Chapter 6 Chapter 2 Principles of Justice-2

I would now like to comment on the second part of the second principle, which will henceforth be understood as the liberal principle of equal opportunity about fairness.This principle must therefore never be confused with the notion that careers are open to talents; nor should it be forgotten that, since it is connected with the difference principle, its consequences are quite different from the liberalism of these two principles. explanation of.In particular, I intend to show hereafter (section 17) that this principle cannot be objected to as producing a society governed by able men.Here, I would like to consider several other issues, especially the relationship between this principle and the concept of pure procedural justice.

First, though, I should point out that requiring open positions is not entirely, or even largely, for efficiency's sake.I don't think so.Positions must also be kept open where everyone in fact benefits from an arrangement.Although certain groups are excluded from certain positions, it may be possible to improve everyone's position by distributing certain powers and interests to these positions.While access to such positions is limited, they may still attract better talent and encourage better behaviour.However, the principles of open positions do not allow this.This principle holds that if certain positions are not open to all on a fair basis, then people who are excluded from those positions rightfully feel that they have been treated unjustly, even if they receive benefit from the greater efforts of those in these positions.Their dissatisfaction may be justified, not only because they are excluded from some of the perks of office, such as wealth and privilege, but also because they are unable to experience the joys of self-realization through the skillful and zealous performance of social obligations.They are deprived of a major human good.

I have already said that basic structure is the first subject of justice.This implies, as we have seen, first and foremost a question of distribution, of distributing basic rights and duties and of adjusting to social and economic inequalities and legitimate expectations based on those inequalities.Of course, any theory of ethics recognizes the importance of seeing basic structures as subjects of justice, but not all theories treat this importance equally.From the perspective of justice as fairness, society is interpreted as a cooperative enterprise of mutual benefit.This basic structure is a system of public rules that prescribes an arrangement of activities that causes people to act together to produce a greater distributed to everyone.What a person does depends on what the public rules think he has the right to do, and what a person has the right to do depends on what he does.People's commitment to act in accordance with these legitimate expectations determines what rights they have, and respect for these demands creates distribution.

These considerations suggest the idea of ​​treating the question of distributive shares as purely procedural justice.This intuitive thinking is to design a social system; no matter what kind of system this social system is, the result is justice, at least within a certain range.The concept of pure procedural justice can be fully understood only by comparing it with complete or incomplete procedural justice.To illustrate what pure procedural justice is, consider the simplest example of fair distribution.Several people are going to share a cake: assuming that a fair distribution is equal, what procedure, if any, will produce this result?Leaving technical details aside, the obvious solution is to have one person divide the cake, let the others take first, and get the last piece himself.He will divide this cake into equal parts, because only then can he guarantee himself the largest possible portion.This example illustrates two features of perfect procedural justice.First, there is an independent standard of what constitutes an equitable distribution, a standard that is established independently of and prior to the procedure to be followed.Second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to produce the desired result.Of course, some assumptions are also made here, for example, the person who is elected can divide the cake equally, he hopes to get a piece as big as he can get, and so on.But we can ignore these details.What is most important is that there be an independent standard for deciding which outcome is just and a procedure for ensuring that it will be produced.It is quite evident that, where there is a great deal of actual interest at stake, complete procedural justice is rare, if not impossible.

An example of incomplete procedural justice is criminal trials.The desired outcome in this regard is that a defendant can be found guilty only if he has committed the crime for which he is charged.Trial procedures are established to investigate and establish the facts of the crime in this regard.But it seems impossible to devise legal rules that will always produce the correct outcome.Trial theory studies which procedural and evidentiary rules, etc., are best considered to facilitate trials consistent with other legal goals.Different arrangements of hearing cases in different circumstances can be reasonably expected to produce the correct outcome, if not consistently, at least most of the time.So the trial is an example of incomplete procedural justice.Even a fair and proper conduct of the law, with due care and due diligence, can lead to erroneous results.An innocent person may be found guilty, and a guilty person may be acquitted.Situations of this kind are what we call misjudgments: situations of injustice that arise not through human fault, but through the coincidence of accidental circumstances that prevent the rule of law from achieving its purpose.The characteristic of incomplete procedural justice is that although there is an independent standard for the correct result, there is no practicable procedure that is sure to produce the correct result.

