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Chapter 11 The first group refuted the work of a Dutch theologian

Gentlemen: Seeing that you wish me to examine the works of Mr. Descartes seriously, I feel that it is my duty on this occasion to satisfy the wishes of those who are so honorable to me, partly in order thereby to prove my respect to you. The cherishment of friendship, on the one hand, is to let you know my shortcomings and what is still lacking in the perfection of my heart, so that you can be a little more merciful to me when I need it, and if I cannot achieve If you ask me, please excuse me from such tasks next time. It may be said, in my judgment, that Mr. Descartes was a man of extraordinary talent and modesty, about whom I think that Momus, who was the favorite slanderer, could not have found anything to blame. place of accusation.He said: I think so I exist; even I am thinking itself or spirit.That's right.

He said: When thinking, I have the concept of things in my mind.And first of all I have the idea of ​​a very full, infinite being.I agree.But I am not its cause, I am not equal to the objective reality of such an idea, so its cause is something more perfect than me, so there exists a being different from me, who has more than I have. More completeness.Or, as Saint-Denis says in chapter 5 of The Names of the Divine, there is a quality which does not exist in the same way as some other things, but which in itself is very simple and without Outsourcing contains all the essences of the being, and everything is contained in it as well as in the first and universal cause.

① French second edition: "Mr. Caterus, a Dutch theologian. About the third, fifth and sixth meditations". ②Momus, the god in Greek mythology who made fun of people's faults. "The person who loved to speak ill of others in those days", the second edition of French is missing. ③Saint Denys, the first Catholic bishop of Paris in the third century AD. But here I have to pause, lest I be too tired; for my spirit is already as excited as the stormy Euripa: I agree, I deny, I approve, I disagree, I do not want to oppose this greatness personal opinion Even so, I disagree.For, I ask: what cause does an idea require?Or tell me what an idea is.It is what is thought, in so far as it is objectively in the intellect.But what does it mean to be objectively in the intellect?This, if I understand rightly, is the consummation of intellectual action in terms of an object; in fact, it is only an external name, which adds nothing substantial to the thing.For, just as to be seen, which in my mind is nothing but the extension of the act of seeing towards me, so to be thought or objectively placed in the intellect, is itself to terminate or stop mental thinking; In itself there is no need for movement and change, or even for things to exist.Why, then, do I seek after a reality that does not exist, that is only a single name, a pure nothing?

①Euripe, a narrow strait between the Greek island of Euboea and the mainland, where Aristotle is said to have drowned. ②French second edition: "If I understand well, it is the thing thought itself". Nevertheless, says the great man: To the extent that an idea contains one such objective reality and no other, it must undoubtedly have some cause.On the contrary, there is no reason; for objective reality is a mere designation, it does not exist in reality.But the influence exerted by a cause is real and actual; what does not actually exist cannot have a cause, and therefore can neither depend on nor arise from any real cause, nor can it ever require a cause.So I have ideas, but these ideas have no cause, and there can never be a greater, infinite cause than me.

But it may be said to me: If you do not assign causes to ideas, at least tell me why this idea contains this objective reality and not that one?This is well said; and since I am not in the habit of saying nothing to my friends, but speaking to them, I say openly all that Mr. Descartes had earlier said about the triangle. .He says: Although perhaps there is no such figure anywhere in the external world of my mind, and never has been there, this does not prevent there being some quality or form of the figure, or definite essence, which quality, or form, or definite essence is fixed and eternal.Thus this truth is eternal, requiring no cause.A boat is a boat and nothing else; Johnny is Johnny, not Johnny.Nevertheless, if you compel me to give you a reason, I will tell you that it comes from the imperfection of our spirit, which is not infinite; for, since the totality is all-encompassing, our spirit cannot If the child can grasp it all at a glance, it divides it into parts, so that since it cannot get the whole picture, it takes it bit by bit, or as they say in the academy. In that way, comprehend inadquate [insufficiently], incompletely, part by part.

However, the great man went on to say: But this way of being in the intellect in which a thing objectively uses its ideas exists, no matter how imperfect it may be, it cannot be said that it is nothing, nor can it be anything. So let's say the idea comes from nothing. There is an ambiguity here; for, if the word nothing is the same as the non-existence of reality, then it is really nothing, since it does not exist, and so it comes from nothing, that is, It has no reason.If, however, the word nothing refers to that figment of the mind, which is generally called reason, then it is not nothing, but a real thing.This thing is clearly understood.Nevertheless, since it is only perceived, and since it does not actually exist, it can be understood, but it can never be caused by a cause, and it can never be placed outside the intellect.

