Chapter 22 The Fifth Group of Objections to the Six Meditations ① Ⅱ
On God, and His Existence
1. First of all, you think that the clear and distinct knowledge of the proposition that I am a thinking thing is the cause of your certainty, and you deduce from this that you can understand everything we have very clearly and very clearly. The rule that everything that is clear is true is made the general principle.It is true that until now we have not found our more reliable rules of certainty in the ambiguity of human affairs, but since there are so many great men, although they seem to have known very clearly and clearly Can it not be doubted that this maxim may be false, since many things are believed to be hidden or unfathomable in the mind of God himself?Of course, after what the skeptics say (you must know their arguments), I can only infer from a well-known thing that things are really as they appear to everyone; Besides, what truth can we guarantee?For example: I clearly and distinctly feel that the taste of melons is delicious, and therefore the taste of melons is really like that to me; Believe it?Because when I was young and my health was very good, I didn't think it was like that, and I definitely felt that there was another taste in the melon.Even now I see that many people do not think it is delicious; I have seen many animals with a very sensitive sense of taste and a very strong body, but their senses are not the same as mine.So is "really" against itself?Or in other words, is a thing, although it is clearly and clearly understood, not itself true, but actually only clearly and clearly understood to be true?It is almost the same with spiritual things.
I once swore that it was impossible to pass from a small amount to a greater amount without passing through a stage of equality; I swore my life that two ever-approaching lines, if extended to infinity, It is not possible to be disjoint at the end.These things seemed to me so clear and distinct that I took them as very true and unquestionable theorems; and then I had some reason to believe otherwise, because I saw the opposite more clearly and distinctly. ; even now, when I think of the nature of mathematical postulates, I cannot avoid feeling some doubt and mistrust as to their truth.I admit, therefore, that one may say that I really know such and such propositions as I suppose or as I perceive the properties of quantities, lines, surfaces, etc.; But can not be sure.Although this is mathematically true, it is related to other things we are talking about now, so I ask you: why are there so many different opinions among people?Everyone thinks he sees very clearly and distinctly the views he defends.Say not that most of them do not stand for their opinion, or that they are only pretending that they understand it well; See also others with equal zeal insisting on contrary opinions, unless you may think that even to this last hour they feign their feelings, and it is not time to bring the truth out of the deepest recesses of their conscience.
You have encountered this problem yourself when you say that you have accepted many things as very certain and obvious and then you see them as doubtful and uncertain; but you are suspending the problem. You don't decide, and you don't justify your maxims; you just use the opportunity to expound ideas by which you might be deceived, which you take to represent something outside of you, which is outside of you. Things may not exist; and after this you again speak of a cheating God, whom you may be troubled by the truth of the propositions "Two plus three equal five" and "A square cannot have more than four sides." deceit, so as to show us from it that you must wait until you have proved that there is a God who cannot be a liar before you prove your maxim.In truth, you need not take so much trouble to prove the maxim which so easily leads us to accept the false as true, and leads us astray; what is most necessary is that you should show us a good The method by which we learn to direct our thoughts, so that we know whether we are mistaken or not every time we think we understand something clearly and clearly.
2. After this, you divide ideas (insofar as they are images, you want to count them as thoughts) into three types: some are inborn with us, some are external, foreign, and Some are made and fabricated by us.Under the first category you put your intellect about what is generally called a thing, or a truth, or a thought; , the idea that the fire you feel has;
Under the third category you put mermaids, hippogriffs, and other monsters of the like, of your own invention and invention.Then you say that maybe all your ideas are foreign, or are all born with you, or are all made by you, because you haven't recognized their source clearly and distinctly enough.Therefore, in order to avoid errors (which may still occur until the source of ideas is fully recognized), I would like to call your attention now: All ideas seem to be foreign, they are derived from things that exist outside the intellect. It arises upon falling on one of our sense organs.For, in fact, the mind not only has (or may even say that it has) the power to apprehend those foreign ideas that proceed from external objects and reach it through the senses, but to take these ideas naked and clearly as the power of the mind itself to accept them as they are; and also of variously combining, dividing, enlarging, reducing, and comparing and combining them in a number of other ways.In this way, at least the ideas of the third category you create are indistinguishable from those of the second; for the idea of a monster with the head of a lion, the body of a ram, and the The ideas of the serpent's tail are no different, and the mind gathers them together into a single idea; for, taken separately, or each observed individually, they are all foreign, from without.Likewise, the idea of a giant, or the idea of a man as large as a mountain, or, if you prefer, the world, is like a foreign idea of a man of ordinary height magnified at will by the mind, and The more the mind magnifies this idea, the more blurred it becomes.Likewise, the idea of a pyramid, or a city, or anything else that one has never seen, is a foreign, somewhat modified, and therefore blurred version of a pyramid or a city that one has seen before. The idea, the spirit adds, divides, and analogizes the idea in a certain way.
①The original text is sheep belly.
As to that class of ideas which you call natural, or which you say is inborn with us, I do not believe that any idea is of this class, nor do I even think that all ideas which are called by that name All seem to be foreign.You say: By my nature I can understand what is generally called a thing.I don't think you mean the function of understanding per se, about which there is nothing in doubt and which is not the problem here; I think you mean the idea of a thing.Nor do you mean the idea of an individual thing;
For the sun, this stone, and all other things in particular belong to the class of which you say the ideas are foreign and not natural.You mean the idea of something considered generally as a synonym for being and having an extension equal to being.But, I ask you, if there were not so many individual things in the mind at the same time, which the mind abstracted into a concept or an idea that fits all things in general and not one thing in particular How, then, can this general idea be in the spirit?
