Chapter 23 The Fifth Group of Objections to the Six Meditations ① III

On Truth and Error 1. At the beginning of this meditation you briefly stated everything that you thought to be sufficiently demonstrated before, and you thought that by this means you opened the way to a further advance in our knowledge.As for me, in order not to delay such a fine plan, I am not going to insist that you should argue those things more clearly; as long as you remember what you agreed to and what you did not agree, it will That's enough, I'm afraid that you will take it as a settled theory in the future. After this you go on to reason: God could never have deceived you; and in order to excuse the fallible faculties you have acquired from him, you attribute the error to nothing.You say that the idea of ​​nothing comes to your mind from time to time, and you share nothing in a certain way; therefore you think you are between God and nothing.This reasoning is of course very beautiful; but, I will not say that it cannot be used to explain what the idea of ​​nothing is, or how we grasp it, nor can it be used to understand what we share in nothing, and many, many things. Something else; and I merely mention that making such a distinction does not mean that God can provide man with a function of judgment that is immune to error.For though that faculty is not infinite, it prevents us from agreeing to mistakes; therefore, what we know we know very clearly and clearly; to judge whether it is possible.

You say against yourself: If you can't understand why God did what he did, it shouldn't be surprising.This is very well said; but it is surprising that you have a real idea in your mind of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good God, and you see in his writings some Not quite done.Thus, since he could have done it more perfectly and did not, it seems to indicate that he lacks either knowledge, ability, or will; that he is not perfect at least in this point, and that He would rather be incomplete than perfect, and would be able to, if he knew how, if he would not be. As for your statement that all causes of this kind, which men are accustomed to derive from ends, cannot be applied to bodily things, you might be right in saying otherwise; but when it comes to God , I am afraid that you have refuted the main argument, which shows that God's wisdom, his power, his vision, and even his existence can be proved by natural reason.

① "Providence" refers to a pre-deliberate arrangement of God, which is equivalent to the "God's will" in the old Chinese idiom "God's will is so". For, leaving aside the convincing evidence that can be derived from observations of the universe, the heavens, and other major parts of the Observations on the good order, utility, and economy of the parts in every kind of creature (whether plants, animals, men, or that part of yourself bearing the image and attributes of God, or even your body) Yes, so where did it come from?In fact, we have seen many great people who not only improved their knowledge of God from the observation of human anatomy, but also praised God with five bodies, because they were in the perfection and arrangement of God's every part of the human body. Saw such a wonderful wisdom, such a great vision.

① "Saving" refers to the ingenuity of Tiangong, see the next paragraph for details. You may say that it is the physical causes of such forms and situations that should be our object of study, and that those who attend to ends rather than motive forces or matter are absurd.But until now no one has been able to understand (let alone explain) how the eleven small skins ① which control the opening and closing of the four openings in the two atriums like the eleven small doors are made; who gave the arrangement; What are their properties, where do their raw materials come from; how their kinetic energy is used to move, what organs and tools are used, and how to use them, what must be there to give them the restraint they have Forces, making them consistent, interconnected, elastic, and of the right size, shape, and position, as we see them.I said that until now no biologist has been able to understand and explain these things, and many others, we, why can't we at least appreciate this wonderful function, the fitting of these little doors at the entrance of the atrium. to praise the indescribable vision of God?For those who therefore think that a first cause must be admitted, which not only these things, but all the more amazing things in the universe that we see, are so wisely arranged to fit them. Why should we not praise such a person?