He said: But besides this I want to check, this I who have the idea of ​​God, in the absence of God, or, as he said just above, in no being more perfect than my being Can I exist with his ideas in my heart?He said: Because, from whom does my existence come?Maybe from myself, or from my parents, or something, etc.But if I had it myself, I would doubt nothing, I would hope for nothing, I would want nothing; for I could give myself all the perfection of whatever idea I have in my mind, that In the first place, I am God myself.If I derive my being from another, I shall arrive at the end that he has his own being; thus.This, and the reasoning I have just done about myself, apply to him, and prove that he is God.I think St. Thoma must have taken this path. He called this path the causality of the efficient cause. This path was taken from the philosophers, but St. Virtue does not consider the causes of ideas.Maybe it's not necessary, because why don't I take the straightest and shortest way?I think, so I exist, I am even spirit itself and thinking; but this thinking and this spirit, either come from itself or from someone else; if they come from someone else, then from whom is this other person coming from?If it is from itself, then it is God; for what exists by itself easily gives everything to itself.

①Thomas Aquinas. ②The English translation is "Aristotle". I call on this great man here, and beg him not to hide his views from a curious reader, who may not be very bright.Because there are two ways to say the word "by itself".The first is in the positive sense, that is to say, by itself as by a cause; thus this would exist by itself, and give existence to itself, if it had been seen and considered beforehand. If a given chooses to give itself what it wants, it will undoubtedly give itself everything, and is therefore God.The second way of saying the words "by itself" is the opposite meaning, which means the same as "by itself or not by others"; if I remember correctly, everyone uses this meaning.

How, then, do you prove that a thing is all-encompassing and infinite if it exists by itself and not by others?Because, if you say: Because it exists by itself, it easily gives everything to itself, and I don't want to hear it now, because it does not exist by itself as it does by a cause, and before it existed, it did not exist. It is impossible to foresee what it might be in order to choose what it will be later.I recall hearing Suarez's reasoning before: all limitation comes from a cause; because a thing is limited and limited, either because the cause has nothing greater and more perfect for it, Either didn't want that kind of thing.Then if something exists by itself and not by a cause, it is true to say that it is infinite and not limited.

① Suarez (1548-1617), a Spanish philosopher. For my part, I do not quite agree with this reasoning; for let a thing exist by itself, as you please, that is, by nothing else, if the limitation is From within it, from the principles of which it is composed, that is to say, from its form itself and its essence, of which you have not proved to be infinite, what will you say then?True, if you think heat to be hot, then it is hot from its interior, from the principles of which it is composed, and not from cold, though you imagine it to be hot from nothing else.I have no doubt that Mr. Descartes has no shortage of reasons to substitute for what others perhaps have not explained sufficiently sufficiently, nor enunciated sufficiently clearly.

