Chapter 2 Chapter 2 On Freedom of Thought and Freedom of Discussion-1

The time when, hopefully, the "free press" had to be protected as one of the guarantees against corrupt or oppressive governments is over.We may now suppose that no further work is needed in order to object to allowing a legislature or executive whose interests are not at one with the people to dictate to them opinions, and to prescribe what doctrines or arguments they shall hear. What an argument.And this aspect of the matter has been advanced so frequently and so successfully by previous writers that it needs no particular insistence here.In England, though the laws concerning the publication of a book are as slavish to this day as they were in the days of the Tudors, they do not, except in moments of some kind of panic, when ministers and judges lose their temper in fear of rebellion. but there is little danger of it being practically enforced against political discussion;1 and generally speaking, in constitutional countries there is no need to worry that the government—whether it is fully accountable to the people or not—is constantly trying to Control the expression of opinion, except when it does so by making itself an intolerant institution on behalf of the general public.So let us suppose that the government is perfectly at one with the people, except that it never seeks to exercise any oppressive power when it thinks it is in accord with the voice of the people.But it is the right of the people to exercise this pressure, whether by themselves or by their government, that I deny.This power itself is illegitimate.The best government is no more qualified to use it than the worst.It is as injurious, or more injurious, to be used in accordance with public opinion than to be used against it.Suppose all mankind minus one held one opinion, and only one held the opposite opinion, then it would be no more justified for mankind to silence that one than that one (if he had power) should silence mankind.If an opinion is a private property of no value except to the proprietor himself, and if a hindrance to its enjoyment is only an injury to private persons, whether the injury affects the few or the many , there are some differences. (23) But the peculiar evil of forcing an opinion to be unpublished is that it is a plunder to the whole human race, to posterity as to the present generation, and even more to those who disagree with that opinion than to those who hold it. .If the opinion is true, they are deprived of the opportunity to exchange error for truth; A clearer perception and a more vivid impression of truth. ①When I was writing these few sentences, the "Government Reporting and Publication Regulations" of 1858 happened to appear, which seems to be a strong contrast to my words.Yet this unwarranted interference with the freedom of public discussion has not caused me to change a single word in this section, nor has it weakened in any way my conviction that the age of the use of punishment against political discourse, except in times of panic It's over in our country.Because, firstly, the whistleblowing regulations have not been upheld; secondly, the whistleblowing is not, properly speaking, a political whistleblower.The offense referred to in the ordinance was not criticism of the institution, nor of the actions or character of the ruler, but of propagating a culture which was accused of being immoral, that is, the teaching that the killing of tyrants had a legal character.

(20) If there is any truth to the argument in this chapter, it is to say that, as a matter of ethical belief, there should be the fullest freedom to proclaim and discuss any upbringing, however immoral it may be considered.Therefore, whether the doctrine of killing tyrants can be called immoral is not related to the topic of this chapter at all, and need not be examined here.But I would also like to make a few points: (1) This question has always been a public moral question; Unworthy sinner—this is considered not a crime by all nations, by some of the best and wisest, but an act of virtue; (3) whether right or wrong, this act It is not in the nature of assassination, but in the nature of civil war.That being the case, so as to the question of incitement to this action, I think that in a given case, this can be the proper object of punishment, but only if there is indeed a significant action that follows and there can be a difference between the action and the incitement. At least if a probable connection is found.Even so, an attack aimed at subversion is only lawful if the government under attack is in self-defense itself, and not by a foreign government.

It is necessary to consider the two assumptions mentioned above separately, each with its own branch of evidence corresponding to it.The argument here is twofold: we can never be sure that the opinion we seek to stifle is a false one; and if we were sure, it would still be a sin to stifle it. First point: the opinion which is sought to be suppressed by authority may be true.Those who want to suppress it certainly deny its authenticity.But those people are not impossible to be wrong.They do not have the authority to decide issues on behalf of all human beings and exclude every other person from the data of judgment.To refuse to listen to an opinion because they are convinced it is false assumes that their certainty is the same as their absolute certainty.Any silent discussion assumes the impossibility of error.

Its conviction may be considered on this common ground, and is no worse for being common. Unfortunately for the good discernment of human beings, in their practical judgments, the fact of their possible error carries far less weight than it is usually admitted in theory; may be wrong, but few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own possibility of error, and few allow the assumption that any opinion with which they feel quite certain may be exactly what they admit their own An example of a mistake made. Despots, or other men accustomed to unlimited obedience, feel this complete confidence in their opinions on almost all subjects.There are those who are more fortunate, who can sometimes hear their opinions refuted, and are not entirely unaccustomed to being corrected when they are wrong—those who submit only to themselves and those around them. The same infinite reliance is placed on opinions shared by men; for, in proportion to a man's lack of confidence in his own solitary judgment, he often cannot help but throw himself with unquestioning trust in the impossibility of error of the "world" in general. .

The so-called world refers to the part of the world that he has come into contact with, such as his party, his faction, his church, and his social class; If he wants to see his own country or his own era, then, by comparison, he can be called almost liberal and big-hearted.Nor is the man's belief in this collective authority in any way influenced by his knowledge of the fact that other ages, other countries, other parties, other sects, other churches, and other classes have thought, and still do, think exactly the opposite. shaken.He transfers to his own the responsibility of having the right to oppose the alien world of others; knowing that it is only chance that decides which of these innumerable worlds he will choose as the object of his trust, but now makes him in London. There are also reasons for a pastor to make him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Beijing--and he doesn't bother to ask.This, however, is self-evident, and as any number of arguments can show, ages are no less likely to be wrong than individuals; see, each age has held many opinions which subsequent ages have regarded not only as wrong, but as absurd. ; from this we can see that many opinions that are current will be rejected by future ages, just as surely as many opinions that were once popular have been rejected by modern times.

