Chapter 10 Sixth Meditation On the Existence of Material Things; On the Real Difference Between the Soul and Body of Man

Now all that remains for me is to check to see if there is something material.Indeed, as far as people regard material things as objects of geometrical arguments, at least I already know that such things can exist, since I have grasped them so clearly and distinctly in this way.For there is no doubt that God has the power to produce everything that I can understand clearly and distinctly, and I have never decided that He cannot do anything because ①I cannot understand well.Besides, the imaginative faculty in my mind (which I use when I see from experience when I think about physical things) is capable of convincing me that physical things exist.For when I consider carefully what the imagination is, I see that it is but a certain application of the faculty of cognition to the object immediately presented to it, and therefore this object exists.

① French second edition: "just because of". In order to make this very clear, I first see the difference between imagination and pure intellectual activity or conception.For example, when I think of a triangle, I not only perceive that it is a shape made of and contains three lines, but besides that, by virtue of my psychic powers and inner workings, I also These three lines are seen as appearing in front of you, and this is what I mean by imagination.If I think of a thousand-sided shape, of course I understand that it is a shape with a thousand sides as easily as I understand that a triangle is a shape with only three sides, but I cannot understand it as I think of a triangle. I can't think of the thousand sides of a thousand-sided shape like the three sides of a thousand sides, nor can I (let's say) see the thousand sides with my mental eye as appearing before me.And though I am always in the habit of using my imagination when I think of physical things, so that when I perceive a thousand-sided shape, I vaguely picture a shape; but this shape is obviously not a thousand-sided because this shape is no different from what I would represent if I imagined a thousand-sided shape or another shape with a very large number of sides, and it can never be used to find the difference between a thousand-sided polygon and other polygons. difference.

① "and contains three lines", missing in the second French edition. If the problem is to consider a pentagon, I can, of course, attend to its shape as I do to a thousand-sided one, without the aid of the imagination; but I can also apply my attention to each of the five sides. on, and can also be applied to the area and space they contain, imagine the shape in this way.It is thus clear to me that I need special concentration to imagine, and I do not need special concentration to understand; and from this special concentration it is clear that there is a difference between imagination and pure intellect or comprehension.

I also saw that in my mind this faculty of imagining, as distinct from the faculty of apprehension, was by no means necessary to my nature or to my essence, that is to say, to my spiritual essence. for, had I not had this faculty of imagination, I would undoubtedly have been the same as I am, so that it may be asserted that it does not depend on my mind, but on something other than my mind. what.And I can easily see that if there is an object and my mind is so closely connected with it that I can think about it whenever it wants, then the mind can conceive the object in this way sex stuff too.This mode of thinking, therefore, differs from the pure intellect only in that, in comprehension, the mind is turned in a certain way upon itself, and considers an idea in itself; To consider something that corresponds to an idea formed by the mind itself or acquired through the senses.I said I could easily see that, if there were bodies, the imagination could do so, and as I could not find any other way of explaining how the imagination was done, I guessed that perhaps there were bodies; But this can only be said to be "perhaps"; and though I have examined everything carefully, I still cannot see any proof of the necessity of the existence of bodies from this clear idea of ​​their nature in my imagination. Come.

① "To comprehend", the second edition of French is: "To comprehend or to understand". But besides this bodily quality as the object of geometry, I am in the habit of imagining many other things, though less clearly, like colours, sounds, tastes, pains, and the like.And since I perceive these things better through the senses, through the medium of the senses and memory, which seem to reach my imagination, I think that, in order to examine them more conveniently, I should also examine what is Sensations, and see if I can draw any solid evidence of the existence of corporeal things from these ideas which I receive into my mind from this mode of thinking which I call sensations.