If the idea of a thing is natural, then of course the idea of an animal, a plant, a stone, and all ideas in general are natural, and we need not take so much trouble to divide many individual What is there to be distinguished, so that, after removing all differences, we have only what is common to each, or (and this is also the case), from which the idea of a class can be made.You also say that your nature enables you to understand what is truth, or, to paraphrase this, the idea of truth is naturally imprinted on your soul.But if truth is nothing but the agreement between the judgment and the thing judged, then truth is only a relation, and therefore cannot be divided from the comparison between the thing itself and the idea of the thing. or (which is the same) inseparable from the idea of a thing, since the idea of a thing has not only the property of representing itself, but also the property of representing the thing as it is.Since ideas are identical with things, or, since ideas in fact represent things as they are, the idea of truth and the idea of things are the same; , then the idea of truth is also foreign, not innate to us.As it applies to every particular truth, it can also apply to truths considered in general, which (as we have just said when we spoke of the idea of things in general) derive from the concept or concept of each particular truth. extracted from the concept.You also say that it comes naturally to you to understand what thinking is, (in other words, as I have always interpreted it) the idea of thinking is innate to you and comes naturally to you.But just as the mind can make an idea of a city into another city, so it can make another idea of an action (say, an idea of seeing or a similar idea of another action). Ideas (for example, as an idea of thinking itself); for there is always a certain relation and analogy between the functions of knowing, which makes it easy to know one from the other.Indeed, no great effort should be made to know to what class the ideas of thought belong.We should better reserve our energies for considerations of the mind itself or the idea of the soul.If we once agree that this idea is innate with us, there is nothing inappropriate to say that the idea of thinking is also innate.That is why we should wait to prove that the idea of the spirit is naturally within us.
3. After this, you seem not only to doubt whether certain ideas come from something that exists outside us, but even whether there is nothing outside us at all.From this you seem to infer that although you have in your mind ideas of what are called external things, this does not mean that these things exist in the world, because your ideas do not come from these things. Things may not come, but may either come from yourself, or be put into your heart by some other means unknown to you.I think it is for this reason that not long ago you did not say that you perceived the earth, the sky and the stars, but only that you perceived the concepts of the earth, the sky and the stars. You may have been deceived by these concepts.If you still don't believe in the earth, the sky, and the stars, why do you walk on the ground?Why do you look up at the sun?Why do you stay close to the stove to keep warm?Why do you eat to satisfy your hunger?Why do you turn your tongue to speak?Why do you write us your thoughts with a pen in your hand?Of course, these things may well be told, or cleverly fabricated, but one can easily expose the deceit; and since you cannot really doubt the existence of these things, you cannot not be very clear Knowing that they exist outside of you, then let us take these things seriously and honestly, and let us accustom ourselves to saying things as they are.But if you think that, once the existence of external things is assumed, we cannot adequately prove that the ideas we have are borrowed from them, you will not only have to answer your own difficult questions, but also Answer all objections that people may throw at you.
In order to point out that our ideas about these things come from outside, you say that it seems that nature tells us this way, as if we realize that these ideas do not come from us and are not transferred by our will.It is not necessary, however, to speak only of reasons and solutions, but, among many other difficult problems, it is necessary to explain and solve the problem of why there are no ideas of color in the mind of a man who is born blind, or in the mind of a man who is born deaf. Is there no idea of any sound in the mind, is it because these external things themselves have not been able to send their own images to the mind of the crippled man, because at birth these paths have been blocked by obstacles and they have not been able to be opened.
After that, you used the sun as an example, saying that we have two very different ideas about the sun: one is received through our sense organs, and according to this idea, we think the sun is very small; the other is from astronomy. According to the concept, we feel that the sun is very big.Of these two ideas, however, the one which does not arise from the senses, but is drawn from certain concepts native to us, or produced by us in any other way, is the truest, The one that most closely matches the sun itself.But one can answer this way: the two ideas of the sun are both like the sun, both are true, or both correspond to the sun, but in a degree the one is more and the other is less, just as two different ideas of the same person One of the ideas is sent to us from ten paces away, the other is sent to us from a hundred or a thousand paces away; The former is more, the latter less; for the idea from the nearer is less diminished than the idea from the farther.
See how easily I can explain it to you in a few words, if it is possible to do so here, and you agree with my principles.Moreover, although we perceive the great idea of the sun in no other way than with the mind, this does not mean that this idea is derived from any concept naturally in our mind; The idea received by our senses (in perfect conformity with the experience of reason which tells us that the same things appear smaller when they are far from us than when they are near) is that as the sun is so far away, its diameter is equal to that of the earth. So many radii① of our own, how many times they are multiplied by our spirit.Do you want to see how nature has not put this idea in our mind at all?Seek it in the mind of a man born blind.You will see that, first of all, this idea has neither color nor light in his mind; then you will see that it is not round, if someone hadn't told him, if he hadn't got some circle in advance things; and you will see at last that it is not so great, if reason or authority had not caused him to enlarge the idea which he took into account.But, let us say a little more without exaggerating, those of us who have observed the sun so many times, considered the apparent diameter of the sun so many times, deduced the true diameter of the sun so many times, and all the ideas we have about the sun Or is the image different from that of ordinary people?Yes, reason tells us that the sun is over a hundred and sixty times larger than the earth, but do we therefore have an idea of such a gigantic body?We magnify as much as we can the idea which we have received through our senses, our mind enlarges it with all its powers, but at last our mind gets confused and confused by itself; To have a clear mind of the sun, we must resort to the ideas we receive through the medium of the senses.It would suffice if we believed that the sun was much larger than we see it, and if our eyes were nearer to it, we would receive a much wider and vaster idea; but our spirit We must be content with the idea our senses give it, and what that idea is, our spirit must see it as it is.
①This is the original text.
4. After this, you admit the inequalities and divergences between ideas and ideas, and then you say: Indeed, those ideas which give me the representation of substance are undoubtedly better than those which only give me the representation of mode or chance. A little more of something contains in itself (so to speak) more objective reality; from which, at last, I comprehend a Supreme, Eternal, Infinite, Almighty, universal of all things but himself. The idea of a Creator God certainly has more objective reality in itself than those ideas which give us representations of finite substances.Your spirit is running really fast here, so it has to stop a little bit.But I don't want to first ask you what you mean by the words objective reality; it suffices for us to know that external things are formally and actually in themselves , but in the intellect, objectively or by representation, you seem to mean only to say that the idea should correspond exactly to that from which it is an idea; The more reality there is in the thing which is represented by it, the more reality it represents.