The objection which seems to be advanced against the above arguments would probably take the following form.This is to say that the impossibility of error is not presupposed much more in the prohibition of the propagation of error than in other things which public authority does in its own judgment and duty.Judgment is passed on to people precisely so that they can use it.Is it okay to tell people that judgment should not be used at all because it can be used wrongly?To prohibit what they think is harmful is not the same as requiring innocence, but rather the duty inherent in doing one's duty to act according to the convictions of one's conscience, however wrong it may be.If we never act on our opinions, because they may be wrong, we must disregard all our interests, and abandon all our duties.An objection applicable to all conduct cannot be a complete objection to any particular conduct.

It is the duty of governments, as well as of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can; to form those opinions carefully, and never to impose them on others unless they themselves are quite sure that they are right.But when they are convinced (as such reasoners may say), if they do not shrink from acting on their own opinions, and allow themselves to be brought to bear by those whom they sincerely believe to be of real benefit to the welfare of mankind, in this or other life, It is not loyalty to conscience but cowardice to spread dangerous teachings without restraint.Because other people in less enlightened days have persecuted what is now believed to be true, people will say, let us be careful not to make the same mistake; but governments and nations make mistakes in other things too. mistakes, and those things have not been denied as proper subjects for the exercise of authority.They have levied high taxes, and waged unjust wars; should we therefore refrain from taxing them, and waging wars under any provocation?People, governments, must act to the best of their abilities.There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there are sufficient guarantees for various purposes in human life.We can and must assume the truth of our own opinions in order to guide our own conduct; and that is no assumption when we forbid bad men to lead society astray by propagating what we regard as false and harmful.

To this objection I reply: This is presuming too much, and it is one thing to assume that an opinion is true because it has not been refuted in the contest of chances; It is another thing to argue and assume its truth: there is a vast difference between the two.The fact that we can assume the truth of an opinion for the sake of action requires complete freedom to oppose and refute it; Be a rational guarantee of being right. Let us consider the history of opinion, or the common conduct of human life, and ask, to what is it due that this or that man is not any worse than he is?Certainly not attributable to the powers inherent in human understanding, for there are often ninety-nine persons who are utterly incapable of a matter which is not self-evident, and only one competent to judge it, and the hundredth for, in every past generation, a number of eminent men have held not a few opinions which are now known to be false, and have done or endorsed many things which no one would now hold to be justified. matter.But what is the reason for the predominance of rational opinion and rational action among human beings as a whole?

If there is such an advantage—and there must be, otherwise human affairs would be, and have been, a state of near hopelessness—the reason lies in the quality of the human mind as an intelligent or The root of all that is valuable in a moral being is that human errors can be corrected.By discussion and experience man can correct his mistakes.Not by experience alone. There must also be discussion to indicate how experience is to be interpreted.Wrong opinions and actions gradually yield to facts and arguments; but they must be brought before the mind before they can have any influence on the mind.As for the fact, if there is no interpretation to indicate its meaning, it is seldom able to speak its own truth.It follows, then, that the whole strength and value of human judgment depend on the property of being corrected when it is wrong; and that it is trustworthy only so long as the means of correction are constantly at hand.If there is a man whose judgment is truly trustworthy, how does it come to be so?This is because he is sincere about criticism of his opinions and actions.This is because he is accustomed to listen to all that can be said against him, to learn from all that is right in it, and to explain to himself, and sometimes to others, the falsity of that which is false.This is because he deeply felt that the only way a person can get close to knowing the whole of a subject is to listen to what people with different opinions say about it, and to study the ways in which different minds observe it.There is no other way for a wise man to be wise; and, in the nature of human intelligence, there is no other way for him to become wise.To maintain a steady habit of correcting and completing one's own opinion by corroborating it with that of others, so long as it does not cause hesitation and hesitation in its execution, is the only thing upon which one can justly place reliance on that opinion. a solid foundation.In short, a man who has known everything that can be said (at least visibly) against him, and has assumed the position of being against all refutations—knowing that he seeks refutations and challenges rather than avoiding them, Knowing that he is not eclipsing any light that can be cast upon the subject from any quarter--then he has a right to think that his own judgment is better than that of any man or group who has not undergone a similar process.

Even those who are the wisest of mankind, who are most qualified to trust their own judgment, see the reasons necessary for trusting their own judgment, they should still be examined before that mixed group of wise few and foolish many, the so-called public, This request is not too much.The most intolerant of all churches, the Catholic Church, even tolerates and patiently listens to a "devil's plea" when canonizing.It seems that no posthumous honor can be granted to the holiest of men until all the devil's charges against him have been ascertained and weighed.Even if Newton's philosophy had been challenged without permission, mankind would not have felt so completely assured of its truth as it does now.Some of our most sound creeds have no safeguards upon which to rely, but a perpetual invitation to the world to prove them unfounded.If the challenge is not accepted, or if it is accepted and the attempt fails, we are still far from certainty; but we have done as much as the state of human reason permits, and we have not neglected what would give truth a chance to reach ours; and if the registry is kept open, we may hope that, if there is a better truth, it will be found when the human mind can accept it; Such an approach to the truth.