In conclusion, I agree with the general rule established by this great man, namely, that what we grasp very clearly and distinctly is true.I even believe that what I think is true, and for a long time I have renounced all monsters and everything that is deduced by reason, because no power can change its own object: if the will moves , it tends toward the good; the senses themselves cannot be mistaken, for the sight sees what it sees, and the ear hears what it hears: if we see the golden copper, we see rightly ; but when we use our judgment to conclude that what we see is gold, we are mistaken. ①Therefore, it is very reasonable for Mr. Descartes to attribute all errors to judgment and will. ① In the second French edition, there are the following sentences after this sentence: "At this time it is that we do not understand well, or rather, we do not understand at all; If there is no mistake, then when the intellect grasps a thing clearly and distinctly, it is true." But now let us see whether what he wants to deduce from this rule is correct.He said: I clearly and distinctly recognize the infinite being, so it is a real being, what is it.Someone will ask him: Do you know the infinite beings clearly and distinctly?What then does this common theorem, accepted by all, mean that infinity, because it is infinite, is unknowable?For, if, when I think of a thousand-sided shape, it vaguely represents a shape to me, I cannot clearly imagine or recognize the thousand-sided shape, because it cannot clearly represent it to me. Its thousand sides, how, then, can I apprehend the being that is infinite, clearly and not dimly, since I cannot see clearly and accurately the perfections of the infinite that compose it? And, perhaps, this is what St. Thomas meant to say, for after objecting to the proposition that God exists is clear and needs no proof, he himself raises an objection to what St. Damasenus said: for the existence of God The knowledge of it is naturally imprinted on the minds of all; therefore it is a clear thing, and requires no proof to know it.To this he replies: Knowing that God exists in general and (as he says) in a certain ambiguity, that is, insofar as he is a blessing of man, is naturally imprinted on our minds; But (he said) this is not simply knowing that God exists, it is exactly the same as knowing that someone has come but not knowing John, even though John is here, and so on.It is as if he wanted to say that God is known under conditions of common reason, either from an ultimate end, or even from a first, very perfect being, or , finally, in the sense of such a being, which vaguely and generally encompasses everything, but not in the exact sense of its being, for then it is infinite, for Unknowable to us.I know that M. Descartes would have no difficulty in answering those who ask such questions; nevertheless, I believe that what I have said in mere discussion will remind him of what Boethius said Yes, there are certain common notions which only scholars know without proof; if those who wish to know more than others ask much, if they take long to consider what they know has been said It is not surprising that they are not able to comprehend what they have put forward as the first and main foundation of all things, and which, nevertheless, they cannot understand without long study and very great concentration. ①Damascenus, medieval Byzantine philosopher and theologian. ② Boece (480-524), an ancient Roman philosopher. But let us agree with this principle and let us assume that someone has a clear and distinct idea of ​​a supreme, supremely perfect being, and from there what are you going to deduce?It is that this infinite being exists, and this fact is so certain that I should be at least as sure of the existence of God and of the truths I have derived from my mathematical demonstrations up to now; God, that is to say, comprehends a supremely perfect being who lacks existence, that is, lacks a certain perfection, which is as inappropriate as to comprehend a mountain without valleys.That's the crux of the whole problem.Anyone who backs down at present must admit defeat; for me, I have a strong opponent to deal with, and I must hide from his edge, so that since I must lose, I can at least keep I can't avoid things temporarily delaying it for a while. First, though we are here acting not by authority but by reason alone, let us hear what Santo Tomas has to say, in order to avoid this great man whom I should object to without reason.He made this objection to himself: as soon as people know and understand what the name God God means, they know that God exists; because from this name, people understand such a thing, which is nothing compared to His greater things can be apprehended.What is, then, in the intellect and in fact is greater than what is in the intellect alone; and this is why, since the name God is understood, and God is in the intellect, he is in Actually exists.I express this argument in terms of formal logic: God is such that nothing greater than him can be apprehended; The name, or its conception, contains being; and thus he can neither exist nor be understood without being.Now, please tell me, is this not Mr. Descartes' argument? St. Thoma defines God as such: that nothing greater than him can be apprehended. Mr. Descartes calls him a supremely perfect being; Something greater can be apprehended.St. Thomas goes on to say: There is nothing greater than himself that can be understood that contains being; otherwise something greater than him can be understood, that is: that which is understood contains being.But does it not seem that Mr. Descartes does not use the same minor premise in his argument?God is a supremely perfect being; and a supremely perfect being contains being, otherwise he would not be supremely perfect.St. Thoma reasoned: since the name God is understood and understood, he is in the intellect, and therefore he exists in fact; that is, since nothing greater than him can be understood In the concept of such a being, existence is included in it, so this being exists.Mr. Descartes deduces the same thing.He said: But only because I cannot comprehend God without existence, because existence is inseparable from him, so he really exists.Now St. Thomas replies to himself as well as to Mr. Descartes: Suppose everyone understands him by the name God to mean what has been said, that he is nothing greater than himself. Such a thing is apprehended, which does not therefore mean that one understands that what is meant by the name exists in nature, but only in intellectual understanding.Moreover, if one does not agree that there is in fact a something, that nothing greater than it can be apprehended, it cannot be said to exist in fact; that is how those who say there is no God openly deny God. of.From here I also reply in a few simple sentences: Although people agree that the supreme and perfect being contains existence because of its own name, this does not mean that this existence is actually what it is in nature. things, but only because of the concept of the Supreme Being, the concept of existence is inseparably linked together.From this, you cannot deduce what the existence of God actually is, unless you first assume that this supremely perfect being actually exists; for, then, it would actually include all perfection. Sexuality also includes the perfection of a real existence. You will find it better now, gentlemen, to relax my spirits a little after such tiring work.The combination of the lion that exists basically consists of these two parts: the lion and the being; for if one or the other is removed, it is no longer the original combination.Didn't God then know this combination clearly and distinctly, completely and eternally?Doesn't the idea of ​​this combination, so far as it is a combination, essentially contain this and that of the two parts?That is to say, isn't existence the essence of the combination of the existing lion?Nevertheless, the clear knowledge which God has for eternity does not necessarily bring into existence this or that part of the body, if one does not presuppose in advance that the whole of the combination actually exists; All the fundamental perfections that it would contain in itself, and therefore its actual existence.In the same way, although I clearly and distinctly know the Supreme Being, although the Supreme Perfect Being includes existence in his basic concept, if you do not presuppose the existence of this Supreme Being, it does not mean that this existence What is sex in reality; for then, having all his other perfections, he would also actually contain the perfection of being; and it would then have to be proved again that this supremely perfect being exists. ① The second French edition is missing. I say a few more words about the real difference between soul and body; for I admit that this great man was so tiresome to me that I can scarcely say more.If there is a distinction between soul and body, it seems to be proved by the fact that these two things can be apprehended clearly and separately from each other.On this point I confronted this learned man with Scotus, who said that in order for one thing to be apprehended distinctly from another, there is only one other between them. Call it the formal and the objective distinction, which he places between the practical and the doctrinal; thus he distinguishes the justice of God from the charity of God; because, he says, they are in Every intellectual act is preceded by different forms of reason, so that the one is not the other; nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that justice is apprehended separately from charity, and therefore can exist separately. correct conclusion.But I have unknowingly exceeded the limit of a letter. This, gentlemen, is what I have to say about what you have proposed to me. Now it's up to you to be the judge.If you pronounce me right, then let him not mind if I offend Mr. Descartes in any way; Lose once.goodbye.
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