I know you followed that up with a distinction between objective reality and formal reality.The reality of form, I think, is the idea itself, which is seen not as representing something, but as a separate being, with some kind of entite in itself.In any case, however, it is certain that the idea and its objective reality should not be measured according to the whole formal reality which the thing itself possesses, but only according to that part which the mind knows, or in other words, according to the know to measure.So, of course, it will be said that you have a very complete idea of a person in your mind who you have seen often, who you have observed carefully, who you have seen in every way; If you have seen a person once, and you have not looked at them very well, the concept you get is very incomplete; and if you have not seen the person, you only see his hat covering his face, and his clothes covering his whole body. , then people will definitely say that you do not have the concept of this person, or, if you have the concept of this person, that concept is also extremely incomplete and extremely vague.
From this I deduce that we may have a clear and true idea of accidents, but of veiled substances we can at best have only a vague and artificial one; Where there is more objective reality than in the idea of accident, one should first deny that they can have a naive, true idea of substance, and that one cannot derive any objective reality from this idea; , even if you admit this, one cannot say that the objective reality in the idea of substance is greater than that in the idea of accident, because all its reality is transferred from the idea of accident. , as we said before, substance is comprehended from accidents or in the way of accidents. We have said that entities can only be comprehended as things that have extension, shape, color... .
As for the concept of God you are talking about, I ask you to tell me, since you are not sure whether he exists, how do you know that he represents to us through his concept as an eternal, infinite, almighty, creation of all things What about the...Doesn't the idea of what you do for yourself come from your previous knowledge of him, that he was introduced to you more than once under these attributes?Because, really, if you'd never heard anyone say anything like that, would you describe him like this?You may tell me that you are just using him as an example now, and you haven't defined him at all.Well, but you have to be careful not to mention it as an assumption in the future.
You say that there is more objective reality in the idea of an infinite God than in the idea of a finite thing.But, in the first place, since the human mind cannot comprehend infinity, it can neither possess nor conceive a thing which represents infinity.Hence whoever speaks of an infinite is giving a name which he does not understand, which he does not even understand.Also, since this thing expands beyond his entire comprehension, the infinity or the negation ① attributed to this expansion is impossible for a man whose wisdom is always confined within certain frames. understand.Again, all these noble perfections which we are accustomed to affix to God seem to have been drawn from some of the things with which we usually praise ourselves, such as the duration of time, power, knowledge, goodness, happiness, etc., We extend these as far as we can, and say that God is eternal, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, all-blessing, and so on.
①It is the negation of the word "limited".
It is true, then, that the idea of God represents all these things, but since this idea of God is composed, as I have described, from the ideas of finite things and then enlarged, it cannot be compared with The sum of various finite things has more objective reality.For whoever says eternity cannot comprehend in his mind the whole process of time without beginning and end; whoever says omnipotence cannot comprehend all possible intricacies of its consequences; .Finally, who can be said to have the whole and completeness of a God, that is to say, represent the idea of God as he really is?If God is as we perceive him, if God has only a sliver of perfection as we see in us (although we perceive these perfections to be much more complete in God), then God is nothing. amazing!Is not the ratio between the size of God and that of man infinitely smaller than the ratio between the elephant and the worm?Suppose someone forms an idea according to the form of perfection he sees in the maggot, and wants to say that the idea he has formed is an idea of an elephant, and that this idea represents the elephant as it really is, if If this man is ridiculous, why should he not be ridiculed if he makes an idea in the image of man's perfection, and wants to say that this idea is the idea of God himself, and that this idea perfectly represents God?Also, I ask you: how do we know that this little bit of perfection that we find in ourselves is also found in God?
Having admitted this, let me ask you again: what might be the essence that we can imagine for him from here?God, of course, is infinitely greater than all understanding; and when our mind applies itself to the observation of God, it not only sees itself too small to comprehend him, but it sees I don't understand the truth, and I am also confused.It is therefore impossible to say that we have any real idea of God, which represents God to us as he really is.Suffice it to say that we produce and make an idea according to the degree of those perfections in us, which suits our littleness and our use, and which is not beyond our comprehension, not Contains any reality that we have not previously known in or perceived from other things.
①For example, 1K100 is 10 times smaller than 1K10.
5. You go on to say: By the light of nature, it is evident that there must be at least as much reality in the dynamic, general cause as in the effect.By this you infer that there must be at least as much formal reality in the cause of the idea as there is objective reality contained in the idea.This is still a step too far, and we'd better stop.First, the common saying that there is nothing in the effect that is not in its cause seems to refer to the material cause, not the efficient cause;
For the efficient cause is something external, and its nature is often different from that of its effect.Even if it is said that an effect obtains its reality from the efficient cause, it does not necessarily mean that everything in the effect is owned by the efficient cause itself, and the effect can have the reality of an efficient cause transferred from other places.This is clearly seen in the results of art; for although the house receives all its reality from the architect, the reality which the architect gives to the house is not his own, but has been brought from elsewhere.The sun does the same thing, it changes the matter of the earth in different ways, and from this change it produces various animals.Again, it is the same with fathers and mothers, although the child receives a little matter from them, not as a moving principle, but as a matter principle.You object that being in an effect must be formally or eminently in its cause, all you want to say is that the form of the effect and the form of its cause are sometimes the same, sometimes different, but not as good as its cause The form of the cause is perfect, and therefore the form of the cause is nobler than that of its effect.But this does not mean that the cause eminently containing the effect gives to it some part of its being, or that the cause formally containing the effect assigns to its effect its own form.For, though the living beings which are biochemical by the method of seeds do so in their biochemistry, I don't think you can say that when a father begets his son, he cuts off his rational soul A portion was given to his son.In short, the efficient cause contains its effects only to the extent that it is able to form its effects out of a certain matter and to give this matter its final perfection.
