Chapter 12 Author's Response to the First Set of Objections①

Gentlemen: I confess to you that you have brought me against me a formidable adversary whose brilliance and learning would have given me much trouble if this authoritative and pious theologian had not been more inclined to promote the cause of God and The cause of his weak defenders dislikes words that attack such a cause openly.But though it would be very righteous for him not to use that method, if I tried to be self-important I would inevitably be condemned.My plan, therefore, is only here to expose the means he employs in favor of me, and not to defend him as an adversary. ①The first French edition is: "The author's reply to a Dutch theologian's objection"; the second French edition is:

"The Author's Reply to Mr. Caterus' Objection". He begins with a brief rendition of the main reason I used to prove the existence of God, so that the reader may better recall it.Then, after succinctly assenting to something which he thought was sufficiently proved, and backing it up with his authority, he came to the crux of the difficulty, namely: knowing how the name idea, the idea, must be understood here. What is the reason for asking. I have said somewhere that an idea is what is apprehended or thought of in itself, so far as it exists objectively in the intellect.He deliberately understood this sentence differently from what I said, so as to give me an opportunity to explain it clearly again.He says: Objectively in the intellect, this is the consummation of intellectual action in the manner of an object, which is only an external name, which adds nothing real to things, etc.Here it must be remarked that this is of the thing itself, in so far as it is outside the intellect, and in the thing itself, yes, this external name is objectively in the intellect; but when I speak of ideas, It is by no means outside the intellect, with regard to which it exists objectively only means that it is in the intellect in the manner in which objects are accustomed to be there.It is like if someone asks, what about the sun that exists objectively in my intellect?People answer quite rightly: it is only an external name, that is, it completes my intellectual activity as an object, but if people ask me what is the idea of ​​the sun, they answer that this is the thought That thing itself, in so far as it is objectively in the intellect, no one will understand it to be the sun itself, in so far as it is in the intellect this external name.And being objectively in the intellect does not mean an activity consummated as an object, but in the intellect in such a way that these things are always there, so that the idea of ​​the sun is that the sun itself exists in In the intellect, not formally, as it is in heaven, but objectively, that is to say, in the way objects always exist.It is true that this way of being is much less complete than the way things exist outside the intellect, but it is not a pure nothingness, as I said before.

When this learned theologian says that a pure nothing is ambiguous, he seems to want to tell me the ambiguity just pointed out, lest I pay no attention to it.For he says that such a thing that exists first in the intellect in its ideas is not a real and actual being, that is to say, it is not something that exists outside the intellect; and this is true.Then he said that this was not something imagined by the mind, or a being deduced by reason, but a real thing clearly apprehended; what was brought up.But he goes on to say: since this thing is only apprehended and does not actually exist, (that is, because it is only an idea and not something outside the intellect), it is true that it can be Understand, but it cannot be caused by any cause, that is, it needs no cause in order to exist outside the intellect.I admit this, 1 but of course it needs a cause in order to be understood, and it is this cause that is the problem here.For example, if one has in mind an idea of ​​some very fine machine, one is justified in asking what is the cause of this idea; who says that this idea is nothing outside the intellect, and therefore cannot be caused by any cause but only He who is understood is unsatisfactory; for what is asked here is no other question than what is the reason why this thing is understood.The one who says intellect itself is its cause, because the cause is one of its activities.The man who says this is equally unsatisfactory; for one does not doubt this, but asks only the cause of the objective artifice in the machine.For though the idea would have such an objective artifice rather than that, it would undoubtedly have a cause, and the objective artifice is the same in the idea as in the objective reality or perfection of the idea of ​​God.It is true that one can assign various causes to this artifice; for either this is some real and similar machine which one is about to see, and the idea is imitated of this machine; a great knowledge of machinery, or perhaps a great ingenuity of the man by which he was able to invent the machine without prior knowledge.It must be pointed out that any artifice (which is only objectively in this idea) must necessarily be formally or preeminently in its cause, whatever that cause may be.Likewise, objective reality in the idea of ​​God must also be thought of.But if God does not actually exist, where can this whole reality or perfection be?This man of extraordinary brilliance has seen all these things; that is why he admits to being able to ask why this idea and not that has this objective reality; to this question he first answers: All ideas tell me The idea of ​​triangles is the same as before, namely, that even though there may be no triangles anywhere in the world, this does not prevent the existence of some definite quality, or form, or essence of triangles; this quality, or form, Or the essence is that there is no need for a reason.But what he judges is not satisfactory; for, even if the properties of the triangle are unchanging and eternal, this does not prevent one from asking why its idea is in us.So he went on: But if you want me to tell a truth, I will tell you that it comes from our spiritual imperfection, etc.This answer, however, seems to mean only that those who wish to oppose me here cannot answer anything of the sort.For, indeed, it is no more true that the reason why the idea of ​​God is in us is due to the imperfection of our minds than that it is due to our ignorance of machines that we imagine a very ingenious machine and not imagine an imperfect one. reason.For, on the contrary, if one has an idea of ​​a machine, containing in it all the artifice one can conceive, one can easily infer from it that the idea arose from a cause in which there is There is, in fact, all conceivable skill, though this skill is merely objective and not actually in the idea.In the same way, since we have in mind the idea of ​​God, which contains in it all the perfections which man can apprehend, it follows from this very evidently that on what causes this idea depends and arises. , this cause itself really contains all this perfection, that is, the perfection of God's actual existence.Of course, as not all men are versed in mechanics, and therefore cannot have ideas of very ingenious machines, likewise, if not all have the same faculties of apprehending God, the problem is equally difficult in both cases. .But since this idea is imprinted on the minds of all in the same way, and we see that it comes from nowhere else but from our own minds, we suppose it to belong to the nature of our minds.And it's not out of place.But we forget the other thing which one should chiefly consider, on which all strength and all light or wisdom of this argument depends, namely, that if our mind is only a finite thing (as it is), and If it does not have the cause of God as the cause of its existence, then this function, which itself has the idea of ​​God, cannot be in us.This is why I once asked the following: If I could exist without God; not in order to present a different reason than before, but to explain it more fully.