First, I will recall in my memory which of the things I formerly received through the senses were true, and on what grounds I had reason to believe them; Reason; finally I will consider what I should believe now. So first of all I feel that I have a head, two hands, two feet, and all the rest of this body which I regard as part or all of myself.Furthermore, I feel that this body is in between many other objects from which it is capable of feeling different kinds of comfort and discomfort. I see comfort through a certain feeling of pleasure or desire gratification, and discomfort through a certain feeling of pain.Besides pleasure and pain, I also feel within me hunger, thirst, and other similar desires to eat and drink, and I also feel certain bodily inclinations to joy, sorrow, anger, and other similar emotions.

Externally, besides the extension, shape, and motion of bodies, I see in them softness, hardness, wetness, and all other qualities that come to the sense of touch.Moreover, I see there light and shade, colours, smells, tastes and sounds, and the variety of shades, colours, smells, tastes and sounds gives me the means to comprehend the sky, the earth, the sea, and in general all other bodies. distinguish each other. Of course, taking into account all the ideas of these qualities that appear in my thinking, and only these ideas I really and directly feel, then I believe that I feel something quite different from my thinking, that is, It is not without reason that the objects that give rise to these ideas.For I have experienced that the minds which these ideas have presented to me do not have my consent, so that whatever is not manifested in one of my sense-organs, I cannot feel it, notwithstanding my desire to feel it. ; and when it manifests itself in one of my sense organs, it is impossible not to feel it.

And because the ideas I have received through my senses are far more vivid, more obvious, and even are much more clearly manifested in their own way, and it seems that they cannot be produced in me, so they must be caused by something else in me.Since I know nothing of those things but what those ideas give me, nothing else can come to my mind unless those things are like the ideas they give rise to. For, I also remember that I used the senses instead of the reason, and I realized that the ideas I made myself were not as definite as the ideas I got through the senses, and those ideas were often among the ideas I got through the senses. so that I can easily believe that I have no idea in my mind which I have not previously acquired through my senses.

It is not without reason, therefore, that I believe that this object [body] (which I call mine by virtue of some special right) belongs more truly and closely to me than any other.For, as a matter of fact, I can never be separated from my body as I am from other objects.I feel all my appetites and all my emotions in and for the body.At last I feel pleasure and pain in parts of the body, and not in parts of other bodies separate from it. However, when I examine why from I don't know what pain sensations give rise to sadness in the heart, and pleasure sensations to joy, or why this I don't know what stomach irritation (which I call hunger) makes We want to eat, a dry throat makes me want to drink, and so on, and I can't see any reason for it except that nature tells me so; There is no (at least I cannot understand) any relationship between the feeling of something that causes pain and the thought that this feeling causes sadness.

In the same way, I seem to know from nature everything else that I judge about the objects of my senses; for I see that the judgments I am accustomed to make in Considerations which enable me to make such judgments have been formed before. Later, however, many experiences gradually undermined all the trust I had previously placed in my senses.Because I have seen many times that some towers seem round to me from a distance, but square to me when I look up; the huge statues standing on the top of the towers are small statues from the bottom of the tower; On every occasion, I have seen that judgments based on external senses are erroneous.Not only the external senses, but also judgments based on the internal senses.Because, is there anything more intimate, more internal than pain?But people who have had their arms or legs amputated in the past have told me that sometimes they still feel pain in the part that has been amputated, which gives me reason to think that although I feel pain in one of my limbs, I cannot Sure ② it hurts.