①The valve. You say that you feel that you cannot venture too boldly to seek and intend to discover the unfathomable purposes of God.You may be right if you mean those purposes which God hides or which He forbids us to seek; The reasons upon which praise is given to their author, God. You may say that the idea of ​​God in each of us is enough for us to have a real and comprehensive understanding of God and His vision without having to search for what purpose God created all things for, without bothering to understand Think about something else.But not all of us are born so lucky, as you are, with this conception of God so full and so clear that it is all too obvious to him.That is why there can be no dislike for those who have not been endowed with such a great light by God, and who can only recognize and praise the author by observing the work.Except that this does not prevent people from using the idea, and even its completion seems to depend so much on the observation of things in the world that, if you will tell the truth, surely Yes, a large part, if not all, of what you know about God comes from this observation.For, I ask you, if from the time you were infiltrated into your body you kept your eyes closed, your ears plugged, and you made no use of any other external senses, and were therefore ignorant of everything and everything outside of you. Ignorance, you spend your life like this, just meditating within yourself, just thinking about your own thinking within yourself, if this is the case, where do you think your knowledge will go?I beg you to tell us, but tell us the truth, and give us an unadorned description of what you think you have of God and of yourself.

2. You later came up with a solution to this: don't see the creation that appears to be incomplete as an isolated whole, but see it as a part of the universe, so that it is complete.This approach is indeed admirable; the problem here, however, is not the incompleteness of the part (a real part, or a part compared with the whole), but the fact that the being is a whole in itself and plays a special, special role. even if you relate it to the whole, the problem remains in knowing whether the universe as a whole is really any better than it is now (many of its parts are incomplete) if all its parts are perfect. ) is more complete.For it may equally be said that a state is more perfect if all its citizens are good, than if some of its citizens are bad in their habits.

Therefore, when you say a little later that some parts of the universe are in some sense inescapably wrong and would have greater perfection than all parts are wrong, this is the same as saying: In a certain sense, It is more complete that a few citizens of the country are bad than that all the citizens are good.From this it follows that, just as a good prince desires only his subjects to be good, so it should be the intention and dignity of the Author of the universe to make all its parts infallible. Though you may say that those parts which are free from error seem more perfect than those which are faulty, yet this happens by chance; and likewise, if the virtue of a good man is somehow shown in contrast with a bad man, It also appears so much by accident.As bad people are not desired in a country to make good people look better, so it seems inappropriate in the universe to make some parts have mistakes to make the parts without mistakes more glorious.

You say that if God, when he cast you into the world, did not intend to place you among the noblest and most perfect of creatures, you have no right to complain. But that doesn't solve the problem, is it not enough that he placed you among the most imperfect creations, and not among the fallible and deceived ones?For likewise, although a prince does not raise all his subjects to the most honorable titles, but places some of them in lower ranks, and others in still lower ranks, to such A prince of the same people may not scold him; but if he not only puts some in the worst and lowest positions, but makes others perform despicable acts, then he is the most culpable, and must not People scolded.

You say: There is really no reason why God should have given you a greater faculty of consciousness than the one he already gave you; I think he should have put all the perfection that he can put in several works into each work.But that doesn't answer my question in the slightest, and you see, the problem is not to know why God didn't give you a greater cognitive faculty, but to know why He gave you a cognitive faculty that is prone to error; The question is not why a perfectly perfect craftsman is unwilling to put the whole perfection of his art in each of his works, but why he even puts some defects in some of them.

You say: Although you still cannot save yourself from error by a clear and distinct perception of everything that can fall into your thinking, you are able to save you from error in another way. Because of mistakes, that is to make up your mind not to make judgments before the truth of the matter is clarified. But when you are always very careful to observe this principle, is it not after all an incompleteness to have a dim view of what we are about to judge, and a constant danger of being mistaken? You say: The error is in the use, which is from you, and is a defect, not in the function you received from God, nor in the use from God.I would like to see that there is no error in that function which is taken to be directly from God; but if we look at that function a little further and see that it was created at the same time as the imperfection capable of error, then there is still something in it. mistake.Therefore, you say very well: you have no reason to blame God, who in fact never owes you anything; but you have reason to thank him for all the riches he has distributed to you.But there is always something surprising, namely: if he knew, if he could, if he didn't envy you for it, why he didn't give you more perfect wealth.