① "That is to say, it does not need a cause in order to exist outside the intellect, I admit this," the sentence in the second French edition reads: "or be placed outside the intellect. I admit this, because in It is nothing but reason." But here the politeness of this adversary drives me to a rather difficult place, and may arouse in me the envy of many; for he compares my arguments with those of St. Thomas and Aristotle. By comparison, it seems that he intends in this way to compel me to give a reason why I have not followed the same path in everything, since I have taken the same path as them.But I begged his permission to explain some of what I had said without mentioning others.In the first place, then, my argument does not follow from my seeing in sensible things an order or some succession of dynamic causes; partly because I think that the existence of God is far more important than any kind of sensible The existence of the sensible is more evident, partly also because I do not see that this causal succession can lead me elsewhere, but only makes me aware of my spiritual incompleteness, because I cannot understand so infinite a number of causes. How so eternally continuous with each other that there is no first cause.For of course, since I cannot understand it, this does not mean that there should not be a first cause; nor does it mean that one can reach a final division, after which a finite quantity can be divided infinitely, because I cannot understand it. This quantity is no longer divisible; but it amounts to saying that my intellect is finite and cannot comprehend the infinite, which is why I prefer to rest my reasoning on my own existence, which does not depend on any The cause is continuous, and nothing else knows it better than I know it; and I ask myself of this, I have not so much sought what cause formerly came into existence, and now preserves me, that I may use This method frees me from the whole continuum of causes.Besides, I do not seek the reason for my existence in terms of me as a combination of body and soul, but only and precisely as a thinking thing.I believe this is of no little use to this question, for in this way, for me to cast off my prejudices, to consider what the natural light tells me, to ask myself, and to firmly believe that nothing of which I have little knowledge cannot exist in my mind. Much better.In fact this is quite different from the fact that I consider my father also to be from my ancestors; and I cannot continue this process to infinity if I see the father who also pursues my father, in order to end this Pursuing, I assert that there is a first reason.Moreover, I do not seek only what is the cause of my being, insofar as I am a thinking thing, but I seek this cause primarily, precisely insofar as I am a thinking thing, which is in The thinking thing, among many other thoughts, recognizes in me the idea of ​​a supremely perfect being; for here rests the whole force of my argument.First, because this idea makes me know what God is, at least as far as I can know him; and, by the laws of true logic, never ask whether something exists without first knowing what it is .Secondly, because it is this very idea that gives me the opportunity to examine whether I exist by myself or by someone else, and to recognize my faults.Finally, it was this idea that he taught me not only that I have a cause for my existence, but that this cause has various perfections, and that this cause is God.Finally, I did not say that a thing cannot be its own efficient cause; for, though it is evidently true that one restricts the meaning of dynamics to those causes which are not the same as, or precede in time, their effects. , but it seems that it should not limit it in this way, on the one hand because it would be a meaningless question, because who does not know that the same is constantly different from itself and cannot be prior to itself in time?On the other hand, also because the light of nature does not tell us that the nature of the efficient cause is to precede its effect in time.For, on the contrary, it has neither the name nor the quality of the efficient cause, except that it produces its effect, and therefore it does not precede the effect.But of course the light of nature tells us that there is nothing against which it is forbidden to ask why it exists, or to trace its efficient cause, or, if it has no efficient cause, why it needs no efficient cause.If, therefore, I think that anything is in any way related to itself as the efficient cause is to its effect, far from here I want to conclude that there is a first cause, on the contrary, from what one calls For the first cause itself, I continue to search for causes, so that I will never reach a first cause.But of course, I confess frankly that there could be something in which there was a power so powerful and so inexhaustible that it never needed any help to exist, and it doesn't now. any help so that it is somehow its own cause; I understand that God is like that.For, even though I was eternal, because there was nothing before me, yet I see the parts of time separated from each other, so that just because I exist now does not mean that I should exist later, if Let me put it this way, if I am not every moment re-created by some cause, which I have no trouble calling the efficient cause, which constantly creates me in this way, that is to say, it preserves me. .Thus it seems quite right that, though God was ever-existing, since it is he who in fact preserves himself, he is said and called himself the cause of himself. (Nevertheless, it must be remarked that I do not mean here a preservation by any real, positive influence of an efficient cause, but only that the nature of God is such that he cannot not be eternal existing.)

