Chapter 9 Chapter 3 Original State-2

In this and the next two sections I shall deal with the problem of the choice between the two principles of justice and the principle of equal utility.Identify reasonable alternatives among these two principles.Perhaps the main problem with formulating the concept of justice as fairness as a viable alternative to the utilitarian tradition.In this section, I first present some intuitive arguments in favor of these two principles.I will also briefly discuss the qualitative structure of the arguments that must be advanced in order to make these two principles decisive. We recall that the concept of universal justice as fairness requires that all social basic goods must be equally distributed, unless some unequal distribution may be in everyone's interest.No limits are imposed on the exchange of these goods, so less liberty can be compensated by greater social and economic benefits.From the point of view of a man picked at random, he cannot obtain special advantages for himself.On the other hand, he has no reason to acquiesce to special disadvantages.Since he has no reason to expect a greater than average share in the distribution of the social good, and since he has no reason to agree to a less than average share, it would be wise for him to admit that the provision of an equal distribution is first principles of justice.In fact, the principle is so obvious that we can count on anyone to immediately think of it.

In this way, the parties have a principle from the outset that not only establishes an equal distribution of income and wealth, but also an equal right to liberty, including equal opportunity, for all.But there's no reason to think that acknowledging this fixes everything.If there are inequalities in the basic structure that improve everyone's situation relative to the baseline of initial equality, why can't they be allowed?Think of the immediate benefits that greater equality allows as smart investments with an eye toward future gains.If, for example, these inequalities were various stimuli that succeeded in eliciting fruitful effort, then the person in the original position could see them as necessary to cover the cost of training and encourage performance thing.One might think that it is best that people should wish to serve each other.But since the parties are assumed to be indifferent to each other's interests, their acceptance of this inequality is an acceptance of the mutual relation of people in a just environment.They have no reason to be dissatisfied with each other's motives.Thus, a person in the original position might recognize the justice of this inequality.In fact, it would be short-sighted if he didn't.He hesitates to accept these provisions only if he clearly knows or feels that he might be disappointed because someone else is better off; Out of jealousy.In order for the principles governing inequality to be decisive, one should look at institutions from the point of view of the most disadvantaged representative population.Inequality is permissible if it maximizes, or at least promotes the long-run expectations of the least fortunate social groups.

This general conception of justice makes no provision as to what inequalities are permissible, whereas the particular conception of justice arranges (with some necessary adjustments in meaning) the two principles of justice exchange with economic and social benefits.It is not my intention here to justify this arrangement.In later chapters (Sections 39, 82) this question will be considered from time to time.But roughly speaking, the basic idea of ​​this arrangement is: If the parties concerned assume that their basic liberties can be effectively implemented, then they will not exchange a lesser liberty for improved economic welfare.The limits of these rights are recognized only when social conditions do not permit their effective establishment; and they are only admitted if necessary to pave the way for a free society.The denial of equal liberties can be justified only in so far as it is necessary to raise the level of civilization to enable men in time to enjoy these liberties.Thus, in adopting the sequence, we are actually making a special assumption in the original position that the parties know that their social conditions (whatever they may be) allow for the effective realization of these equal liberties.The sequence of these two principles of justice is ultimately justified only in so far as it always follows the general conception of justice.This sequence of words is the long run of the general view.In most cases I shall assume that the necessary conditions for such a sequence are likely to be attainable.

From the above arguments, it seems clear that these two principles are at least a plausible conception of justice.The question, however, is how a more systematic argument can be made for these two principles.There are several things that need to be done.One can estimate their institutional importance and point to their implications for basic social policy.Thus, by comparison with our considered judgments of justice.These two principles are tested.Part II of this book will discuss this issue.But one can also look for some decisive arguments in favor of these two principles from the point of view of the original position.To see how this can be done, it is a useful direct extrapolation to treat these two principles as maximin solutions to social justice problems.There is an analogy between these two principles and the max-min rule for choosing under uncertainty.This is evident from the fact that these two principles are those which a man may choose in order to design a society in which his enemies will assign him a place.The maximin rule requires us to arrange the alternatives according to the worst possible outcomes: we should adopt an approach whose worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of all other alternatives.Of course, people in the original position do not assume that their original position in society is determined by some malicious adversary.As I point out below, they should not reason from false premises.The veil of ignorance does not violate this thinking, because ignorance does not equal misbelief.But if the parties have to protect themselves from such contingencies, then these two principles of justice may prevail, which explains what this conception of justice means by maximin solutions.And this method of analogy also shows that, if the account of the original position makes it possible for the parties to adopt the conservative attitude expressed by this rule reasonably, then a decisive argument can actually be advanced for these two principles.In general, such maximin rules are clearly not an appropriate way to guide choice in situations of uncertainty.But it is an attractive approach with certain salient features.It is my purpose, therefore, to show that arguments in favor of these two principles can be advanced on the basis of which the original position exhibits these characteristics to the fullest, that is, on the basis of which they are most vividly represented.

Consider the income statement below.It represents a profit or loss that does not belong to the strategic operation situation.No one competes with the decision-maker, but instead faces several possible situations that may or may not be recognized.What circumstances happen to exist does not depend on what decisions the translator has made, nor on whether he has announced his actions in advance.The numbers in the table are monetary values ​​(in hundreds of dollars) compared to some original condition.Benefit (g) depends on individual decision (d) and situation (c).Therefore, g=f(d,c).Assuming there are three possible decisions and three possible scenarios, then we can have such an income statement.

