Chapter 24 The Fifth Group of Rebuttals to the Six Meditations ① IV

Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Difference Between the Soul and Body of Man 1. You say that material things can exist in so far as they are regarded as objects of pure mathematics.I do not want to say much about this here, although material things constitute the objects of mathematics, but purely mathematical objects, such as points, lines, surfaces, and indivisible things composed of points, lines, and surfaces, cannot have any actual existence.I am only speaking on the point that once again you distinguish imagination from pure intellectual activity or conception; for, as I have said before, these two things seem to be two activities of the same function, and if they If there is any difference between them, it can only be a matter of more and less; in fact, please notice how I justify it by the words you have proposed.

You said before that imagining is nothing but thinking about the shape or image of a physical thing; and here you think to comprehend or understand is to think about a triangle, a pentagon, a thousand-sided, a thousand-sided , and the shape of some other bodily things; and now you distinguish them in such a way that you say that the imagination is a certain attention to the body of the sensible faculty, which no intellectual activity requires.So when you simply comprehend a triangle as a shape with three corners effortlessly, you call it intellectual activity; when you, with some effort and concentration, represent the shape, observe it, examine it, When you comprehend it clearly and meticulously, and distinguish the three corners, you call this imagination.Thus, since it is really easy for you to grasp that a thousand-sided shape is a shape with a thousand angles, and no matter how much mental concentration you use you cannot distinguish all these angles clearly and finely. come out, not being able to represent them all, in which your mental ambiguity is no less than when you observe a thousand-sided shape or any other shape with many Metaphysically, your thinking is an intellectual activity rather than an imagination.

Nevertheless, I see nothing to prevent you from extending your imagination and your intellectual activity to thousand-sided polygons, as you have done to triangles.For, you did make some effort to conceive in some way this shape with so many angles, though they were so numerous that you could not comprehend it; There is a shape with a thousand horns, but this is only a consequence of the power or meaning of the word, not because you grasp rather than imagine the thousand horns of the shape. Here, however, it must be noted how gradually the degree of clarity fades away and the degree of obscurity increases.For, of course, you will represent, or imagine, or even perceive more vaguely a square than a triangle, but more clearly than a pentagon, which in turn is more vaguely than a square. more clearly than hexagons, and so on, until you can no longer come up with anything clearly; for then, whatever idea you have, that idea cannot be clear. It can't be clear, and then you don't want to make any mental effort anymore.

Therefore, if when you perceive a shape clearly and more attentively, you would like to call this mode of perception in general imagination and mental activity; If you wish to call a shape merely by the name of intellectual activity, when you apprehend it without mental concentration, you may of course do so; It is only an accident of this inner knowledge that you perceive a certain shape sometimes more strongly, sometimes less strongly, sometimes more clearly, sometimes more vaguely.Indeed, if, from the heptagon and the octagon, we were willing to go to all other shapes down to the thousand-sided or multi-sided, and if we were willing to attend to every degree between the clearest and the most indistinct, we could say Does the imagination stop when one gets to a certain place or a certain shape, and only intellectual activities remain?Shall we not see a continual process of one and the same perception, increasing and increasing insensibly as its vagueness and carelessness and its clarity and concentration decrease?Also, I beg you to observe how you have devalued the intellectual activities, and how far you have exalted the imagination; When imagining, you don't want to belittle one and elevate the other, what else?

You say afterwards: The power of imagination in your mind, in so far as it differs from the power of understanding, is by no means necessary to your essence, that is to say, to your spiritual nature.However, if the two are just one and the same ability or function, the difference in function is that one is more and the other is less, how is this possible?You go on to say that the mind turns to objects when it imagines, and looks at itself or the ideas in its own mind when it understands.But how can the mind turn to itself, and observe any idea, if it is not turned at the same time to something corporeal, or to something represented by a corporeal idea?For, in fact, the triangle, the pentagon, the thousand-sided, the multi-sided, and all other shapes, or even the idea of ​​all these shapes, are bodily, and the mind can only apprehend them as bodily, or in terms of bodily One can only think about sexual things when they are apprehended in the proper way.As for our ideas of things that are immaterial, such as God, angels, human souls or spirits, etc., it is true that all the ideas of these things in our minds are either corporeal, or almost corporeal, and they From the figure of man and from the figure of other very simple, very slight, and very imperceptible things, such as wind, fire, or air, as we have said.As for your statement that it is only possible that you conjecture that some body exists, there is no need to say much about it, because it cannot be said honestly.

