choices within the scope of a particular theory.The value of any stipulation lies solely in the soundness of the theory it produces; a stipulation by itself cannot solve any fundamental problem. The propriety of these formal conditions derives from the task of regulating people's demands on their own institutions and on each other from the principle of justification.These requirements are quite natural if the principles of justice are to function, that is, the role of allocating fundamental rights and duties and determining the distribution of benefits.Each of these requirements is fairly low, and I assume that the traditional conception of justice can satisfy them.These conditions, however, preclude all forms of egoism, as I shall see below.This situation shows that these conditions are not without moral validity.This makes it all the more necessary to justify these conditions not from the specification and analysis of concepts, but only from the rationality of the theory that contains them.I illustrate these conditions in terms of five well-known aspects. First, principles should be universal.That is, it must be possible to formulate these principles without using what might intuitively be considered proper names, or ad hoc terms.Therefore, the assertions used to illustrate these principles should express general properties and relationships.Unfortunately, great philosophical difficulties seem to prevent a satisfactory account of these problems.I do not intend to address these issues here.When proposing a theory of justice, people have the right to avoid the problem of how to define general attributes and relations, and to guide themselves with what seems reasonable.Furthermore, since the parties have no precise understanding of themselves or their position, they cannot in any way identify themselves.Even if a man can get the approval of others, he does not know how to adapt principles to his own interests.The parties involved actually have to stick to general principles and use an intuitive approach to understand the concepts here. Part of the naturalness of this condition is that the basic principles must be