Chapter 9 Fifth Meditation On the Essence of Material Things; Again on God and His Existence

I have much left to examine about the attributes of God, and about my own nature, that is to say, my spiritual nature; but perhaps I shall find another occasion to investigate, and when I see what must be done or what must be done After doing nothing to know the truth, the main thing I'm going to do now is try to get out of all the doubts I've been in for the past few days, shake off those doubts, and see if we're even a bit sure about material things. Can't recognize anything. But before I examine whether such things exist outside of me, I should first consider the ideas of these things (for they are in my mind), and see which are clear and which are vague.

First I clearly think of what philosophers usually call a "quantite continue," or an extension that has length, breadth, and thickness.The extension is in this quantity, more precisely, it is in the thing; to the thing one adds extension.Next, I can enumerate many, many different parts of this quantity, and add to each of them various sizes, shapes, positions, and motions.In the end I could assign to each movement a different duration of its duration. Not only do I see these things clearly when I consider them in this way in general, but when I pay a little attention I see innumerable features of number, shape, motion, and the like, the truth of which is not only So obvious, and so in tune with my nature, that when I began to discover them, I seemed not to know anything new, but to recall what I had known before, that is, to discover Some things that were already in my heart, even though I hadn't thought of them before.

What I think is most important at present is that I feel in my mind that I have innumerable ideas of things which, though they may have no existence outside my mind, cannot be regarded as pure nothing; and, though I To think of them or not to think of them, they are not of my invention, but of their true and unchanging nature.For example, when I think of a triangle, even though there may be nowhere in the world outside of my mind such a shape, perhaps never, but after all some definite quality or form or essence of the shape Still there is, it is unchanging, eternal, not invented by me, and never depends on my spirit, as we can show from the fact that we can deduce the various properties of this triangle ( Such as the sum of its triangles being equal to two right angles, the largest angle to the largest side, and the like, which, though I never thought of them when I first thought of a triangle), now I know very well Clearly, very clearly, whether I like it or not, they are all within the triangle, so it cannot be said that I made this up out of thin air.

If perhaps the idea of ​​a triangle came to me through my senses, because I have sometimes seen triangular objects, but this is only my own refutation of myself, because I can make a thousand things in my mind. Thousands of other shapes can not make people doubt that they have fallen on my senses, but this does not prevent me from being able to deduce various characteristics of their nature. Of course, I can also deduce the nature of triangles. various features.Of course these things must all be true, because I perceive them so clearly that they are something other than pure nothing; for, obviously, everything that is true is something.I have fully proved before that everything that I know clearly and clearly is true.I have no proof of this, but when I perceive them clearly and distinctly, I cannot but regard them as true, as the nature of my mind makes me do.And I remember that, even when I was still strongly bound to the objects of my senses, I still included among the abiding and unchanging truths of shapes, numbers, and other things pertaining to arithmetic and geometry, which I clearly and distinctly grasped. .

① In the second French edition, there is another sentence below: "Because truth and existence are one and the same". Now, if I assert from the mere idea of ​​what I can derive from my thinking that what I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to this thing actually belongs to this thing, may I not deduce from this about An argument and a demonstrative proof that God exists?Of course I perceive in my mind that his idea (that is, the idea of ​​a supremely perfect being) is no worse than any idea of ​​any shape or number.I do not know the fact of the nature of an actual and eternal being as belonging to it any more clearly and distinctly than I know what shape or number I can prove is really of the nature of this shape or number. poor degree.Thus, even if all that has been asserted in the preceding meditations were not true, the existence of God should at least count in my mind as certain as all mathematical truths which I have hitherto regarded only as regards numbers and shapes, despite the fact that at first glance It's not entirely obvious, it seems a bit sophistry.For, being accustomed in all other things to separate being from essence, it is easy for me to believe that the existence of God can be separated from his essence, so that God can be understood as not actually existing.Nevertheless, on reflection, it becomes evident to me that the existence of God cannot be separated from his essence, just as the essence of a rectilinear triangle cannot be separated from the sum of its triangles equal to two right angles, or the idea of ​​a mountain. It cannot be separated from the idea of ​​a valley.It is therefore equally inappropriate to conceive of a God (that is to say, a supremely perfect being) who lacks existence (that is, to conceive of a certain perfection) as to conceive a mountain without valleys. of.

But although in fact I cannot comprehend a God without being, nor can I comprehend a mountain without valleys, yet since it cannot be said that there are mountains in the world just because I comprehend a mountain with valleys, likewise, although Nor does my understanding of an existential God not mean that there is a God, for my thinking does not impose any necessity on things; Winged horses, too, although there is no such thing as God, I might be able to add existence to God.Absolutely not.Herein lies the sophistry that belies the appearance of this rebuttal.For, from the fact that I cannot comprehend a mountain without valleys, I cannot conclude that there are neither mountains nor valleys in the world, but only mountains and valleys, whether they exist or not, regardless of each other. How ② is inseparable; on the contrary, just because I cannot understand God without being ③, then being and God are inseparable, so God exists.It's not because I think of things as they are, and ④impose some necessity on things;

On the contrary, it is because the necessity of the thing itself, that is, the existence of God, determines my thinking to perceive it in this way⑤.For I can imagine a horse without wings or with wings, but I cannot conceive of a God without being, that is to say, a supremely perfect being who lacks a supreme perfection. ① "There is one", missing in the second French edition. ② "In any case", the second edition of French is missing. ③French second edition: "Only from me can only understand God as existing". ④ "And", the second French version is "or".