You go on: Nor should you blame God for encouraging you to perform this act of will, that is to say, those judgments which you have mistaken, since they depend on God and are therefore entirely true and absolutely good. ; in a sense there is more perfection in your nature that you can do these actions than that you cannot do them.As for the defect (the formal reason of error and crime lies in the defect), it needs no help from God, because it is not a thing or a being, and because if it is connected to God, God is it , then it cannot be called a defect, but a negation, in the sense given to the words defect and negation in the Academy.However, while this definition is rather nuanced, it is not entirely satisfactory.For though God does not encourage the defect in the action (which is what is called error or falsehood), he does; and if he did not encourage it, there would be no defect.Moreover, he himself is the author of the power to err or to err, and is therefore a power without power; and therefore it seems that the defect in the act should not be so much attached to the power, which itself is impotent. , but should involve its author, who, having been able to make it capable, and even more capable than necessary, wishes to make it as it is.It is true that a locksmith is not blamed for not making a big key to open a small box, but he is blamed for making a small key, but making the key so unsuitable that it cannot be opened. It may be difficult to open this small box.In the same way, it is not really the fault of God, if he would have given such a cowardly creature as man a faculty of judgment, and he did not give him a faculty of judgment large enough to understand all, or most things, It is not his fault that he cannot understand, or comprehend, the most sublime things; and the question, no doubt, is that it is amazing why, of the few things he wants to leave to judgment, so little is given to him. Human ability not to feel helpless, indecisive and powerless. 3. After that, you are looking for where your mistakes come from, and what their reasons might be.I will not argue with you why you call the intellect the only function of knowing ideas, that is, its ability to simply understand things without adding or denying them, and why you call the will or free will the "judging function", that is, Say, let it affirm or deny, approve or disapprove.I only ask you why you confine your intellect to certain limits, while leaving no limit to the will or to liberty to arbitrarily decide.For, in truth, the extent of the two functions seems to be equal, or at least the intellect seems to have as great an extent as the will; for the will tends to nothing unless the intellect has not foreseen it beforehand. ①The word Librearbitre is generally translated as "free will" in English according to freewill in our country.According to the context, it seems that this can also be translated as "free decision" according to the original meaning of the word in French. I say that the intellect has at least as great a scope, because its scope seems to be greater than that of the will.Not only because our will or free judgment has no tendency, we cannot judge anything, if we have not grasped it beforehand, if its ideas have not been grasped and brought forward by reason, and we cannot judge anything. There is no choice, no love or hate for anything; also because we dimly perceive a great many things, about which we have no judgment, no disdain or desire. emotion.Even the faculty of judging is sometimes so indeterminate that the reasons by which it is judged are of equal weight in both respects, or there is no reason in both respects, and therefore there is no judgment, though the intellect perceives and experiences these things, which are