Conversely, if there is no independent standard for the correct outcome, but only a correct or fair procedure, so that the outcome it produces is also correct or fair, whatever the outcome Proper compliance, then pure procedural justice exists.This situation can be illustrated by gambling.If several persons take part in a series of fair bets, and the distribution of the hoard after the final betting round is fair, or at least not unfair, then I shall assume here that a fair bet is a A bet with zero expectations, the bet is voluntary, no one cheats in the bet, etc.The betting procedure is fair.It is freely enacted under fair conditions.This background situation thus dictates a fair procedure.Any distribution of the sum of the original stakes among the individual hands may result from a series of fair bets.In this sense, all these special allocations are equally fair.A distinguishing feature of purely procedural justice is that the procedures for determining just outcomes must actually be carried out; for in these cases there are no independent standards by which a definite just outcome can be identified.Obviously, we cannot say that a situation is just because it could have been reached by following some fair procedure.This statement is too arbitrary, and may lead to absurdly unjust results in the end.One can only say that almost any distribution of benefits is just, or fair, because it would have occurred as a result of fair gambling.What makes a gamble ultimately a fair or not an unfair outcome is the outcome of a series of fair gambles.A fair procedure turns its fairness into results only when it is actually enforced.

Therefore, in order to apply the concept of pure procedural justice to the allocation of shares, an institutional system of justice must be established and administered fairly.Only with the basic structure of justice as the background, including just political composition and just economic and social institutional arrangements, can one say that necessary justice procedures exist.In the second part of this book, I describe in some detail the basic structure that has these necessary features.I shall describe various institutions, and relate it to the two principles of justice.Intuitive concepts in this regard are well known.Assume that laws and governments act effectively to make markets competitive, resources to be fully utilized, and property and wealth (especially if private ownership of the means of production is allowed to exist) to be obtained in the form of appropriate taxes or whatever Wide distribution, and a reasonable minimum social difference is guaranteed.At the same time, it is assumed that there is a fair equality of opportunity guaranteed by education for all, and that all other equal liberties are also guaranteed.In this way, the resulting patterns of income distribution and expectations will help realize the difference principle.The interests of the better off improve the conditions of the least benefited in the complex of institutions that we consider to achieve social justice in the modern state.If this cannot be done, adjust the interest so that it does, for example, fix the smallest social difference at an appropriate level.The systems that currently exist are fraught with grave injustice.However, there will always be some way of making them consistent with their basic design and intent, so that the difference principle can be fulfilled in accordance with the requirements of liberty and fair equality of opportunity.It is this fact which underlies our beliefs that makes these arrangements just arrangements.

It is self-evident that the role of the principle of fair opportunity is to ensure that the cooperative system becomes a system of purely procedural justice.Unless this principle is realized, distributive justice cannot function, even to a limited extent.The great practical advantage of purely procedural justice is that it satisfies the requirements of justice.It is no longer necessary to keep an eye on a myriad of different situations and the ever-changing relative status of particular persons.If such details were relevant to the question, enormous complexity would arise, and in order to deal with them one avoids prescribing principles.It would be a mistake to focus on the changing relative positions of individuals and to require that each change (which is a separate matter taken in isolation) must be just in itself.What needs to be judged, and judged from a general point of view, is the arrangement of the basic structure.We have no reason to be dissatisfied with it unless we are prepared to criticize it from the point of view of a representative man in a particular position.To accept these two principles, therefore, is to enter into an agreement to dismiss much of the knowledge and many of the complications of everyday life as a matter that has nothing to do with social justice.

Therefore, according to pure procedural justice, the evaluation of the distribution of benefits is not based on comparing the existing total amount of benefits with the known desires and needs of known individuals.Commodities that have been produced are distributed according to a system of public rules.And this system determines what to produce, how much to produce and with what tools to produce it.It also determines legal claims, and respect for which produces distribution.Therefore, according to this kind of procedural justice, the correctness of the distribution is based on the justice of the cooperative arrangement that produces this distribution, and it is also based on answering the claims of the individuals participating in the cooperation.The evaluation of a certain distribution is inseparable from the rule system that produces the distribution, and it is also inseparable from the things that individuals do in good faith according to the established expectations.Asking abstractly whether one method of distributing what is known and available to particular individuals with known desires and preferences is better than another is simply unanswerable.This notion of principle does not see the basic question of distributive justice as a question of distributive justice.