Condition ——————————— Decide C1 C2 C3 ——————————————————— d1-7 8 12 d2-8 7 14 d3 5 6 8 The max-min rule requires us to make a third decision.Because in this case, the worst possible outcome that can happen is that one gets $500, which is better than the worst outcome of other actions.If we had taken one of the other actions, we could have lost $800 or $700.Thus, choosing d3 maximizes f(d,c) for a monetary value of C, and minimizes f for some known d. The term "maximum" means the maximum of a set of minimums; and the maximin rule directs our attention to the worst possible outcome, while following any proposed course of action, and following that To make a decision, such results are likely to occur.

There seem to be three main features of the circumstances that make this unique rule plausible.First, this rule does not take into account the degree of likelihood of various possible situations, so it would probably be justified if estimates of these degrees of probability were to be wildly discounted.At present, the most natural selection rule seems to be to calculate the expected monetary payoff from each decision, and then to take the course of action with the best chance of success. (The specification of this expectation is as follows: Let us assume that gij represents the number in the income statement; i is the row index, j is the column index; j = 1, 2, 3, let pj be the probability of the situation, ∑pj = 1 .therefore, the expectation for the i-th decision is equal to ∑pj gij.) Then it must be that knowledge of the degree of likelihood is impossible, or at least highly unreliable, in this case.That being the case, it would be unreasonable not to cast doubt on the calculation of probabilities, unless nothing else could be done, and especially unless the decision is a fundamental one that must be justified to others.

The second characteristic of the maximum-minimum rule is as follows: The man who is choosing has such a conception of the good that he cares little about the fact that he can earn more than the minimum salary, but only follows the maximum-minimum rule. According to the rules of value, he must in fact receive more than the minimum salary.He's not worth the risk for the greater good, especially when it may turn out that he's going to lose a lot of what's important to him.This last one leads to a third feature, namely that the negated choice has consequences that are almost unacceptable.This situation involves enormous risks.Of course, these features combine to produce the most effective effects.This typical case following the max-min rule is when all three of these characteristics are most fully realized.Thus, this rule is not universally applicable, and certainly not self-evident.Rather, it is a guideline, a rule of thumb that comes into play only in exceptional circumstances.The applicability of this rule depends on the qualitative structure of the probable gains and losses in relation to one's conception of the good, and this is all empirical, that is, it is reasonable not to trust entirely to conjectured assumptions about the probable estimate of the extent.As stated in the comments on the income statement, it should be pointed out that the items in the statement represent monetary values, not actual utility.This difference is important because, first, calculating expectations on the basis of such objective values ​​is not the same thing as calculating expected actual utility, and may produce different results.However, the most important point is that, according to the theory of justice as fairness, the parties do not know their own conception of the good, so they cannot estimate how much utility in this usual sense they can get.In sum, we wish to go beyond de facto chances of selection arising from specific conditions.Expectations are thus based on indices of primary goods against which the parties make their choices.The items listed in the table represent this view of contractarianism in terms of money, not utility.

As I have shown, the specification of the original state makes it a case to which the maximin rule applies.To make this clear, let us briefly review the nature of the situation, keeping in mind its three characteristics.First, the veil of ignorance precludes all but the vaguest knowledge of possible degrees.The parties involved have no basis for ascertaining the general nature of their society or their place within it.So they have every reason to be careful to do a careful calculation of the probabilities to see if there is any other path for them to follow, and they must also consider how their choices of principles will have consequences for others, especially for their children and grandchildren. That said, it also seems reasonable, since the rights of these people will be profoundly affected by this choice.There are other reasons for not being entirely credible, which I will mention below.Suffice it to say for the moment that these considerations are all the more forceful because the parties have little knowledge of this profit and loss account.Not only are they unable to speculate on the degree of possibility of various possible situations, but they are also unable to enumerate these possible situations and foresee the consequences of each of their possible choices.The person making the decision is in a state of total ignorance, far from being what some digital table would suggest.It is for this reason that I mentioned a method of analogy with the rule of maximum and minimum.

There are several arguments in favor of the two principles of justice that illustrate the second feature.For example, if we could insist that these principles produce some sort of workable theory of social justice.And these principles are consistent with reasonable requirements for efficiency, so this conception of justice guarantees a satisfactory minimum.Just thinking about it, maybe there's no reason to do better.A large part of this argument, especially in Part II of this book, is thus to show that these two principles are a fulfilling conception of justice in terms of their applicability to major problems of social justice.These details serve a certain philosophical purpose.Furthermore, if we can identify the priority of liberty, the lexical sequence of these two principles.Then this way of thinking is actually decisive.This priority means that people in the original position do not want to sacrifice equal liberty for the greater good.These two principles in the lexical sequence guarantee minimums that parties are unwilling to compromise for the greater economic and social good.The reasons for this arrangement are discussed in Chapters 4 and 9.