therefore Just still not sure. Also, you said: Among all the other things in your heart, you don’t know any one that is so complete and vast, although it can be bigger and more complete. For example, the function of knowing, for this kind of function, you can even make an infinite concept.This clearly shows that the realm of the intellect is no less than that of the will, since it can be extended to an infinite number of objects.As for your confession that your will and God's will are equal, not in a sphere but in form, I ask you, if you define the formal concept of the intellect as well as the formal concept of the will If so, why shouldn't you say the same to the intellect? But, to end our argument in one sentence, please tell me what the will can achieve but the intellect cannot.If not, then it seems that the error, as you say, is not due to the fact that the field of the will is greater than that of the intellect, and that it judges things which the intellect does not apprehend, but that the two faculties have an equally large spheres of things in which the intellect comprehends badly, and the will also makes a bad judgment about those things.Since the will does not judge what the intellect does not apprehend, and what the will judges incorrectly is precisely because the intellect does not apprehend, that is why I do not see that you must extend the will beyond the limits of the intellect. reason. With regard to your inferences about the existence of various things, you give examples to prove your opinion.This example is, in truth, very good when it comes to judgments of your being; but it seems bad when it comes to other things; for, whatever you say, or even say, whatever you make up What, it is absolutely true: you neither doubt nor cannot be sure that there is something else other than yourself, and that it is different from you, because you have grasped very clearly that you are not alone in the world .You assume that you have no reason to believe the one and not the other.No, you can assume this; but you should also assume that this does not mean that there can be any judgment from this. It should be assumed that the will always stays in the situation of "indifferent", and can never make any judgments until the reason Until one side is found to be more true than the other. And you go on to say: This indifference goes all the way up to things quite clear and obvious, beyond the intellect's apprehension, so that however great the probability of those guesses which you are fit to judge of something, all your The mere realization that these are mere guesses is enough to give you the opportunity to judge otherwise.I think this is wrong.For your knowledge that these are mere conjectures may well lead your mind to conjectures, and your judgments will be shaky and insecure, but it will never enable you to judge things justly. On the contrary, unless afterwards your mind conjectures not only as probable, but stronger and more manifest.You go on to say that you have had experience with this these days, that you have assumed as false everything that you used to take to be quite true.But you must remember that your statement has not been approved by everyone; For, truth be told, you have not been able to convince yourself that you have never seen the sun, nor the earth, nor man, nor heard a sound, nor walked, nor eaten, nor written Words, no words, no other similar actions performed with the body. From this it follows that the form of error does not lie, as you think, in a bad exercise of free will, but in too little relation between the judgment and the thing judged, as the intellect perceives is different from the thing itself.That is why errors do not come from the side of free will, because it judges badly, but from