Later, regarding the objective reality you infer, I will give an example of my own image.My image can be viewed in a mirror, or in a portrait painted by an artist.As I myself am an image in a mirror because I myself cast my image in the mirror, and the painter is an image in a picture, so also when my own idea or image is in your mind in the mind of another, one may ask whether I myself am the cause of the image, since it is I who cast my image into the eye, and through the medium of the eye reaches intellect itself; or whether there is some other Reason, like a skilled and meticulous painter, it is carved and pasted in the mind.But it seems unnecessary to look for any other reason than me; for, though the intellect can afterwards enlarge, reduce, organize, and knead this image of myself at will, I am nevertheless the first instance of all the reality it has. One and the main reason.What is here said of me should apply equally to all other external objects.You now distinguish two kinds of reality ascribed to this idea: formal reality and objective reality.As for the reality of form, it cannot be anything but this fine, sparse substance, which continually flows or emanates from me, and which, once received into the intellect, becomes an idea. .If you don't want to say that this thing from the object is a flow of substance, then say what you like, and you will inevitably reduce its reality.As for objective reality, it can be nothing but the representation or image of myself which the idea has, or at most the co-ordination and arrangement which enable the parts of the idea to represent me.Whatever you take it for, I don't see any realness in it anyway, since it's just a relation between the parts that concern me; or it's the reality of form as such Not a style that is arranged and handled that way.But it doesn't matter much, since you will, then I agree that it is called objective reality.After raising this question, I think you should compare the formal reality of this idea with my own formal reality or with my substance, and compare its objective reality with the coordination of various parts of my body. Or with my own outline and appearance; and you take pleasure in comparing its objective reality with its formal reality.Finally, no matter how you interpret the previous theorem, it is clear that not only is there as much formal reality in me as there is objective reality in my idea, but the formal reality of this idea is the same as my formal reality. It is nothing in comparison, that is to say, with the reality of my whole substance.I therefore agree with you that there must be at least as much formal reality in the cause of an idea as there is objective reality in the idea, since everything contained in an idea is compared with its cause. , it is nothing at all.