Two. After this you speak of the senses, and you first enumerate all that you know through the senses and which you accept as true, because nature seems to tell you so.Immediately afterwards you speak of certain experiences which overturned all your faith in the senses, and brought you to that point, which we saw in the first meditation, of doubting everything. However, I am not here to argue about the veracity of our senses.For the error or falsity is not in the senses, which are not active, but receive the image only as it appears to it, as it must necessarily appear to it, owing to the circumstances of the senses, objects, circumstances, etc., at the time. Provide them.The error or falsity is in judgment, or in the mind; and judgment or the mind does not give due delicacy, and fails to notice that things which are remote, either because they are remote or for some other reason, should be more remote than they are. We appear small and blurry when we are close; in other situations as well.Nevertheless, no matter where the error comes from, it must be admitted that there is error; the question is only whether we can really never be sure of the reality of anything that the senses make us perceive.

It is true, however, that I do not see that much effort should be made to solve a problem so clearly determined by so many everyday examples; I will only answer what you say, or rather, what you refute: it is absolutely true Yes, when we look at a tower so close that we can almost touch it with our hands, we no longer doubt that it is square, although when we are a little farther away we once thought it was round, or at least it was. Doubt whether it is square or round, or what shape it is. In the same way, after amputation of a hand or foot, one still feels pain in the hand or foot. This feeling sometimes deceives the person whose hand or foot has been amputated. This is due to the animal spirit, which It used to be brought into these members, where it caused sensation.But an able-bodied person who has a recent injury to his hand or foot cannot doubt that he really feels pain in his hand or foot.

In the same way we are either awake or asleep, and it is true that while we are asleep we are sometimes deceived into thinking we see things we do not; but we do not always dream; When we are fully awake, we are so sure that we never wonder whether we are awake or dreaming. In the same way, though we may think that nature enables us to be mistaken about what seems most true to us, yet we also know that nature enables us to know truth; Or when we see a stick half in water; but sometimes we also know truths, as in arguments in geometry, or when a stick is out of water; for these truths are too obvious to let We doubt; and if we could distrust the truth of all our other knowledge, at least we cannot doubt that all things appear to us as they appear to us, and that they appear to us Impossible not very real.And though nature seems to give us much that reason tells us not to believe, this does not take away the reality of appearances, does not make it untrue that we take what we see to be like that.However, it is not here to observe how rationality and sensual stimuli contradict each other, and whether it may be like the left hand holding it with the right hand without strength, or something else.

3. You then come into the problem, but you seem to touch only slightly; for you go on to say: But now that I have begun to know myself better, and have begun to see more clearly my source I don't really think, then, that I should accept in a muddle everything my senses seem to tell me; You have a point in what you say, and I think there can be no doubt that your thinking has always been built on that foundation. You go on: First, because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive can be God-produced as I perceive it, if I can clearly and distinctly perceive one without reference to the other, suffices to determine that this one thing is distinct or distinct from the other, for they may be set apart, at least by the power of God; It doesn't matter.I have nothing else to say about this, except that you are using an obscure to prove a clear, not to mention that there is some vagueness in the conclusion you draw.I'm not going to refute you either: You must first demonstrate the existence of God and what his abilities can achieve, and then point out that he can do everything you can clearly understand.I merely ask whether you clearly and distinctly apprehend this property of a triangle, namely, the largest angle to the largest side, from another property, namely, that the sum of the triangles is equal to two right angles; and whether you therefore believe that God can This property is separate from another property, so that triangles can sometimes have this property and not that property, and sometimes have that property and not this property.However, in order not to dwell too much on this, and because this distinction is of little relevance to our problem, you go on: Thus, it is because I do realize that I exist, and besides that I am a thinking thing I see nothing else that necessarily belongs to my nature or to my essence; and therefore I am sure that my essence consists in the fact that I am a thinking thing, or that I am a substance. , the whole essence or nature of this entity is thought.It is here that I would like to stop; but it will suffice here to repeat what I said about the second meditation, or wait and see how you want to argue.