Finally, the third feature is valid if we can postulate that some other conception of justice might produce a regime that each party finds intolerable.For example, it is sometimes thought that under certain conditions the principle of utility (either of the two principles of utility) could, if not justify slavery or serfdom, at least justify serious violations for the greater social good Liberty is justified in doing so.Here, I need not consider how much truth there is in this statement, nor the possibility of obtaining these necessary conditions.For the moment, the argument is simply to illustrate the ways in which a conception of justice may take into account outcomes that may not be acceptable to the parties.Now that these two principles of justice guarantee a satisfactory minimum, it seems unreasonable, if not unreasonable, for the parties to take the chance that this outcome will not occur. Sensible. These are the few features of the case to which the rule of maximum and minimum applies, and a brief description of how the arguments in favor of these two principles of justice can be brought into it.Thus, if the conventional view enumerated above (Section 21) speaks of these possible decisions, then this rule can be used to select the principles.Because of the fundamental nature of the choice of conceptions of justice, the original position clearly displays these characteristics over a wide range.These arguments for the max-min rule are just to clarify the structure of the choice problem in the original position.These arguments illustrate a qualitative analysis of this structure.We also present the arguments in favor of these two principles more fully below.I would like to close this section with an objection.This objection is likely to be raised as a disapproval of the difference principle, and thus raises an important question.The objection is whether, since we should maximize (subject to the usual constraints) the hopes of the least advantaged, it is not justified to raise or lower the expectations of the more advantaged substantially , may depend on whether the prospects of the worst off have changed slightly.Example: Great disparities in wealth and income are permissible provided that the expectations of the most unfortunate are raised the least.But at the same time, similar inequalities in favor of the more advantaged are inadmissible if the least disadvantaged suffer the least.Yet it seems bizarre that raising billions of dollars to raise the expectations of the more privileged is justified in terms of raising or lowering the expectations of the least benefited by pennies.This objection has parallels to the following cases where the maximum-minimum rule is difficult to apply.Consider the sequence of natural numbers n in the income statement: 0n 1/n 1 Even for some slightly smaller number, it is reasonable to choose the second column, if it is unreasonable not to choose the first column, which violates the rule of maximum and minimum values, then another problem must arise later in the sequence. Part of the answer to this question is: the purpose of the difference principle is not to apply to such abstract possibilities.I have said that the problem of social justice is not a problem of the arbitrary distribution among particular individuals of varying amounts of something, be it money, or property, or whatever.Nor is there some good that constitutes expectations and can be transferred from one representative person to another in every possible combination.The possibilities contemplated by this objection cannot actually exist; possible tendencies are severely restricted so as to exclude them.The reason for this is that these two principles are connected into a conception of justice that applies to the basic structure of the entire society.The principle of equal liberty and the principle of open status work to prevent these accidents from happening.As we raise the expectations of the better off, the status of the worst off continues to improve.Every such improvement, however, is to some extent in the interest of the latter.Greater expectations of the more beneficiary may offset training costs and encourage better performance of the task, thereby promoting general interest.While nothing guarantees that inequalities will not be high, there is a persistent tendency to level them through increased utilization of educated talent and