That's the amount of certainty a thing that can be wrong can get, and that's the only way to get it. It is strange that men, who admit the truth of the arguments in favor of free discussion, object to pushing them "to their extremes"; they fail to see that no reason, unless valid in extreme cases, is Valid in any event.It is curious that, having admitted that there should be free discussion on all subjects which may be doubtful, they think that certain principles or teachings are so certain because they are so certain—that they ?Certainly?Believe it is certain-so it should be forbidden to challenge it; but also think that this is not a pretense of impossibility of error.It should be noted that if any proposition were to be denied as certain if one were permitted to do so, but not permitted, we would call it certain if we called ourselves and those who agreed with us as certain. The arbiter of certainty, and the arbiter who does not listen to the opinions of others. In today's age, which has been described as "little of conviction and dread of doubt"-where men are not so much sure of the truth of their opinions as they are of not knowing what to do without them-it is required that an opinion should be Claims of protection from public attack rest less on the veracity of an opinion than on its importance to society.There are certain creeds, it is said, so useful—not to mention essential—to the welfare of society that the government is under an obligation to support them, just as it is obliged to protect any other social interest.In the face of things so necessary and so directly included in the duties of government, it is maintained that something less improbable of error is sufficient to entitle government, and even to compel government, where the general opinion of mankind Next, act according to its own opinion.It has also often been argued, and still more often thought, that only bad men would weaken those salutary creeds; and that there can be nothing wrong with restraining bad men, and forbidding what only bad men would wish to do.The idea is to frame the problem of legitimation that shackles discussion as a question not of the truth of the doctrine but of its usefulness; and thereby panders to itself and escapes the responsibility of pretending to be the infallible arbiter of opinion. They cater to themselves in this way, without seeing that it is merely a transfer of the assumption of impossibility of error from one point to another.The usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion: just as arguable, just as open to discussion, and requiring as much discussion as that opinion itself.To judge an opinion harmful as to judge it false requires a judge who is incapable of error, unless the opinion pronounced has ample opportunity to defend itself.Furthermore, it is not acceptable to say that although a heretic is not allowed to assert the truth of his opinion, he is also allowed to assert its utility or innocence.The truth of an opinion is part of its utility.If we want to know whether it is advisable to believe a certain proposition, may we not consider whether it is true at all?No creed contrary to truth can be really useful in the opinion of the best man, not of the bad; When accused of blasphemy against a doctrine, can you prevent them from asserting that defense?Indeed, those who are on the side of the accepted opinion have never forsaken every possible use of this justification; you will not see that they deal with the question of utility as if they could abstract it entirely from the question of authenticity, On the contrary, above all, precisely because their teaching is "truth" alone, knowledge and belief in it is maintained as essential.There cannot be a fair discussion on the question of usefulness when an argument of such importance is applicable only to one side and not to the other.And, as a matter of fact, when law or public sentiment do not permit the truth of an opinion to be contested, they are equally