capable of forever becoming a kind of public charter of a well-ordered society.Since these principles are unconditional, they always apply (under circumstances of justice), and any generation must be able to understand them.Knowledge of these principles, therefore, should not require knowledge of the details of accidents, and certainly not of the involvement of individuals and groups.Traditionally, the most obvious test of this condition has been the idea that whatever is right is in accordance with the will of God.But in fact, such theories are usually supported by some kind of argument from some general principles.For example, Locke believed that the basic principle of morality was as follows: If a person is created by another person (in the theological sense), then that person is obliged to act according to the rules prescribed by his creator.This principle is so general that it singles out God as the legitimate moral authority given the nature of the world as Locke sees it.This does not violate the generality condition, although at first glance it seems to be. Second, the principles need to be broadly applicable.Since everyone is a moral subject, these principles must apply to everyone.Therefore, I assume that everyone can understand these principles and use them to think about problems.This places a certain upper limit on their complexity and the variety and number of their features.Moreover, if a principle contradicts itself, or if everyone is asking for trouble by following it, then it should be excluded.Likewise, a principle is unacceptable if it is justified to adopt a principle only if others obey a different principle.The choice of principles is ultimately based on each individual's observance. As stated, universality and extensiveness are obvious conditions.For example, solipsistic egoism (everyone is to serve my - or Pericles' - interest) fits the generality requirement but not the universality requirement.While all people can act on this principle, and in some cases the outcome may not be bad at all (depending on the dictator's interests), this personal pronoun (or name) violates the first