Having said this, it is easy for me to answer the distinction of the word itself which this very learned theologian warned me to explain; A thing cannot be its own efficient cause, without here pointing out similar other kinds of causes in relation to the efficient cause, though when they say that the thing exists by itself (unless that thing is without a cause) , they are not accustomed to understand anything else, and though they prefer to dwell on things rather than words, they will readily recognize that the negative meaning of the word itself lies in nothing but the inadequacy of the human spirit. The opposite sense of perfection, having no basis in the thing, has another positive sense, which is derived from the reality of the thing, on which my argument is based.For, for example, if anyone thinks that a body exists by itself, he means that the body has no cause, and that he cannot use any positive reason, but only a negative one. to affirm what he thought, for he had no knowledge of any cause of the object.But this proves a certain incompleteness in his judgment, as he would easily recognize later on, if he considers that the parts of time do not depend on each other, and that thus from the time he assumed the object until now it is Existence by itself, that is to say without a cause, does not mean that it should exist in the future, if it does not have some real and positive ability in it, this ability, so to speak, is constantly regenerated. its words.For, seeing that there is no such power in the idea of ​​an object, he can easily deduce from it that the object does not exist by itself, and thus regards the term existence by itself as positive.In the same way, when we say that God exists by himself, it is true that we may also understand this as the opposite, and think otherwise, except that he exists without any cause; The reason why he exists, or why he does not cease to exist, if we consider the immeasurable, unfathomable power contained in his idea, which we recognize as so full, so rich, that in fact it is his If there can be no other reason than the reason why it exists and does not cease to exist, then we say that God exists by himself, no longer in the negative sense, but on the contrary in the positive sense. Said.For, though it need not be said that he is the efficient cause in itself, fear that the word may be disputed; but since we see that he exists by himself, or that he has no cause different from itself, not out of nothing, but out of the real, true immensity of his powers, so that we have every right to think of the effect of what he does to himself in a certain way, and the cause to it. does the same thing, and thus he positively exists by himself.Everyone also has the right to ask himself: does he exist by himself in this sense?When he finds in himself no power to preserve, even for a moment, he has reason to conclude that he exists by another, even by a being who exists by himself. , because, since here the question is present and not past or future, the process cannot be continued to infinity.I will even add here a few words, (though I have not said elsewhere) that a mere second cause cannot be traced, for, if it has such power as to preserve a thing outside itself, it would All the more reason to preserve itself by its own power, so that it exists by itself.

① "Re-", missing in the second French edition. ② "And...the reason", the second French version is: "Just as there is no reason to want him." ③Second edition in French: "And the real reason why it has always existed like this." ④The second French edition has the following text behind this paragraph, which was not included in the Latin edition or in the first French edition in 1647, but was added in the second edition in 1661.Descartes died in 1650, so it can be proved that this text was not read by Descartes and was entirely written by Clareser.