expanding opportunity.The conditions laid down by the other principles ensure that the disparities which may arise are much smaller than those which men have often endured in the past. We should also point out that the difference principle not only assumes the role of other principles, but also contains a certain theory of social institutions.In particular, it rests on the idea that in a competitive economy (with or without private ownership) with an overt class system, excessive inequality will not be the rule.I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 5.Considering the distribution of natural assets and the laws of motivation formation, huge disparities will not exist for a long time.The point to be emphasized here is that no one will object to the general facts of economics and psychology as the basis for choosing basic principles.As we have seen, we assume that the parties in the original position know general facts about human society.Since the knowledge of this aspect has become the premise of their careful thinking, their principles of translation selection cannot be separated from these facts.Of course, it is crucial that these premises be true and reasonably general.For example, it is often objected that utilitarianism might excuse slavery or serfdom, as well as other violations of liberty.Whether these systems are justified depends on whether the results calculated by insurance statistics show that these systems produce large happiness gaps.To this, the utilitarian replies that the nature of society is such that such calculations are usually against the denial of liberty.Some utilitarians have attempted to formulate certain general assumptions (as I shall mention) to account for the claims to liberty and equality.Therefore, they assume that people have similar utility functions that meet the condition of ever-shrinking marginal utility.The consequence of these provisions is that, assuming that the amount of income is fixed, and if we leave out the influence on the future, then the distribution of income should be equal.Because as long as some people get more than others, the total utility can be expanded by transferring income to those who get less.The distribution of rights and liberties can largely be viewed in the same way.If these assumptions are reasonable, there is nothing wrong with this approach. Thus, contract theory and utilitarianism agree that the basic principles of justice are taken for granted by natural facts about people in society.The account of the original position clearly shows this dependence: people look at the parties' decisions in terms of general knowledge.In addition, the various factors of the original state also contain a lot of information about the living environment of human beings.Some philosophers hold that the basic principles of morality should not depend on the assumption of all contingent conditions, and that they should not take for granted any facts except logical facts and other facts arising from logical facts through conceptual analysis.Certain moral values ​​should be applicable to all possible human beings in the world.This view turns moral philosophy into the study of creation ethics: a study of the views an omnipotent god might have in deciding who is the best of all possible human beings.Even ordinary facts of nature are subject to selection.Of course, we have a natural religious interest in this creation ethics.But that seems to be beyond human comprehension.From the point of view of contract theory, this amounts to saying that people in the original position know nothing about themselves and their world.So how can they make a decision?The question of choice becomes clear only when the options are suitably limited by natural law and other constraints, and when the decision-maker has some will to choose.Without this explicit structure, the questions posed are also ambiguous.For this we must not hesitate to make the choice of principles of justice a prerequisite for a theory of social institutions.In fact, one cannot avoid the assumption of general facts, any more than one can cope with a conception of the good without which the parties arrange their choices.If these assumptions are true and fairly general, then all is in order, since without them the whole arrangement would be empty and meaningless. From these arguments it is evident that both general facts and moral conditions