6. You go on to say that if there is an idea in your mind whose objective reality is so great that you cannot contain it either formally or preeminently, so that you cannot be its cause, the effect must be in the world. If there is something else in the world besides you, it must be that without it you cannot have any arguments for the existence of anything.But, as I have said before, you are not the cause of the reality of the idea; the cause of the reality of the idea is the very thing represented by the idea, since things send their own images as in mirrors. Your mind, even when you can sometimes come up with some monsters.However, whether you are the cause or not, do you really suspect that there is nothing else in the world except you?I beg you not to make mysteries of us; for, whatever the idea may be, I do not think you need find any reason for a thing so sure.
After this you enumerate some of the ideas that are in your mind; among these, besides your own, you also enumerate the ideas of God, of corporeal and inanimate things, of angels, of animals ideas and people's ideas.You enumerate these in order (after you say that there will be no question about your own ideas) to infer that the ideas of man, animals, and angels are ideas of God which you may have, your own. Concepts and concepts of physical things are combined, and even the concept of physical things can come from yourself.But what I find surprising here is how you can be so sure that you have an idea of your own, which is even so rich in content that you can derive from it a whole host of other ideas , and there can be no question about it; though it may indeed be said that either you have no idea of your own at all, or, if you have, it is very vague and incomplete, as I have already said about As mentioned in the meditation ①.True, you insist on this point that nothing can be known to you more easily and manifestly than yourself; but if I point out here that since you will not and cannot have ideas of your own,那么你对任何东西都没有比对你或你的精神更容易、更显明地认识的了，这话怎么讲呢？的确，考虑到眼睛为什么并且怎么不能看见它自己，理智为什么并且怎么不能理会它自己，我就想到无论什么都不能作用于它本身，因为事实上，手，至少是手指，不能打它自己，脚也不能踢它自己。再说，为了认识一个东西，既然必须是这个东西作用于认知的功能，也就是说，必须是这个东西把它的形象送到认知的功能里边，或者说，必须是这个东西告诉认知的功能，把它自己的影像装在它上面，那么显然的是，功能本身既然不在它自己以外，就不能把它自己的形象送给或传给它自己，因而也不能形成它自己的概念。而你想为什么眼睛不能在它自己里边看见它自己却能在镜子里边看见它自己呢？这无疑是因为在眼睛和镜子之间有一个距离，眼睛把它自己的影像送给镜子以作用于镜子，使镜子随后把眼睛的形象送还给它以作用于它。给我一面镜子，你用同样的办法来作用于镜子吧，我向你保证，在它把你自己的形象反射、送还给你之后，你能够看见并且认识你自己，当然这种认识不是直接的，不过至少是一种反射的认识；我看不出你用别的办法能够对你自己有任何概念或观念。
①即《对第二个沉思的反驳》。
我本来还可以在这里坚持问你，要不是上帝的观念是象我以前所描述的那一种，你怎么可能有上帝的观念，要不是你事先听说过，你怎么可能有天使的观念；我怀疑你会对天使有过任何思维；要不是动物和其它一切东西落于你的感官，你怎么可能有它们的观念；对于这些东西，我相信你永远不会有任何观念；要不是你看到或听说过数不尽的其余东西，你也永远不会对它们有任何观念。不过，我不在这上面继续坚持下去了，我同意人们能够把存在于精神里的各种东西的观念进行安排、组合、从而产生许多别的事物的形式，不管你能数得出多少东西的形式来，都不足以说清那么多种多样的形式，也不能说清任何一种东西的清楚、明确的观念。
我只想在物体性的东西上停一下。提到这些观念，要知道你怎么能够（在你一直认为你不是物体性的，并且把你自己看做是那样的时候）单独从你自己的观念得出物体性的东西的观念来，这倒不是一个小的难题。因为，假如你只认识精神性的或非物体性的实体，那么你怎么也能领会物体性的实体呢？这两种实体彼此之间有任何关系吗？你说它们彼此之间在它们都是能够存在的这一点上是共同的；不过，如果不首先领会你说有共同性的东西的性质，这种共同性就是不可理解的。因为，你做出一个共同的概念，而这个共同的概念只有从对于一些个别东西的认识上才能做成。不错，假如理智用对非物体性的实体的认识就能做出物体物的实体的观念来，那么就用不着怀疑一个天生的瞎子，或者是一个自从生下来就被关到一点光都看不见的地方的人，能够做成颜色和光的观念了。你说人们也可以有广延、形状、运动以及其他一些共同可感觉的东西；不过你光是空口说白话，没有什么事实根据。光是说一说，那太容易了。因此我奇怪的是：为什么你不能用同样容易的办法得出光的观念，颜色的观念以及成为其他感官的各自对象的一些别的东西的观念。不过对于这件事不要扯得太多了。七、你最后说：因而只剩下上帝的观念了，在这个观念里边，必须考虑一下是否有什么东西是能够从我自己来的。用上帝这个名称，我是指一个无限的、永恒的、不变的、不依存于其他东西的、全知的、全能的、以及我自己和其他一切东西（假如真有东西存在的话）由之而创造和产生的实体。所有这些，事实上都是使我越认真考虑它们，就越不相信我对它们所具有的观念能够单独地来源于我；因此，从上面所说的一切中，必然得出上帝存在这一结论。