To these reasons for skepticism I have lately added two other very general reasons.The first is that I never believe that when I am awake I feel what I sometimes think I feel when I am asleep; objects, so I don't see why I should trust things that seem to feel to me when I'm awake.The second is that I don't yet know, or rather I pretend not to know, the Creator of my being, and I see nothing that would prevent me from being just the way I was made by nature, to make me appear even to my truest mistake on those things. ①French second edition: "What they no longer have". ② "Affirmation", French second edition: "Completely affirmation". The reasons above which lead me to believe in the reality of sensible things can be answered without much trouble.Since nature has given me many things which do not make sense to me, I do not think I should put too much faith in what nature tells me. And, though the ideas which I get from my senses do not depend on my will, I do not think that it should therefore not be asserted that they are derived from something other than mine, since perhaps there is some function on my part. (although I haven't recognized it until now) is the cause of these ideas. But now that I have begun to know myself better, and have begun to discover more clearly the Creator of my source, I do not really think that I should accept in befuddles all that my senses seem to tell me; but I Nor do I think I should suspect everything. First, because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly apprehend can be God-produced as I perceive it, it is sufficient for me to apprehend one thing clearly and distinctly without reference to others. The one thing is distinct or different from the other, because they can be set apart, at least by God's omnipotence; and as to what power separates them, so that I can judge them as different things, it does not matter. relation.Thus, just because I do realize that I exist, and at the same time I see nothing necessarily belonging to my nature or to my essence except that I am a thinking thing, I do feel confident in asserting that My essence consists in the fact that I am a thinking thing, or in that I am an entity whose whole essence or nature is thinking.And, though it may be (or rather indeed, as I shall say) that I have a body, I am very closely united with it; but because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of ​​myself, that I am only a thinking thing without extension, and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of ​​the body as a mere extended thing and cannot think, so it is certain: this I, that is to say My soul, which is to say what I am, is completely and truly separate from my body, and the soul can exist without the body. Also, I have in my mind several quite peculiar and different faculties of thought, namely, the faculties of the imagination and the faculties of the senses. , that is, without an intellectual entity to which they are attached. 1 For, in our conception of these functions, or (to use academic terminology) in their conception of their form, they imply a certain intellect.From there I comprehend that they are not the same as I am, just as shape, motion, and other modes or accidents are not the same as the objects themselves which support them.I also realize that some other functions, like changing places, taking various poses, and similar other functions, cannot be understood without some entity to which they can be attached, nor can the first few functions be understood. Man comprehends, and thus they cannot exist without this entity.It is quite evident, however, that these faculties, if they exist at all, must be attached to some corporeal or extended substance, and not to an intellectual one, for in their clear and distinct conceptions Here, indeed, some kind of extension is involved, but never intellect.Moreover, there is in me a certain passive sensory faculty, that is, the faculty of receiving and recognizing ideas of perceptible things; but if there is no other active faculty in me or in another To be able to form and produce these ideas, then this passive function is useless to me, and I absolutely cannot use it.But since I am nothing but a thinking thing, this active function cannot be in me, because it is not based on my thinking beforehand, and the ideas are never assisted by me, and often even against my will. appears to me on the contrary; therefore it must be in some substance different from