are required even in arguments in favor of fundamental principles of justice. (Of course, it is always clear that secondary moral codes and particular moral judgments are determined not only by normative principles but also by factual premises.) In contract theory, these moral conditions are described in terms of the initial contractual state appearing in the form of.It is also clear that general facts and moral conditions have a division of labor in the attainment of conceptions of justice, and that this division of labor may vary from one theory to another.As I noted earlier, principles vary in how they embody desirable moral ideals.It is characteristic of utilitarianism that it leaves many problems to arguments from general facts.Utilitarians believe that the laws of society and human nature rule out situations that are incompatible with our considered judgments.They often use this argument to deal with objections.In contrast, justice as fairness theory, as it is commonly understood, ingrains the ideal of justice more directly in its fundamental principles.This conception of justice relies less on general facts to match our judgments of justice.This ensures that the practice can be applied to a wider range of possible situations. Two reasons justify rooting the ideal of justice in its fundamental principles.The first and most obvious point is that the general assumptions made by utilitarians that produce desirable outcomes may only be likely true, or may not even be true.Furthermore, the full meaning and extent of application of these assumptions may also be entirely speculative.This may well be true of the general assumptions necessary for all assertions of the principle of utility.From the point of view of the original position, it might not be reasonable to rely on these assumptions, so it might be far more reasonable to make this ideal more explicit in the chosen principles.In this light, the parties may prefer to be directly assured of the right to liberty rather than rely on insurance statistical calculations which may be dubious and purely speculative.These opinions are all the more forceful because of one's desire to avoid complex theoretical arguments in arriving at some general conception of justice (Section 24).Compare with reasoning for these two principles.Grounds used as a utilitarian criterion violate this limitation.But second, if people state to each other once and for all that even though theoretical presumptions about utility are often in favor of equal liberty rights (which is assumed here to be the case), they don't want things to be different.People do have some kind of benefit in doing so.Since, according to the theory of justice as fairness, morality is universal, the choice of these two principles is really such a statement.Even if the general utilitarian assumptions are true and sound, the benefits of such a collective statement favor these principles.These issues I consider in more detail in conjunction with openness and stability (Section 29).The relevant point here is that, while ethical theory in general can undoubtedly have recourse to natural facts, there may be good reasons for rooting belief in justice more directly in fundamental principles than in order to get a full theoretical understanding of as may be required by various accidental factors in the world. I would now like to examine the reasoning in favor of the principle of average utility.The classical principles in this regard are discussed below (section 30).One of the strengths of contract theory is that it reveals that these principles are distinct concepts, however consistent their actual outcomes may be.Their underlying analytic assumptions are quite different in the sense that they are associated with some apparently different interpretations of the original position.Or rather, this is what I intend to demonstrate. For the classical principle of utility to apply to the basic structure of society, it is necessary to require that the institutional arrangements should maximize the absolute weighted aggregate of expectations about representative people.This total is obtained by weighting each expectation by the number of people in the corresponding status and then adding them.Therefore, when other conditions are equal, if the number of people in a society doubles, the total utility will also double. (Of course, according to the utilitarian