Chapter 3 Chapter 2 On Freedom of Thought and Freedom of Discussion-2

It is a fundamental discipline to gain a real understanding on moral and human subjects, and even if there are no opponents to all important truths, we must imagine some and furnish them with the most skillful The strongest argument the devil's apologists could concoct. To lessen the force of the above considerations, the enemies of liberty may again say that it is not necessary that mankind in general know and understand all that philosophers and theologians can say against or in favor of their opinions.It is not necessary, they say, that the common man should be able to uncover all the falsehoods or falsehoods of a genius opponent.It is enough, they say, if there are always some who can answer those false or false statements, so that nothing which would lead the unlearned into error is not unrefuted.Simple minds, they say, who have been taught the obvious grounds of repeated truths, entrust all the rest to authority; If there are difficult problems, one can rest quietly on the assurance that all the difficult problems that have been posed have been or can be answered by those who have been specially trained for the job anyway.

Let me concede to this view as far as those who are most easily satisfied in the amount of truth they understand (which should be accompanied by belief in it) claim; even so, the arguments in favor of freedom of discussion are not weaken.For even this statement admits that human beings ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been answered satisfactorily; how then can objections which require an answer be answered unless they are stated?How can one know that a reply is satisfactory if the rebutter has no opportunity to show that it is unsatisfactory?Philosophers and theologians who solve difficult problems must at least acquaint themselves with them, if the public does not need them, and must know them in their most bewildering form; They must be freely stated and held in the most favorable light they can afford.Catholicism has its own way of dealing with this troublesome problem.It divides men into two classes: those who are allowed to accept its teachings by direct conviction, and those who must accept them by indirect trust.Of both, it is true, there is no choice as to what to accept; but the clergy, at least the clergy who can be fully trusted, are allowed and rewarded for the sake of answering the arguments of those who object. and thus have access to heretical writings; as for the layman who does not practice them, it is difficult to obtain this opportunity unless he has special permission.This discipline admits that knowledge of the enemy's affairs is beneficial to the preacher, but it goes hand in hand with this by keeping it from the rest of the world; More spiritual enlightenment, though not more spiritual freedom, for the general public.By this device Catholicism has succeeded in attaining the spiritual preeminence for which its purpose seeks, for civilisation, without liberty, never produces a broad and free mind, but does produce a A smart advocate who defends a case.But in Protestant countries this remedy is denied; for Protestants maintain, at least in theory, that the responsibility for choosing a religion must be borne by each man himself and cannot be shifted from the preacher.Besides, under the current state of the world, it is practically impossible to block the works that scholars read from non-scholars.Everything must be freely written and printed without any restraint, if the missionaries of mankind are to realize all that they ought to know.

Further, on the assumption that the accepted opinions are true, the lack of free discussion is only harmful if it prevents people from knowing the grounds for those opinions, or it may be said to be an intellectual but not a moral hazard. , which does not detract from the value of opinions so far as their influence on character is concerned.But the fact is that, in the absence of discussion, not only the grounds of an opinion are forgotten, but the very meaning of the opinion itself is often forgotten. In such cases, the words expressing meaning no longer suggest any idea, or suggest only a small part of the idea with which they were originally intended to express.Clear concepts and living beliefs are gone, and there are only words preserved in stereotypes in their place; or if any part of meaning remains, it is only the shell and skin of opinions, the essence of which is It's all lost.There are vast chapters of human history filled with facts of this kind which cannot be too seriously studied and contemplated.