the side of reason, because it understands badly.It may therefore be said that free will is such a dependence on the intellect that if the intellect understands or thinks that something is clearly understood, free will will make a firm and definite judgment, whether it is actually a judgment or not. It may be true, or it may be held to be true; but if it perceives things in a vague way, free will will judge hesitantly and uncertainly, but with the belief that it may be right , and will not be wrong, even though the judgment may or may not agree with the facts.It follows, therefore, that the question is not so much whether we are able to prevent ourselves from being wrong, but rather whether we are able to prevent ourselves from persisting in error; free will, but that we must apply our minds to a clearer perception, and with a clearer perception must follow a better and more reliable judgment. 4. In the conclusion you exaggerate what you can derive from this one meditation, and at the same time you prescribe the manner in which you can know the truth, saying that if you add enough to everything that you comprehend very fully Note, if you separate them from what you have dimly grasped, you will be sure to know the truth.This is not only true, but also the fact that the whole of the previous meditation (which would be understandable without it) seems useless and superfluous.Note, however, that in order not to be mistaken, it is not a matter of knowing whether or not things should be seen clearly and distinctly, but of knowing how, and by what means, to recognize that we have an intelligence so clear and distinct that We can be sure it's true, making it impossible for us to be mistaken.For you will notice that we objected to you from the very beginning that even when we feel that we know something so clearly and distinctly that we cannot think that we can know any more clearly and distinctly, we Often get it wrong.You have made this rebuttal yourself, but I am still looking forward to this technique, or this method, and I think you should mainly work on this aspect. On the Essence of Material Things; Again on God and His Existence 1. You first say that you clearly imagine magnitude, that is to say, extension with length, breadth, and thickness, and continuation of number, shape, position, motion, and time.Of all these things you say the idea of ​​which is in your mind, you bring up the shape; and in the shape you bring up the rectilinear triangle, of which you say this: Even outside my thinking there may be no place in the world at all There is such a shape, maybe it has never been, but after all, there is still a certain quality, form, or essence of this shape. It is unchanging and eternal, and I did not fabricate it out of thin air. It does not depend on my spirit; for from this we can demonstrate various properties of this triangle, such as the fact that the sum of its triangles is equal to two right angles, that the largest angle is to the largest side, and so on, which, though It never occurred to me when I first imagined a triangle before, but I knew it so clearly and so obviously that, whether I wanted to or not, they were all inside the triangle, so I couldn't say I made them up out of thin air.That's all you say about the nature of material things; for the little things you add afterwards are nothing more than that in the end.So I don't want to raise any questions in this regard. All I am suggesting is that it seems difficult to establish any immutable and eternal nature other than that of the Supreme God.You may say that what you say is nothing but what is taught every day in the schools, namely, that the nature or essence of things is eternal, and that the propositions which men make about the nature or essence