view, expectations are used to measure the total satisfaction enjoyed and foreseen. They are not just indices of primary goods, as the theory of justice as fairness suggests.) The principle of average utility is related to Instead, it directs society to maximize average utility (per population average), rather than total utility.This seems to be a relatively modern view: both Mill and Wicksell have held it, and some others have laid new foundations for it not long ago.In order to apply this concept to the basic structure of society, a system is established that maximizes the percentage-weighted aggregate of the expectations of a representative individual.To calculate this aggregate, we multiply the expectation by the fraction of the number of people in the corresponding position in society.Therefore, it is no longer true to say that doubling the number of people in a society doubles the utility, other things being equal.Conversely, as long as the percentages in each status remain the same, so does the utility. Of these two principles of utility, which one is likely to be chosen in the original position?To answer this question, it must be pointed out that two different principles produce the same result if the population remains the same.But if the population changes, the results will be different.The classical principle of utilitarianism stipulates that in the case where the system affects the size of the family, the age at marriage, etc., the arrangement of the system should maximize the total utilitarianism.It must then be the case that, as long as the average utility per capita decreases gradually as the number increases, an occasional increase in population should be encouraged, however low the average may fall.If this is the case, the increase in the total amount of utility due to the increase in the number of people is large enough to make up for the decrease in the per capita share.As a matter of justice rather than as a matter of choice, a very low welfare average may be desired. (See below) irregular population growth Formally speaking, the conditions for irregular population growth are: the curve y=F(x) (y is the average calculated by population, x is the population) should be flatter than the equiaxed hyperbola Xy=c.Because xy is equal to the total utility, the rectangular area indicates that when the curve y=F(X) is flatter than Xy=C, the total utility increases with the increase of the X value. This consequence of the classical principle of utility seems to suggest that parties in favor of the principle of average utility may reject it.These two principles can only be equivalent if it is assumed that average welfare always falls fairly rapidly (beyond a certain point anyway) so that there is no serious conflict between the two principles.But this assumption appears to be problematic.From the point of view of people in the original position, it seems reasonable to agree on some minimum standard in order to maintain average welfare.Since the parties aim to advance their own interests, they have no desire at all to maximize the aggregate amount of satisfaction.Therefore, I think that the more reasonable utilitarian principle that can replace the two principles of justice is the principle of average utility rather than the classical principle of utility. Now, I want to consider how the principle of equal utility can be achieved by the parties.The reasoning I am about to outline is so general that, if it is correct, it completely sidesteps the question of how to formulate alternative principles.The principle of average utility would be considered the only reasonable alternative.One can imagine a situation where, given several different societies, a rational person can decide to join one of them.To determine the plan, first assume that the members of these societies all have the same choices.It is also assumed that these choices meet the conditions that enable one to prescribe a basic utility.Moreover, every society has the same resources and the same distribution of natural talents.But individuals with different talents earn differently, and every society has a policy of redistribution beyond a certain limit, which reduces incentives and thus reduces production.Assuming that these societies enforce different policies, how would one decide which society to join?Had he been fully aware of his own abilities and interests, and had known