condition.In addition, a principle of generality may not be a principle of universality.These principles are proposed to apply to a limited class of people, such as those selected on the basis of biological or social characteristics, such as hair color or class status.Of course, people acquire certain obligations during their lives, and assume certain responsibilities that are unique to them.Nevertheless, such responsibilities and obligations are the result of basic principles applicable to all moral agents.These requirements arise on a common basis. The third condition is the openness condition, which naturally arises from the contractual point of view.All parties believe that they are choosing principles for a general conception of justice.They assume that, if they accept these principles as the result of some agreement, then, for these principles.Everyone would know all that he could possibly know.Therefore, a general awareness of the broad acceptance of these principles should have desirable effects and contribute to the stability of social cooperation.这个条件和广泛性条件的区别是，后者使人们在每一个人都明智而正式地采用这些原则的基础上来评价这些原则。但是，所有的人都了解并采用了某种原则，而这个事实却又没有被人们广泛知晓或得到人们的明确承认，这也是可能的。公开性条件的目的，是使各方把正义观作为在社会生活中得到公开承认的并且充分有效的道德法规来评价。康德的绝对命令理论要求我们作为有理性的人可能愿意将其当作目的王国的法律而制定出来的原则办事，就这一点来说，公开性原则显然包含在这种理论中了。康德认为，这个王国事实上好比是一个道德的共同体，它把这些道德原则用作它的公共宪章。 还有一个条件是，正当观必须为互相冲突的要求规定先后次序。这个要求直接来自正当观的原则在调整各种对立要求时所起的作用。However.在确定什么是先后次序时却发生了困难。如果某种正义观是全面的，就是说，能够把可能产生的（或实际上可能产生的）各种要求都加以安排，那显然是可取的。而这种次序安排一般应该是有转移力的：比方说，如果基本结构的第一个安排比第二个安排更正义，第二个安排比第三个安排更正义，那么第一个安排也应比第三个安排更正义。这种形式上的条件是很自然的，虽然并不是始终容易得到满足。但是，格斗比武是否也是一种裁定方式呢？体力较量和动刀动枪的结果终究要产生一种次序安排：某些要求战胜了另一些要求。反对这种次序安排的主要理由，不是因为它是不可转移的，而是因为它应该避免依靠武力和狡计来使人们接受正当原则和正义原则。因此，我认为，按照每个人的威胁优势来分配利益，这不是正义观。它没有按照规定的意义确立一种次序安排，这种安排的依据就是人们及其地位的某些有关方面，而这些方面又是不以人们的社会地位和他们恫吓别人、胁迫别人的能力为转移的。 第五个也是最后一个条件是决定性条件。有关各方应在实际推理中把这一套原则看作是终审上诉法院。为支持这些要求所能提出的论据，没有比这更高的标准了；根据这些原则成功地作出的推理是结论性的。这种充分普遍的理论包含了适用于全部美德的原则。只要我们按照这种理论来思考问题，它就会要求我们去对有关事项及其适当重点进行全面的考虑，因此它的要求是决定性的。这些原则凌驾于法律和习惯以及一般的社会规章的要求之上。我们应把社会体制直接作为正当原则和正义原则来安排，并对之表示尊重。根据这些原则得出的结论也凌驾于关于审慎和自身利益的考虑之上。这并不是说，这些原则坚持要求人们去作出自我牺牲；因为各方在提出这种正当观时，已尽可能地考虑了他们的利益．个人审慎的要求已经按照这整套原则得到了适当的重视。