Now, when people say that any limitation is due to a cause, I think seriously people get it right, but they don't express it in any pure words and they can't get rid of the difficulty; because, seriously Limitation, so to speak, is but a negation of a greater perfection, not by a cause, but by that which is limited.Although it is true that everything is limited by causes, this is not obvious in itself, but must be proved in other respects.For, the delicate theologian answered well, a thing can be limited in two ways: either because the one who produced it did not give it more perfection, or because it is so in its nature, That is, it can only accept certain perfections, just as the nature of a triangle cannot have more than three sides.But I think that everything that exists exists either because of a cause, or because of itself, as a cause; for, since I grasp and understand not only existence, but also the negation of existence very well, Then there is nothing we can deliberately think to exist by itself so that it must be given any reason why it exists instead of not; so we should always give positive account of the words exist by oneself, and As if this were due to a reason (namely, due to a very rich ability inherent in him), this ability can only be "on" in order to prevent the objection that people may make here, that is, to ask oneself in this way I say it is impossible that a man of his own may have the power to preserve himself without being aware of it, but if this power were in him he must know him; is a thinking thing, in which he cannot be aware of anything, because all actions of a mind (such as this action of preserving oneself, if it is born of the mind) are thoughts, and thus are presented to the spirit and known to the spirit, then this action, like other actions, will also be presented to the spirit, known to the spirit, and because of this action, the spirit must know that it produces it. functions. All actions necessarily lead us to know the functions which produce them."

In the emperor, it is easy for people to argue. The generally neglected, though in fact unquestioned, question which this learned sage then agreed to me was so important to rescue philosophy from its seeming darkness that when he While affirming it with his authority, he has helped me a lot in my career. Here he asks, with good reason, whether I know the infinite clearly and distinctly; For although I have tried to guard against this objection, it is so readily presented to everyone that it is necessary for me to answer it a little more extensively.So I say here first that the infinite, in so far as it is infinite, is not really understood, but it is understood anyway; limit, which is clearly understood it is infinite.Here I make a distinction between indefini and infini.There is nothing I would really call "infinite" unless I see no limit anywhere in it, in the sense that only God is infinite.But those things for which in some consideration I merely see no end, such as the extension of imaginary space, innumerable numbers, the divisibility of the parts of quantities, and the like, I call them Infinity, not called infinity, because they are not endless, nor limitless, anyway.Again, I distinguish infinite form, or infinity, from infinite things.For, as regards infinity, though we take it positively, we only take it in a negative way, that is, from the fact that we do not see any limit in it.As for the infinite, it is true that we also understand it from the front, but we do not understand all of it, that is to say, we do not understand all the intelligent things in it.In the same way, when we look at the sea, we cannot but say that we see it, though our vision does not reach all its parts, nor measure the whole extent of its vastness.In fact, when we only look at it from a distance, it is as if we want to see it all with our eyes, but we see it dimly; We can only imagine all the sides of a polygon in a vague way; but when our vision stops at only a part of the sea, what we see can be very clear and distinct.In the same way, when we imagine only one or two sides of a thousand-sided shape, our imagination can be very clear and distinct.In the same way, I agree with all theologians that God is incomprehensible to the human mind, even to those who try to see him all at once with the mind, as if seeing him from a distance. in this sense, St. Thoma has said in the place quoted before: the knowledge of God is in our minds only in a state of indistinctness, like in a blurred image. see the same; but those who seriously consider each of his perfections, and contemplate them with all the power of their mind, not to understand them, but to admire and know how they surpass all understanding. , those who find in God innumerable and clearly known, and more easily than in any other creature.What St. Thomas himself recognized quite correctly, as can be easily seen in the following passage, is that he affirms that the existence of God can be demonstrated.As for me, whenever I say that God can be clearly and distinctly known, I never mean only the knowledge of the finite little energies appropriate to our minds.There is therefore no need for a different understanding of the truth of the things I am proposing, as it will be readily seen if one notices that I speak of the subject in only two places: one, when The question is whether something solid is contained in our idea of ​​what God has done, or whether there is only a negation of things (as one can doubt whether there is a negation of heat in the idea of ​​cold), which is easily questioned. known, though men do not understand infinity.In another place, I maintain that the nature of existence to the supremely perfect being is the same as that of the three sides to the triangle, and this is also fully comprehensible, without the need for a vastness so vast as to be included in God. Everything recognizes the impossibility of knowing.