Conversely, if a known set of goods is to be distributed among particular individuals with known wants and needs, then a distributive conception of justice seems to apply naturally.The good to be distributed is not produced by these individuals, nor are these individuals in any existing cooperative relationship.Since there are no prior claims to the things to be distributed, it is natural to distribute them according to wants and needs, or even to maximize the net balance of satisfaction.Unless equality is preferable, justice becomes an efficiency.This distributive view, after appropriate generalization, produces the classical utilitarian view.For as we have seen; this theory compares justice to the benevolence of the impartial spectator, and benevolence to the most efficient institutional design that raises the greatest margin of satisfaction.I said before that, according to this conception, society is regarded as a number of separate individuals, each defining a separate sphere, in which rights and duties and the few means of satisfaction are distributed according to rules, so that desires get full satisfaction.I will leave other aspects of this idea for consideration below.The point to be made here is that utilitarianism does not regard the basic structure as an arrangement of purely procedural justice.Utilitarians, at least in principle, have an independent criterion for evaluating all distributions, namely, whether they produce the maximum net balance that is satisfied.According to utilitarian theory, institutions are more or less incomplete arrangements for achieving this goal.Hence, in view of existing desires and inclinations, and the natural continuation into the future which they permit, the aim of the statesman is to propose those social arrangements which will come closest to the stated ends.Since these arrangements are subject to the inevitable constraints and encumbrances of everyday life, the basic structure is an example of incomplete procedural justice.

I will assume for the moment that the two parts of the second principle are arranged in lexical order.In this way, we have a sequence of words within another sequence of words.However, this arrangement can be modified if necessary in accordance with the general conception of justice.The beauty of this particular conception of justice is that it has a definite form and raises certain researchable questions, for example, under what circumstances can a sequence of words be chosen?Our research has a specific direction and is no longer limited to general principles.Of course, the idea of ​​a distribution share is obviously a very simplistic formulation.Its purpose is to clearly describe a basic structure that exploits purely procedural justice concepts.But even so, we should seek out some simple concepts that together produce a reasonable conception of justice.The concepts of basic structure, of the veil of ignorance, of the confluence sequence, of the most disadvantaged position, and of purely procedural justice are examples of this.None of these concepts can be counted on to work by themselves, but when put together properly they can be quite useful.It would be going too far to assume that there is a rational solution to all or even most moral problems.Perhaps only a few questions can be satisfactorily answered.In short, social wisdom consists in the establishment of institutions which do not often present insurmountable difficulties, in the recognition of the need for clear and simple principles. So briefly about the two principles of justice and the procedural views they express.In later chapters I will introduce further details by illustrating an institutional arrangement for realizing this idea.However, there are still several preparatory next-section discussions, and it is clear that utilitarianism assumes some fairly accurate measure of these expectations.Not only must there be a baseline measure for every representative person, but these must also be reasonable for interpersonal comparisons.If we want to say that some people gain more than others lose, then I have to assume that there are ways of relating different human scales to each other.It is unreasonable to demand great accuracy, but estimates in this respect must not be left to our uninstructed intuitions.Judgments made on questions of large differences of interest are likely to bring different claims into conflict.Moreover, these judgments may be based on ethical and other ideas, not to mention prejudice and self-interest, which raises questions about their validity.Just because we actually make what we call interpersonal welfare