This is illustrated in the experience of almost all moral teachings and religious creeds.Those teachings and creeds were full of meaning and vitality for their founders and their immediate disciples.As long as the struggle to give them the upper hand over other creeds continues, the sense of their significance will not diminish, or even be elucidated into fuller consciousness.As a result, it either gains momentum and becomes general opinion, or it stops advancing, maintaining the ground it has gained without spreading it any further.As soon as one of these two endings becomes evident, the debate on the subject relaxes and tends to die away.The dogma thus acquires a place, if not an accepted opinion, then one of recognized schools or divisions of opinion; and those who claim it generally have inherited it rather than adopted it; The transition of these doctrines from one to the other has now become the only exceptional case, and therefore occupies little place in the thoughts of the professors.By this time they are less constantly on the alert than at first, either to defend themselves against the world, or to win the world over to them; They can bear it), nor bother dissenters (if there are such dissenters) with arguments in favor of that creed.From this time on, the vitality of the doctrine usually begins to wane.How often we hear preachers of all creeds lament how difficult it is to keep in the minds of believers a vivid apprehension of the truths they profess, which penetrates the affections and really governs the conduct.When a creed is still fighting for its existence, no such difficulty arouses complaint: then even some of the weaker fighters know and feel what they are fighting for, and how it differs from other creeds. difference; in the period of each creed's existence, not a few men were seen to embody the fundamental principles of that creed in all forms of thought, to measure and consider those principles in all their important implications, and to experience to the full character effect of that creed that belief in that creed should produce in a mind thoroughly saturated with it.But as soon as the creed becomes a thing of inheritance, and one accepts it passively rather than actively, that is to say, as soon as the mind is no longer compelled to do what the creed suggests. When at first exercising its vitality to that degree, there is a gradual tendency to forget all but the formulas of the creed, or to give it only a cold and insensible assent, as if accepting it. Since it comes from trust, there is no need to bring it into consciousness or to test it by personal experience; until at last it becomes almost completely disconnected from the inner life of man.And so there arose, as so often in this age of the world as to form a majority: the creeds existed as if outside the human heart, and served only to harden and ossify the human heart against the impulse thrown to the higher parts of humanity. All other influences; whose strength consists only in not allowing any new and living beliefs to enter the mind, and which itself does nothing with respect to them except as a sentinel watching over the mind and mind to keep them empty.

The extent to which the most deeply moving doctrines become dead creeds in the mind, and cannot be realized in the imagination, emotion, or understanding, can be measured by the number of Christians. Take the case of Christianity as an example.By Christianity here is meant what all churches and denominations describe, that is, the maxims and precepts contained in the "New Testament."That is held sacred by all who profess to be Christians, and accepted as the law.It is not too much to say, however, that not one Christian in a thousand actually guides or tests his personal conduct by reference to those laws.The standard by which he conducts himself is the custom of the nation to which he belongs, the class to which he belongs, or the religious profession he holds.He thus has, on the one hand, a body of moral maxims, which he believes to be rules of government given to him by an infallible wisdom; Some maxims agree to a certain degree, others less so, and some are even directly opposed, but on the whole, there is a balance between the interests and hints of Christian creed and secular life. A kind of harmony between.For the former set of standards, he respects; for the latter set of standards, he pays true allegiance.All Christians believe that God blesses the poor, the sluts, and the mistreated; they all believe that it is harder for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven than it is for a camel to pass through a needle; they all believe that they do not There should be a judge, or they should be judged; they all believed that they should never swear by God; they all believed that they should love their neighbor as themselves; they all believed that if anyone should take their burqa They should give him their coats too; they all believed that they should not think of tomorrow; they all believed that if they would be perfect they should sell all they had and give it to the poor.They were not insincere in saying they believed those things.They do believe that, just as people believe what they have often heard praised but never discussed.But in the sense of how a living faith governs conduct, they believe those doctrines only to the point where they usually work for them.Those teachings, in their integrity, are of great use if they are used against their enemies; It goes without saying that it is used as a reason.But if someone should remind them that those maxims require countless things that they have not even thought to do, that person will get nothing but be relegated to that very unpopular role of being superior to others. That's all.That is to say, the teachings do not take root among ordinary believers, and do not become a force in their hearts. They just have a habitual respect for the voice of those teachings, but they have no sense of extending from the words to the things they refer to. Feelings can force the mind to assimilate those things and make them fit the formula.In short, when it came to conduct, they turned to Mr. A and Mr. B to instruct them on how far they should obey Christ.