me in which it is formally or eminently contained (as I indicated before) objectively present in the idea produced by this function. all reality.This substance is either a body, that is to say, a thing which formally and actually contains all that is objectively and through representation in these ideas; or is God himself, or some other creature nobler than a body, The same is preeminently contained in this creation. ①French second edition: "Furthermore, there are several different thinking functions in me, each of which has its own peculiar way: for example, there are in me the functions of imagination and the functions of feeling, without them , although I can clearly and distinctly comprehend all of me, I cannot conversely have them without me, that is, without an intellectual entity to which they are attached or to which they belong.” ②French second edition: "Just as the form is different from things". ③French second edition: "Besides, I cannot doubt in my heart". ④ French second edition: "or in something else". But since God is not a liar, it is evident that he does not himself directly, nor through the medium of some creature (in which the reality of the idea is not formally contained, but only preeminently contained), the idea of ​​these things give it to me. Because, since I have not been given any function to realize that things are like this, but have given me a very strong tendency to believe that they are sent to me by physical things, or come from physical things①, then if the facts Since these ideas do not come from or arise from ① corporeal things but from ② other causes, I see how it can be argued that it is not a hoax.Therefore, it must be admitted that ③ there are physical things. ① French second edition: "On the contrary, I am very inclined to believe that they come from physical things." ②French second edition: "From elsewhere or produced in". ③French second edition: "It must therefore be concluded that". Even so, they may not be quite as we see them through the senses, for the perceptions of the senses are very indistinct in many things;1 but at least it must be admitted that what I perceive clearly and distinctly, that is, , in general, that which is contained in the objects of speculative geometry is real. As for other things, however, some are merely individual, such as whether the sun is so large, such a shape, etc.; but God is certainly not a liar, and therefore he has not allowed any error in my opinion without at the same time giving me some function to correct it, just on that basis As far as I'm concerned, I think I can assert that I have in my mind a sure way of knowing them. ① French second edition: "Because there are many things that obscure the perception of the senses". First, there is no doubt that there is a certain truth in everything that nature tells me. For by nature, in general, I mean nothing but God himself, or the order and arrangements which God has established in his creatures.As to my individual nature [nature], I mean nothing else but the sum total of all that God has given me. ① "Natural", "nature", "nature", French is a word: nature. But nothing is clearer or more obvious than this nature tells me, that I have a body, that when I feel pain, it is uncomfortable; when I feel hungry or thirsty, it needs to eat or drink, wait.I therefore never doubt that there is truth in this. Nature also tells me with pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I not only live in my body, as a helmsman lives in his ship, but that besides that, I am very closely connected with it, Melt, mingle, unite with it like a whole.Because, if this is not the case, then when my body is injured, I, who is only thinking, will not feel the pain because of it, but will only use my reason to perceive the injury, just like a helmsman It was like seeing by sight if something was broken in his boat; when my flesh needed food, I knew it straight away, without vague senses of hunger and thirst telling me.For in fact all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are but certain vague modes of thought, which arise from and depend upon the union of mind and body, as if mixed. Besides, nature tells me that there are many other objects around my body, some of which I should tend to and avoid others.And, of course, from the different kinds of colours, smells, tastes, sounds, hot and cold, hardness, etc., which I perceive, I do assert with certainty that in the objects which