comparisons doesn't mean we understand the basis for those comparisons, or that we should admit they are reasonable.To solve these problems, we must account for these judgments in order to propose the criteria on which they are based (section 49).As for social justice issues, we should try to find some objective basis for making these comparisons, one that people can recognize and agree to.From a utilitarian point of view there appears to be no satisfactory solution to these difficulties.Thus, at least for the time being, the principle of utility seems to make too many demands on our ability to assess the question of the balance of interests so that at best it provides for the establishment of an ambiguous appellate court to resolve questions of justice. Nor, however, do I believe that a satisfactory solution to these problems is impossible.Although these difficulties are real, and the difference principle is proposed to prevent them, I do not want to emphasize the relative merits of this principle.First, the skeptical attitude towards interpersonal comparisons is often based on dubious views, for example: the degree of happiness or liking as an indicator of happiness is a degree of pure feeling; although the subject of feeling can experience and understand the degree of feeling degree, but it is impossible for others to understand it, and it is also impossible to infer it reasonably and with certainty.Both arguments appear to be false.In fact, unless it can be shown why judgments of happiness raise particular intractable problems, the second argument above can only be part of a skepticism that other people have minds.I don't think the real difficulty with utilitarianism lies here.The main problem is that, even if interpersonal comparisons can be made about gratification issues, these comparisons must reflect values ​​that can reasonably be sought.It is unreasonable to promote one objective over another simply because the former can be more accurately evaluated.Debates about interpersonal comparisons often obscure the substance of the issue.i.e. whether to maximize total (or average) happiness in the first place. The difference principle can resolve some of these difficulties in interpersonal comparisons.This manifests itself in two ways.In the first place, so long as we can identify the most disadvantaged representative persons, all that remains to be done thereafter is a judgment on the order of welfare.We know by what status social institutions are to be judged.It does not matter how much worse off the situation of this apparent individual is than that of other people.If status can be classified as better or worse.Then the lowest position can also be found.Basic measures cause no further difficulties, since no other interpersonal comparisons are necessary.Of course; in giving due weight to the least favored representative, we need not use anything other than a judgment of order.If we can determine whether a change in the basic structure has made him better or worse off, then we can determine what his best position is.We need not know to what extent he prefers one position to another.Thus, the difference principle requires us to make less judgments about welfare.By no means do we need to calculate the total amount of interest involving the base measure.Although interpersonal qualitative comparisons are required to determine the lowest status, for the rest of the status, it is sufficient to make an ordinal judgment on a representative person. The difference principle avoids some difficulties by taking a simplistic approach as the basis for interpersonal comparisons.These comparisons are made in terms of expectations of basic social goods.In fact, I formulate these expectations simply as indices of these goods that a representative person can expect to receive.If someone in a certain position has a high index, it means that this person's expectations are greater than those of another person.I have already said that the so-called primary social goods are those things that a rational person would presumably want if he wanted anything else.Whatever may be the details of a man's rational project, there are presumably all sorts of things which he would like more or less of.With more of this good, people are generally guaranteed greater success in carrying out their own intentions and promoting their own goals, whatever those goals may be.Broadly speaking, the primary goods of society are rights and liberties, opportunity and power, income and wealth (a very important primary good is a person's sense of self-worth; section discussion).Generally speaking, it seems obvious