这整个设计是不可更改的，因为一旦它所规定的实际推理过程得出了结论，问题也就解决了。现存的社会安排以及自身利益的要求，已经得到了应有的考虑。我们不能因为我们不喜欢这种结果而到头来对它们重新考虑。 因此，总起来看，对正当观所规定的这些条件可以归结为这样一点，即正当观是具有普遍形式并得到广泛应用的一系列原则，作为安排有道德的人们之间互相冲突的要求的终审上诉法院，它们应该得到人们的公认。正义原则由于它们的特殊作用和适用对象而被人们所认识。不过，这五个条件本身并不排除任何传统的正义观。然而，应该指出的是，它们确实排除上面列举的不同形式的利己主义。普遍性条件既排除了唯我独尊的利己主义，也排除了不受约束的利己主义，因为每一种利己主义都需要有一个专名，或代词，或一个临时拼凑起来的说法，以便或者突出独裁者，或者形容不受约束的人。然而，普遍性并不排除一般的利己主义，因为每一个人都可以按照自己的判断来做任何最能推进自己目标的事。这里的原则可以用一种十分普遍的方法清楚地表达出来。正是这种有先后次序的条件使一般的利己主义变得不可接受，因为如果每个人都有权随心所欲地推进自己的目标，或者如果每个人都应该促进他自己的利益，那么对立的要求就根本得不到安排，于是它们的结果也就由武力和狡计来决定。 所以，这几种利己主义没有出现在提供给各方的正义观一览表上。它们被形式上的限制排除了。当然，这并不是一个出人意外的结论，因为显而易见的是，原始状态中的人选择另一种正义观，可能对他们自己要有利得多。如果他们要问大家应该赞同哪些原则，那么在任何情况下，任何形式的利己主义都不是一个可供考虑的重要候补者。这不过是证实了我们已经知道的情况，就是说，虽然利己主义是合乎逻辑的，而且从这个意义说，也不是不合理的，但它和我们直觉上认为是道德观点的东西格格不入。从哲学上说，利己主义的意义不在于它是一种可供选择的正当观，而在于它是对任何这类正当观的挑战。按照正义即公平理论，这一点在我们可以把一般的利己主义解释为无协议效力这个事实中得到反映。如果各方不能达成某种协议，可能就是利己主义在作怪。 原始状态这个概念是要确定一种合理的程序，以便任何一致同意的原则都会是正义的。其目的是把纯粹程序正义的概念用作理论的基础。我们必须设法消除一些特定的偶然因素的影响，因为正是它们使人们发生争执，并诱使人们去利用社会环境和自然环境为自己的利益服务。为了做到这一点，我假定各方都处在一张无知之幕的后面。他仍不知道各种可供选择的原则会怎样影响他们的具体情况，他们不得不完全按照一般的考虑来评价原则。 因此，假定各方并不知道某些具体事实。首先，没有人知道他在社会中的地位，即他的价级地位和社会地位；他也不知道他在自然资产和自然能力的分配中的命运如何，不知道自己的智能和力量，等等。另外，任何人也都不知道他的关于善的观念，不知道他的合理生活计划的细节，或者甚至不知道自己的心理特征，如厌恶冒险、易于乐观或悲观。不仅如此，我还假定各方不知道他们自己的社会的具体情况，就是说，他们不知道社会的经济或政治状况，也不知道社会已能达到的文明和文化阶段。原始状态中的人不知道自己属于哪一代人。对于知识的这些比较广泛的限制是适当的，这部分是因为社会正义问题不但出现在一代人的内部，而且也出现在两代人之间，例如，资本节约的适当比例问题，自然资源的保护问题，以及自然环境问题。至少从理论上说，还有一个关于合理的遗传政策问题。同时，在这些情况下，为了维持原始状态这个概念，各方也不应该知道使他们互相对立的那些偶然因素。不管最后证明他们是属于哪一代人，他们必须选择某些原则，而这些原则所产生的后果是他们准备接受的。 因此，各方迄今所知道的唯一的具体事实，就是他们的社会受到正义环境的支配以及这一点意味着什么。然而，他们知道有关人类社会的一般事实，这被认为是理所当然的。他们熟悉政治事务和经济理论原则；他们知道社会组织的基础，知道人类的心理规律。事实上，凡是影响对正义原则的选择的一般事实，假定各方都是知道的。对一般的知识，即一般的规律和理论，不存在任何限制，因为必须使正义观适应它们所支配的社会合作制度的特点，没有理由排斥这些事实。例如，有一种考虑是违反正义观的，这就是认为：从道德心理的规律看，即使人们的社会体制符合某种正义观，人们也不会获得要按照这种正义观行动的欲望。因为在这种情况下，要获得社会合作的稳定将很困难。正义观的一个重要特征是它应能证明自身的正确性。就是说，它的原则应该是这样的原则：当它们在社会基本结构中得到体现时，人们往往获得了相应的正义感。人们具备了道德学习的原则，就培养起一种要按照它的原则来行动的欲望。在这种情况下，正义观就是稳定的。这方面的一般知识在原始状态中是可以允许的。 无知之幕这个概念提出了几个问题。有人可能反对说，如果排除了几乎所有的具体知识，那就难以了解所谓原始状态的含义。因此，如果说一个人或更多的人可以在任何时候进入这种状态，或者也许更理想的是，可以根据适当的限制，纯粹依靠推理来模拟对这种假设状态的审慎思考，这可能是有帮助的。我们在论证某种正义观时，必须肯定，它是得到允许的各种可供选择的正义观中的一种，并且符合规定的形式限制。