这样一来你终于达到了你预期的目的；至于我，我把你刚才所得出的这个结论拿来琢磨一下，我看不出你从什么地方能得出它来。你说你从上帝身上所领会的那些东西不能是从你自己来的以便从而推论它们一定是从上帝来的。然而，首先，它们决不能是从你自己来的，而且单独靠你自己，你也不能认识它们，这是再真实不过的了。因为，除去外在的对象本身把它们的观念给你送来以外，这些观念还是来自你的父母、你的老师们、圣贤的话里、以及和你一起谈过话的人的话里，你是从那些话里学来的。可是你也许回答说：我不过是一个精神，我不知道在我以外是不是有什么东西；我甚至怀疑我是不是有用来听到什么东西的耳朵，不知道是不是有跟我谈话的人。你可以这样回答；可是，假如你真没有耳朵来听我们说话，假如没有人教过你说话，你会说上面的话吗？我们说话要严肃一点，不要歪曲真理；你所说的关于上帝的那些话，难道你不是从同你一起生活的那些人们的经常接触中学来的吗？既然你记住了他们的话，难道你不是也从他们那里记住了那些话所指的和你所理解的概念吗？因此，虽然人们同意我们说它们不能单独由你而来，但这并不等于因此就说它一定来自上帝，而只能说它是来自你以外的什么。然后，在你以前所看见过和学过的东西上你所不能形成、不能组成的那些观念里边有什么呢？你因此想领会超乎人类智慧以外的什么东西吗？不错，假如你如实地领会了上帝，你就真地可以认为你是亲自受过上帝的培养教导了；但是你加给上帝的所有那些属性不是别的，它们只是一大堆你在某些人们身上和其余的东西上所观察到的某些完满性，对这些完满性，你的精神有能力高兴怎么样就怎么样加以理解、组合和扩大，就象我们多少次看到的那样。
你说，虽然你能够由你自己得出来实体的观念，因为你自己是一个实体，不过你却不能由你自己得出一个无限实体的观念，因为你自己不是无限的。假如你认为你有无限实体的观念，那你就大错而特错了。无限实体的观念在你心里不过是一个空名，而且只是按照人们所能够了解无限的那样了解的，而实际并没有了解无限；因此象这样的一个观念并不一定是从一个无限的实体发出的，因为，就象以前曾经说过的那样，它们可以是由人类精神有能力理会的那些完满性加以组合、扩大而形成的；除非是象古代哲学家们那样，把他们对于这个可见的空间，这个世界，以及这个世界所由之而组成的很少的本原所具有的观念加多了多少倍，做成了无限广大的世界的观念，无限多的本原的观念，和无限多的世界的观念，你想说他们不是用他们的思维做成的这些观念，而是这些观念是由一个真正广大无垠的世界，由真正无限多的本原，由实际存在无限多的世界送到他们心灵里边的。
至于你所说，你由一个真正观念领会了无限。当然，如果这个观念是真的，它就可以如实地给你表象无限，你从而就可以理解在它里边的最本质的东西，即现在所谈到的无限性本身。不过你的思维总是为有限的东西所局限，而你除了无限这个名称本身以外，没有说到别的，因为你不能理解超乎你的理解力以外的什么，所以人们有理由说，你只是用有限的否定词来领会无限。光说你在一个无限的实体里边比在一个有限的实体里边会领会到更多的实在性是不够的；因为你必须领会一个无限的实体，而这却是你没有做的；而且实在说来，光是扩大有限的实体你也领会不到更多的实在性；然后你想在你用你的思维象这样放大了和扩展了起来的东西里边比它在被缩小了和没有被扩展时有着更多的实在性，这除非是你也认为这些哲学家，当他们想象许多世界的时候所领会的实在性真地比他们只领会一个世界时所领会的实在性要多。关于这一点，我将顺便提到：我们的精神越增加和扩大某一形象或观念，它就越模糊，其原因就在于，当它扰乱了这个形象的自然情况，从自然情况中去掉了各部分的区别，把这个形象扩展到如此程度，使它如此稀薄，以致最后它消散了。我也不能不说，精神由一个完全相反的原因，即当它把它以前以某种大小所领会的观念过份地加以缩小时，它也同样会模糊的。
你说，你不能理解无限，甚至不能理解无限中的很多东西，这都没有关系；而重要的是，只要你对其中很少的东西领会得很好，以便真地可以说你对这些东西有了一个非常真实、非常清楚、非常明白的观念就行了。绝非如此；假如你真不理解无限而只能理解有限的话，那么你就没有一个真实的无限的观念，你有的只是一个有限的观念。最多只能说你认识了一部分无限，而不能因此就说你认识了无限本身。同样，谁要只认识了一个洞穴的窟窿就可以说他认识了世界的一部分，但不能说他有整个世界的观念。因此，假如他相信一个如此小的部分的观念是整个世界的真实的、自然的观念，那就是十分可笑的。你说：可是，无限不能被有限的你所理解，这是它的特点。不错，这一点我也相信；不过，只把无限表象出一个非常小的部分，或者甚至一点也没有表象出来，这也决不是无限的真实观念的特点，因为这个部分同全部是不能伦比的。你说：只要你把这很少的东西领会得很清楚就够了。是的，就如同你想要对谁有一个真正的观念，只要看看他的头发梢就行了。一个画家为了在画布上如实地表象出我来，只要画上我的一根头发，或者甚至画上我的一根头发梢，不是也可以成功吗？而实在说来，在我们对无限所认识到的一切同无限本身之间的差别要比我的一根头发，或者我的一根头发梢同我的全身之间的差别不仅大得多，甚至大到无限倍。总之，你的全部推理既不证明无限多的世界，也同样不能证明上帝。那些古代哲学家们倒还容易由他们对这个〔世界〕所具有的清楚、明白的认识而做出、领会出那些〔世界〕的观念来，而你却不容易由你对你的实体（你连它的本性都还不知道）的认识而领会出一个上帝，或者一个无限的存在体来。
八、你在这以后又做出了另外一个推理：因为，假如我在心里不是有一个比我的存在更完满的存在体的任何观念，不是由于同那个存在体做了比较我才会看出我的缺陷的话，我怎么可能知道我怀疑、希望，也就是说我知道我缺少什么东西，我不是完满无缺的呢？那么既然你不全知道，既然你不是在一切东西里，既然你不具有一切，如果说你怀疑什么东西，你希望一个什么东西，如果说你知道你缺少什么完满性，这有什么不得了呢？你说你知道你不是完满无缺的。我当然相信你的话，你可以毫无顾虑地这样说而不会有错；你最后说：因此，有一个比我更完满的什么东西存在。为什么不是呢？尽管你所希望的并不总是比你更完满。因为当你希求一些面包时，你所希求的面包无论如何并不比你或比你的身体更完满，它只能是比饿肚子更完满罢了。那么你怎么结论出有什么比你更完满的东西存在呢？这是因为，比如说，你看到了包括你、面包、以及同你一起的其他一切在内的全部东西；因为既然宇宙的每个部分本身都有一些完满性，并且这些部分相辅相成，使彼此更为完满，那么很容易领会，在全部里比在部分里有着更多的完满性，而结果，因为你不过是全部的一部分，你一定认识什么是比你更完满的。你因此可以用这个方式在你心里有一个比你的存在更完满的存在体的观念，由于同它比较，你才认识你的缺陷，而不去说在这个宇宙里有其余的部分比你更完满；这样一来，你可以想要它们所具有的东西，而由于同它们比较，你的缺陷才能够被认识出来。因为，你能认识一个比你更强壮、更健康、更精干，长得更美、更有知识、更温和、因而更完满的人；而你并不难领会他的观念，并且，经过同这个观念做了比较，就不难认识到你没有那么好的健康，没有那么大的力气，一句话，没有象他所具有的那么多的完满性。