that these things fit the description of primary goods.They are social goods because of their relation to the basic structure; liberty and power are regulated by the rules of the main institutions, and the distribution of income and wealth is governed by these rules. The theory of the good, which is used to account for the primary goods, is presented more fully in Chapter 7.This is a familiar theory dating back to the time of Aristotle, and similar theories were embraced by philosophers as diverse as Kant and Sidgwick in other respects. .Contractualism and utilitarianism have no dispute over this theory.The main idea of ​​this theory is that a person's goodness depends on his most reasonable long-term life plan under a fairly favorable environment.A man is happy if he succeeds more or less in carrying out this plan.Simply put, the so-called good is the satisfaction of reasonable desires.We may therefore assume that each individual has a rational plan of life for the conditions he faces.The purpose of this plan is to make his interests properly satisfied.It arranges activities so that desires may be fulfilled without interference.This plan has been produced to the exclusion of other plans which are either less likely to succeed, or which do not bring the purpose to such a full realization.A rational plan is a perfect plan, compared with all possible alternatives; all things considered, there is no better plan. Suppose now that, although the ultimate ends of men's rational plans do vary, they all require some primary good, natural or social, in their execution.Individuals differ in their plans according to their abilities, circumstances, and needs; and rational plans are adjusted to these contingencies.But whatever the goals of one's system, primary goods are always the necessary means to achieve them.For example, greater intellect, greater wealth, and opportunity enable a person to achieve goals that he would not have even dreamed of otherwise.The expectations of a representative person are thus regulated in terms of indices of the social primary good available to him.Although people in the initial state do not know their own conceptions of the good, they do know, presumably, that they want more of the basic good of society.Rather than want less.And this knowledge is sufficient to enable them to know how to promote their interests in the initial position. Let's consider a few difficult questions.One problem is clearly that of interpretation of the index itself.How should we measure the different basic social goods?The problem is greatly simplified by assuming that the two principles of justice are arranged in sequence.Fundamental liberties are always equal, and fair equality of opportunity exists; people need not balance these liberties and rights against other values.The basic social goods that change in distribution are power and privilege, income and wealth.But, because of the nature of the difference principle, these difficulties are not as great as they appear at first glance, and the only index problems that concern us are those that concern the most disadvantaged groups.To improve this index, adjustments are made for the primary goods enjoyed by other representative individuals, subject to usual limitations of course.So long as we are sure that they are in a better position, there is no need to lay down the emphasis on that position.But this is usually easy to do, since they tend to have more of each primary good, and greater power and wealth tend to go hand in hand.It is enough if we know how the distribution of the good to the more advantaged affects the expectations of the least advantaged.So the problem of exponents basically becomes a problem of adding primary goods to the most disadvantaged, the least powerful, and the least paid, since the two problems are also often interrelated.We do this by taking the point of view of a representative individual of the group and asking him which combination of social primary goods is reasonable to choose.In doing so, we undeniably rely on our intuitive abilities.But this cannot be completely avoided.The purpose of doing so is to replace moral judgments with those of reasonable prudence, and to make the scope of recourse to intuition more limited and more clearly focused. Another difficulty is this: one might object that expectations should in no case be defined as indices of primary goods, but as satisfactions to be expected in carrying out plans with these goods.People are happy, after all, by the realization of these plans, and therefore expectations should not be estimated on the basis of available means.Justice