Chapter 7 Chapter 2 Principles of Justice-3

I would like to conclude the discussion of these two principles by stating the significance of the equal conception of justice expressed by the two principles of justice.I also want to prevent in advance any objection to the principle of fair opportunity that it leads to a society of ruthless able-bodied men.To pave the way for doing this, I would point out several aspects of the conception of justice that I have developed. First, we can say that the difference principle pays some weight to what the remedial principle specifically considers.The so-called remedial principle is the principle of redress for undue inequalities; since undue inequalities of birth and birth are undue, these inequalities should be compensated in some way.Thus, this principle asserts that, in order to treat all people equally, and to provide true equality of opportunity, society must pay more attention to those with less natural endowments and those born with a less favorable social position.This idea is to remedy the deviation caused by accidental factors in equality.In applying the remedial principle, more resources can be spent on educating the less intelligent than the more intelligent, at least at some point in their life, such as early schooling.

but.As far as I know, no one has ever proposed the principle of remedy as the sole criterion of justice, as the single goal of social order.This seems plausible, since most of these principles are treated as preliminary principles, principles that need to be considered in comparison with other principles.We may compare this principle, for example, with the principle of raising the average standard of living or promoting the common good.But whatever other principles we may have, the claim of remedy must be considered.The principle of redress is considered one of the elements that embodies our conception of justice.The difference principle is certainly not a remedy principle.The difference principle does not require society to try to even out disadvantages, as if all people should be competing in the same game on a fair basis.But the difference principle can allocate educational resources to improve the long-term expectations of those least benefited.If more attention is paid to people with better talents to achieve this goal, it is allowed, otherwise it is not allowed.And in making this decision, the value of education should not be judged solely on the basis of economic benefits and social welfare.The role of education is equally important, if not more important, because education enables a person to enjoy the culture and participate in the affairs of his society, thereby giving each person a firm sense of self-worth.

Thus, although the difference principle and the remedy principle are not the same thing, the difference principle does achieve some of the goals of the remedy principle.It changes the goals of the basic structure, so that the overall arrangement of the system no longer highlights the value of social benefits and expert politics.Thus, we argue that the difference principle actually embodies an agreement to view the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in whatever benefits arise from that distribution.The blessed, whoever they may be, benefit from their good fortune only on the condition of improving the position of the loser in the competition.Those who are naturally advantageous gain, not merely because they are more endowed, but only by repaying the cost of their training and education, and by putting their talents to the aid of the less fortunate.Anyone is not born with greater abilities, nor is he born with a relatively favorable starting point in society.But this is not to say that these differences should be eliminated.There are other ways to eliminate these differences.The basic structure can be arranged so that these chance factors favor the least fortunate.If, therefore, we wish to establish social systems in which no individual gains or loses without giving a compensating benefit or receiving compensating interests, then we are led to the difference principle.

On the basis of these statements, we may perhaps deny the argument that because the distribution of natural talents and the accidental factors in the social environment are unjust, and this injustice must affect human arrangements, institutional arrangements Always flawed.Sometimes this opinion is raised as an excuse to ignore injustice, as if refusing to acquiesce in injustice is like refusing to admit death.Natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that men are born into certain positions in society; these are merely facts of nature.What is just and what is unjust depends on how the system treats these facts.Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because they make these accidental factors the basis for the ultimate fate of more or less closed and privileged social classes.The basic structure of these societies embodies the arbitrariness of nature.But one need not be at the mercy of these chance factors.A social system is not an immutable order beyond human control, but a pattern of human behavior.According to the view that justice is fairness, people agree to share fate.They have agreed with each other in devising institutions to take advantage of natural contingencies and social circumstances only when they serve the common good.These two principles are a rational way of dealing with the arbitrariness of fate; the institutions which realize them are just, though undoubtedly still imperfect in other respects.