We may be assured, however, that among the early Christians it was not so, but quite otherwise.Had this been the case, Christianity would never have spread from an obscure sect of some despised Hebrews to become the state religion of the Roman Empire.When their enemies once said, "Look how those Christians love one another" (a remark that few people will say now), they undoubtedly had a very vivid sense of the meaning of their creed. Feelings, and then greatly weakened down.It is probably chiefly for this reason that Christianity now makes so little progress in expanding its sphere, and after eighteen centuries it was almost exclusively confined to the sphere of Europeans and European descendants.Now, even among strict believers, even those who take their teachings much more seriously than the average person, and realize more than the average person the significance of several teachings, such a more active part of the teachings in their minds is usually only Calvinism. (Calvin), Knox, or other characters similar to themselves in character.As for the words of Christ himself, they co-exist indifferently in their hearts, and produce no more effects than those produced by mere listening to a few gentle words.

As to why the teaching which is the peculiar mark of a denomination retains more vitality than the teaching which is common to all recognized denominations, and why those who practice mission feel more anxious to keep the latter alive in their meaning. There are no doubt many reasons for suffering; but one reason is certain, that every particular doctrine is more questioned, and has to be more often defended before open refutation.And when there is no enemy left on the battlefield, teachers and scholars, alike, go to sleep at their posts. In general, the same is true of all traditional teachings, be it those concerning the wisdom and knowledge of life, as well as moral or religious traditions.All words and articles are full of general arguments about life, both about what life is and about how to be in it; arguments that everyone knows, that everyone repeats or hears and acquiesces , is accepted by all as self-evident truth, but most people only begin to really learn its meaning when personal experience—often painful experience—makes its meaning real to them. .It is not until after some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment that a man has been wounded by some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment that a man thinks of some proverb or cliché which he has been familiar with all his life, and for which he would feel as early as afterward In other words, it would have saved him from this catastrophe--this is not uncommon.There are, indeed, many reasons for this to be the case, besides lack of discussion: there are certain truths whose full significance cannot be appreciated until personal experience.But even of this truth a man learns much more of its meaning, and impresses much more deeply with what he learns, if he often hears it debated for and against it by men who understand it. into the heart.The fatal tendency of human beings to stop thinking when they see that something is no longer in doubt is responsible for half the mistakes they make.

A modern writer has said it well about the "slumber of established opinion." What is this nonsense!It will be asked: Is the absence of agreement an essential condition of true knowledge?Is it necessary for someone to be able to perceive the truth that there must be a certain number of people who insist on error?Is it true that a creed loses its reality and its vitality as soon as it becomes accepted by the common people?Is it true that a proposition cannot be fully understood and fully felt unless it is in doubt? Does this mean that, as soon as mankind has unanimously accepted a certain truth, that truth perishes among them?Everyone has always thought that the highest goal and best result of improving knowledge is to unite mankind better and better in the identification of all important truths; does knowledge exist only when its goal is not achieved?Shall the fruits of conquest be destroyed by the very completeness of victory?

I'm not sure about those claims.The doctrines of indisputability or indisputability constantly increase in number as mankind progresses; and it may almost be said that human well-being is measured precisely by the number and weight of truths which have reached an indisputable degree. of.The cessation of serious controversies one after the other on many points is one of the necessary things in the solidification of opinion; and this solidification, which is of course salutary in regard to true opinion, is no less useful in regard to error. dangerous and harmful.Thus, although this gradual narrowing of the boundaries of difference of opinion is necessary in the double sense of being both inevitable and indispensable, we do not therefore have to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial.The loss of an intelligent and vivid apprehension of a truth as important a boost as that afforded by being compelled to explain and defend that truth to opponents is weighed against the benefit of its universal recognition. Even if it is not enough to overwhelm the latter, it is still a big offset.So when this help is no longer available, I confess that I would like to see human teachers try to provide a substitute; in front of him, as a contender with different views, anxious to win him over, brings them before him.