This is the conclusion you draw: and, though perhaps (or rather, as I am about to say) I have a body, with which I am very closely bound; Having a clear and distinct idea that I am only a thinking thing without extension, and on the other hand I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​the body as a mere extended thing and not thinking, so affirm The point is this: this me, that is to say my spirit, or my soul, that is to say, what I am as I am, is completely and truly distinct from my body, and the soul can exist without the body.This is undoubtedly what you want to achieve.Since this is the main problem of the whole problem, it is necessary to stop here and see how you can solve it.First of all, the problem here is to distinguish the spirit or soul of man from the body; but what body do you mean?Of course, if I understand rightly, gross flesh made up of limbs; for your words say this: I have a flesh; I am united to it; , that is, my spirit, must be distinct from my body; and so on.But, spirit!I ask you to notice that the problem is not with the gross flesh.I'd better object as some philosophers think that you are what the Greeks called—that perfection of reality, form, kind, and, in the common language, the mode of the body; for, indeed, there is Whoever thinks this way cannot think that you are more distinct from the body than the shape or anything else from its likeness; whether you are the whole soul of a man, or whether you are, as the Greeks called it—maybe It may be an external faculty or force, such as an intellectual or passive intellect.But I would like to treat you a little more freely, as an active intellect; even as separable; though not as separable as they imagined.For, since these philosophers think that this active intellect is present in all men and even in all things in the world, it acts on the possible intellect to know, just as light acts on the eye to make it see. (Thus they are accustomed to compare the active intellect to the light of the sun, and thus regard it as foreign, something from without); therefore I, I would rather regard you as (and I can see that you like this ) is a spirit, or a special kind of intellect, which you rule in the flesh.I repeat, it is not a matter of knowing whether you can separate from this gross flesh, and therefore I said not long ago that it is not necessary by the power of God to make you separate from what you apprehend separately, but It consists in knowing whether you are not some other object, for you may be a finer, more sparse object that penetrates this gross body, or dwells only in some part of it.Besides, don't think that you have pointed out to us until now that you are a purely spiritual being, with nothing bodily at all; and when you said in your second meditation that you are not wind, fire, vapor, air, At that time, you should remember that I once reminded you that there is no basis for your statement.