Another point is that the difference principle embodies a concept of reciprocity.It is a principle of mutual benefit.We have seen that, at least as long as the chain is maintained, each representative person will admit that the basic structure is designed to promote his interests.The social order can be justified for everyone, especially for those least favored; and in this sense it is equal.However, it seems necessary to consider intuitively how to achieve this mutually beneficial condition.Let any two representative people be A and B, and let B be the one who benefits less.Indeed, since our primary concern is comparison with the least favored, let us assume that B is such a person.Now, since A's benefit is gained by improving B's prospects, B can recognize A's better situation.If A does not get his better position, then B may even be worse off than he is now.The problem is to point out that A has no reason to be dissatisfied.Perhaps, what he gets should be less than what he might get, because he gets more, which may result in some kind of loss for B.So, what can be said about those who have benefited more?In the first place, each individual's welfare is clearly determined by the arrangement of social cooperation without which no one can live a satisfactory life.Second, only if the terms of the arrangement are reasonable can we demand the voluntary cooperation of everyone.The difference principle thus appears to be a rational basis, and if some practicable arrangement is an indispensable condition for the realization of the good for all, then those who are better endowed, or People who are more fortunate in their environment can count on others to work hand in hand with them on this basis.

Those who are in a better position deserve greater benefits, regardless of whether it is in the interests of others.There is a natural tendency to disapprove of this statement.On this issue, it is necessary to clarify the concept of "desert".Whereas a just system of cooperation is a system of public rules and the expectations established by that system, those who have the potential to improve their situation and do what the system declares to reward are entitled to their benefits.This statement is absolutely correct.In this sense, the more fortunate are entitled to claim better status; their claims are legitimate expectations set by social institutions, and society has a duty to satisfy them.However, this notion of "desert" presupposes the existence of a cooperative arrangement; whether such an arrangement must first be designed in accordance with the difference principle or some other criterion is irrelevant to this question.

It might be thought, that those who are more endowed deserve those endowments, and the superior character which makes their development possible.Since he's more prominent at this point, he deserves the greater benefit that can be achieved on his own talent.However, this view is undoubtedly incorrect.No man's place in the distribution of endowments is his due, any more than his first beginnings in society are his due, and this seems to be a fixed point of our considered judgment, asserting that a man deserves The good character which enables him to strive to develop his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends largely on a happy family and social environment, for which he himself can never claim credit.The concept of desert does not seem to apply in these situations.Hence the more favorable representative can never say that he deserves, and thus has the right to participate in, some cooperative arrangement in which he can use his way of welfare to obtain benefits.His claim is groundless.From a common-sense perspective, therefore, the difference principle seems acceptable to both the more advantaged and the less advantaged.Strictly speaking, of course, this view is by no means an argument in favor of the difference principle, since in contract theory the argument is advanced from the point of view of the original position.But these intuitive considerations help clarify the nature of the principle and its implications as a principle of equality.

I pointed out earlier (section 13) that a society should try to avoid areas where the marginal contribution of the better off to the welfare of the less well off is negative.It should only work on the rising part of the contribution curve (and of course the maximum).One reason for this, as we now seem to see, is that in this part of the curve the criterion of mutual benefit is always fulfilled.Moreover, there is a natural notion that the unity of social interests has been achieved; and since only reciprocal interest is permitted, the interests of the representative persons are not obtained at the mutual detriment of each other.Of course, the shape and slope of the contribution curve is determined at least in part by the unpredictable circumstances of talent, in the face of which there can be no question of justice or injustice.But suppose we take the forty-five-degree line to represent the ideal of perfect unity of interests; it is along this contribution curve (here a straight line) that everyone gets the same benefits.Thus, insistence on the realization of these two principles of justice seems to tend to raise the curve, bringing it closer to the ideal of perfect unity of interests.Once society exceeds this maximum, it acts along the downward sloping part of the curve, so that the alignment of interests no longer exists.Those who benefit more benefit, those who are less fortunate suffer, and vice versa.This situation is similar to being at the efficiency bound.This situation is far from satisfactory when it comes to questions of justice of the basic structure.Therefore, in order to realize the ideal of unity of interests according to the conditions given to us by nature, in order to meet the standard of mutual benefit, we should continue to stay in the positive contribution zone.

Another advantage of the difference principle is that it provides an explanation for the principle of fraternity.Compared with liberty and equality, the concept of fraternity plays a secondary role in democratic theory.It is considered a less explicit political concept which does not prescribe any democratic rights per se but merely conveys certain mental attitudes and ways of behaving without which we might not see The value indicated by these rights.Or, closely related, fraternity is thought to embody a certain equality of social esteem, which is most manifest in public meetings of all kinds and where there is no habit of taming and submission.Fraternity no doubt implies what has been said above, as well as civic friendship and social solidarity, but if understood in this way, fraternity does not express any definite claim.We still need to find a principle of justice that works with this basic concept.However, the difference principle does seem to fit the natural meaning of fraternity, the idea that if one cannot benefit the less well-off, one does not wish for the greater good.According to the ideal family concept and the usual actual situation, the principle of maximizing the total amount of benefits cannot be used in the family.Family members generally do not want benefits unless their benefits advance the interests of the rest of the family.This is exactly what happens when things are done according to the difference principle.The better off would desire the greater advantage only under an arrangement which would promote the interest of the less fortunate.