less forgiving of its usefulness in denying that opinion.At best they will allow at best to lessen the absolute necessity of that opinion, or the real guilt of rejecting it. In order to show more fully the harm of refusing to listen to opinions merely because we have condemned them in our own judgment, I think it advisable to confine the discussion to a particular case; Again I have determined those cases which are most unfavorable to me, that is to say, those in which the arguments against liberty of opinion are held to be strongest, whether on the record of controversy, whether on questions of truth or questions of utility.And define the opinions to be refuted as belief in God and belief in the other world, or any generally recognized moral doctrine.To fight on such a field gives great advantage to the unjust adversary; for they will doubtless say (and many who do not want to be unjust say in their hearts): Don't you think these teachings are sufficiently certain that you should Was it taken under the protection of the law?Is belief in God one of those kinds of opinions, and, if confirmed, would you say you're pretending to be impossibly fallible?But I must be allowed to say that conviction of a doctrine (whatever it may be) is not called a presumption of impossibility of fallibility.What I mean by pretending to be impossibly fallible is that acting on behalf of him decides the question without allowing the other person to hear what the opposite side can say.Even if I put this pretense on the side of my most serious convictions, I still condemn and condemn it with all sincerity.No one's persuasion, however vigorous, speaks not only of the fallacy of an opinion, but of its pernicious consequences, not only of its pernicious consequences, but of its (to use words I utterly despise) ) is immoral and impious; but so long as he engages in the pursuit of that private judgment—while enjoying the support of the public judgment of his countrymen or contemporaries—preventing the defense of that opinion from being heard, he is pretending Impossibility of error.This pretense is far from being less objected to, or considered less dangerous, because the opinion it is directed at is called immoral or impious, which is the most fatal point with respect to all other opinions.It is in what may be called immorality or impiety that one generation has committed such dreadful errors as to excite the astonishment and terror of posterity.It is in such cases that we see some memorable instances in history, when the arm of the law was employed to exterminate the best men and noblest doctrines; Doctrines are preserved as a cover (as if ironically) for doing the same to those who disagree with them or with their accepted interpretations. How often must mankind be reminded that there was once upon a time a man named Socrates, between him and the legal authority and public opinion of his time, a memorable quarrel. conflict.This man lived in an age and country rich in personal greatness, and those who know him and that age best leave him to us as the most virtuous man in that age; and we know that he is The leader and archetype of all moral teachers hereafter, Plato's sublime inspiration and Aristotle's astute utilitarianism—"two masters in sound tones"—this is moral philosophy and all The two springs of other philosophies—both have him as their source.The acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers of all time--whose reputation, after more than two thousand years, continues to grow, and surpasses all other names that have glorified their country--by the judgment of a court, He was executed by the people of the country for the crime of impiety and immorality.By impiety, he meant that he denied the gods of the state; indeed, his accusers claimed that he did not believe in any gods at all (see "Apology"). The so-called immorality is to say that he is a "man who corrupts the youth" in terms of his teachings and teachings.In the face of these pleadings, there