of things are also an eternal truth.But even this is so barely believable.Besides, how is it to be understood to say that there is no human nature, or that a rose is a flower when there is not even a rose? I know what they're saying is that it's one thing to talk about the nature of things, it's another thing to talk about their existence, and they all agree that the existence of things isn't completely eternal, but they want the nature of things to be eternal of.But if this is so, and since it is also certain that the chief thing in things is essence, what great thing did God do when he produced being?Indeed, he did no more than a tailor makes a man's suit.But how would they prove that the essence of man (say Plato's) is eternal and independent of God?Proof, they will say, by its being a universal.But in Plato there are only individual things; in fact, the intellect is accustomed to form a common concept out of all the same qualities it sees in Plato, in Socrates, and in everyone else, and in this They all agree on the common concept, so that this concept may well be called a universal nature of man, or the essence of man, because it is understood to be common to all.However, it is indeed inexplicable to say that it was already universal before Plato and all other people existed, and that the intellect had already made this abstraction of the universal. You will say, what's wrong!Wasn't the proposition that man is an animal true even before any man existed?So isn't it perfectly eternal?For my part, I say frankly to you, I do not grasp that it is true before any man exists, except in the sense that wherever there is a man he is necessarily an animal.For, in fact, although there seems to be a difference between the propositions that man is an animal and that man is an animal, that is, the emphasis on being in the first and essence in the second, it is certain that in Essence is not excluded in the first proposition, and existence is not excluded in the second; for when we say that man or man exists, we mean animal man; when we say man is an animal, we mean Refers to man, when he exists.Besides, since the proposition that man is an animal is not a more necessary truth than the proposition that Plato is a man, the proposition that Plato is a man should also be an eternal truth. The individual essence of human beings should not be inferior to the universal essence of human beings.The same is true for other things, and it would be too much trouble to list them all.I would add one more thing though: When we say that man's nature makes it impossible for him not to be an animal, do not therefore imagine that this nature is something real or existing outside the intellect, but only that, if a thing is man, it must be related to other beings. The things we call people are similar because of their similarity to each other.This resemblance, I say, is the resemblance of individual natures, and in this resemblance the intellect makes the concept, or idea, or form of a common nature, and that which must be man cannot be without it. Having explained this, I say the same about your triangle or its nature, because, yes, the triangle in your mind is like a ruler with which you check to see if something should be used. called the triangle.But don't think that this triangle is a real thing or a real and existing thing outside the intellect, because it is completely made by the spirit according to the appearance of some material triangles that the senses make it perceive. These ideas of appearance are brought together to form a common idea in the way I have just explained about human nature. So also do not imagine that those characteristics which one has argued to belong to the triangle of matter, because they are suitable for these