⑤ French second edition: "On the contrary, it is the necessity in the thing itself, that is to say, the necessity of God's existence determines that I have such a thought." Nor should I say here that after I admit that God has various perfections, I really must admit that God exists, because existence is one of the various perfections.And in fact①, my first assumption is not necessary, nor is it necessary to think that every quadrilateral can be inscribed in a circle; It can be inscribed in a circle, because a rhombus is also a quadrilateral, so I have to admit a mistake.I say that I should not say such things, because, even if I do not have to think of God, yet whenever I think of a first and supreme being, and bring up (let's say) his In conception, I must necessarily attribute to him various perfections, though I cannot enumerate them all, nor can I fix my attention especially to each of them. .This necessity is sufficient for me to conclude (after I have recognized existence as a perfection) that this first and supreme being really exists. ②In the same way, I am not obliged to imagine a triangle; but whenever I consider a rectilinear form composed of only three angles, I must use whatever is used to make the sum of the triangles not greater than two right angles. Add it all, even though maybe I didn't particularly think about it at the time.But when I check which shapes can be inscribed in a circle, I do not have to think that all shapes with four sides are included in this number; Besides what I can understand clearly and clearly, I can accept other things into my thinking.There is, therefore, a great difference between false assumptions like the above and the true ideas innate to me, of which the first and foremost is the idea of ​​God.

① "In fact", the second French edition is missing. ②French second edition: "This necessity is enough to make later (once I realize that existence is a kind of perfection) I can easily conclude that this first and supreme being exists." For in fact I have seen in several ways that this idea is not a figment of my own mind, but an image of a real and unchanging nature.First, because I cannot comprehend anything but God whose existence necessarily belongs to its essence; secondly, because I cannot comprehend two or many Gods like him; I see clearly that He must have been and will be eternally eternal before; and finally, because I have grasped in God a thousand other things from which I can reduce nothing, nothing Change.

① "Other countless things, from these things", the second French version is "Other many things, from God". Besides, whatever proofs and arguments I use must come back to this point: Only what I understand clearly and distinctly has the power to convince me completely. And even among what is thus apprehended, there are in fact some which are evidently known to every one, and some which can be discovered only by a more thoughtful and more careful examination; , they are all considered to be reliable.For example, all right triangles, although at first it is difficult to see that the sum of the square formed by the base is equal to the square formed by the other two sides, since obviously this base is Opposite the greatest angle, but once we recognize this, we believe that both are equally true.As for God, if I had no preconceived notions in my mind, if my thinking had not been disturbed by a continual stream of perceptible images, there would be nothing I could have known earlier or more easily than God. up.For is there anything more in itself than I think there is a God, that is to say, a supreme and perfect being, whose mere idea contains necessary or eternal existence, so that he is Is this matter clearer and more distinct?

Though I have labored a great deal to comprehend this truth well, I now not only believe it in everything that seems to me most certain, but I also see the truth in everything else besides it. Reliability is absolutely dependent on it; without this knowledge it is never possible to know anything fully. For, as soon as I understand something very clearly and distinctly, I naturally believe it to be true: it is in my nature.Even so, I can't always think of one thing in my mind.I am often reminded that when I judge a thing to be true, and when I cease to consider the reasons which prompted me to judge it, if I do not know that there is a God, there may be other reasons which can easily change my opinion. : This is also due to my nature.Then I could never have true and reliable knowledge of anything whatsoever, but only vague and unreliable opinions. ① "I naturally believe", the second French version is "I have to believe". For example, when I consider the properties of a triangle 1, I obviously know (I'm somewhat adept at geometry) that the sum of the triangles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, and when I apply my thinking to prove it, I cannot I do not believe this; but if I do not know that there is a God, I may very well, if I do not know that there is a God, though I remember that I understood it clearly that the sum of its triangles is equal to two right angles. skeptical of its truth, because I can convince myself that nature has made it easy for me to be wrong about even the most obvious and reliable things I think I understand, mainly because I remember often thinking of many things as True, reliable, and then there are other reasons for my judgment of these things as absolutely wrong. ① French second edition: "Straight-line triangle". But when I realized that there is a God, and that all things depended on him, and that he was no liar, I concluded that nothing I could see clearly and distinctly could not be true, though I no longer To think on what grounds I judge everything to be true, so long as I remember that I understand it clearly and distinctly, no contrary reason can be given me to doubt it, so that I have no doubts about the thing. There is a true and reliable knowledge, and this knowledge extends to everything else that I remember having proved before, to the truths of geometry, and the like. For why contradict me, force me to doubt them?Is it because of my nature that I keep getting it wrong?But I already know that I cannot be mistaken in my judgments about reasons that I know well.Is it because I used to think of many things as true and reliable, and then I realized that they were wrong?But I knew none of these things clearly and clearly, and at that time I did not know the law by which I really knew the truth. I believed them for reasons that I later saw were still Not as convincing as I thought at the time.Is there anything else to refute me?Is it because maybe I'm asleep (as I've contradicted myself before), or is it because these thoughts I'm having now are no more unreal than we imagine them to be sleep-dreams?But even when I am asleep, everything that comes to me clearly is absolutely true.I therefore realize very clearly that the reliability and truth of all knowledge depends on this one knowledge of the real God, and that I cannot know anything else fully until I know God.And now that I know God, I am in a position to acquire a full knowledge of the infinity of things, not only of those that are in God, but also of those that belong to the nature of bodies, which can be obtained by Be the object of the proofs of the geometers.Geometers do not care about the existence of this object.