produce these different sense perceptions there is a great variety of Objects correspond, although they may not actually be the same as these objects.And between the different sensory perceptions, some make me comfortable and some make me uncomfortable, so I can draw a completely reliable conclusion, that ① my body (or so far as I am composed of body and soul) , rather the whole of myself) can get different safety or danger from other objects around. ①French second edition: "Therefore there is no problem". But there are many other things which nature also seems to tell me, but which I do not really get from nature, but are brought into my mind by a certain habit of judging things lightly. of; This makes it easy to make them contain something false.For example, just as I think that if there is nothing moving in a space that touches my senses, this space is an empty space; in a hot body there is something similar to the hot idea in my mind. ; the same whiteness or blackness I perceive in a white or black body; the same taste or taste as I perceive in a bitter or sweet body, and other things as well. .Stars, towers, and all other distant objects are of shape and size, etc., as they appear at a great distance from our eyes. ① French second edition: "Known from nature". However, in order to make everything clear in this respect, I should just limit what I really mean when I say what nature tells me.For I here take nature in a narrower sense than I call nature the totality of all that God has given me; and this is because that all-encompassing totality includes much that is only of the mind.What I mean by nature here is not referring to those things.For example: my conception of truth that once done cannot be undone; and many, many similar things made me realize by the light of nature without the aid of objects.At the same time, there are also things that belong only to bodies, and those things are not included here under the name of nature, such as bodies having the property of weight, and many other things, and I do not refer to these things, but only Refers to those things given by God as the sum total of spirit and body.This nature does tell me to avoid that which excites me painful sensations, and to approach that which excites pleasurable sensations; What conclusions should be drawn about what is outside of us, unless it is carefully and maturely examined by the mind.For I think it is only a matter of the spirit to recognize the reality of such things. For instance, though the stars do not impress my eyes more than the little flame of a candle, yet there is by no means any real or natural faculty in my mind to convince me that the stars are no greater than the flame of a candle, but I have been judging like this since my childhood, without any reasonable basis.Although I feel heat when I am near the fire, and even pain when I get too close, there is no reason for me to believe that there is anything like heat in the fire, and there is nothing like pain. Same thing, I just had reason to believe that there was something in the fire, whatever it was, that irritated me with heat or pain. ① "Little", missing in the second French edition. In the same way, although I can find nothing in some spaces that stimulates and touches my senses, I should not therefore conclude that there are absolutely no objects in these spaces.But I see that, whether in this or in many other similar things, I have often disturbed and disturbed the order of nature, because these sensations or perceptions of the senses are placed in me. Just to warn my mind of what is good or bad for the totality of which the mind is a part, which, up to this point, are quite clear and distinct, but I take them as They are used as if they are very reliable, from which I can directly know laws outside me, while what they can tell me about the essence or nature of objects is very unclear. But I have checked enough before that, notwithstanding the goodness of God, I sometimes err in judgments of this kind.Difficulties have hitherto arisen with regard to what nature tells me to tend to or to avoid, with regard to the inner senses that nature has placed within me; for I sometimes see mistakes, and thus I am directly deceived by my nature.For example, if poison is put in the meat and the taste of the meat is very good, it can tempt me to eat the poison, so that I am deceived.Yes, in this respect, of course, it is forgivable, since it only fed me meat that was