triangles, have been carried over from the ideal, universal triangle; Those are the material triangles, and not the ideal, universal triangle; except in the case where the intellect recognizes the two characteristics as being within the material triangle, and then gives them to the ideal, the triangle of universals, and to draw their attention to this situation, they are later returned to the triangle of matter when confronted with arguments.Likewise, the characteristics of human nature do not exist in Plato or Socrates transferred from this universal nature; to the nature of the universal after having recognized them, and in all others; and returning them to them only in order to draw their attention to them when an argument is required. Go to everyone.For it is quite plain and well known that reason did not make the proposition that all men are rational after seeing that Plato, Socrates, and many others were rational; Take it over as the premise of his syllogism. Not bad, spirit!You say you have the idea of ​​a triangle in your mind, and even if you never see any three-cornered shape in objects, you still have the idea of ​​a triangle in your mind; The idea of ​​other shapes falls upon your senses.But, as I said not long ago, if all your senses were dead, so that you saw nothing, and felt no surface or tip of an object, you thought you could make the idea of ​​a triangle in your mind. or any other idea of ​​shape to come?You say that you now have many ideas that have never fallen into shape with your senses.This I agree with, and it will not be difficult for you, for you can make and compose an infinite number of other shape. Besides, there must be something to be said here of the spurious, fictitious nature of the triangle, according to which it is supposed to be composed of lines without breadth, containing an area without thickness, and terminating in There are no sections on the three tips.But that's going too far. 2. After this, you go on to prove the existence of God again, the main argument of which consists in the following sentences: You say that anyone who seriously thinks about this will clearly see that the existence of God cannot from its essence, as the essence of a rectilinear triangle cannot be separated from the sum of its triangles equal to two right angles, or the idea of ​​a mountain from that of a valley.It is therefore as inappropriate to conceive of a God, that is to say, a supremely perfect being, who lacks existence, that is to say, a certain perfection, as to conceive of a mountain without valleys.It should be noted here that your comparison seems to be neither correct nor adequate.For, on the one hand, you are quite right, comparing essence with essence; but after this, you do not compare being with being, or properties with properties, but being with properties.It seems, therefore, to say that either the omnipotence of God cannot be separated from the essence of God, as (for example) the sum of the three angles of a triangle equals two right angles cannot be separated from the essence of the triangle; Just as the essence of the triangle is separated, so the existence of God cannot be separated from the essence of God; for then both comparisons will be very good, and will agree not only with your first comparison, but also with your latter comparison.However, this is not necessarily a convincing proof of the necessary existence of a God; nor does it necessarily follow that there are triangles in the world, although its essence is actually the same as Its beings are inseparable, however our mind may distinguish them, that is, though it apprehends them separately, just as it may apprehend the essence of God from his being. Notice, then, that you count existence as one of the perfections of God, and not of a triangle or of a mountain, although it is equally important to the one and the other, according to each case. The same is completeness.But in truth, whether you observe existence in God, or observe it in other things, it is not a perfection, but only a form, or a reality, without which there cannot be. completeness.