But instead of seeking a means to this end, men have lost all means which they had before.The grand Socratic method of argument, as exemplified in Plato's dialogues, is what I mean by this method.It was chiefly a counter-discussion on some of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with the utmost skill, and aimed at persuading the cliché who took accepted opinions only, that he did not Knowing the subject, let him know that he has not yet given any meaning to the doctrines he professes; thus, after realizing his ignorance, he can be placed on a path leading to a firm faith, Let that faith stand upon a clear understanding of the significance of the doctrine itself and of the evidence of the doctrine.As for the academic polemics of the Middle Ages, they had more or less the same aim.It is meant to make sure that the student understands his own opinion, and also (necessarily connectedly) the opposite opinion; grounds that can strengthen the former and refute the latter.It is true that this academic polemic has its irremediable defect, that it rests on the premise that it rests on authority rather than reason; That powerful method of argumentation which forms the intellect which is called the "Socrates' poison"; but like the latter it has, in fact, contributed to the modern mind far more than most people are willing to admit; and the modern mode of education, But nothing can fill the place of either in the least degree.A man who draws all his lessons exclusively from teachers or from books, even if he escapes the encircling temptation to content himself with scribbling, is never compelled to listen to both, and so (even among thinkers) Far from always being successful in knowing both sides; so the weakest part of what he says in the defense of his opinion is what he intends as an answer to the adversary.It is fashionable now to belittle negative logic—a logic that points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice without establishing positive truths.Such a negative criticism is indeed insufficient as a final result; but as a means to achieve a positive knowledge or belief that deserves its name, it is no matter how much it can be judged. too high; it may be said that until the time comes when men are again systematically trained in this kind of logic, there will be only a few great thinkers, and only a very low number of thinkers in any line of thought except in the departments of mathematics and physics. general intelligence level.On any other subject no man's opinion is worthy of the name of knowledge unless he has undergone, either through the imposition of others, or of his own initiative, such mental processes as an active argument with an opponent requires of him.How absurd, then, that a thing so indispensable without it and so difficult to create should be rejected when it offers itself to you!So if anyone is disputing the accepted opinion, or if anyone will be disputing the accepted opinion as long as law or public opinion permits, then we have to thank them, to listen to them with open hearts, and to rejoice in that, Because someone else has done for us what we should otherwise have done (so long as we have any concern for the certainty or vitality of our beliefs) and with far greater effort.