very tasty, and not poisons that it did not know, so I can only draw the conclusion from this, That is to say, my nature cannot know everything completely and universally. This is of course not surprising, because since man is a limited nature, he can only have limited and perfect knowledge. But we are often mistaken also in those things which we get directly from nature, just as sick people sometimes wish to eat and drink things which may be harmful to them.On this one would say that what caused them to err was that their nature [nature] was broken.But that is not the point, for a sick man is as truly a creature of God as a healthy man, and he is no less unwilling than anyone else that God's good will give him a deceitful nature [nature], like a man made of wheels and pendulums. Like a clock made into a clock, when the clock is not well made and cannot fully meet the clockmaker's wishes to tell the time, it also obeys all the laws of nature with the same accuracy; in the same situation, if I regard the human body as a Like a machine composed of bones, nerves, muscles, blood vessels, blood, and skin, the absence of spirit in it does not prevent it from acting in exactly the same way as it does now, when it is not directed by the will and therefore by Spiritual assistance, but only by the arrangement of its various organs to act.I therefore readily recognize that since the body is, say, edematous, it naturally suffers from a dry throat, which habitually gives the mind a feeling of thirst, and thus tends to arouse its nerves and other It is as natural, in part, to make him ask for water, and thus to increase his ailment, and to injure himself, as to meet his body's need by drinking water when he is well, when his throat is dry.Although I have seen a clock designated for its purpose by the person who made it, I can say that if the clock does not move correctly it is because it violates its natural God made the machine, and gave it all the motions it should have in it, though I have reason to think that if its throat was dry, and it did not follow its natural order, and drank It is the same that is harmful to its health.But I realize that explaining nature [nature] in the latter way is very different from explaining nature [nature] in the former way.For the latter way is not a mere question of title, it depends entirely on my thinking, which brings a sick man and a broken clock to me in relation to a healthy man and a well-made in contrast to the idea of ​​a clock and watch, and it by no means signifies anything ② that exists in what it refers to; rather, to explain nature in another way, I mean something that actually exists in , so that it is not without reality. ① "Simple", the second edition of French is "external". ②French second edition: "in fact any". However, from the point of view of the body of a edematous patient, this is of course only a matter of external designation, because it is said that its throat is still dry when it does not need to drink water, because of its natural [nature] 〕broken.Even so, it is not a mere question of titles, but a fault of nature, which consists in its thirst, And drinking water is very harmful to it.So what remains to be examined is why the goodness of God does not prevent it, since the natural [nature] of such a man is false and deceitful. At the beginning of the examination, I saw first of all that there is a great difference between mind and body, this difference being that, by its nature, the body is always divisible, while the mind is absolutely indivisible.For in fact, when I consider my psyche, that is to say, myself as a mere thinking thing, I cannot separate parts in psyche, I perceive myself as a single, complete and though the whole mind seems united with the whole body, yet when a foot or an arm or whatever is amputated from my body, surely it has not been amputated from my mind what.The functions of wishing, feeling, understanding, etc. cannot really be parts of the mind either, since the mind is entirely devoted to wishing, feeling, understanding, etc.But corporeal or extended things are quite the opposite; for there is nothing corporeal or extended that I cannot easily3 divide into many parts by my thinking, so that there is nothing that I think is indivisible.If I had not learned otherwise, this would be enough to tell me that the spirit or soul of man is quite different from the body. ①French second edition: "It is not that I clearly know and