The ideal of fraternity is sometimes thought to involve the connection of thoughts and feelings, and it is unrealistic to expect such a connection between members of society in a society with great differences.This is undoubtedly another reason why democratic theory has neglected the issue of fraternity.Many feel that fraternity has no proper place in political affairs.But fraternity is not an unworkable idea if it is seen as embodying the requirements of the difference principle.The institutions and policies that we are most confident of being just seem to meet the requirements of fraternity, at least in the sense that the inequality they permit positively affects the welfare of the less favored.In any case, I will present plausible arguments for this in Chapter 5.On this interpretation, therefore, the principle of fraternity is a perfectly practicable criterion.Once we accept this criterion, we can relate the traditional concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the democratic interpretation of the two principles of justice in the following way: liberty corresponds to the first principle, equality corresponds to the first the notion of equality and the fair notion of equal opportunity in this principle, while fraternity is in line with the difference principle.We thus find a place for the concept of fraternity in the democratic interpretation of the two principles, while we believe that it also makes a definite claim on the basic structure of society.Other aspects of fraternity should not be forgotten, but the difference principle shows its basic meaning in terms of social justice.

On these views it seems self-evident that a democratic interpretation of these two principles will not lead to a meritocracy.This form of social order follows the principle that careers are open to talent and uses equality of opportunity as a means of engaging people in the pursuit of economic prosperity and political dominance.There are marked differences between upper and lower classes, both in their means of living and in their rights and privileges to organized power.The culture of the poor is impoverished, while the culture of the ruling and technocratic classes is assured by their contribution to the goals of power and wealth of the state.Equality of opportunity is equal opportunity to leave the less fortunate in the pursuit of personal influence and social status.The danger of a capable society therefore lies not in the idea of ​​democracy but in different interpretations of the principles of justice.As we have just seen, the difference principle alters society's goals in fundamental ways.This result is especially evident once we note that we must, where necessary, take into account the essential good of self-respect, the fact that a well-ordered society is a social union within a social union (§ 79) .That is to say, an unmistakable sense of self-worth must be sought for the least benefited, thus limiting the degree of inequality permitted by hierarchical forms and justice.For example, the allocation of educational resources is not solely or necessarily based solely on the estimated benefits of these resources from productive trained skills, but also on the basis of the benefits of these resources in enriching citizens (here also including those who are less benefited). ) personal and social life.This latter consideration becomes more and more important as society progresses. This is probably sufficient to outline the conception of social justice expressed by these two principles as they apply to institutions.Before proceeding to discuss the principles as they apply to individuals, I should mention another question.Hitherto I have assumed that the distribution of natural assets is a natural fact, and that we have no need to change it, or even consider its intentions.But to some extent, this distribution must be affected by the social system.Caste systems, for example, tend to biologically divide societies into distinct peoples, while open societies genetically encourage the widest diversity.In addition, it is possible to adopt some more or less explicit policies from eugenics.I shall leave aside the issue of eugenics, confining myself always to the traditional concerns of social justice.We should point out, however, that it is generally not in the interest of the less fortunate to propose policies that diminish the talents of others.And if they accept the difference principle, they see greater talent as a social asset that can be used to promote the common good.But it is also in everyone's interest to have high natural assets.This will enable each to carry out a better plan of life.Thus, the parties in the original position wish to ensure that their descendants receive the best genetic talents (assuming their own talents are fixed).Promoting reasonable policies in this regard should be done by the previous generation for the next generation, and this is a problem that arises between generations.At all times, therefore, society should take steps in order to preserve at least the general level of natural talent and to prevent the proliferation of serious defects.The principles which should guide these measures should be those which the parties are likely to agree to for the sake of posterity.I mention this purely theoretical difficulty in order to point out once again the ways in which the difference principle has the potential to transform issues of social justice.We can imagine