如果我们缺乏被排除了的这种知识，我们就不能对这种正义观作任何有利的考虑，除非它们可能是我们应该竭力主张的合理考虑。评价正义观必须根据它们得到公开承认和广泛应用的一般结果，同时还要假定它们会得到每个人的遵守。说某种正义观可能会在原始状态中被选择，就等于说符合某些条件和限制的合理的审慎思考可能会得出某种结论。得出这种结果的论据在必要时可以更正式地提出来。不过，我将始终按照原始状态这个概念来叙述。这样做更经济，也更有启发性，可以显示人们可能容易忽略的某些基本特征。 这些论点表明，不应把原始状态看作是包括了活着的一切人在某一时刻的聚会，更不应把它看作是包括了某时可能活着的一切人的聚会。它不是一个所有实际的或可能的人的集会。从这两方面去想象原始状态是异想天开；这种想法对直觉不再会有真正的指导作用。总之，重要的是要对原始状态作出解释，使人们何以在任何时候采纳它的观点。人们何时采纳这种观点，谁采纳这种观点，应该是没有区别的：限制条件只能是同样的原则应始终得到选择。无知之幕就是达到这个要求的一个基本条件。它不但保证能够得到的知识是相干的，而且也保证这种知识始终是相同的。 人们可能会表示异议说，无知之幕这个条件是不合理的。有人无疑会反对说，应该按照能够得到的全部知识来选择原则。对这种论点有许多不同的回答。这里，我打算概括地说一说几种回答，这些回答着重于简单化，因为如果要有什么理论，那就非简单化不可。（在康德对原始状态的解释基础上的简单化将在下文第40节中提到。）首先，显而易见的是，既然各方并不知道他们之间的分歧，而且他们每一个人又都同样具有理性和相同的处境，那么每一个人对同样的论据也就深信不疑。因此，我们能够按照随意挑出来的某个人的观点来考察在原始状态中所作的选择。如果任何人在经过适当考虑之后选择了某种正义观，而不选择另一种正义观，那么他们就都会这样做，从而可以达成某种一致的协议。为了更形象地说明这种情况。我们可以设想，有关各方必须通过一个中间仲裁人来彼此打交道，这个仲裁人要宣布已经提出了哪些可供选择的正义观以及赞成这些正义观的理由。他禁止结成联盟的企图，并在各方达成协议时负责通知他们。但是，假定各方的考虑必然是相同的，那么这个仲裁人事实上也就是多余的了。 于是，十分重要的结果产生了：各方失去了任何通常意义上的讨价还价的基础。没有人知道他在社会中的地位，也不知道他的自然资产，因此，也就没有人能够使原则迁就自己的利益。我们可以设想，订约人之一扬言，除非别人同意对他有利的原则，否则他决不退让。但是，他怎么知道哪些原则对他特别有利呢？这一点对于结盟也同样适用；如果一批人决定联合起来以不利于别人，那么他们可能也不知道选择什么原则才对他们自己有利。即使他们能使每一个人都同意他们的方案，他们也可能无法保证这会对他们有利，因为他们无法靠姓名或外貌来辨认谁是自己人。不适用这种结论的一个例子是储蓄。由于原始状态中的人知道他们是同时代的人（采用现时进入原始状态这一解释），他们可以拒绝为他们的下一代作出任何牺牲以有利于自己的这一代。他们完全承认任何人都没有义务要为后代储蓄这个原则。以前的各代人有的储蓄，有的没有储蓄。现在的各方根本无法改变这个事实。这个例子说明，无知之幕不能保证得到理想的结果。因此，我将用一种不同的方法，即改变关于动机的假定，来解决两代人之间的正义问题。但是，由于有了这种修正，任何人就都不能够提出为促进自己的利益而专门设计的原则了，每个人不管暂时处于什么样的状态，都不得不为所有的人作出选择。 因此，在原始状态中对具体知识的限制是十分重要的。没有这些限制。我们也许根本就不能提出任何明确的正义理论。我们可能不得不满足于一种模糊不清的公式，认为正义就是在不能就协议内容本身进行充分讨论的情况下可能得到一致同意的东西。对正当观的形式上的限制，亦即对一些原则直接适用的限制，对我们是不够用的。无知之幕使一致选择某种正义观成为可能。没有对知识的这些限制，商定原始状态的问题可能会复杂到无法解决。即使从理论上说存在某种解决办法，至少在目前我们也许还不能确定。 我认为，无知之幕的概念已经包含在康德的伦理观中了（第40节）。然而，甚至一些契约理论也常常忽略了为各方规定知识并对他们能够得到的选择进行说明这个问题。有时候，这种在道德上得到明确考虑的状态，却是以一种不明确的方式提出来的，结果人们无法确定最后会是什么样的状态。例如，佩里的理论墓本上就是一种契约理论：他认为，个人和社会的结合必须按照完全不同的原则迸行，后者靠合理的审慎，前者靠善意的人们随一致。他似乎依据基本上和前面所提出的同样理由否定了功利主义，就是说，功利主义把适用于个人的选择原则不适当地扩大应用于社会面临的选择。正确的行动方针应该具有能够最大限度地促进社会目标的特点，假定各方对环境有充分的了解，并以对彼此利益的仁爱关心为其动机，那么通过反思而得到的协议，是有可能提出这些目标的。然而，并未作出任何努力以任何明确的方式来说明这种协议的可能结果。事实上，如果没有详尽得多的说明，是不可能得出任何结论来的。这里，我不想对别人提出批评，而是希望说明一下有时看来好像是十分众多的不相干细节的必要性。 提出无知之幕这个概念，不仅仅是为了简明起见。