These are some of the main reasons for the usefulness of differences of opinion (and this will continue until another stage in the progress of man's knowledge, which at present appears to be an incalculable distance), now There is one more thing left to say.So far we have considered only two possibilities: one is that the consensus is assumed to be false so that some other opinion is true; the other is that the consensus is assumed to be true so that its conflict with the opposite error It just contributes to a clear comprehension and deep feeling of its authenticity.But there is a more common case than both, that is, that there are two conflicting doctrines, one not being true and the other false, but sharing a truth in between; Since it only reflects a part of the truth, it needs different opinions to make up what it leaves. On subjects beyond the reach of the senses, popular opinion is often true, but seldom or never the whole truth.They are parts of truth; sometimes a larger part, sometimes a smaller part, but always exaggerated, distorted, and separated from other truths which should accompany and condition them.Heretic opinion, on the other hand, is generally some suppressed and neglected truth, which suddenly throws off its chains, and either seeks to reconcile the truth contained in the prevailing opinion, or casts it as an enemy and uses the same The exclusivity of it establishes itself as the whole truth.The latter case is by far the most common, for in the human mind one-sidedness is always the rule and many-sidedness the exception. Thus, even in the whirling motion of opinion, it is usually this part of the truth that goes down and that part that rises.Even in the progressive movement, which is supposed to be additive, it is mostly merely the substitution of one partial truth for another; Things are more necessary and more suitable for the needs of the times.Since even prevailing opinions on true grounds are of such a partial character, we should value all opinions which are omitted from prevailing opinion, but which in themselves express some part of the truth, however much their truth may be interwoven. Mistakes and confusion.No sober judge of human affairs should feel irrepressible indignation that he who compels us to notice truths we would otherwise overlook also overlooks some of the truths we see.He would rather think that, just because popular opinion is still one-sided, it is more welcome than in other cases to welcome unpopular truths that have their one-sided claimants; for this is usually the most vigorous and most compelling Reluctant attention is paid to what the one-sided advocates claim to be complete but are really fragments of wisdom. For example, in the eighteenth century, when almost all educated people and the uneducated people who followed them were enthusiastically admiring the so-called civilization and the miracles of modern science, literature, and philosophy, when they Having greatly overestimated the degree of difference between modern people and the ancients, when all the differences are in favor of themselves, please see how some of Rousseau's paradoxes exploded like bombs in a large number of structures. Among the tight one-sided opinions, its original position is changed, and its molecules are forced to recombine into a better form under the wedge of new molecules, which has a beneficial shocking effect.It is not that the prevailing opinions seem on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's, on the contrary, they are closer to the truth, contain more positive truths, and are much less wrong.But in Rousseau's teachings there is a considerable amount of truths precisely which popular opinion lacks, and they are swept downstream in the torrent of opinion, and when the tide goes out they reveal the treasures left behind.For example, the simplicity of life has a higher value, and the snares and hypocrisy of a false society have a debilitating and corrupting effect. These have penetrated the educated mind since Rousseau and have never completely disappeared. ideas; they will always produce their due effect, though assertions are as much to-day as ever, and assertions by facts, since language has almost exhausted itself on this subject. up. Again, in politics, it has become almost a cliché: one party wants order and stability, the other progress or reform, and both are necessary for a healthy state of political life, until this or the other It can expand its understanding, know and be good at distinguishing what is suitable for preservation and what should be eliminated, and become a party that emphasizes both order and progress.Each of these two ways of thinking brings out its usefulness by virtue of the defects of the other, and each relies largely on the opposition of the other to keep itself within the limits of reason and health.Each side has its own opinion about democracy and aristocracy, about property and equality, about co-operation and competition, about luxury and economy, about sociality and individuality, about liberty and discipline, and so on. On every other question of practical life there are opposing opinions; and unless all these opinions are expressed with equal liberty, and are asserted and defended with equal ability and energy, neither factor will have a chance to work in harmony. If it is right, it will definitely rise and fall under the balance.On some of the great practical questions of life, truth is largely a matter of harmonizing and combining opposites, and men seldom have a mind large enough and just to adjust to anything close to being right, so that it is only through The brutal process of waging a struggle under a hostile banner can do it.If, on any of the great public questions mentioned above, one of the two opinions prevails more than the other, it is the minority at a particular time and place that should be not only tolerated but encouraged and patronized. that one.For that opinion then represented a neglected interest, an aspect of human well-being that was in danger of not