that if talents also have an upper limit, then in the long run, we can finally enter a society with the greatest equal freedom, a society where everyone has the greatest talents.But I do not intend to discuss this idea further. In the discussion so far I have examined principles that apply to institutions, or more precisely, to the basic structure of society.It is evident, however, that another class of principles must be chosen, since a comprehensive theory of right should also include principles applicable to individuals.In fact, as the accompanying drawings show, one also needs principles applicable to international law and, of course, priority rules for assigning priorities where principles conflict.Except for some incidental discussion (Section 58), I will not discuss principles that apply to international law; nor do I intend to conduct a systematic discussion of principles that apply to individuals.But there are some principles of this class that are an integral part of any theory of justice.This and the next section illustrate the implications of several of these principles, although the reasons for their selection are not studied until later (Sections 51-52). The drawings are purely diagrammatic.It does not mean that the principles associated with the concepts lower in the tree are derived from the concepts above.This diagram shows only those principles which must be chosen before there is a comprehensive conception of right.Roman numerals indicate the order in which principles were recognized in their original state.For example, there should be agreement first on principles that apply to the basic structure of society, then on principles that apply to individuals, and then on principles that apply to international law.The last choice is the priority rule, although we can temporarily choose these earlier accidental factors according to later revisions. The order in which the principles are chosen raises a series of problems which I shall leave aside.What is important is that the principles be adopted in a definite order, and this ordering has to do with the more difficult parts of the theory of justice.To illustrate: Although it is possible to choose many natural duties before choosing principles applicable to the basic structure without substantially changing these principles, the order of the two reflects after all that duties presuppose principles applicable to social formations of.Certain natural duties, such as the duty to maintain just institutions, also presuppose these principles.It seems, therefore, a simpler course to adopt first the principles which apply to the basic structure, and then all the principles which apply to individuals.The first choice of principles applicable to the system shows the social nature of the virtue of justice, that is, the close connection between justice and social practice that idealists often point out.The individual, Bradley says, is merely an abstraction.This statement of his can be interpreted without much change: a person's duties and responsibilities presuppose a morality about the system.The specification of the content of the justice system must therefore precede the specification of individual requirements.This means that, in most cases, the principles applicable to the basic structure should be decided before deciding on the principles applicable to obligations and responsibilities. Thus, in order to define a comprehensive conception of right, the parties in the original position have to choose not only a conception of justice in a definite order, but also principles that go along with each of the major concepts belonging to the category of the concept of right. .I assume that these concepts are relatively small in number and have a definite relationship to each other.Hence, in addition to principles applicable to institutions, there must be an agreement on principles applicable not only to the conduct of states but to individuals, such as the ideas of fairness and fidelity, mutual respect, and benevolence.Intuitively, this kind of thinking is: to say that something is just, that is to say, something conforms to the principles recognized and applicable to such things in the original state, these two concepts are the same thing, or in other words, the former even The latter can be used instead.I do not see this notion of right as providing an analysis of the meaning of the word 'right' commonly used in moral relations. It is not an analysis of the concept of right in the traditional sense, but that The wider notion of right as fairness should be substituted for the existing notion. Needless to say. The word "just" in common use (and other related words) is necessary to account for this ideal concept of right in contractarianism. The more complicated particulars of the term are equivalent in meaning. For our purposes, I agree that sound analysis is best understood as providing a satisfactory alternative, that is, one that avoids certain A vague and chaotic point of view that satisfies a certain urgent need. In other words, to explain is to exclude: we start with a certain concept, and it is a bit troublesome to explain this concept; is useful. Some account achieves these ends by other means with less difficulty. For example, if the theory of justice as fairness, or more generally, the theory of right as fairness, is consistent with our considered judgments of reflective equilibrium, if This theory enables us to say what