the particulars of these societies, he might have been able to foresee the welfare which he would almost certainly enjoy in each.Therefore, he can make a decision on this basis.He does not have to do any probability calculations. However, this case is rather special.Let us gradually change it so that it more and more resembles the situation of someone in the original position.For example, assume first that the participant does not know for sure what his talents will enable him to do in these different societies.If he believes that his chances of choice are the same as those of everyone else, he may be able to make decisions that maximize his desired welfare.He calculates his expectations of a particular society by considering the expectations of representative members of that society as alternative utilities, and his estimate of his own Either status may apply.In this way, his expectation is specified by the utility-weighted aggregate of representative individuals, namely ∑piui, in which Pi represents the possibility of him obtaining the i-th position, and ui represents the corresponding The utility of a representative person.He then chooses the society that offers the highest expectations. Several further constraints bring this situation closer to that of the original state.It is assumed that the hypothetical joiners should know nothing about their abilities or the place they might occupy in each society.Suppose further that his chances of selection are the same as those of all persons in these societies.Now, suppose that he can proceed with a series of probabilistic inferences that he has an equal chance of being any individual (that is, he considers his chances of being any representative person to be part of the society that person represents ).既然如此，他的期望仍然与每个社会的平均功利完全相同。这些限制最后使他对每个社会的期望利益和这个社会的平均福利一致起来。 到目前为止，我们都是假定所有的人不管是否属于同一个社会，他们都有相同的选择机会。他们的关于善的观念大致相同。一旦取消了这个高度限制性的假定，我们就迈出了最后一步，从而获得了一种不同的原始状态。让我们假定，对这些社会成员或作决定的人的选择机会都是一无所知。这些事实以及关于这些社会的结构的知识都被排除掉了。无知之幕现在就完整了。但是，一个人仍然可以设想，假设中的新来者仍像过去一样进行推理。他认为，他有成为任何人的同样的可能性，被充分赋予了那个人的选择机会、那个人的能力和社会地位。他的期望显然是具有最大平均功利的那个社会的最高期望。我们可以从下面的办法中明白这一点。设n为某个社会的人数。设这些人的福利水平为U1，U2，…un。这样，总的功利即为∑ui，而平均功利为∑ui／n。假定一个人有成为任何人的平等机会，则该人的期望为：1／nu1＋1／un2＋…＋1／nun或Eui／n。期望的数值与平均功利完全一致。 因此，如果我们撇开功利的人际比较不谈，如果各方被看作是有理性的人，他们决不厌恶风险，并在估计可能性时遵循不充分理由原则（即作为前面概率计算基础的原则），那么，原始状态这个概念就会自然而然地导致平均功利原则。各方在选择这个原则时，按照这种观点来最大限度地提高他们所期望的福利。因此，某种形式的契约理论提供了一种赞成平均功利原则的观点而不赞成古典功利原则的观点的论证方法。事实上，除此以外难道还有别的什么方法可以用来说明平均功利原则吗？严格说来，它毕竟不同于古典的观点，它不是一种目的论，因此它缺乏最大限度扩大善这个概念所具有的一种直觉上的吸引力。遵守平均功利原则的人至少在这一点上大概是要求助于契约理论的。 此外，采取假设的新来者的立场，对普遍性也没有任何损害。诚然，原始状态中的人知道他们在某个具体社会里已占有了一个位置。但从原始状态的观点看，对事情是如何发生的推理和对事情将会如何发生的推理，其间并无任何本质的差异。无知之幕排除了任何造成明显差异的基础。因此，不管是哪种推理，都能产生赞成平均功利原则的论据。各方在接受平均功利原则时会一致同意，要按照他们可能会予以利用的这个原则，像假设中的新来者在类似于原始状态的环境下对社会进行选择那样，尽可能地把他们的社会安排好。一旦原始状态中的人被看作是一个准备在各种情况下对最抽象的概率推理进行投机的有理性的个人，平均功利原则就对他们产生了吸引力。为了论证赞成正义的两个原则，我们必须证明，规定原始状态的条件排除了各方的这种观念。事实上，这里我们碰到了正义即公平理论的一个主要问题，即这样来规定原始状态，虽然能够达成某种有意义的协议（无知之幕以及排除讨价还价和偏见的基础的其他条件），但为了取得这一结果而规定的种种限制仍然导致了具有契约论传统的特点的原则。 在着手讨论赞成正义的两个原则的论据之前，我想提一下平均功利原则的几个难题。不过，我首先还是应该指出一种不过是似是而非的反对意见。我们已经看到，这个原则可以被看作是一个有理性的人的道德观，这个人准备冒一切必要的风险以最大限度地提高自己的从原始状态来看的期望。（如果不存在预知可能结果的任何客观基础，那就用不充分理由原则来对这种结果进行计算。）不过，人们总是想要反对这个原则，说它是以全体社会成员实际上同样接受风险为先决条件的。人们要说，在某个时刻，每个人实际上必然已同意去冒同样的风险。由于这种时刻显然是不存在的，这个原则也就是不合理的。可以考虑一下一个极端的例子：一个奴隶主企图在奴隶面前证明自己对奴隶的立场是正当的，他说，首先鉴于他们的社会情况。奴隶制对于产生最大的平均幸福是必不可少的；其次，从原始契约状态出发，他可能会选择平均功利原则，甚至不惜冒随后可能出现的风险，使自己也成了奴隶而被人合法占有。我们大概会倾向于立刻拒绝奴隶主的这种论点，认为这即使不是有意歪曲，至少也是文不对题。人们也许会认为，他可能会选择什么，这并没有关系。除非人们事实上已经同意一种具有实际风险的正义观，否则没有人会受它的要求的约束。 然而，按照契约观点，奴隶主的论据的一般方式是正确的。如果奴隶反驳说，由于不存在实际的选择机会，不存在分担事情的可能结果的风险问题，所以奴隶主的论点是毫不相干的。奴隶的这种说法可能是一种错误。契约论是一种纯粹的假设：如果某种正义观可能在原始状态中得到一致同意，那么它的原则就是能够适用的正确原则。这种协议过去不曾有过，将来也不会有，这是毫无异议的。我们不能忽此忽彼：我们不能由于无法找到一致同意的合适机会来说明个人的责任和义务而就用假设去解释正义理论，然后又强调带有风险的实际情况来抛出我们所不需要的正义原则。因此，按照正义即公平理论，批驳奴隶主论点的办法就是指出，他所援引的原则可能在原始状态中就遭到否决。我们的唯一选择就是利用这种原始状态的各个方面（按照人们所喜爱的解释），来证实绝大部分理由都是赞成正义的这两个原则的。我打算在下一节着手这样去做。 平均功利原则的第一个难题，我在讨论最大最小值规则时已经提到，我曾把这个规则作为安排赞成这两个原则的论据的一种推断手段。它涉及有理性的人估计可能结果的方法。所以会产生这种问题，是因为在原始状态中假定一个人具有成为任何人的同等机会，似乎没有任何客观根据。就是说，这种假定不是以一个人的社会的已知特征为根据的。在导致平均功利原则的论据的早期阶段，假设的新来者对自己的能力和他正在选择的各个社会的设计是有所了解的。对他的机会的估计就是以这方面的知识为基础的。但在最后阶段，则是对具体事实全然无知（正义的环境所包含的事实除外）。对个人前景的解释在这个阶段完全决定于不充分理由原则。这个原则被用来在缺乏任何知识的情况下以概率来说明结果。在我们没有任何证据时，可能的情况就被认为是同样可能的。例如，拉普拉斯推论说，如果我们要在两个各自装有不同比例的黑球和红球的坛子里摸球，但我们不知道放在我们面前的是哪一个坛子，于是我们就得首先假定从每个坛子中摸球的机会是相等的。这就是说，作为这些先验概率的基础的无知状态，提出了和一个人有许多证据说明一个硬币对所有的人一视同仁这种情况同样的问题。利用这个原则的一个特点是，它使一个人能够在一种严格的概率统计的基础上把各种知识结合起来，甚至在毫无知识的情况下对概率作出推断。