was every ground to believe that the judge sincerely found him guilty, and put to death as a criminal a man who perhaps deserved to be called the best man that ever lived. To take another example of judicial crimes, which, even if brought up after the execution of Socrates, does not seem to be a decline in peaks, this is what happened to Calvary more than 1,800 years ago. event.This man, who saw his life and heard his conversations, made such an impression on his memory of his moral sublime grandeur that for eighteen centuries thereafter was worshiped as the incarnation of Almighty God.He was so vilely put to death.Who should I be? As a blasphemer.People not only misunderstood their benefactor, but misunderstood him as the very opposite of what he was, and treated him like an ungodly monstrosity, and it is they themselves who are doing that to him today. It is considered so.The antipathy of mankind today to those two lamentable dispositions, and especially to the latter of the two, renders their judgment of the then ominous protagonist extremely injustice.The protagonists, in all respects, are not really bad, no worse than the average human being, but rather the opposite; they possess the religious, moral, and patriotic sentiments; they are also a class of men who, in any age, including our own, have had every opportunity to live their lives in respect without condemnation.The great priest, when he tore his robes, and uttered charges which, in all the minds of the countrymen, constituted the gravest crimes, might well have been genuine in his terror and indignation, as they are today. Devout men are as sincere in their religious as in their moral sentiments; and likewise, most of those who today are horrified by his conduct, would have taken acted exactly as he had done.Orthodox Christians, who are apt to think that those who stoned the first martyrs must have been worse than themselves, should remember that among those persecutors was Saint Paul. Let us add another example, which is most touching when the impressionability of an error is measured from the wisdom and morals of the person who falls into it.If ever there was a man who possessed both power and reason to claim to be the best and most enlightened man of his time, it was only Emperor Marcus Aurelius. As the despot of the whole civilized world, he lived his life not only with immeasurable justice, but with the softest heart that could not be expected from his Stoic upbringing.The few faults that can be attributed to him lie only in the side of indulgence; as for his writings, the highest moral products of the minds of the ancients, there are only inconspicuous differences, if any, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. if.Such a man, such a better Christian in every sense except dogmatism than almost any prominent Christian head of state before, has persecuted Christianity.He stood at the pinnacle of all previous human achievement, he had an open, unbridled intellect, he had the qualities that guided himself to embody the Christian ideal in his moral writings, yet he failed to see the impact of Christianity on the world. — the world into which he has committed himself by duty — is a good thing and not a curse.He knew that society was in a deplorable state at that time.Nevertheless, he saw, or thought he saw, that the world was kept together and kept from getting worse by the adherence to the accepted gods.As a ruler of mankind, he sees it as his duty not to dismember society; and he fails to see how, if the existing bonds of society are broken, any other bonds can be formed to knit it together again.The new religion is openly aimed at breaking those ties. So unless his duty is to adopt that religion, it seems his duty is to extinguish it.Thus, since the theology of Christianity does not seem to him to be true or derived from the will of God; since the strange history of a crucified God seems to him extremely unbelievable, and such a whole is built on a