we wish to say after due research, and it provides a way of rejecting customary statements in favor of others. So understood, one can regard justice as fairness and right as The two theories of fairness are seen as providing a definition or explanation for the concepts of justice and right. I now turn to principles that apply to individuals, the principles of fairness.By this principle I intend to account for all the claims of a sharp separation of duty from natural duty.This principle holds that a person must fulfill his responsibilities according to the rules of the system, but two conditions must be met: first, the system is just (or fair), that is to say, it realizes the two principles of justice; Second, people have voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement, or have voluntarily taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the arrangement in order to advance their own interests.The main idea here is that if several persons participate in a mutually beneficial cooperative enterprise according to the rules, and thereby limit their own liberty in the way necessary to produce the benefits of all, then those who submit to this limitation have right to similar acquiescence from those who benefit from their submission.If we do not do our part, we cannot benefit from the cooperative labor of others.The two principles of justice define what is a fair and equitable share for institutions that are fundamental structures.Therefore, if these arrangements are just, each gets his fair share when all (including himself) do their best. The requirements imposed by the principle of fairness, then, are, as the name implies, obligations.All obligations arise in this way.It is important to point out, however, that the principle of fairness has two parts, the first stating that institutions and practices must be just, and the second stating what voluntary actions are necessary.The first part sets out the conditions necessary for these voluntary actions to constitute obligations.According to the principle of fairness, it is impossible to owe a duty to an unjust system, or at least to a system which exceeds the limit of tolerable injustice (which has not been specified hitherto).In particular, it is impossible to be accountable to an autocratic system of government.Here, the necessary background for the creation of obligations by consensual or other actions, however manifested, is absent.Obligatory relations presuppose a just system or a system that is reasonably just from circumstances.It would therefore be wrong to argue against the theory of justice as fairness, and the theory of contracts in general, as having the effect of making citizens obligated to unjust regimes which coerce their consent, or obtain their acquiescence by more subtle means.Locke, in particular, has been the target of false criticism that ignores the necessity of certain background conditions. Duty has several features that distinguish it from other moral requirements.First, obligations arise as a result of our voluntary actions.These actions can be express or tacit assurances, such as promises and agreements, but it need not be so, any more than it is necessary to accept an advantage.In addition, the content of obligations is usually defined by institutions or practices whose rules specify what a person must do.Finally, the so-called obligations are usually imposed on specific persons, that is, those who cooperate together to maintain the above-mentioned arrangements.As an example of these characteristics, consider the political act of running for election and, if successful, holding office in a constitutional regime.This action creates an obligation to perform public duties, and these responsibilities determine the content of the obligation.Here, I do not see responsibility as moral responsibility, but as tasks and responsibilities assigned to certain positions.In this case, however, one would still have a moral reason (a reason based on moral principles) for fulfilling these duties, just as one would necessarily do so in accordance with the principle of fairness.A man who holds public office also has a duty to his fellow men, for he is ever seeking their trust and trust, and is cooperating with them in the administration of a democratic society.Likewise, we have obligations not only when we accept judicial, executive, or other powers, but also when we marry.We have obligations by commitment or tacit understanding, and we have obligations even when we play sports, the obligation to play according to the rules and to practice sportsmanship. I believe that the principle of fairness encompasses all of these obligations.However, two important situations remain somewhat problematic, namely, political obligations and obligations to keep promises that apply to citizens in general but not to those who hold public office.In the first case, it is not clear what the necessary binding action was, or who carried it out.I do not think that, strictly speaking, there is any political obligation to the average citizen.In the second case, it is necessary to explain how to use the practice of justice to generate fiduciary duties.in this regard.We need to examine the nature of the practice in question.I will discuss this issue elsewhere (sections 51-52). While all duties are accounted for by the principle of equity, there are many natural duties, positive and negative, to be discussed.It is not my intention to