You also said that you did not dispute these things there; but I did not see you discussing the matter afterwards, did not see you give any reason why you were not an object of this nature.I've been waiting for you to be here to do this; However, if you say or prove anything, it is only that you are not such a gross object, and I have already said that there is no problem with this. 4. You say: But because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​myself, that I am only a thinking thing without extension, and on the other hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​the body, that It is just an extended thing that cannot think.In the first place, however, the idea of ​​the body does not seem to me to require much effort; for if you speak of the idea of ​​bodies in general, I shall be compelled to repeat here what I have already refuted to you, that you It should be shown beforehand that thinking is incompatible with the essence or nature of objects; then we are again in our first difficulty, for the problem consists in knowing whether you, in thinking you, are not a subtle and sparse bodies, for such a thing as thought is incompatible with the nature of bodies.But since, when you say this, you mean only gross flesh, from which you think you are distinct and separable, I have no objection to the idea that you can have bodies; But suppose, as you say, that you are a thing without extension, and I firmly reject the idea that you have such a thing.For, I ask you to tell us how you think an extended body, its image or idea, can be received in you—that is, a substance without extension— where to go?For either this image arises from a body, and therefore it must be corporeal, it must have its parts distinct from each other, and therefore it must be extended; Comes from elsewhere, and is perceived in other ways.But just because it necessarily represents bodies, and bodies are extended, it must have parts, and therefore it must be extended.Otherwise, if it has no parts, how can it represent parts?If it has no extension, how can it represent an extended thing?If it has no shape, how can it perceive a shape? If it has no place, how can it perceive which parts of a thing are high and which are low, which are to the left and which are to the right, which are in front and which are behind, which are straight and which are curved?If it had no multiplicity, how could it represent various colors... The idea of ​​body is therefore not entirely without extension; but if the idea of ​​body has extension, and you have no extension, how can you accept it?How can you make it work with you?How do you master it?How do you feel about it fading away and finally disappearing? Then, I have nothing more to say about your conception of yourself, having already said mainly on the second meditation.For, in that, it is plainly seen that you never have a clear and distinct idea of ​​yourself; On the contrary, it seems that you have no conception of yourself at all.Because although you definitely know that you are thinking, you don't know what you are thinking, so although you know this activity clearly, you don't know the main thing, that is, you don't know this entity is, and thinking is only one of the many activities of this entity.Therefore, I feel that I can use a blind man as a metaphor.A blind man who feels heat, and who has been told that heat comes from the sun, thinks he has a clear and distinct idea of ​​the sun; thus, if he is asked what the sun is, he answers that it is a thing that generates heat.But you will say that I do not mean here only that I am a thinking thing, but also that I am a thing without extension.But don't say that this is something you have not proved, although it is still a matter between us; I beg you to tell me, do you get a clear and distinct idea of ​​yourself from this?You say that you are not an extended thing; of course I know from this what you are not, and not what you are.how! In order to have a clear and distinct idea of ​​something, that is to say, a real and natural idea, is it not necessary to know the thing positively for what it is, that is, to say it positively? ? Is it enough to know what it is not?Does anyone have a clear and distinct idea of ​​Bucephalus if he merely knows that Bucephalus is not a fly? ①Bucephale (Bucephale) is the name of the mount of Alexander the Great in the Roman Empire. Yet it can only see in the eyes. However, in order not to get entangled in this more, I just ask you: You say that you are a thing without extension; so don't you permeate the whole body?Of course I don't know how you're going to answer; because although at first I thought you were only in the head, it was only due to mere speculation rather than really believing it was your opinion.My guess is based on what you said shortly after.You say: The soul is not directly infected with all parts of the body, but only with the brain, or perhaps with one of the smallest parts of the brain.But this does not make me completely sure whether you are in the brain or in a part of the brain; because you can be scattered all over the body and only feel in one part; as we usually say: the soul is scattered in the brain. The whole body, the following words also make me suspicious.You say: Although the whole soul seems to be united in the whole body,  ….Because there you don't really say you are united in all flesh, but you don't deny it either.But, anyway, let us first assume, if you will, that you are spread throughout