foundation that he cannot believe at all. Of course, the system of thought above could not be conceived of as the motive force of that adjustment (unaware of the fact that it proved to be so, even after a weakening); In a solemn sense of duty, the persecution of Christianity was sanctioned.This incident strikes me as one of the most tragic facts in all history.It occurred to me that if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the Empire under the auspices of Marcus Aureus and not under Constantine, Christianity in the world would not have known It pains me mentally to be something so different.But it should be noted that, in the mind of Marcus Aureus, there is nothing that can be offered for the punishment of the doctrine of the Antichrist that would not be applicable to the punishment of the spread of Christianity, as he practiced it; and we would be doing him a disservice by denying this. Fair, and not in line with reality.No Christian believed more firmly in the belief that atheism was false and tended to the disintegration of society than that of Marcus Aureus, who, of all men at that time, believed that Christianity was just that. It should be considered as the one that best understands Christianity.From this point of view, I would advise anyone who is in favor of punishing the preaching of opinions, unless he admits that he is smarter than Marcus Aulius--more profound than he. If he is wiser than he is in the wisdom of the times, more determined to seek the truth than he is, and more determined to hold on to the truth after he has found it-he should be careful not to double assume his peace. The impossibility of error of the masses, you know, is what the great Antoninus did with such unfortunate results. The enemies of religious liberty also felt that, without some arguments justifying Marcus Antoninus, it was impossible to justify the use of punishment to restrain infidel opinion; Now and then they admit the above results; and they say, along with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity are right; will pass triumphantly, for the penalties of the law are at last powerless against truth, though they sometimes produce a salutary effect against injurious error.This is a form of justification for religious intolerance that deserves sufficient attention rather than ignoring the past. This theory of justifying the persecution of truth because persecution is incapable of inflicting harm on truth cannot be dismissed as deliberate hostility to the acceptance of new truths, but the treatment of those who have benefited mankind in such a way as to render mankind in debt to them, we It can't really be called generosity.Know that it is a matter of discovering to the world something deeply connected with it, which it did not know before, and proving to the world that it has misunderstood some important points concerning earthly or spiritual interests. The great service that man can do to his fellow man is in some cases as great as the contribution of the early Christians and later reformers, when like-minded Dr. Johnson believed that it was possible to bestow upon mankind most precious gift. Yet this doctrine holds that martyrdom should be the reward for the masters of such splendid benefits, and that the reward for them is to be treated as the worst of sinners, and that is not to say that human beings should be sedated. The lamentable mistakes and misfortunes that are mourned by holding ashes are regarded as normal and can be interpreted as the right state of things.According to this doctrine, whoever advocates a new truth should, and has stood, as in the Legislative Assembly of the Locrians, when a new law is to be proposed, a noose is put around the neck, and as soon as a mass meeting hears Having stated his reasons and inappropriately adopted them, he immediately tightened the noose and strangled him.Whoever defends this treatment of beneficiaries, we cannot imagine how much he will value that beneficence; and I believe he who thinks this must think that new truths might have once been advisable, but Now we have enough truth. As for saying that truth will always triumph over persecution, this is actually an optimistic mistake. People repeat it one after another until it becomes a cliché, but all experience proves otherwise.History is rich in examples of persecution that suppressed the truth.Suppresses truth centuries, if not forever.As regards religion alone, the Reformation had erupted at least twenty times before Luther, and all of them were suppressed.Arnold of Brescia was suppressed.