state these responsibilities in terms of a principle.Admittedly, such a non-uniform approach may be in danger of relying too much on precedence rules, but I will have to put that difficulty aside.The following are examples of natural duties: a duty to help another in his need, if by doing so he will not incur undue danger or loss to himself; a duty not to injure or injure another; and a duty not to cause unnecessary suffering.The first kind of natural duty, the duty to help each other, is a positive duty, a duty to do good to others; the latter two are negative duties, which require us not to do evil.Intuitively, the distinction between positive and negative responsibility is obvious in many cases, but it is also often difficult to tell.I am not going to point out this distinction in particular.The distinction is important only in connection with priority issues, since it seems plausible to say that negative responsibilities should outweigh positive responsibilities where the distinction is obvious.But I'm not going to discuss that here. What distinguishes natural duties, in contrast to obligations, is that they apply to us without regard to whether our actions are voluntary.Furthermore, they are not necessarily linked to institutional or social conventions; their content is generally not regulated by the rules of these arrangements.Thus we have a natural duty not to intentionally cause pain to others and a natural duty to help others, whether or not we have taken these actions.There is no reason to say that we have not made any promise not to cause pain or retaliate against others or to help others.Indeed, for example, the promise not to kill people is generally ridiculous and superfluous, and it is also wrong to stipulate moral requirements where there are no moral requirements.Perhaps in some circumstances that arise in a just war, a person has the right to kill for a special cause.Only in this case, too, would a promise not to kill, if any, be appropriate.Another feature of natural duties is that these duties are valid among persons regardless of their prescribed relations; they are recognized among all equal moral agents.In this sense, natural responsibility is not only shared by specific people, such as those who cooperate together in a particular social arrangement, but also by people in general.This feature in particular shows the aptness of the adjective "natural."It is an aim of international law to ensure the recognition of these responsibilities in the conduct of States.This is especially important when limiting the means used in warfare, since it assumes that, at least in some circumstances, a war of self-defense is justified (Section 58). From the point of view that justice is fairness, a basic natural duty is the duty of justice.This responsibility requires us to support and obey the institutions of justice that exist and apply to us.It also compels us to promote the institutions of justice that remain to be established, at least if they can do so without costing us too much.Thus, if the basic structure of society is just, or can be as justly expected to be under the circumstances, then each individual has a natural duty to make his contribution under the existing arrangements.Everyone is bound to these institutions independently of his voluntary actions, whether realized or unrealized.Thus, even though the principles of natural duty come from the contractarian view, they do not presuppose, in order to be applied, some express or tacit act of assent, and indeed do not presuppose any voluntary action. condition.These principles, which apply to individuals as to institutions, are principles which might have been recognized in the original position.These principles are considered the result of a hypothetical agreement.If the principles are presented to show that any binding action, consensual or not, is not a prerequisite for their application, then they apply unconditionally.The reason why duty should be determined by voluntary action is mentioned in the second part of the principle of equity which states this condition.It has nothing to do with the contractual nature of the idea that justice is fairness.In fact, once we have a full set of principles, that is, a comprehensive conception of right, we can completely forget about the idea of ​​the original position, and apply these principles as we apply any other principle. 正义即公平理论允许有无条件的原则，这并没有什么矛盾或甚至令人惊异之处。只要指出这样一点就够了：原始状态中的各方可能会赞同规定自然责任的原则，而这些原则一经提出，就是无条件适用的。我们应该指出的是，既然公平原则可以规定对现存正义安排的契约关系，那么这个原则所包含的义务就能维持一种已经存在的、来自正义的自然责任的关系。这样，一个人就可能既有自然责任，也有遵守体制和尽自己责任的义务。这里要注意的是，有几种办法可以把一个人与政治体制相联系。就大多数情况说，正义的自然责任是更基本的，因为它约束了一般公民，而且不必为了适用而要求任何自愿行动。另一方面，公平原则只约束担任公职的人，或者由于地位较好已在这个体系内推进了自己目标的人。因此，位高任重就有了另外的含义，即拥有较多特权的人获得了甚至更牢固地把自己束缚在某种正义安排上的义务。 关于其他类型的适用于个人的原则，我不打算多讲。虽然同意并不是一类不重要的行动，但我必须把讨论局限于社会正义理论。然而，可以看到，一旦选定了规定要求的所有原则，那么进而承认规定同意行动就不必要了。其所以如此，是因为同意是我们可以采取也可以不采取的行动。这种行动并不违反任何义务或自然责任。在研究同意行动时，人们希望挑出从道德观点看意义重大的同意行动，并说明它们同责任与义务的关系。从道德上说，许多这样的行动是无关紧要或微不足道的。但在同意行动中，有一类属于职责以外的有趣行动。这些行动就是宽仁、慈悲、英雄主义或自我牺牲。采取这种行动当然是好的，但这并不是一个人的责任或义务。职责之外的行动并不作为一种要求，虽然一般地说，如果不涉及行动者本身的损失或风险，这种行动也可能是一种要求。但一个人如果作了某种职责以外的行动，这也并不意味着可以免除他的自然责任。虽然我们有一种实现某个重大的善的自然责任，如果我们能够比较容易做到的话；但如果那样做需要我们付出相当大的代价，那么我们就被解除了这种责任。职责之外的行动提出了一些对伦理学理论来说头等重要的问题。例如，初看起来，古典的功利观就似乎不能说明这些问题。只要是能对别人带来更大的善的行动，只要这种行动所产生的总的利益超过了我们可以采取的其他行动所产生的总的利益，那么我们看来就得不计代价去完成这些行动。相当于在自然责任说明中的那种免除是根本不存在的。因此，正义即公平的理论把某些行动算作职责之外的行动，这些行动可能是功利原则所要求的。然而，我不打算进一步讨论这个问题。所以要在这里提到职责之外的行动，只是为了全面的缘故。现在，我们必须转向解释原始状态这个问题。