稍后一些，你给你自己提出这样一个意见：可是也许我是比我所想的更多一点的什么东西，也许我归之于上帝的所有这些完满性是以某种方式潜在于我之中，虽然还没有产生出来，还没有由它们的行动表现出来，而假如我的认识越来越向无限去增长，就有可能产生出来，由它们的行动表现出来的。可是你自己回答说：虽然我的认识的确每天都获得更进一步的完满，虽然有很多东西是潜在于我，而不是现实存在于我，但是没有一个是属于上帝的观念；在上帝的观念里，一点没有只是潜在的东西，而全是现实存在的、实在的东西，尤其是从我的认识逐渐增加，一步步地增长这一点上，难道不就说明了我的认识的不完满性的必然论据吗？不过，对于这个问题可以这样回答：不错，你在一个观念里所领会的东西，在这个观念里边是现实存在的，可是不能因此就说这些东西在观念所表象的东西本身里边是现实存在的。就如同建筑师想象一个房子的观念，这个观念，不错，是现实存在地由墙、地板、房盖、窗户以及其他的部分所组成的，按照他所采取的计划那样，可是房子以及它的各部分还不是现实存在的，而只是潜在的；同样，古代哲学家们对于无限多的世界所具有的那个观念实际上也包含着无限的世界，但你不能因此就说这些无限的世界现实存在。因此，不管在你心里有什么潜在的东西也罢，没有也罢，你的观念或认识能够一步步地增加、增长就已经足够了，不应该因此就推论说被它所表象或认识的东西现实地存在着。你在这以后所提到的，即你的认识永远不会是现实无限的，这一点倒是完全可以同意你的；不过你也应该知道：关于上帝，你永远不会有一个真实的，自然的观念，你对上帝要比你对仅仅看了他的头发梢的那个人还有多得多、无限多的东西有待于你去认识呢。因为，即使你没有看见这个人的全身，不过你看见过别的人，同别的人比较以后，你就能够用揣测来想象出他的观念来；但是不能说我们看见过同上帝、同他的本质和广大无垠性相似的东西。
你说你领会上帝是现实无限到这种程度，以致在他的完满性上不能有所增加。可是你并不知道他而竟这样地判断了他，你所下的这个判断不过是出于你精神的一种臆断，同古代哲学家们以为有无限的世界、无限多的本原，和一个广大到不可能增添任何东西的宇宙一样。你接着说一个观念的客观的存在体不能取决于或产生自一个仅仅是潜在的存在体，而只能来自一个形式的或现实的存在体。如果说我刚才说的关于一个建筑师的话以及关于古代哲学家们的话是正确的，主要地是，假如你注意到这一类的观念是由其他的、其原因的现实存在性早已告知了你的理智的那些观念所组成的，那么你看你说的这句话就能够是多么正确的。
九、在这以后你问，如果在没有上帝的情况下，具有一个比你的存在更完满的存在体的观念的你，你自己能够存在吗？你回答说：那么我是从谁那里得到我的存在呢？是从我自己？还是从我的父母？还是从不如上帝完满的什么其他原因？接着你证明你不是由你自己存在的。但这是不必要的。你也讲出为什么你以前也不是一直存在的；但这也是多余说的，除非你想从而推论出你不仅具有你的存在的动力的、生产的原因，而且你还具有一个时时保存你自己的原因；而你说这是因为，既然你的全部生存时间可以分为许多部分，那么由于各个部分之间彼此不相依赖，因此必然在每一个部分上你都是重新被创造的。但是我请你看看这话怎么理解。因为，不错，某些结果，为了坚持存在，为了不是每一时刻都被消灭，就需要给它们第一次存在的那个原因在当前并且继续不断地作用着。太阳的光就是属于这类性质的。实在说来，虽然这类的结果事实上同无形中接续它们的那些另外的结果不那么完全一样，就象从河流中的水所看到的那样；但是我们还看见别的，不仅在产生它们的原因不再作用了的时候，甚至在那个原因完全腐朽和消灭的时候，它们依然存在。我们看见的其原因已经不继续存在了的一切东西都属于这一类；在这里我们用不着一一加以列举，只举你就够了，你自己就是其中的一个，不管你的存在的原因是什么。但是你说，你的生存的时间的各个部分彼此不相依赖。在这一点上我们可以辩解说，我们想像不出任何东西，它的各部分彼此之间比时间的各部分彼此之间是更不可分的，比时间的联系和连续是更不可分解，比它的后来的各部分是更不容易分开，比先前的各部分更有结合性，更有依存性。不过，不必在这一点上再争执下去，我只问你：时间的各部分（它们是外在的、连续的、不起任何作用的）彼此之间的这种依存性或独立性对于你的产生和保存有什么用处呢？肯定的是它们对于你的产生和保存并不比潮水不断的涨落冲激一块岩石而对于这块岩石的产生和保存所起的作用更多。你后来说：但是从我以前存在里并不能得出我现在必然存在这一结论来。我很相信这话。
但不是由于因此就需要一个原因不断地重新创造你，而是由于并非无可能有什么原因能够毁灭你，或者你在你里边所具有的力量和能力少到使你自己最后消灭了。
你说由于自然的光明，这是一件非常明显的事，即保存和创造只是从我们的思想方法来看才是不同的，而从事实上来看并没有不同。但是我看不出这是明显的事，除非也许象我刚才所说的那样，在这样的一些结果里，它们要求它们的原因在当前而且继续不断地作用着，象光和诸如此类的东西那样。
你接着说你在你里边没有那种能力能够使你自己保存下来，因为你既然是一个在思维的东西，那么假如这样的一种能力是在你里边，你会对它有所认识。但是在你里边的确有某一种能力，它使你确信你将继续存在；不过不是必然地、无可怀疑地，因为这种能力，或者是自然的构造，不管它是什么吧，还做不到给你铲除一切种类的毁灭原因，不拘它是内在的还是外在的。这就是为什么你将继续存在下去，因为你在你里边有足够的能力，不是为了重新产生你，而是为了使你在万一有什么毁灭原因突然到来的情况下，得以继续存在下去。
不过，你从你的全部推理中结论得很好：你依赖一个和你不同的什么东西，但不是由于你被重新产生，而是由于你以前曾经被它产生过。
你接着说，你所依赖的这个存在体既不能是你的父母，也不能是除了你的父母以外的东西。但是，为什么不是你的父母呢？你不是好象那么明显地和你的身体一起被他们产生的吗？不必说太阳和许多别的东西也助成你的产生。你说：可是，我是一个在思维的东西，一个在我心里有上帝的观念的东西。
然而你的父母，或者你父母的精神，他们不也是和你一样是在思维的东西吗？不是也有上帝的观念吗？而你为什么要在这里，象你所做的那样，喋喋不休地又说你以前说过的那个定理，即这是一件非常明显的事：在原因里一定至少和在它的结果里有一样多的实在性？你说，假如我所依存的是上帝以外的东西，那么人们可以问：他是自在的呢，还是他在①的？因为，假如他是自在的，那么他就是上帝；假如他是他在的，那么人们将再一次地问同样的问题，直到人们达到一个自在的原因时为止，而结果，这个自在的原因就是上帝；因为在这上面无穷地往上追究是不可能的。不过，假如你的父母曾经是你的存在的原因，那么这个原因之存在也不是自在的，而是他在的，而这个别的原因又是由于别的原因而存在的，这样一直到无穷；而假如你不能同时证明世界有始，因而有第一个父亲，在他上面再没有父亲了，你就永远不能证明这样无穷地往上追究有什么不合理。的确，这样无穷地往上追究之所以似乎不合理仅仅在于这些原因彼此如此紧密地互相连结和从属，以致低级的东西没有高级的推动就不能行动；就如同一个什么东西被一块石头碰动了，石头是由一根根子推动的，棍子是被手摇动的；或者如同一个重量是吊在一根链子的最末一个环上，这个环是被在它上面的一个环牵引着，而那一个环又被再上面的一个环牵引着；因为，这样一来，就必须追究到一个使其余的一切都动起来的首动者。然而在这些原因里（它们是这样被安排了的，即当第一个原因毁灭时，依存于它的那个原因就不能续存下去，就不能起作用），好象是假定追究到无穷去也并没有什么不合理。
因此，当你说，非常明显，不可能追究到无穷这话的时候，你看亚里士多德是否这样判断的；他认为世界是无始的，他并不认为有第一个父亲。
①由于别的原因而存在。