as fairness theory, however, takes a different view.This view is not about measuring, much less maximizing, the satisfaction people get by looking back at how they used the rights and opportunities available to them.Nor does it attempt to evaluate the relative merits of different conceptions of the good.Instead, members of society are conceived of as rational beings who can adapt their conceptions of the good to their position.Once the value of different people's ideas of the good is assumed to be consistent with the principles of justice, there is no need to compare the value of these ideas.Everyone's equal liberty is guaranteed, and he can carry out any life plan he wants as long as it does not violate the requirements of justice.The principle of people's sharing of social basic goods is: if some people's basic goods are obtained by improving the status of those who have less basic goods, then they can possess more basic goods.Once the whole arrangement is established and functioning, it is no longer a question of how much the total amount of satisfaction is, or whether it is complete.The thing itself proceeds according to the principles of possible choices in the original position.According to this conception of social justice, therefore, expectation is defined as an index of primary goods that a representative person can reasonably count on.A person's prospects are improved if he can expect to receive a set of priority primary goods. It is worth pointing out that this interpretation of expectations actually represents a kind of consensus that compares people's status only with reference to what more people are supposed to want.This appears to be the most practicable way of establishing a recognized objective standard, a common standard acceptable to reasonable people.If there can be no similar agreement on how to value happiness in terms of what people achieve in carrying out their rational plans for life, there can be still less agreement on the intrinsic value of these plans. up.Here, taking basic goods as the basis of expectations is another simple and easy way.I would like to say by the way that this simple approach, as well as some others, is accompanied by some kind of philosophical explanation, although it is not strictly necessary.Of course, it is not enough for theoretical assumptions to be simple and intelligible; they must point to some fundamental factor that accounts for the facts we wish to know.Likewise, the various components of a theory of justice must embody the basic moral characteristics of social structures, if some moral characteristics seem to be left aside.Then we'd better believe that's not the case.I will try to follow this one rule.But even so, a theory of justice is correct not only in the apparent acceptability of its premises, but also in its consequences.In fact, the two cannot be effectively separated, so that the discussion of institutional issues, especially in the second part of this book, although it may seem at first glance to be less philosophical, is in fact unavoidable. . In applying the two principles of justice to the basic structure of society, one has to consider how certain representative individuals are looked after by the social system in terms of their position.For example, the difference principle states that the higher expectations of the more advantaged should help the prospects of the least advantaged.Or, as I sometimes put it less rigorously, social and economic inequalities must serve the interests of representatives of the various relevant positions.The point of view of those in these positions defines a fairly general point of view.Of course, not all social status is relevant.For there are not only farmers, but also dairy farmers, farmers who grow wheat, farmers who work large tracts of land, and countless professions and groups, and so on.If we had to take into account so many positions, we could not have a logical and handy theory.It is impossible to evaluate so many competing demands.We must therefore recognize certain positions as more fundamental than all others, as positions which provide a suitable perspective for evaluating social institutions.The choice of these positions thus becomes part of a theory of justice.But by what principles should these statuses be determined? To answer this question we must remember the basic problem of justice and the way in which the two principles of justice deal with it.I have emphasized that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society.So put it this way.It is because of the far-reaching influence of the basic structure of society.Omnipresent, yet