我想对原始状态加以规定，以便我们找到理想的解决办法。如果允许得到关于详细情况的知识，那么，结果就会由于随意性的偶然因素而有了倾向性。正如已经说过的那样，根据每个人的威胁优势来分配利益不是一种正义原则。如果原始状态要产生正义的协议，那么有关各方就必须处于公平的地位，并作为道德的主体得到平等的待遇。必须调整初始契约状态的情况，使世界的随意性得到纠正。此外，如果我们在选择原则时，即使有了充分知识也仍然要求意见一致，那也只能解决少数几个相当明显的问题。在这种情况下，以意见一致为基础的正义观实际上可能是不充分的和不重要的。但是，一旦排除了知识，关于意见一致的要求就不是不恰当的，而这种要求能够得到满足这个事实就具有极大的重要性。这样，关于得到选择的正义观，我们就能够就，它代表了一种真正的利益一致。 Conclusion.在大多数情况下，我将假定各方都具有全部的一般知识。没有哪一种一般事实是他们不能知道的。我这样假定，主要是为了避免把问题复杂化。尽管如此，某种正义观仍然应该成为社会合作条件的共同基础。既然要达成共同的协议就必需使原则的复杂性受到某些限制，那么在原始状态中利用理论知识可能同样要有所限制。不过，要对各种各样的一般事实的复杂性进行分类和定级，显然会是很困难的，我不打算这样去做。然而，在我们碰到了一种复杂的理论结构时，我们还是能够识别的。因此，合理的说法似乎是：在其他条件相等时，如果一种主义观是以明显的比较简单的一般事实为基础的，而对它的选择也不是决定于按照一系列在理论上规定的可能性而进行的煞费苦心的计算，那么应予选择的就是这种正义观，而不是另一种正义观。赞成某种普遍正义观的理由，在环境许可的情况下，最好应能使人人明白。我认为，这种考虑所赞成的是正义的两个原则，而不是功利标准。 我始终假定，原始状态中的人是有理性的。每个人在选择原则时都以最大的努力来促进自己的利益。但我同时还假定，各方并不了解他们的关于善的观念。这就是说，虽然他们知道他们具有某种合理的生活计划，但他们并不知道这个计划的细节，即这个计划打算促进的具体的目标和利益。因此；他们怎样才能确定哪种正义观最符合他们的利益呢？或者说，我们是否必须假定他们最后不得不依靠纯粹的猜测？为了对付这个困难，我假定他们同意前一章提到的关于善的说明：他们认为自己可能会希望得到较多的而不是较少的社会基本善。当然，一旦揭去了无知之幕，结果可能证明他们中的一些人由于宗教原因或其他原因，事实上也许并不希望得到较多的此类善。但从原始状态的观点看，如果各方不愿多得，无论如何不会有人去强迫他们那样做，同时，一个人也不会因为多得了一些自由权而吃亏，既然如此，如果他们假定他们确实希望得到较大的份额，那也是合理的。因此，即使各方被剥夺了关于他们的具体目标的知识，他们也有足够的知识去评定可供选择的正义观。他们知道，一般地说，他们都必须努力保护自己的自由权，扩大自己的机会，扩大促进自己目标的手段，不管它们是什么样的目标。在关于善的理论和道德心理学的一般事实的指导下，他们的审慎考虑就不再是猜测。他们能够作出一般意义上的合理决定。 除了一个基本的特征外，这里引用的理性概念是社会理论中一个众所周知的标准概念。因此，一个有理性的人通常被认为对他们面临的选择具有一种合乎逻辑的偏爱。他们根据这些选择促进自己目标的程度来评定它们的次序；他所奉行的计划要能满足他的较多的而不是较少的欲望，并且有被顺利执行的较大机会。我所提出的特殊假定是，一个有理性的人不会患妒忌病。他不会仅仅因为别人同样得到较少而准备接受损失。他不会由于知道或感觉到别人的社会基本善的指数较大而垂头丧气。只要他与别人之间的差距不超过一定的限度，同时他又认为现存的不平等不是以不正义为基础，也不是听任机会错过而无补偿的社会目标的结果，那么情况至少是这样（第80节）。各方不会为妒忌所驱使这个假定产生了一些问题。也许，我还应该假定他们不易受其他种种感情，如羞耻感和屈辱感的影响（第67节）。不过，要对正义进行令人满意的说明，最终也将不得不处理这些问题，但目前我打算把这些复杂问题撇在一边。对我们的方法的另一种反对意见认为它太不现实。当然，人都会受这些感情之害。正义观怎能无视这个事实呢？我打算把赞成正义原则的论据分为两个部分来处理这个问题。在第一部分，正义的原则是按照不存在妒忌这一假定而提出的；而在第二部分，我们要考虑由于人类的生活环境，所得到的正义观是否可行。 提出这个方法的一个理由是，妒忌往往会使每个人的境况更差。从这个意义上说，妒忌是对集体不利的。假定不存在妒忌，也就是假定人们在选择原则时应该认为自己有自己的本身已很充足的生活计划。他们有一种牢固的自我价值意识，即使在别人拥有较少的促进自身利益的手段的情况下，他们也不打算放弃自己的任何目标。我将根据这种假定提出一种正义观，看一看会发生什么情况。我在下文还打算指出，如果把得到采纳的原则付诸实施，它们将会导致某些社会安排，在这些安排中，妒忌和其他破坏性的感情不可能是强烈的。这种正义观排除了产生破坏性态度的条件。因此，这种正义观是天生稳定的（第80—81节）。 互不关心的理性这个假定是说：原始状态中的人试图尽可能地承认能够促进他们的系统目标的原则。