Here again he compares my argument with another of St. Thomas's, in order to somehow compel me to indicate which of the two is the strongest.I feel that I can do so easily, since Santomar does not use this argument as his, and he does not come to the same conclusion as the one I use; finally, I have nothing here Leave this angelic Master.For he has been asked whether the knowledge of the existence of God is so natural to the human mind that it needs no proof, that is, whether it is obvious to everyone; he denies it, and I like him. .But his objection to himself can also be put in this way: When one knows and understands what the name God means, one understands that nothing greater than Him can be known;

But this is something that exists in the intellect as well as in fact, and it is greater than that in the intellect alone, so that when one knows and understands what the name God means, one understands that God exists in In fact it also exists in the mind at the same time.There is a glaring error of form here; For one should only conclude that, therefore, when one knows and understands what the name God means, one understands that it signifies a thing which exists both in fact and in the intellect; What is signified by a phrase is not therefore true.My argument is, however, that what we clearly and distinctly apprehend as belonging to something, the abiding, unchanging, true nature, or essence, or form, can really be said or affirmed to belong to ; but when we inquire into what God is carefully enough, we clearly and distinctly perceive his existence as belonging to his true, abiding and unchanging nature, so that we can really be sure that he exists; or At least this conclusion is legitimate.But this major premise cannot be denied, because it has been agreed before that everything that we clearly and distinctly understand or grasp is true.The problem is only the minor premise, where I admit that the difficulty is not small.First, because we are so accustomed to distinguishing being from essence in everything else that we pay little attention to how being belongs to the essence of God and not to the essence of other things; To distinguish that which belongs to the real, abiding and unchanging essence of something from that which is ascribed to it only by the fancy of our intellect, although we see quite clearly that existence is of the essence of God, But we cannot conclude from this that God exists, because we do not know whether his essence is permanent and real, or whether his essence is only a fabrication made by our minds.However, in order to get rid of the first part of this difficulty, it is necessary to distinguish between possible existence and necessary existence, and to show that possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of ​​everything that I clearly and distinctly apprehend. , whereas necessary existence is contained only in the idea of ​​God.For I have no doubt that those who will carefully consider the difference between the idea of ​​God and all other ideas will see quite rightly the fact that although we only perceive other things as existing, But this does not mean that they exist, but only that they can; To the extent that the existence of reality is necessarily and eternally linked to the other attributes of God, there must necessarily be the existence of God.Then, in order to get rid of another part of the difficulty, it must be observed that those ideas which contain no real, abiding and unchanging nature, but only fictive ones, composed by the intellect, can be captured by the intellect itself, not only by its thinking, but by A clear and distinct action, to divide; so that those things which the intellect cannot thus divide are certainly not made or composed by it.For example, when I think of a horse with wings, or a real lion, or a triangle drawn in a square, it is easy for me to see that I can do the exact opposite and think of a horse without wings. , a lion that does not exist, a triangle without a square, and thus these things have no real, permanent and unchanging nature.If I conceive of a triangle, or a square (I will not speak of lions and horses here, since their nature is not yet fully recognized), then, of course, whatever I shall recognize as contained in the idea of ​​a triangle , that the sum of its triangles is equal to two right angles, etc., I shall truly affirm that it belongs to a triangle, and that everything I shall find contained in the idea of ​​a square belongs to a square; for, though I can comprehend a triangle by restricting my thinking to such a point that I can at any rate comprehend only that the sum of its triangles equals two right angles, but I cannot comprehend a triangle with a clear and definite movement, that is to say, clearly Understand what I'm saying, and negate the thing from it.Again, if I consider a triangle drawn inside a square, it is not in order to ascribe to the square what belongs to the triangle alone, or to the triangle what belongs to the square, but only to examine what results from the combination of the two.东西，那么由三角形和正方形组合起来的这个图形的本性就不会不如光是正方形或者光是三角形的本性真实、不变。这样一来我就可以一点不错地确认正方形并不比在它里边画的三角形的两倍小。属于这个组合成的图形的本性的其他东西也一样。可是，如果我考虑到一个非常完满的物体的观念，这里边就包含着存在性，而这是因为在事实上存在，同时也在理智中存在，比光是在理智中存在有更大的完满性，我就不能由此断言这个非常完满的物体存在，而只能说它可以存在。因为我相当认识到这个观念是由我的理智本身做出来的，理智把一切物体性的完满性都结合在一起了；同样，存在性并不从包含在物体的本性中的其他完满性中得出来，因为我们既可以肯定它们存在，也可以否定它们存在。 ②由于在检查物体的观念时，我在物体里边看不出有任何力量足以使它自己产生自己或者自己保存自己，我就很可以断言必然的存在性（问题在这里只在于这种存在性），尽管它是多么完满，和它之属于一个没有谷的山的本性，或者属于一个比二直角更大的三角形的本性是一样地不合适。可是现在如果我们问，不是关于一个物体，而是关于不拘一个什么样的东西，它在它里边有着可以在一起存在的一切完满性，是否存在性应该被算在这些完满性里边。不错，首先我们可以怀疑这种事情，因为由于我们的精神（它是有限的）只习惯于把它们分别来加以考虑，它也许一下子看不出来它们彼此是多么必然地连结在一起。可是，如果我们仔细地考查一下，即：是否存在性适合于至上强大的存在体以及什么样的存在体，我们就会清楚，分明地认识到，首先，至少是可能的存在性对它合适，就象它对凡是我们在我们心中具有什么清楚的观念的东西，甚至对那些由我们的精神的幻想而组合成的东西，都适合一样；然后（因为我们不能想到上帝的存在性是可能的而不同时由于注意到他的无限的能力而认识到他能够用他自己的力量存在），我们就会由此断言他实实在在地存在，并且他曾经是完全永恒地存在。因为，非常明显，自然的光明告诉我们，能够用他自己的力量存在的就永远存在；这样，我们将认识到必然的存在性之是包含在一个至上强大的存在体的观念里不是由于理智的虚构，而是由于它属于这样的一个存在体的真实、不变的本性而存在；而我们将很容易认识到，这个至上强大的存在体在他自己里边没有包含在上帝的观念里的其他一切完满性，这是不可能的，因此它们都是由于其本性，不是由于理智的任何虚构而连结在一起的，并且存在在上帝之中。所有这些东西，对于认真对它们加以思索的人说来都是明显的，没有什么跟我以前说过的话不同的地方，仅仅是在方式上在这里解释的不同，在方式上我特意改变了一下以适合于各种各样的人。我在这里将毫无顾虑地承认，这个论据是这样的：那些不记得有助于证明这个论据的一切东西的人，他们会很容易把这种论据当做诡辩，这使我在开始时犹豫是否我应该使用这个论据，因为怕的是给那些不明白它的人以机会对别的论据也不相信了。可是，因为可以证明有一个上帝的，只有两条路可走：一条是从他的效果上来证明，另一条是从他的本质或他的本性本身来证明，而我曾尽我之所能在第三个沉思里解释第一条道路，我相信在这以后我不应该省略去另外一条道路。