事实上，不存在的东西既没有完满性，也没有不完满性；而存在的东西，它除去存在性之外还有许多完满性，它并不把存在当做特殊的完满性，不把它当作完满性之一，而仅仅把它当做一种形式或一种现实，有了它，事物本身和它的一些完满性就存在，没有它，就既没有事物，也没有它的那些完满性。因而一方面不能说存在性在一个事物里边是一种完满性，另一方面，假如一个事物缺少存在性，也不能说它不完满，或缺少某种完满性，只能说它没有，或者说它什么都不是。这就是为什么，在你举三角形的完满性时，你并不把存在性包括进去，也不由之而得出结论说三角形存在。同样，在你列举上帝的完满性时，假如你不是想要把有争辩的东西当作已经证明了的东西，并且把问题当作前提的话，你也不应该把存在性包括进去以便由之而得出结论说上帝存在。 你说，在其他一切事物里，存在是和本质有分别的，只有在上帝里除外。但是，请问，柏拉图的存在和本质，除非是用思维，它们怎么能分别得开呢？因为，假定柏拉图不存在，他的本质又将如何呢？而同样情况，在上帝里边的存在和本质不是用思维分别开的吗？ 你接着给你自己做了这样的一个反驳：也许是这样的：和不能仅仅由于我领会一个带谷的山，或者一个带翅膀的马，就说在世界上有山和有带翅膀的马一样，也不能由于我把上帝领会为存在，就说他存在；并且在这上面，你说这个反驳的外表下掩盖着一种诡辩。但是你并没有费很大事就解决了你自己装扮的那种诡辩，你主要是使用了揭露如此明显的一种矛盾的办法，即存在的上帝并不存在，而你对于马或山却不采用同样的办法，也就是说，你不把它们当作存在的东西。但是，假如你像在你的比较里把谷包含在山里，把翅膀包含在马里一样，把上帝和知、能、以及其他属性连结在一起去观察的话，那么问题就完全出来了，那就要由你来向我们解释你怎么能够领会一个有斜坡的山或一个带翅膀的马而不想到它们存在，而在领会一个全知、全能的上帝时就不能不同时想到他存在。 你说：我们有自由去想像一个马没有翅膀或有翅膀，但是我们没有自由去领会一个没有存在性的上帝，也就是说，一个没有至上完满性的至上完满的存在体。这倒没有什么话可说了；不过，既然我们有自由去领会一个马有翅膀而不想到存在性，而假如它一旦有了存在性，那么按照你的说法，那就将是在它里边的一种完满性了；同样，我们有自由去领会一个上帝，在他里边有知、能以及其他一切完满性，而不想到存在性，而假如他一旦有了存在性，到那时他的完满性才算完成。因此，既然从我之领会一个马带有翅膀这一完满性这件事上不能推论出它有存在性（按照你的说法，存在性是一切完满性中最主要的），同样，从我之领会一个上帝具有知以及其他一切完满性这件事上也不能得出结论说他存在，而是他的存在性尚有待于证明。 虽然你说过在一个至上完满的存在体的观念里，存在性和其他一切完满性是都包括在内的，但你是没有证据地肯定了成问题的东西，是把结果当成前提了。因为另外我可以这样说：在一个完满的佩伽兹①的观念里，不仅包含了带有翅膀的完满性，而且也包含了存在性这一完满性；因为，既然上帝被领会为一切种类的完满性上的完满，那么同样，一个佩伽兹也被领会为它那一种类上的完满；而且这个对比如果保持住的话，那么看来就不能硬说它不能在两者的身上都应用得上。 ①佩伽兹（Pegase），希腊神话中飞马的名字。它是宙斯的儿子培尔塞的坐骑，曾于一怒之下踢出一个“灵感之泉”，诗人后来就从这个泉中汲取灵感。 你说：在领会一个三角形的时候，不一定想到它的三角之和等于二直角，虽然这同样是真实的，因为任何人只要以后仔细研究一下，就会看出它是这样的；同样，人们很可以领会到上帝的其他一些完满性而不想到存在性，但是既然人们不得不承认存在是一种完满性，就不能因此说他不是真地具有存在性。不过，你很可以判断出人们能够回答什么，即： 既然人们以后承认这一特点是在三角形里，因为人们用一种很好的论证证明了这一点，那么同样，为了承认存在性必然在上帝之中，也必须用很好的、坚实的道理来论证它；因为否则就没有什么东西是人们不能说成或认为是任何别的东西的本质了。 你说：当你把一切种类的完满性都归给上帝的时候，你并不是像假如你想一切四方形都能内切于圆那样做。你在那一方面弄错了，因为你后来知道菱形就不能内切于圆，可是你在这方面并没有同样弄错，因为后来你认识到存在性是实际上适合于上帝的。可是的确似乎是你也同样弄错了；要不然，假如说你没有弄错，那么你就必须像人们指出菱形能够内切于圆是矛盾的那样，指出存在性是和上帝的本性不相矛盾的。 我对其他许多东西就不说了，那些东西不是需要进一步地加以解释，就是需要给以更有说服力的证明，要不就是和以前说过的互相抵触，例如：除了上帝以外我们不能领会有别的什么东西其存在是必然地属于其本质的；接着，不可能领会跟他一样的两个或许多上帝；而既然现在只有一个上帝存在，那么他以前必然是完全永恒地存在过，将来也永恒地存在着；并且你在上帝身上领会了其他无数的东西，从这些东西里你一点也不能减少，一点也不能改变；最后，这些东西必须就近加以观察，必须非常仔细地加以检查，以便知觉它们，并且认识他们的真实性。 三、最后你说全部科学的可靠性和真实性绝对取决于对真实上帝的认识，没有这种认识，在各种科学里边就永远不可能有任何确定性或真理。你举了下面这个例子，你说：当我考虑三角形的性质时，我显然知道（我在几何学方面有些内行）三角形的三角之和等于二直角，而且当我把我的思维运用到论证它的时候，我不可能不相信这一点；可是只要我的注意力稍微离开论证，虽然我记得我是清清楚楚地理解了它的三角之和等于二直角，不过假如我不知道有一个上帝，我还是很可能会怀疑它的真实性的，因为我可以说服我自己：自然使我生来就很容易能够在即使我以为理解得最明显、最可靠的东西上弄错，主要因为我记得经常把很多东西认为是真实可靠的，而以后，又有别的理由使我把这些东西判断为绝对错误的。可是当我认识到有一个上帝之后，同时我也认识到一切事物都取决于他，而他并不是骗子，从而我断定凡是我领会得清楚、分明的东西都不能不是真的，虽然我不再去想我是根据什么理由把一切东西断定为真实的，只要我记得我是把它清楚、分明地理解了，人们就不能给我提出任何相反的理由使我再去怀疑它，这样我对这个东西就有了一种真实、可靠的知识，这个知识也就推广到我记得以前曾经证明过的其他一切东西。比如推广到几何学的真理以及其他类似的东西上去。先生，看到你谈得这样认真，并且相信你说的都是老实话，我看我再也没有别的话可说了；除非一点，那就是你很难找到什么人相信你以前不相信几何学论证的真理，而现在你由于认识了一个上帝才相信了。因为，事实上，这些证明是非常明显、确定的，它们本身无需有待于我们的思虑就会得到我们赞成的；而当它们一经被理解，它们就不容许我们的精神对它应有的信念再持犹疑不定的态度，因为，同样情况，我认为你既然有理由在这一点上不去害怕那个不断企图捉弄你的恶魔的狡诈，你也同样有理由使你如此坚定地认为你不可能在我思维所以我存在这个前提和结论上弄错，虽然那时你对上帝的存在还不肯定。同时，即使事实上不能比这再真实了，即的确真有一个上帝，他是万物的造主，而且他不是骗子，不过，由于它好像不如几何学的论证那样明显（关于这一点，只要这一个证据就足够了，即很多人并不相信上帝的存在、世界的创造、以及谈到上帝的其他许许多多东西，然而没有一个人怀疑几何学的论证），有谁相信几何学论证的明显性和确定性要从对上帝的证明中得来呢？有谁相信迪亚果腊（Diagroe）、太奥多腊（Theodore）、以及其他一切类似的无神论者们不能确信这些种类的论证的真理呢？最后，你到什么地方去找到这样的人，当你问他为什么确信一切直角三角形底边的正方形等于其他两边正方形之和的时候，他回答说他之确信这条道理是因为他知道有一个上帝，这个上帝不是骗子，他本身是这一真理的创造者以及世界上一切东西的创造者？或者，相反，你到什么地方去找这样的人，他回答说他之确信这条真理不是因为他的的确确知道这一点，他不是从决无错误的论证使他非常相信这一点？尤其是，可以认为毕达哥拉斯、柏拉图、阿几米德、欧克里德以及其他一切古代数学家都会做出这样的回答，我觉得他们之中没有一个人会提出来上帝以确认像这样的一些论证的真理的！不过，因为这话也许你不是对别人说的，而只是对你自己说的，再说，也因为这是一件可赞扬的、虔诚的事，那么就不必再多说了。