他们这样做是要为自己获得最高的社会基本善的指数，因为这能使他们最有效地促进自己的关于善的观念，不管最后证明这是什么样的观念。各方彼此不想使对方得到好处，也不想使对方受到损害；他们不为爱心或仇恨所驱使。他们彼此都不想比对方得到更多的好处；他们既不爱妒忌，也不爱虚荣。如果用比赛用语，我们可以这样说：他们竭力争取绝对高分。他们不希望他们的对手得高分或得低分，他们也不想尽量扩大或尽量缩小他们的成功与其他人的成功之间的差距。比赛的概念并不真正适用，因为各方并不以获胜为念，而是要得到从自己的系统目标来看的尽可能多的分数。 还有一个保证严格遵守的假定。假定各方都能有一种正义感，而这一点在他们之间又是尽人皆知的。这个条件是要保证原始状态中达成的协议的完整性。这并不意味着各方在审慎思考时应用了某种正义观，因为这样做可能使关于动机的假定的论点无效。相反，它意味着各方可以依赖彼此的谅解，并按照最后得到一致同意的任何原则来行动。一旦原则得到了承认，各方就能相互依赖以遵守这些原则。因此，在达成协议时，他们知道，他们的保证不是徒劳的：他们都能有正义感，这一点保证所选定的原则将会得到尊重。然而，至关重要的是要看到，这种假定仍然允许考虑人们按照各种不同的正义观去行动的资格。关于人类心理的一般事实和道德学习的原则，是有关各方需要仔细研究的有关问题。如果一种正义观不可能证明自己是正确的，或者缺乏稳定性，那就决不可等闲视之．这时，也许可能选择另一种不同的正义观。这个假定只是说，各方从一种纯粹形式的意义上说都有感知正义的能力：各方考虑了每一种有关情况，包括关于道德心理的一般事实，将会坚持最后选定的原则。他们是有理性的，因为他们不会缔结他们知道他们不能信守或很难信守的协议。除其他考虑外，他们还要计算承担义务的负担（第29节）。因此，在评价正义观时，原始状态中的人必须假定他们所采纳的正义观将会得到严格的遵守。他们的协议的结果必须在这个基础上产生。 通过前面对各方的理性和动机的评论，关于原始状态的说明基本上就全面了。我们可以用下面列举的这种初始状态的各种因素及其变化来总结一下这个说明（星号表示对构成原始状态的解释）。 1.各方的性质（第22节） *a．连续的人（家长、或遗传世系） b.单独的个人 c. 团体（国家、教会，或其他法人团体） 2.正义的主题（第2节） *a. 社会基本结构 b.法人团体规章 c. 国际法 3. 对可供选择的正义观的介绍（第21节） a.较短（或较长）的正义观一览表 b. 对各种可能性的一般说明 4.进入原始状态的时间（第24节） *a. 凡在人的一生中任何时间（在理性年龄期间）进入 b. 所有实际的人（生存于某一时间的人）同时进入 c.所有可能的人同时进入 5.正义的环境（第22节） *a．休谟的中等匮乏条件 b.以上条件加上其他极端条件 6.对正义原则的形式上的条件（第23节） *a．普遍性条件、广泛性条件、公开性条件。先后次序条件和决定性条件 b.同上的较少公开性的条件 7. 知识和信仰（第24节） *a．无知之幕 b. 完全的知识 C．部分的知识 8.各方的动机（第25节） *a．互相漠不关心（有限的利他主义） b.社会团结友好的因素 c.完全的利他主义 9.理性（第25节，第28节） *a．用统一的期望和对概率的客观分析来采取实现目标的有效手段 b.同上，但无统一的期望，也不利用不充分理由原则 10.协议条件（第24节） *a．永远一致 b.有限期间的多数同意，等等 11.遵守条件（第25节） *a.严格遵守 b.不同程度的部分遵守 12. 无协议效力（第23节） *a．一般的利己主义 b.自然状态 现在，我们可以转向原则的选择问题。但我首先要提一提应予避免的几个误解。首先，我们必须记住，原始状态中的各方是从理论上规定的个人。他们取得一致意见的根据，是对这种契约状态以及他们对基本善的选择所进行的说明。因此，说正义原则可能会得到选择，就等于说这些人会怎么决心像我们所描述的那样来行动。当然，如果我们要在日常生活中模拟原始状态，就是说，如果我们要按照道德理由及其规定的限制来律己处世，那么，我们大概会发现，我们的思考和判断都受到我们特有的爱好和态度的影响。要在努力坚持这种理想化状态的条件时纠正我们的爱好和厌恶，这无疑将会证明是很困难的。但这丝毫不影响认为上述原始状态中有理性的人可能会作出某种决定的论点。这是一个属于正义理论的问题，是关于人能在多大程度上担负起调整自己的实际推理任务的又一个问题。 既然我们假定原始状态中的人对彼此的利益不感兴趣（虽然他们可能会对第三方表示某种关心），那么我们也许可以认为，正义即公平这个理论本身就是一种利己主义的理论。当然，这不是前面提到的三种利己主义中的任何一种。但有人可能会像叔本华看待康德学说那样认为，这仍然是利己主义的。不过，这是一种误解。原始状态中各方被说成是对彼此的利害关系漠不关心，这不一定意味着遵守可能得到一致同意的原则的人在日常生活中也同样对彼此漠不关心。显然，正义的两个原则以及关于义务和自然责任的原则要求我们考虑别人的权利与要求。而正义感就是一种遵守这些限制的通常有效的欲望。决不可把原始