你继续进行你的推理说，人们也不能够假定也许很多原因共同产生了你的存在，你从其中的一个原因里接受了你归之于上帝的那些完满性中之一的观念，从另外一个原因里接受了一个另外的观念，因为所有这些完满性都只能存在于以统一性或单纯性为其主要完满性的唯一的、真实的上帝之中。
不过，无论你的存在的原因只有一个也罢，有许多也罢，这些原因不一定是把它们的（也就是你后来所凑集起来的）完满性的观念印到你的心里。不过，我想问你，就算是你的存在不能有许多原因，但是至少，为什么那许多东西不能都存在于世界之上，而你关于这些东西，在分别地考察和赞美了它们的不同的完满性之后，竟认为一切完满性都集之于一身的那个东西该是多么幸福？你知道诗人们如何给我们描述了潘多腊①；你不也是一样吗？你不是也把你所赞美的属于不同人们的卓越的知识、高尚的智慧、至高无上的能力、充沛的健康、完满无瑕的美貌、永不衰落的幸福、以及长寿等完满性都集合起来，并且想到，谁要是能够具有这一切，他该是多么值得令人赞美吗？接着你不是把所有这些完满性扩大到这样的程度，使具有这些完满性的人更值得令人赞美，不仅是由于他在他的知识、能力、时间的延续、以及他的全部完满性上毫无所缺，同时也由于这些完满性达到如此高度，以致人们不能再增之一分，而这样一来，他就成为全知的、全能的、永恒的，他就把各类完满性具有到至高无上的程度，而且，当你看到人类的本性不可能包含这么一大堆五花八门的完满性时，你不是就想到把所有这都集于一身的那个东西该是完全幸福的吗？你不是也相信，象这样的一种东西是否存在于世界之上是值得你去追求，去知道的吗？你不是由于某些论据使你相信象这样的一种东西似乎是存在比不存在更合适一些吗？在终于假定了它存在之后，你不是否认了它具有物体性、有限性以及在概念上含有某种不完满性的其他一切性质吗？许多人无疑地就是象这样进行他们的推论，虽然大家可能并没有走同一的道路，有些人把思维推进得比另外一些人更远一些，有些人把神关闭在物体里面，另外一些人给神赋以人的形象，还有一些人不满足于一个神，于是按照他们自己的想法造了许多神，另外还有一些人随心所欲地在神的问题上想入非非，象无知的偶像教那样。关于你所说的统一性的完满性，你把你归之于上帝的那一切完满性领会为密切地结合在一起而不可分割，这倒无妨，虽然你对他的观念并不是他放在你心里，而是你从外在的一些对象抽出来然后增加上去的，象我们以前所说过的那样；他们就是这样地不仅把潘多腊给我们描绘成一个具有一切完满性的女神，每个神都把自己的一个主要的优点赠给了她，而且他们也是这样地做成了一个完满的理想国的观念和一个十全十美的演说家的观念；等等。最后，从你存在以及从一个至高无上地完满的存在体的观念之存在于你心里这件事上，你得出结论说这非常明显地证明了上帝存在。不过，虽然结论是非常正确的，即上帝存在，但是我看不出这个结论是必然地从你所提出的一些前提得出来的。
①潘多腊（Pandora）是希腊神话中在最高的神——宙斯的命令下造的第一个女人。智慧女神雅典纳给了她一切才华和聪明智慧。
十、你说：我只剩去检查一下我是用什么方法取得了这个观念的；因为我不是通过感官把它接受过来的，而且它也从来不是不管我愿意不愿意而硬提供给我的；它也不是我的精神产生出来或虚构出来的，因为我没有能力在上面加减任何东西，因此没有别的话好说，只能说它和我自己的观念一样是从我被创造那时起与我俱生的。可是我已经不只一次地指出过，一部分是你可以从感官接受来的，一部分是你自己捏造的。至于你所说的，你不能在上面加减任何东西，你要记得你开始时对他的观念是多么不完满；你想想，可能有些人，或有些天使，或有些比你更有知识的别的东西，你可以从他们那里学到你还不知道的有关上帝的本质的什么东西；
你至少想想，上帝可以（无论是在今生或是在来生）教导你、提高你的认识，使你得以把你已知的有关他的一切都认为不算什么；最后你想想，从对万物的完满性的考察上，如何可以上升到认识上帝的各种完满性，并且由于这些完满性不能一时都被认识，而是日复一日地发现一些新的，因此我们不能一下子对上帝有一个完满的观念，这个观念是随着我们的知识的增加而不断完满起来的。你接着这样说：当然不应该奇怪，上帝在创造我的时候，把这个观念放在我里边，就如同工匠把标记刻印在他的作品上一样；这个标记也不必一定和这个作品不同。可是，只就上帝创造我这一点来说，非常可信的是，他是有些按照他的形象产生的我，对这个形象（里面包含有上帝的观念），我是用我领会我自己的那个功能去领会的，也就是说，当我对我自己进行反省的时候，我不仅认识到我是一个不完满、不完全、依存于别人的东西，这个东西不停地倾向、希求比我更好、更伟大的东西，而且我同时也认识到我所依存的那个别人，在他本身里边具有我所希求的、在我心里有其观念的一切伟大的东西，不是不确定地、仅仅潜在地，而是实际地、现实存在地、无限地具有这些东西，而这样一来，他就是上帝。不错，所有这些，表面上看起来都非常正确、非常漂亮，我并不说它们不对；然而我还要问，你是从什么前提上推出来的这些东西。因为，我以前所反驳的那些，姑且搁下不管，我要问你，假如真把上帝的观念在我们心里就如同工匠的标记刻印在他的作品上一样，那么请你告诉我，这个标记是用什么方式刻印的？它是什么样形式的？你是怎么去辨认的？如果它和作品或东西本身没有不同，那么难道你自己不过是一个观念吗？你不过是一个思维方式吗？你既是刻印的标记，同时又是刻印的主体吗？你说非常可信的是，上帝是按照他自己的形象创造的你。
实在说来，这话用信仰和宗教的光明是可以相信的；但是，除非你假定上帝是有一个人的形象，这话怎么能用自然的理性去领会呢？这个相似性在什么上呢？你不过是灰和尘土，你胆敢跟这个永恒的、非物体性的、广大的、非常完满的、非常荣耀的、以及尤其重要的是，对我们暗淡无光的、软弱无能的精神来说，非常不可见的、非常不可理解的东西相似吗？
你曾经面对面地看见过他，把你和他比较，以便相信你是和他相象的吗？你说这是非常可信的，因为他创造了你。相反，就是因为这个，它才是不可信的。因为作品永远不能和作者相似，除非作品是作者用把自己的本性传过去的办法生出的。
可是你并不是上帝用这样的办法把你生出来的；因为你不是他的儿子，你也不能分有他的本性；你仅仅是被他创造的，就是说，你仅仅是被他按照他所想出的主意而制造的；因此，你不能说你和上帝相似，就如同你不能说一座房子和一个泥瓦匠相似一样。而且即便是这样，而假定你是上帝所创造的这一点，你还没有证明。你说：你领会出这个相似，同时你又领会出你是一个不完全、依存于别人的东西，这个东西不停地希求更伟大、更好的一些东西。可是，既然上帝相反地是非常完满、完全不依存于别人、非常自身满足无缺，他是非常大、非常好的，为什么这不反而是一个不相似的标记呢？不必说当你想到你是依存于别人的时候，你不是因此就立刻想到你所依存的是你的父母以外的人，或者，假如说你想到的正是你的父母以外的人，你也没有理由说明为什么你相信你和他相似；也不必说，奇怪的是为什么其余的人，或者是，假如你愿意的话，其余的精神们，和你领会的不一样，既然主要的是毫无理由认为上帝没有把他自己的观念象刻印到你心里那样也刻印到他们心里。肯定地说，仅仅这一点就再好不过地足以证明这不是上帝亲手刻印的一个观念了，即：假如是上帝亲手刻印的观念，那么所有的人就都会有同样的标记刻印在精神上，他们就都会用同一的方式、同一的样子领会上帝了；他们就都会把同样的一些东西归之于上帝，就都会对他有同样的感觉；可是我们所看到的却与此恰恰相反。不过，关于这个问题，已经谈得太多了。