the body, whether you are the same thing as the soul or not, I ask you, you—you have been from the top of your head Down to the soles of your feet, you are as big as your body, and as many parts as your body have, you have as many parts to cooperate with it—don’t you have extension?Are you going to say that you have no extension, because you are whole in the whole body and whole in every part?If you say so, then I ask you, how do you understand it?Can the same thing be whole in many places at the same time?It is true that religion teaches us the sacred mystery of the Eucharist; but here I am speaking of you, and we are considering here only those things which can be naturalized, except that you are a natural thing. Brightness② is examined from the perspective of cognition.That being the case, can it be understood that there are places where there are not many things?Are a hundred places more than one?If a thing is wholly in one place, can it be elsewhere, if it is not outside itself, as the first place is outside the rest?Answer what you will; but it is at least a matter of knowing whether you are in each part wholly, or whether you are in each part of your body according to each part of yourself. is an unclear, uncertain thing; and since it is more obvious that nothing can be in many places at once, you are not wholly in each part, but only wholly in the whole, so that you is distributed throughout the body according to each part of you, so that it is also more evident that you are not without extension. ① "Holy Eucharist" is one of the "sacraments" of Catholicism. It is a paper-thin bread with a diameter of about three centimeters, representing bread and wine. According to Catholic superstition, it is truly and materially Contains the flesh, soul and holiness of Jesus, believers who eat it will be fully integrated with Jesus in terms of soul and body. ② that is, from the rational rather than from the faith. We now assume that you are only in your brain, or that you are only in one of the smallest parts of your It is still extended, and you are like it, so you are also extended, and you also have many small parts, corresponding to all its small parts.Wouldn't you say, perhaps, that you think of that little part of you that is connected to your brain as a point?I can't believe this is the case.However, even if it is a point, if it is a physical point, the same problem still exists; because this point has extension, and it is by no means without parts.If this is a mathematical point, you first know that it is made by our imagination, and there is no point in fact.However, if we assume that there is, or rather, that there are these mathematical points in the brain, that you are united at one of these points, that you live in this point, then please note that this assumption is useless ; for, however much we may suppose, you must also be exactly at the junction of the nerves, from which all parts informed by the soul convey to the brain the idea or image of what is perceived by the senses.In the first place, however, all the nerves do not come to a single point, either because many of the nerves scattered over the back reach and terminate at the spinal cord, as the brain extends to the spinal cord; The nerves in the middle don't all terminate (or reach) the same place in the brain.Even if they all come to one place, their meeting cannot end at a mathematical point; for these are objects, not mathematical lines, which cannot come together, join together at a point.Even if they could converge and unite at one point, the animal spirits flowing along the nerves could neither come out nor go into that point, for they are objects, and objects are not like mathematics. As pointed out, it cannot be without a position, and cannot pass over a thing that does not occupy a position.Even if it can not be in a position, it can pass over something that does not occupy a position, but just like this, you exist in a point that has neither place nor part, neither left nor right, nor up and down , you can never tell where things are coming from and what they are reporting to you.As for the energy that you have to send all over the body to communicate sensation and movement, I think that's the same, not to mention that it's impossible to understand how you imprint movement onto those energy, if you're in a point, if you're not a objects, or if you don't have a body to touch and push them in its entirety.For, if you say that they are automatic, and you only direct their motion, you will remember that you have said somewhere that bodies cannot be automatic, so we can deduce that you are the cause of its motion.Then please explain to us, how does this instruction work without some kind of concentration, without some kind of movement from your side?Without active and moving contact, how can one thing focus and work hard on another thing and make it move?Since the light of nature tells us that only objects can touch and be touched, how can there be this contact without objects? But since it is up to you to tell us that you are a thing without extension and therefore without corporeality, why am I wasting so much time here?I don't think you want to use the saying that people are used to: man is composed of body and soul to prove it. It seems to say that if the name object is given to this part, that part cannot be called an object.For, if so, you have made it possible for me to distinguish thus: Man is composed of two substances, the one gross and the