多尔契诺（Fra Dolcino）被镇压下去了。萨旺那罗拉（Savonarola）被镇压下去了。阿尔拜儒之徒（Albigeois）被镇压下去了。佛奥杜之徒（Vaudois）被镇压下去了。乐拉之徒（Lollards）被镇压下去了。胡斯之徒（Hussites）被镇压下去了。即使在路德时期以后，只要什么地方坚持迫害，迫害总是成功的。在西班牙，在意大利，在东西佛兰德（Flanders），以及在奥帝国，新教就被根绝了；在英国，若是玛丽女王（Queen Mary）活着，或者伊丽莎白女王（Queen Elizabeth）死了，也很会早已是那样的。迫害一直是成功的，除开在异端者已经成为过强的党派以致无法做到有效迫害的地方。没有一个可以理喻的人能够怀疑，基督教曾可能在罗马帝国被消灭净尽。它之所以能够传布并占得优势，乃因多次迫害都只是间或发生的，仅仅持续一个短的时间，其间则隔有很长的几乎未经阻扰的宣传时隙。由此可见，若谓真理只因其为真理便具有什么固有的力量，能够抵抗错误，能够面临监狱和炮烙而挺占优胜，这乃是一种空洞无根的情操。 须知人们之热心于真理并不胜于他们之往往热心于错误，而一使用到足量的法律的或甚至仅仅社会的惩罚，一般说来对二者便都能成功地制止其宣传。真理所享有的真正优越之处乃在这里：一个意见只要是真确的，尽管可以一次再次或甚至多次被压熄下去，但在悠悠岁月的进程中一般总会不断有人把它重新发现出来，直到某一次的重现恰值情况有利，幸得逃过迫害，直至它头角崭露，能够抵住随后再试图压制它的一切努力。 人们会说，我们现在已不把倡导新意见的人处死了，我们已不象我们先人之杀戮先知者，我们甚至还替他们营造坟墓。真的，我们是不再弄死异端者了；现代舆情所能容忍的对于即使是最有毒害的意见的惩罚，其程度也不足以根据那些意见。但是，还让我们不要阿谀自己，认为我们现在已经免于法律迫害的污点了。对于意见的惩罚，或者至少对于发表意见的惩罚，还凭法律而存在着；至于这些罚章的执行，即使在近时，也并非一无例证致使人们可以完全不信其有一天会充分复活起来。即在1857年，在康沃（Cornwall）郡的夏季巡回裁判庭，就有一个不幸的人，①据说在生活一切关系方面都还是碌碌庸行的，只因说了和在门上写了几句触犯基督教的话就被判处二十一个月的徒刑。在同时的一个月之内，在旧百雷（Old Bailey）地方，又有两个人分别在两个场合上被拒绝充当陪审员，②其中一人并受到推事和律师之一的重大侮辱，只因他们诚实地自陈没有什么神学的信仰；同时还有第三个，一个外国人，则因同样的理由被拒绝对一个窃贼进行控诉。③这种对于报怨求偿的拒绝，系依据法律上的一条教义，即凡不宣称相信一个神（任何一个神就足够了）和相信彼界的人概不能被准许到法庭作证。这无异于宣布这种人为法外之人，被排拒在法庭的保护之外；这不仅等于说，人们可以对他们进行掠夺或攻击而不受处罚，只要没有他人而只有他们自己或抱有同类意见的人在场，这还等于说，人们也可以对任何人进行掠夺或攻击而不受处罚，假如要证明这事实只有靠他们来作证的话。这条教义又以一个假定为根据，就是说，凡不信彼界的人，其誓言概无价值。这个命题显示着，赞成它的人对于历史是太无知了（因为历史上千真万确的情况是，各个时代都有很高成数的无信仰者乃是出色的正直而享有荣誉的人）；凡人只要稍稍理会到，有多少以道德和成就而享世界盛名的人都是众所深知至少是其熟人们所深知的无信仰者，谁就再也不会主强这个命题了。再说，这条规律又是自杀性的，它取消掉自己的基础。在凡是无神论者必是说谎者这一假定之下，它容许了所有愿意说谎的无神论者来作证词，而所拒绝的倒只是那些敢冒不韪，宁愿公开自认一条人所痛恶的信条而不愿肯定一点虚妄之事的人们。实行这样一条自判为背谬于其所设目的的规律，只能视为仇恨的标志，迫害行为的遣骸，同时也是迫害行为本身，而且还具有一个特点，即受迫害的资格正是清楚地被证明为不应受迫害。并且，这条规律以及它所含的学理对于有信仰的人也是一个侮辱，正不亚于对于无信仰的人是一个侮辱。因为，若谓凡不信彼界的人必然要说谎，那么势必要说凡信彼界者之避免说谎，假如他们是避免了的话，只是因为怕入地狱了。对于这条规律的创作者和教唆者，我们且不伤他们，且不说他们所形成的基督道德的概念乃是出自他们自己的意识吧了。不错，这些情况只是迫害行为的陈迹和残余，可以不认作意欲实行迫害的标志；英国人心理往往有一种优柔虚弱状态，当自己实巳不复坏到要实行一条坏原则时却反常地以主张那条原则为乐，上述残余情况正可视为这种心理状态之一例。但是，不幸之处则在，停顿已近一代之久的更坏形式之下的法律迫害能否继续停顿下去，这在公众心理状态中并没有什么保证。在现在这个年代里，日常事物平静的表面常会为复活旧罪恶的尝试所搅动，正象为倡导新惠益的尝试所搅动一样。目前所夸称的宗教复兴，在狭隘而无文化的人们心中至少同样也是迷信的复活；而凡是人民情绪中还存有不宽容思想的强烈而经久的酵母的地方——这是无论何时都留踞在我国中等阶级之中的——总是无需费力就能挑动他们去积极迫害他们所从来不视为迫害的正当对象的人们。④使得我们这个国度不能成为一个精神自由的地方的正是这一点，正狂热的人们和大言不惭的人们从教堂讲坛上发出的各种谵语就不值得去理会了；而福音派的首脑们在管治印度人和回教徒问题上也当作一条原则宣称说，凡不讲授圣经的学校概不得受公款资助，其后果必然是，凡非真正的或假冒的基督徒也一概不得授予公职。据报告，一位副国务大臣于1857年11月12日向选民发表演讲时曾说：“不列颠政府宽容他们的信仰”（不列颠亿万臣民的信仰），“宽容他们所称为宗教的迷信，这已产生了阻滞不列颠声誉上升的作用，已产生了阻碍基督教健康成长的作用。……宽容当然是我国宗教自由的巨大基石；但不要让他们滥用宽容这一贵重的字眼。照他理解，所谓宽容，乃是?在?具?有?同?一?崇?拜?基?础?的?基?督?徒?之?中，大家都有完全的崇拜自由；乃是对?具?有?一?个?居?间?的?共?同?信?仰?的?基?督?徒?中各个不同宗派的宽容。”我请大家注意这一事实：一个被认为适宜在自由党政权下在我国政府中担任高级官职的人竟会主张这样一条教义，认为凡不信基督为神的人概应屏诸宽容的界线之外。试问，看到这种獃子般的表现之后，谁还能溺于错觉，以为宗教迫害之事已经一去不复反了呢？①这人是托玛斯普雷（Thomas pooley），于1857年7月31日受到波德明巡回裁判庭（Bodmin Assizes）的判处。12月，他得到皇室的特赦。 ②一人是呼里约克（George Jacob Holyoake），事件发生于1857年8月17日；另一人是楚勒夫（Edward Truelove），事件发生于1857年7月。 ③这人是格莱钦的男爵（Baron de Gleichen），事件发生于1857年8月4日，在马尔波鲁街警察法庭上（Marlborough Street police Court）。 ④近来有一种激动的迫害情绪得到大量灌输，并与印度兵叛变事件中我国民族性最坏部分的普泛开展结合起来；我们从这里可以得到很多警示。 是人们对于不信仰他们所重视的信条的人所抱的意见和所怀的情绪。在过去很长的时间里，法律惩罚的主要害处就在它加强了社会的诋毁。而正是社会的诋毁乃是真正有效力的东西，其效力竟使得在英国，在社会戒律之下，敢于发表意见的事比在他国，在法律惩罚的危险之下，还要少见得多。对于除开经济情况使其无赖于他人的善意而外的一切人，在发表意见的问题上，舆论是象法律一样有效力的；人们可以被投置在监狱之内，同样也可以被排拒在赚取面包的办法之外。 那些已将面包稳取到手而无需或向有权势者，或向团体，或向公众取得恩遇的人们，在公开发表意见方面自然不怕什么，可是只怕被人想来不好，谈论不好，而这些则应当不需要什么了不起的英雄性格才使他们能够承受。关于这种人，是没有什么诉诸怜悯心情替他们辩解之余地的。但是，虽然我们已不象从前所惯为的那样把许多灾祸加于和我们思想不同的人，可是也许会以我们现在对待他们的办法对我们自己做出与历来同样多的灾祸。苏格拉底是被处死了，但苏格拉底的哲学则如日在中天，光辉照遍整个的知识长空。基督徒是被投饲狮子了，但基督教会则长成一株堂皇繁茂的大树，高出于那些较老而较少生气的生长物，并以其复荫窒抑着它们。