understand that I am an absolutely single and complete thing". ②French second edition: "I know very clearly". ③ French second edition: "Because I can't imagine any physical and extended thing, no matter how small it is, it is easy for me...". I also see that the spirit is not directly infected by the parts of the body, but only from the brain, or even one of the smallest parts of the brain, that part which performs this function which they call the "common sense." , makes the mind feel the same thing whenever that part feels in the same way, though at this time the other parts of the body may feel differently, as evidenced by innumerable experiences which need not be said up. ①senscommun.Ancient Greek and medieval philosophy held that the common sense is the sum of the various senses, from which the various senses are divided. I also saw that the nature of a body is such that no part of it can be moved by a part of it which is a little apart, nor can it be moved by any part between those two bodies, although this distance The farther part does not move.For example, on a fully stretched rope with four parts A, B, C, and D, if God moves the last part D, then the first part A will move, and the way it moves is the same as stretching the middle part B or The same is true for the part C and the last part D remaining immobile.The same thing is that when I feel pain in my feet, physics tells me that this feeling is transmitted through the nerves distributed in the feet. These nerves are like ropes leading from the feet to the brain. When they are stretched on the feet, they also stretch the starting and ending points of these nerves in the brain, and stimulate a certain movement there to make the mind feel pain, as if pain is Like on the feet.But since these nerves must pass through the legs, buttocks, waist, back, and neck in order to pass from the feet to the brain, it is also possible that although their ends on the feet are not stretched, but only Passing over certain parts of the waist or neck, they will also stimulate in the brain the same movements that are received by an injury to the foot, and then the mind will necessarily feel the pain in the foot as if it were injured.The same should be the case with the other kinds of perceptions of our sense organs. At last I saw that, since of all the motions at work in that part of the brain which directly receives the impressions, each one can arouse only one of the sensations,1 it could at most be hoped or imagined that this motion should be able to arouse all the sensations, That sense which gives the mind the truest feeling and which is most commonly useful for the maintenance of the body's health. 经验使我们认识到，自然给我们的一切感觉就是像我刚才说的那样，因而在这些感觉里边表现出来的无非都是产生它们的②上帝的能力和善心。 ①法文第二版：“……起作用的每个运动使精神仅仅觉到一个感觉”。 ②“产生它们的”，法文第二版缺。 这样，例如当脚上的神经比平时更强烈地动起来的时候，这些神经的运动经过脊椎一直到大脑，在大脑那里给精神一种印象使它感觉到什么东西，比如疼，比如在脚上，精神从疼上就知道了并且激动起来，尽可能驱除疼的原因，把这个原因当成是对于脚非常危险、非常有害的东西。 不错，上帝可以把人的自然〔本性〕建立成这样的，即同样是这个运动，它在大脑里使精神感觉到完全不同的东西，举例来说，这个运动使它自己感觉到它自己，也许它是在大脑里，也许它是在脚上，也许在脚和大脑之间的别的什么地方，也许不管它是什么别的东西，不过所有这些都比不上它使精神感觉到那样好地有助于保存肉体的东西了。 同样，当我们需要喝水的时候，它就在喉咙里发干，这就运动它的神经，用神经运动大脑里面的一些部分，这个运动使精神有渴的感觉，因为在这个机会上，没有别的比知道我们需要喝水来保存我们的健康更有用的东西了。其他情况也一样。 从以上这些就可以明显地看出，尽管有上帝的至善，人的自然〔本性〕，就人是由精神和肉体组合而成的来说，有时不能不是虚伪的、骗人的。 因为如果有什么原因不是在脚上，而是从脚一直到大脑抻起来的神经的某一个部分上，或者甚至在大脑里，刺激起来通常和脚不舒服时所刺激起来的同样运动，那么人们将感觉到疼，就和疼是在脚上一模一样，感官就自然地要受骗了； 因为既然在大脑里的一个同样运动只能在精神里引起一个同样的感觉，而这个感觉是脚受伤了的一个原因所刺激比在别处的原因所刺激的时候多得多，那么这个运动把脚疼①而不是什么别的部分疼带给精神，这样说总算是更合理一些吧。而且喉咙发干不是像平常那样总是由于喝水对于身体的健康是必要的原因，而是有时由于什么完全相反的原因，就像患水肿病人所遭遇的那种情况，即使是这样，喉咙发干在这地方骗人也总比相反地当身体没有不舒服时骗人要好得多。其他情况也一样。 ①法文第二版：“总是把脚疼”。 当然，这个考虑不仅在认识到我的自然〔本性〕可能犯的各种错误上对我有好处，同时在更容易避免错误或者改正错误上对我也很有好处。因为，知道了在有关身体的合适或不合适的东西时，我的各个感官告诉我的多半是真的而不是假的，它们差不多总是用它们之中几个来检查同一的东西以便为我服务，而且，除此之外，它们还能利用我的记忆把当前的一些认识连接到过去的一些认识上去，并且还能利用我的理智，因为我的理智已经发现了我的各种错误的一切原因，那么从今以后我就不必害怕我的感官最经常告诉我的那些东西是假的了。而且我应该把我这几天的一切怀疑都抛弃掉，把它们都当作是言过其实、荒谬绝伦的东西，特别是把有关我过去不能把醒和梦分别开来的那种非常普遍不肯定的态度抛弃掉，因为我现在在这上面看出一种非常显著的区别，这个区别在于我们的记忆决不能像它习惯于把我们醒着时所遇到的那些事情连接起来那样，把我们的各种梦互相连接起来，把它们跟我们生活的连续性连接起来。而且事实上，假如有人在我醒着时突然出现在我面前又突然不见了，就像我在睡着时所见到的影象那样，使我看不出他是从什么地方来的，也看不出他是到什么地方去了，那么我就把他看成是在我大脑里形成的一个怪影或者一个幽灵，和我在睡着时在大脑里形成的那些怪影或者幽灵一样，而不会把他看成是一个真人，这也并不是没有道理的。可是，当我知觉到一些东西，我清清楚楚地认识到它们是从什么地方来的，它们在什么地方，它们出现在我面前的时间，并且我能把我对它们产生的感觉毫无间断地同我生活的其余部分连接起来，那么我就完全可以肯定我是在醒着的时候而不是梦中知觉到它们。而且，如果在唤起我所有的感官、我的记忆和我的理智去检查这些东西之后，这些东西之中的任何一个告诉我的都没有任何东西跟其余的那些所告诉我的不一致，那么我就决不应该怀疑这些东西的真实性。因为，从上帝不是骗子这件事得出来的必然结果是，我在这上面没有受骗。 然而，由于事情的必然性经常迫使我们在我们得出时间在把这些事情加以非常仔细的检查之前去决定，那么就必须承认人生是有可能经常在那些个别的事情上犯错误的；并且最后，必须承认我们的自然〔本性〕存在着缺陷和弱点。