①“完全”，法文第二版缺。 ②法文第二版下面还有一句：“也就是说可以把它们领会为存在，也可以把它们领会为不存在”。 关于这位非常博学的神学家说是从司各脱那里引证的形式的（formelle）分别，我简要地回答如下：形式的分别和样态的（modale）分别没有什么不同，它只能适用于一些不完整的东西，我曾仔细地把这些东西同那些完整的东西加以区别。实在说来，它〔形式的分别〕足以使一个东西被精神的一种抽象作用（它不能完满地领会事物）领会为同另一个东西有分别，而不是为了使两个东西被领会为彼此不同到这样程度，使我们理解其中的每一个都是一个完整的东西，和另一个完全不一样；因为，为了这样做，就需要一个实在的分别。这样，举例来说，在同一的一个物体的运动和形状之间，有一个形式的分别，并且我很可以去领会运动而不去领会形状，去领会形状而不去领会运动，去领会运动和形状而不去特别想到运动着的和有形状的物体；可是我却不能完整地、完满地领会运动而不领会这个运动所依附的什么物体，也不能完整地、完满地领会形状而不领会这个形状所依附的物体，最后也不能设想运动是一个其中没有形状的东西，或者形状在一个不能运动的东西里。同样道理，我不能领会没有正义者的正义，或者没有爱德者的爱德，而且我们不能设想有正义的人本身不能同时是有爱德的。可是，在我仅仅想到物体是一个有广延的、有形状的、可动的、等等的东西时，我完整地领会什么是物体（也就是说，我把物体本身领会为一个完整的东西），尽管我否认在物体里有属于精神的本性的一切东西。我也领会精神是一个完整的东西，它怀疑，它理解，它想要，等等，尽管我不同意在它里边有任何包含在物体的观念里的东西。如果在物体和精神之间没有一种实在的分别，这是绝对做不到的。 先生们，这就是我对你们的共同朋友的那些精细的、出于善意的反驳的答辩。可是，如果我没有足够的幸运来完全满足他的要求，务请你们通知我在什么地方还应该更加大量地加以解释，或者也许在什么地方甚至有大的错误。如果我能通过你们从他那里获得这项通知，我将不胜感激之至。