我们现在仅仅有点社会的不宽容，这既不杀死一个人，也不拔除什么意见，但是这却诱导人们把意见遮掩起来，或者避免积极努力去传布意见。在我们这里，以每十年或每一代来看，异端意见极少取得或者甚至还丢失了它们的阵地；它们从来不曾传布得遥远而广泛，而只是保持在一些深思勤学的人们的狭小圈子里暗暗燃烧着；它们在那些人中间发源开端，却从来未得以其真的或假的光亮照到人类的一般事务。这样，就形成了一种事态，有些人觉得很可满意，因为这里没有对什么人罚款、把什么人监禁的不愉快过程就把一切得势的意见维持得外表上未遭扰乱，而同时对那些溺于思想痼疾的异议者也并未绝对制止他们运用理性。这在保持知识界中的宁静、保持其中一切事物都一仍旧贯地进行方面，倒不失为一个便宜的方案。 但是为知识方面这种平静所付出的代价却是牺牲掉人类心灵中的全部道德勇敢性。这样一种事态，有一大部分最积极、最好钻研的知识分子都觉得最好把真正的原则以及信念的根据保藏在自己心里，而在公开演讲中则把自己的结论尽量配合于他们内心所弃绝的前提——这是决不能产生出那种一度装饰过知识界的开朗无畏的人物以及合乎逻辑而贯彻始终的知识分子的。在这种事态之下，只能找到这样一类的人，不是滥调的应声虫，就是真理的应时货，他们在一切重大题目上的论证都是为着听众，而不是自己真正信服的东西。还有些人出于这两途之外，则把其思想和兴趣局限在一些说来不致犯到原则领域以内的事物上，即局限在一些细小的实际的问题上——这些事物，只要人类心灵得到加强和扩大，是自己就会弄对，也是非到那时不能实际弄对的：在那时，那些足以加强和扩大人们的心灵以及人们对于最高问题的自由而勇敢的思想的事物被放弃了。 凡认为异端者方面这种缄默不算一种灾害的人，首先应当思量一下，这样缄默的结果是使异端意见永远得不到公平透彻的讨论；而一些经不起这样讨论的异端意见，虽然会被遏止不得散布，却不会就此消失。由于禁止一切不归结于正统结论的探讨，败坏最甚的还不是异端者的心灵。最大的损害乃在那些并非异端者的人，由于害怕异端之称，他们的整个精神发展被限制了，他们的理性弄得痀了。世界上有一大群大有前途的知识分子和秉性怯弱的人物，弄得不敢追随任何勇敢、有生气的和独立的思想的结果，否则就要把自己带到会被认为不信教或不道德的境地——请问谁能计算这世界受到何等的损失？在这一大群之中，我们还可以间或看到某个具有深刻良心和精细理解的人，用其一生以他所不能压熄的智力从事于矫作世故，并竭其一切巧思努力于把其良心和理性所迫促的东西与正统调和起来，而最后或许还办不成功。须知作为一个思想家，其第一个义务就是随其智力所之而不论它会导至什么结论，谁不认识到这一点谁就不能成为一个伟大的思想家。设有人以相当的勤劬和准备自己进行思考可是产生错误，另有人则抱持真确的意见可是只为免使自己思考，在这两种情况下，真理所得于前者的比所得于后者的要多。还不是单单为着或者主要为着形成伟大思想家才需要思想自由。相反，为着使一般人都能获致他们所能达到的精神体量，思想自由是同样或者甚至更加必不可少。在精神奴役的一般气氛之中，曾经有过而且也会再有伟大的个人思想家。可是在那种气氛之中，从来没有而且也永不会有一种智力活跃的人民。若见哪一国人民一时曾经接近于那种性格，那是因为对于异端思想的恐惧会经暂告停止。只要哪里存在着凡原则概不得争辩的暗契，只要哪里认为凡有关能够占据人心的最大问题的讨论已告截止，我们就不能希望看到那种曾使某些历史时期特别突出的一般精神活跃的高度水平。并且，只要所谓争论是避开了那些大而重要足以燃起热情的题目，人民的心灵就永不会从基础上被搅动起来，而所给予的推动也永不会把即使具有最普通智力的人们提高到思想动物的尊严。 关于那种活跃情况，有三个历史时期可以为例：一个是紧接宗教改革之后一段时间内的欧洲的情况；另一个仅限于欧洲大陆并仅限于较有文化的阶级，那是十八世纪后半期的思考运动；第三个时期为时更短，就是德国在歌德（Goethe）和费希特（Fichte）时期知识方面的跃动。这三个时期在其所发展出来的一些特定意见上是大不相同的，但有一点则三者一样，就是在那三个时期中权威的枷锁都被打碎了。那时，旧的精神专制已被推翻，而新的还未代立。正是由那三个时期所给予的推动才把欧洲造成现在这样。无论在人心方面或者在制度方面出现的每一进步，都可清楚地分别溯踪于三者中的或此或彼。 可是苦干时间以来，有些现象表明所有那三项推动力量已经差不多用光；我们若不再度力主精神自由，我们就不能期待什么新的起步了。 现在我要转到论证的第二部分，不再假定任何公认意见都会谬误，而姑且冒认它们皆系真确，然后来考查一下，若不对那些意见的真确性进行自由和公开的讨论而迳加以主张，这样又有什么价值。凡持有一种坚强意见的人，不论怎样不甘承认其意见有谬误的可能，只要一想，他的意见不论怎样真确，若不时常经受充分的和无所畏惧的讨论，那么它虽得到主张也只是作为死的教条而不是作为活的真理——他只要想到这一点，就应该为它所动了。 有一类人（幸而不象从前那样多了）想，有人对于他们所认为真确的意见只要无怀疑地表示赞同，虽然对于它的根据一无所知，也不能替它在最肤浅的反驳面前作一番守得住的辩护，那也就足够了。这样的人，只要一旦能够领到权威方面教给他们的信条，便自然而然会想，若还允许对这信条有所问难，那就没有好处而只有害处。这样的人，当他们的势力得势时，就会使得人们几乎不可能以聪明而有考虑的方式排斥一个公认的意见，虽然仍不免卤莽而无知地把它排斥；这是因为，要完全堵绝讨论究竟不大可能，而当它一旦达到时，没有坚定信念作基础的信条自然一遇辩论的影子就会退避三舍。根本说来，即使舍弃这个可能性不提——就假定真确意见是深踞心中，但系作为一个成见、一个脱离论证的信条、一个反对论证的证据而深踞心中——这也不是一个理性动物主持真理时所应取的办法。这不是有知于真理。这样主持下的真理，毋宁说只是一个迷信，偶然贴在宣告真理的字面上罢了。 假如说人类的智力和判断力是应当培养的（这至少是新教徒所不否认的事），那么试问在什么事物上最适于锻炼一个人的那些能力呢？难道还有比那些关涉本人甚切以致必须对它们抱有意见的事物更为适宜的吗？假如说对于理解力的培养在一个事情中要胜于在另一个事情中，这无疑最好是在学得自己的意见的根据中来进行。在一些要有所信便首须信得正确的题目上，人们不论相信什么，总应当能够为它至少在普通的反驳面前作辩护。但是有人会说：“把他们的意见的根据?教?给他们就成了。对于一个意见，不见得因为没有听到争论就一定是鹦鹉学舌。譬如学习几何学的人并非单把定理装入记忆，同时也懂得和学会演证；若因他们从未听到什么人否认并试图证倒几何学的真理就说他们对于几何学真理的根据懵然无知，那就未免荒唐了。”毫无疑问，若只说到象数学这个题目，其中根本没有错的一方要说的东西，那样说法是很可以的。数学真理的证据有其特殊之点，就是所有论据都在一方。这里没有反驳，也没有对反驳的答复。但是在每一个可能有不同意见的题目上，真理却象是摆在一架天秤上，要靠两组互相冲突的理由来较量。即使在自然哲学当中，对于同一事实也可能有另种解释：例如有以地球中心说代替太阳中心说的，有以热素论代替氱气论的；这就必须能够表明为什么那个另一说不能成为真理；除非到这一点已经得到表明，并且我们也知道它是怎样得到表明的，我们就不算懂得我们所持意见的根据。至于再转到一些远较复杂的题目，转到道德、宗教、政治、社会关系、生活事务等等，那在每一个要争执的意见上倒有四分之三的论证须用于驱除一些有利于不同意见的现象。古代有个除一人而外的最大演说家留有记载说，他对于敌方的情事，即使不用比研究自己的情事时所用的更大的强度，至少总要用同样的强度来加以研究。西塞罗（Cicero）用这种办法当作在公开辩论时获得成功的手段，这正是为了达到真理而研究任何题目的人们都需要仿效的。一个人对于一件情事若仅仅知道他自己的一方，他对那个情事就所知甚少。他的理由也许很好，也许不曾有一个人能驳倒它。但是假如他也同样不能驳倒反对方面的理由，也不尽知那些理由都是什么，那么他便没有根据就两种意见之中有所择取。这时他的合理立场应当是把判断悬搁起来；他若不甘心于这样，他便不是被权威带着走，就是象世界上一般情况那样采取他自己情绪上所最倾向的一方。进一步讲，一个人之听取敌方的论据，若仅听到自己的教师们所转述的样子，其中并伴有他们所提供的作为辩驳的东西，那也还不够。那不是对待论据的公正办法，也不会拿它们真正触到自己的心。他必须能够从实在相信那些论据、真诚替它们辩护、并为它们竭尽一切努力的人们那里听到那些论据。他必须在那些论据的最花巧又最动听的表达形式之下来认识那些论据；他必须感受到那种为真确见解所必须遇到并予以解决的难题的全部压力；否则他就永不能真正掌握到足以对付并解决那个难题的真理。百分之九十九的所谓受过教育的人们都是处于这种情况，甚至那些能为自己的意见滔滔辩护的人们也是如此。他们的结论也许真确，但对于他们所知的东西而言则会是谬误：他们从未把自己投放在与他们思想不同的人们的精神境地去想一想那些人必会说些什么；因而若照知这一字的本义说来，他们可说是并不知他们自己所宣奉的教义。一个教义的某些部分足以说明其余部分并将它释为正当，这在他们是不知的；有些考虑足以表明两个似乎彼此冲突的事实实在可以互相调和，或者足以指明在看来都很有力的两个理由之间应当如何取舍，这在他们也是不知的。总之，对于所有足以转变比重、足以决定一个全面理解者的判断的那部分真理，他们都是陌生的；而要真正知道那部分真理，只有兼顾双方、无所偏重、并力图从最强的光亮下来观察双方的理由的人们才能做到。