先验概率不管是怎样推断出来的，都是某种理论的一部分，也是根据随机抽样对机会所作出的估计。关于无知识这种限制情况并未提出任何理论问题。随着证据的积累，先验概率无论如何也得到了修正，而不充分理由原则至少保证了从一开始就不排除任何概率。 现在，我要假定，各方不完全相信仅仅根据这个原则推断出来的可能性。考虑到原始协议的根本重要性，考虑到使一个人的决定似乎应对他的将会因此而受到影响的子孙后代负责这种欲望，这个假定似乎是合理的。我们为他们去冒险要比为我们自己去冒险来得勉强；我们愿意去冒险，只是因为这种不确定性无法避免，或是由于按客观知识估计可能得到的利益很大，因此拒绝接受提供给他们的机会，似乎是不负责任的举动，即使接受这种机会结果证明是有害的。由于各方有正义的这两个原则可供选择，他们能够在很大程度上回避原始状态的不确定性。他们能够在他们的社会条件许可的情况下，保证使他们的自由权和某种相当令人满意的生活水准得到保障。事实上，正如我将在下一节论证的那样，撇开平均功利原则以不充分理由原则为基础这一点不谈，选择这个原则是否真能提供一种较好的前景，这也是值得怀疑的。因此，无知之幕的作用似乎是有利于正义的两个原则的。这种正义观对完全无知这种情况比较适用。 当然，还有一些关于社会的假定。如果这些假定是合理的，它们就能使各方对相等的概率作出客观的估计。要理解这一点，可以把埃奇沃思赞成古典的功利原则的论据改变为赞成平均功利原则的论据。事实上，可以把他的推理加以调整，为几乎任何一种普遍的政策标准提供论据。埃奇沃思的主张是提出某些合理的假定，为自身利益着想的各方可以合理地根据这些假定，一致同意把功利标准作为评价社会政策的一个政治原则。这个原则之所以必要，是因为政治过程不是一种竞争性过程，这些决定不能由市场作出，必须找到别的什么办法来调和互相歧异的利益。埃奇沃思认为，功利原则作为理想的评价标准，可能会得到为自身利益着想的各方的一致同意。他的思想似乎是：从许多场合的长远情况看，在每一个场合都最大限度地提高功利的政策，对任何个人来说，极可能产生最大的功利。把这个标准坚持应用于税收和财产立法等等，从任何一个人的观点看，都是为了产生最佳效果。因此，采用这个原则，为自身利益着想的各方就可以得到合理的保证，使他们不但不会最后失败，事实上还会使他们的前景得到最大的改善。 埃奇沃思的主张的缺点是，必要的假定是极其不现实的，尤其对基本结构来说是不现实的。只要对这些假定加以说明，就可以看出它们似乎是多么不合理的了。我们必须假定，构成政治过程的这些决定的作用，不但或多或少是独立的，而且就其社会效果来说，也是大致相同的；而它们的社会效果无论如何不会很大，否则这些作用就不可能是独立的。此外，还必须或者假定人们从一种社会地位进入另一种社会地位是随机性的，并且他们的生命长到足以使得失最后达到平衡；或者假定有某种机制保证在功利原则指导下的立法有整个时间里平均施惠。但是，社会显然不是这样的一种随机过程；而有些社会政策问题要比另一些社会政策问题重要得多，它们在体制分配利益方面常常引起巨大而持久的变化。 例如，可以考虑一下一个社会打算使它的外贸政策发生历史性变化这个例子。这里的问题是，这个社会要不要取消长期以来对进口农产品征收的关税，以便使新兴工业中的工人获得较廉价的食品。按照功利主义观点，这种变化是理所当然的，但这并不意味着它不会持久地影响地主阶级和产业阶级的相对地位。只有在这许多决定中的每一个决定对分配份额只有较小的暂时影响，同时又有某种体制手段可以保证随机性的情况下，埃奇沃思的推理才是适用的。因此，按照实际的假定，他的论据充其量只能证实功利原则作为一种适用于次要的政策问题的立法标准，只具有一种次要地位。但这一点显然意味着这个原则不能用来解决社会正义的主要问题。我们在社会中的原始状态、我们的天生禀赋以及社会秩序是一种体系这个事实的无所不在的持续影响，首先表明了正义问题的特点。我们决不能为数学上引人入胜的假设所迷惑，从而声称人们社会地位的随机性和人们境况的不对称现象最终会取得平衡。相反，我们必须充分认识到情况并非如此，也不可能如此，从而根据这种认识来选择我们的正义观。 因此，如果要接受平均功利原则，名方似乎必须根据不充分理由原则来进行推理。他们必须遵循有些人所说的拉普拉斯规则，在不确知的情况下进行选择。所有概率都以某种合乎自然的方法被认定了，而每一个概率都被分配了同样的可能性。虽然没有提供关于社会的一般事实来支持这种分配，但各方仍然进行概率计算，好像知识仍未用尽似的。我无法在这里讨论概率这个概念，但有几点是必须指出的。首先，概率的含义应该作为道德哲学的问题，尤其是正义理论的一个问题而提出来，这一点也许是令人奇怪的。然而，把道德哲学看作是合理选择理论的一部分，却是契约论的必然结果。鉴于规定原始状态的方式，自然要考虑概率问题。无知之幕直接导致了在不确知的情况下进行选择的问题。当然，可以把各方看作是十足的利他主义者，并假定他们在进行推理时仿佛肯定处于每一个人的地位。对原始状态的这种解释，消除了风险和不确定性因素。 然而，按照正义即公平理论，这个问题是无法完全避免的。至关重要的事情是，不要让被选择的原则决定于对风险的特殊态度。为此，无知之幕也排除了关于这类倾向的知识：各方不知道他们是否对冒险感到特别厌恶。对正义观的选择，应该尽可能依靠对接受风险的合理估计，而这种估计是不受个人对以某种方式进行冒险的特有爱好的影响的。当然，社会制度可以利用这些不同的性格倾向，建立使这些倾向有可能为实现共同目标而充分发挥作用的体制。但无论如何，制度的基本设计最好不要依靠这些态度（第81节）。因此，这些倾向对在原始状态中进行冒险问题表明了一种特有的保守观点，这并不是赞成正义的两个原则的论据。必须指出，考虑了这种地位不顾对冒险的任何特殊态度而表现出来的独一无二的特点，一个人在似乎厌恶冒险的情况下所作出的选择就是合理的选择。 其次，我曾简单地假定，如果对概率的判断是合理决定的依据，那么它们必须具有某种客观的基础，即了解具体事实（或合理信念）的基础。要证明这一点，无须举出事情发生的相对次数，而应对影响结果的各种倾向的相对力量提供估计依据。鉴于在原始状态中作出选择的十分重大的意义，以及各方希望他们的决定对别人来说也似乎有充分根据这个事实，对客观理由的需要变得更加迫切了。因此，为了充实对原始状态的说明，我将假定各方不完全相信对可能性的估计，因为这种估计不是以关于具体事实的知识为依据的，这种估计即使不是唯一地也是主要地从不充分理由原则推断出来的。新贝氏理论家和坚持更传统的概念的理论家对于客观依据的需要似乎并无争论。在这个问题上的争论是：应有多大程度上把以常识等等为基础的、对可能性的直觉上的不精确估计具体化为概率论的正式手段，而不是把这种估计特地用来调整以不考虑这种知识的方法而得出的结论。新贝氏理论家在这方面有令人信服的论据。当然，如果有可能以系统的方式而不是以没有规律的和未经说明的方式来利用我们的直觉知识和根据常识的预感，那就更好。但这丝毫不影响这样的论点：如果要使对概率的判断成为在原始状态这种特殊情况下作出决定的合理依据，它们就必须以关于社会的已知事实作为某种客观基础。 我在这里提到的最后一个难题，产生了一个深奥的问题。虽然我不能适当处理它，但也不回避它。麻烦来自对平均功利原则最后一步推理中的期望的独特性。如果在正常情况下对期望进行估计，则可按一套选择，即个人所作出的选择，来推断出这些选择的功利（即∑piui式子中的ui）。这种功利表示这个人按照他自己的价值系统来估计的选择办法的价值。然而，在这种情况下，每种功利都是以一个不同的人的选择为基础的。有多少个不同的人，就有多少种不同的功利。当然，这种推理显然是以人际的比较为先决条件的。但是，如果暂时不考虑对这些比较作出规定的问题，这里需要注意的一点就是：这个人在进行选择时被认为好像根本就没有他自己的目的似的。他按照自己是若干个完全具有各自的系统目标、能力和社会地位的人们中的任何一个来进行冒险。因此，我们也许想要知道，这种期望究竟是不是一种有意义的期望。由于不存在一种对这种期望作出估计的选择安排，这种期望也就似乎缺乏必要的统一性了。 为了说明这个问题，让我们把对客观情况的估价与对人的能力、性格特征和目标系统等方面的估价区别开来。现在，从我们的观点看，按照对另一个人的社会地位、财富等等的规定，或按照对他的社会基本善的前景的规定来估价他的情况，通常是相当容易的。我们使自己处于他的地位，完全具有我们自己的性格和爱好（不是他的性格和爱好），同时考虑我们的计划可能会受到什么影响。我们并不到此为止。我们还可以估计一下，处于另一个人的地位，至少具有他的某些性格和目标，对我们会有什么价值。由于我们知道自己的生活计划，我们能够决定我们具有这些性格和目标是不是合理，从而决定在我们能够去发展和鼓励这些性格和目标的情况下，我们是不是应该那样去做。这些问题我将在第七章讨论。这里只要说这样一点就够了：完全不谈我们自己的关于善的观念的细节，而去估价另一个人的总的环境、他的客观情况以及他的性格和目标系统，这是我们无法做到的。如果我们要完全根据我们自己的立场去判断这些问题，我们就必须知道我们的生活计划是什么。正如构想的期望所假定的那样，别人的环境对我们的价值并不是对他们的价值。 此外，我们知道，人际比较的最明确的基础是社会基本善，即每一个有理性的人都被认为无论想要别的什么时都需要的东西。我们越是接近这个人的更高目标及其各个方面，并试图估计它们对我们的价值，这种方法就越是靠不住。其所以如此，是因为这些估计预期我们的生活方式会发生根本的变化，我们的计划会得到更广泛的修改。事实上，想要在人与人之间规定一种把全面的最后目标也计算在内的衡量标准，这似乎是没有意义的。这个问题就像把不同的艺术风格拿来比较一样。的确有许多事情人们在做，并且发现按照自己的心意去做是完全值得的。当然，功利主义者可能会承认这种不同意见，接受关于基本善的解释，然后按照有关的基本善的指数来规定他的原则，这涉及到我不打算继续进行研究的理论的某种重大改变。我将限于讨论这个一般性的观点。 因此，通过对平均功利原则进行推理而最后得到的期望似乎是不合逻辑的。这样说有两个理由：首先，这种期望不像通常应该的那样是以一系列目标为基础的；其次，由于无知之幕排除了各方对自己的关于善的观念的认识，别人的环境对一个人的价值简直就是无法估计的。这种论据最后纯粹是从形式上来表达一种毫无意义的期望。关于期望的这个难题，同关于概率的知识的难题有类似之处。从这两个情况看，在原始状态的条件排除了合理使用这些概念的基础之后，推理仍旧用这些概念来进行。