innate.This structure favors certain starting points over others in distributing the benefits of social cooperation.It is these inequalities that the two principles of justice seek to limit.Once these two principles are realized, other inequalities that arise when people take voluntary actions based on the principle of freedom of association are allowed.The so-called relevant social status is thus, so to speak, the starting point, properly generalized and synthesized.These positions have been chosen to illustrate the general view, the idea that following these two principles minimizes the randomness of natural accidents and social fortunes. I assume, therefore, that in most cases each person occupies two related positions: that of an equal citizen and that dictated by his proper place in the distribution of income and wealth.The relevant representative persons are thus representative citizens and persons representing different levels of welfare.Since I am assuming that other positions are generally entered voluntarily, we need not take into account the views of those in these positions in our judgments about the basic structure.In fact, we should adjust the whole arrangement to suit the choices of those at the so-called starting point.In judging social institutions, we must set aside our more specific interests and our groups, and see our position in terms of these representative people. That is to say, basic structures should be evaluated as far as possible in terms of the status of equal citizens.This status is defined by rights and liberties which in turn are required by the principle of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity: if these two principles are fulfilled, all men are equal Citizenship, so everyone has this status.In this sense, equal citizenship prescribes a universal view.It is from this point of view that the issue of adjudication of fundamental liberties is resolved.I will discuss these issues in Chapter Four.But it should be noted here that many social policy issues can also be considered from this position.There are also issues for which the effects of distribution are unimportant or irrelevant, though everyone's interest is at stake.The principle of common interest can be applied in these cases.In accordance with this principle, institutions are to be judged by the degree to which they effectively secure to all the necessary conditions to further their ends equally.Or the extent to which it effectively promotes common goals that will benefit everyone equally.例如，维护公共秩序和治安保卫的合理规章，或维护公共卫生和安全的有效指施，就促进了这个意义上的共同利益。在正义战争中保卫国防的集体努力也同样如此。可以这样认为，维护公共卫生和安全以及在正义战争中取得胜利，也具有分配效果：富人比穷人受益多，因为富人要失去的多。但是，如果社会和经济的不平等是正义的，那么可以不管这些效果，而应用共同利益的原则。平等公民的观点是一种适合的观点。 为了判断社会和经济的不平等而对有代表性的人所作的规定，是不大令人满意的。首先，我把这些个人看作是由收入和财富水平规定的，因此，为了回避指数问题，我假定这些社会基本善同权力和权威这些社会基本善有着充分的联系。总的来看。这个假定对于我们的论题是相当可靠的。还有一个问题是要挑出多少个这种有代表性的人，不过这个问题无关紧要，因为差别原则只挑选一个代表来扮演一个特定的角色。严重的困难是怎样来界定最不幸集团。 这里，想要避免某种随意性似乎是不可能的。有一种可能的做法就是选择一个特定的社会地位，例如不熟练工人的地位，然后把这个集团中所有的具有平均的或更少的收入和财富的人算作地位最不利的人。地位最低的有代表性的人的期望被规定为整个这一类人的平均期望。另一种可供选择的办法是，只根据相对的收入和财产来作出规定，而不管社会地位如何。例如，所有收入和财富不到平均数一半的人，都可以被看作是地位最不利的那一部分人。这种规定仅仅取决于较低的那一半分配，并且具有把注意力集中于受惠最少者和一般公民的社会差距的优点。毫无疑问，这种差距是受惠较少的社会成员的地位的一个基本特征。我假定，这两种规定中的任何一种，或这两种规定的某种结合，都相当有用。 在任何情况下，我们都要把境况最差的人的期望或多或少地总合起来看，在这个计算基础上选定的数字在一定程度上都是有针对性的。然而，我们在提出差别原则时，可以在某个方面以一些实际考虑为理由。哲学论据或其他论据迟早都会用尽，而无法作出比较细微的区别。因此，我假定，原始状态中的人认为差别原则就是按照其中的一种方式来规定的。他们从一开始就把这个原则看作是一种有限的总合原则，并在和其他标准比较时来对它进行估价。这不是说好像他们都一致同意把地位最不利的人严格地看作就是境况最差的个人，从而为了使这个标准能起作用而在实际上采用某种平均化的办法。相反，正是这种适用标准本身应该从原始状态的角度来予以评价。关于受惠最少者的更确切的规定，最终可能证明是不必要的。 因此，正义即公平这个观点尽量地按照平等公民的地位和收入及财富的各种水平来评价社会制度。然而，有时候其他一些地位可能也需要考虑。例如，如果存在着以固定的自然特点为基础的不平等的基本权利，那么这些不平等就要挑出一些相关的地位。由于这些特点是不可改变的，它们所规定的地位就可以当作基本结构中的出发点。性别的差异就具有这类特点，种族和文化的差异也具有这类特点。因此，如果人们在基本权利的分配中得到偏爱，那么只有在这种不平等对妇女有利并且从妇女的观点看是可以接受的情况下，差别原则（按一般解释）才能证明这种不平等是正当的。类似情况也可以用来为种姓制度或种族不平等辩护（第39节）。这种不平等大大增加了相关的地位。并使这两个原则的应用变得复杂起来。另一方面，这些不平等即使能对受惠较少者有利，那也是难得如此，因此，在一个正义的社会里，数目较少的相关地位一般来说应该足够了。 至关重要的是，从相关地位的角度作出的判断，拒绝考虑我们在比较特殊的情况下容易提出的要求。如果我们按照我们的比较明确的地位来为自己考虑，那就不是每个人始终都能从这两个原则的规定中得到好处。除非相关地位的观点具有优先性，否则仍然会存在对立要求的混乱情况。因此，这两个原则事实上就是表明了一种默契，要把我们的利益加以安排，而对其中的某些利益予以特别的重视。例如，从事某种行业的人常常发现，自由贸易违反他们的利益。如果没有关税和其他限制，这个行业也许不能始终保持繁荣。但是，如果从平等公民的观点或地位最不利的人的观点看，自由贸易是可取的，那么即使某些更具体的利益要受到损失，这种贸易仍然是正当的。我们应在事先就同意正义的原则，并同意始终按照某些地位的观点应用这些原则。如果对有代表性的人的地位规定得比较狭窄，那就无法保证使每个人在每个阶段的利益都得到保护。我们承认了某些原则和应用这些原则的某种方式，就必然要承认这些结果。当然，这不是说可以对自由贸易的严酷性放任不管。但是，应该从一种合适的普遍角度来考虑减少自由贸易严酷性的安排。 因此，相关的社会地位规定了普遍的观点，按照这种观点，正义的两个原则被应用于基本结构。这样，每个人的利益都得到了考虑，因为每个人都是平等公民，无论是在收入和财富的分配中，或是在差异赖以存在的固定不变的自然特点的范围内；每个人都有其应有的位置。对于某种合乎逻辑的社会正义理论来说，选定相关的地位是必要的，但被选定的地位应该符合社会正义理论的基本原则。选定了所谓出发点，人们就是贯彻了减少自然偶发事件和社会环境的后果这种思想。除了能增进别人的福利的方法外，任何人都不会从这些意外事件中得利。