other subtle; The latter is then called the soul or spirit.The same can be said of other animals, and I am sure you will not agree that they have a spirit like yours, though it is enough for them if you give them their souls.So when you conclude that there must be a difference between you and your body, you can see that, and you can quite agree with that, but you can't therefore not be physical, a very fine, sparse object, with It is different from another coarse and turbid object. You go on to say: thus you can exist without it.But what good does it do you when it is agreed that you can exist without this thick, heavy body, as the aroma of an apple comes out of an apple and spreads into the air?Of course, it's a little more than the philosophers I've talked to before, who thought that when you die you're all over, no more, no less, just like a shape that disappears when the face changes. , it doesn't exist at all.Because, not as they think, you are only a mode of body, but you are also a slight, subtle physical entity, so we don't say that you are completely annihilated when you die. You fall back into your original state of nothingness, but you remain in your parts so dispersed and isolated from one another; It is impossible to think anymore, and you have no right to say that you are a thinking thing, or a spirit, or a soul.I refute all these things of yours, however, not because I doubt the conclusions you intend to draw, but because I do not believe your arguments on the subject. 5. After this you infer some other things of this kind, all of which I do not intend to insist on.I just bring up one thing.You say: nature also tells you by pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that you not only live in your body, as a helmsman lives in his boat, but, besides, you are very closely connected with it. united with it, fused, blended with it as a whole.Because, you say, if this is not the case, then when my body is injured, I, who is only a thinking thing, will not feel the pain, but will only use my intellect to perceive the injury, Just as a helmsman uses vision to sense if something is broken in his boat.When my body needs food, I know it straight away, without vague feelings of hunger and thirst telling me, because, in fact, these feelings of hunger, thirst, pain, etc. are just some vague ways of thinking , they are dependent on, and come from the union of mind and body, as (let us say) admixture.This is very well said, but still does not explain: if it is true, as you say, that you are immaterial, indivisible, without the slightest extension, how can this combination, this similar mixing or mixing, Does it suit you?Because if you are not bigger than a point, how can you join or unite with the whole body that is so big?At least how do you connect with the brain or the smallest part of the brain, which, as I said before, no matter how small, must have a size, or an extension?If you have no parts, how are you mixed or like mixed with the finest parts of that matter (with which you admit that you are united), since there can be no parts that can mix with each other? Mix this fact?If you are completely different from this substance, how can you mix with it and become a whole with it?Since all combinations, unions, or associations are possible only among the parts, shouldn't there be a certain proportion between the parts?But can you comprehend that there is also a correspondence between a corporeal and a non-corporeal thing?Can we understand, say, how in a pumice stone air and stone are mixed and combined into a true, natural composition?But the correspondence between stone and air is much greater than between body and spirit, for stone and air are both bodies, while spirit is entirely immaterial.Besides, shouldn't all unions be made by the very close, very intimate contact of two things that are united?However, as I said just now, if there is no object, how can we contact it?How can a corporeal thing take a non-corporeal thing and join and connect to itself?或者，非物体性的东西怎么能附着于物体性的东西上来互相结合，连结合起来，假如在它里边没有任何东西可以用来连结它或用来被它连结呢？关于这一点，我请你告诉我，既然你自己承认你能感觉疼，那么像你那种性质和情况，也就是说，你是非物体性的，没有广延的，你怎么能够经验这种感觉呢？因为疼的印象或感觉，假如我理解得不错的话，是来自各个部分的一定的拆散或分离，这种拆散或分离是在什么东西溜进各个部分之间以致断绝了它们以前存在的连续性的时候发生的。不错，疼是一种违反天性的情况；不过，一种东西，它天性一向是一致的、单纯的、同一方式的、不可分的、不可能接受改变的，怎么能把它置于违反天性的情况中去呢？疼既然是一种变坏，或不能没有变坏而发生的情况，那么一种东西，它既然是比一个点还更不可分，不可能改变成为别的东西或不可能让它不再是它之所以为它的东西而不完全消灭，那么它怎么能变坏呢？再说，当疼是自脚上、胳臂上以及其他好几部分一起发生的时候，在你里边不是必须要有许多不同的部分来把疼不同地接受到里边去，以免于使疼的感觉模糊不清，使你觉得好像光是来自一个部分。不过，总而言之，总的问题仍然存在，即要知道物体性的东西怎么被感觉，怎么和非物体性的东西进行交通，在物体性的东西和非物体性的东西之间的相称性怎么能建立起来。 六、对于你后来为了指出在上帝和你之外在世界上还有别的东西存在而非常丰富地、非常漂亮地论证的其他东西，我就都不提了。因为首先你推论你有一个肉体和一些肉体的功能，此外在你的肉体周围还有许多别的物体，那些物体把它们的形象送到你的感官里边，这些形象就是这样地从那里传到你那里，并且在你里边引起来快乐和痛苦的感觉，这些感觉就告诉你对这些物体要去趋就或者躲避。 从所有这些东西里边，你最后得出这样一个结论，即：既然你所有的全部感觉通常在物体的安与危上向你报告的多半是真的而不是假的，那么你就不用害怕感官每天告诉你的那些事物都是假的。关于你在睡着时做的梦，你也认为是这样。 梦不能同你的生活的其他一切行动连结起来，象你醒着所遇到的那些事物那样；这就说明在你思想里边有真实性的东西，必然是在你醒着的时候所有的那些，而不是在你梦中的那些。 由于上帝不是骗子，因而，你说，你必然在这上面就没有受骗，而在你醒着的时候向你表现得如此显明的东西，也一定不可能不是真实的。你在这方面的虔诚实在令我敬佩，同样也必须承认，你在你的著作中的最后几句话也是非常有道理的：人生是有可能会犯很多错误的，必须承认我们的本性存在着弱点和缺点。 先生，以上这些就是我在心里对于你的《沉思集》所想到的一些意见；不过，我把我在开头时所说过的话再说一遍： 这些意见没有什么重要，不值得你去费心；因为我不认为我的判断值得你重视。因为，比如一块肉很合我的口味，而我看到它不合别人的口味，这时我并不认为我的口味比别人的口味高；同样，当一种意见让我喜欢而别人并不以为然的时候，我决不想我的意见是最真实的。我倒相信“各有所好”这话说得十分好；我认为要让大家都有同样的感觉和要让各人的口味都一样，这差不多是同样不公道的。我这样说，是为了使你相信，我不反对你对我这些意见随便做怎样的判断，或者甚至认为它们毫无价值，只要你承认我愿为你效劳的感情，只要你不忽视我对于你的品德的尊敬，这对我就已经足够了。 说不定我也许说了什么失礼的话，因为在争论的时候比较容易激动，这是常有的事。假如是这样的话，那决不是我的本意，我完全同意把它从我的文章里边涂掉；因为我可以向你保证，我最初和唯一的意图只在于享有你的友情的荣誉，并且把这种友情完整无缺地保存下来。goodbye.