getting its share.I know that in our country there is no intolerance of differing opinions on most of the above-mentioned subjects.My reason for citing them is to show, by more and more available examples, the generality of the fact that, in the present state of the human intellect, aspects of truth are attainable only through differences of opinion. Chances of fair play.If some men are found to be exceptions to the apparent unanimity of the world, even if the world is on the right side, there is always the possibility that the few who dissent may have something worth hearing to defend themselves, and if he keeps silent, Truth will be lost. It will be objected, "But there are some accepted principles, especially on the highest and most important questions, which are more than half-truths. Christian morality, for example, is the whole truth in moral questions, and if one teaches A morality that differs from it, and he falls into complete error."This is the most important case in practice, and no aphorism of generality is better fitted to test it. But before asserting what Christian morality is or is not, it is best to establish what is meant by Christian morality.If it refers to the morality of the "New Testament," I wonder how people who derive this knowledge from the book itself can suppose that it claims or intends to make it a complete set of morals. Doctrinal.The Gospels often quote pre-existing morals, and limit their teachings to certain specific matters and make some corrections to their related morals or easily adopt broader and higher morals; and its expression is derived from the following The broadest expressions, often impossible to interpret literally, have more poetic or eloquent appeal than legislative accuracy.It would never be possible to formulate a moral doctrine from here without supplementing something from the "Old Testament," which would amount to saying that it would also have to be worked out from a solid but in many respects barbaric and The original intention is also to borrow subsidies from the moral system designed for barbarians.St. Paul, who was openly hostile to this Judaic interpretation of the teachings of his Lord and filling out its framework, likewise assumed a pre-existing morality, that of the Greeks and Romans; and his exhortations to Christians , is an adaptive system of adjustment to that morality on a large scale, even to the point of overtly sanctioning slavery.What is now called Christian morality—indeed it is rather called theological morality—was not the work of Christ himself or of his apostles, but came from a distant period and was gradually built up by the Catholic Church during the first five centuries. In the hands of moderns and Protestants, though it has not been adopted without doubt, it has not changed much, far less than can be expected from them.In fact, they were for the most part content to take away what had been added to it in the Middle Ages, and each sect added something new, suited to its own character and inclination.I should rank last among those who deny that such a morality, and its early preachers, was also of great benefit to mankind, but I do not hesitate to say that it is, in many important points, Incomplete and one-sided, human affairs would be in a worse state than they are now were it not for certain ideas and sentiments which it does not sanction have also contributed to the formation of the life and character of Europeans.Christian Morality (to use that name) has all the attributes of a reactionary movement; it is for the most part a protest against the pagan spirit.Its ideals are negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, seeking innocence rather than striving for the high, striving for the best rather than striving for the good. Refraining from Evil: In short, in its teachings (someone said it well) the words "you shouldn't" inappropriately overshadow the words "you should".Specifically, it was afraid of indulgence, so it worshiped asceticism as an idol, which was later gradually reconciled into a kind of legalism.It unveils the hope of heaven and the threat of hell as motives assigned exclusively to the moral life: here it falls far below the ancient sages, which in its meaning endow human morality with an essential The nature of selfishness, since it separates each man's sense of duty from the interests of his fellow men, and does not take them into account unless self-interest induces them.In essence, it is a doctrine of passive obedience: it earnestly teaches people to submit to all established authorities; although it does not mean that they must actively obey when they issue orders that are forbidden by religion, but for those imposed Any grievances in ourselves allow no resistance, let alone rebellion.When it comes to the question of duty to the state, when the morality of the best pagan nations has raised this duty to a disproportionate position and even violated the just liberty of the individual, in purely Christian ethics this aspect of the question of duty A major sector has received little attention and recognition.We have read the adage that "a ruler commits a crime against God and against the state when he appoints a man to a certain office, if there is another in his dominion who is more worthy of that office"--this is From the Qur'an, not from the New Testament.If the concept of duty to the public has received any recognition in modern morality, it has been drawn from Greek and Roman sources, not from Christianity.In the same way, even in the morals of private life, any quality of grandeur, nobility of heart, personal dignity, even a sense of honour, etc., is derived from the purely human part of our education, not from its religion. those qualities could never have grown under an ethic which professed obedience as its only value. 我和任何人一样远远不想硬说上述那些缺点，在一切意想得到的样子下，乃是基督教伦理所必然固有的；我也不想硬说，有许多为一个完备的道德教义所必具而基督教伦理却没有包含的东西就不容和它调和在一起。我更远远不想拿这些意思讽及基督本人的教义和训条。我相信，凡基督所说的话语都是我能见到证据证明有意要那样说的；我相信，凡基督所说的话语和凡为一种周瞻详备的道德所需要的东西是没有不能调和起来的；我相信，凡伦理当中最好的东西都可以摆到基督的话语里面，不致对其词句有多大触犯，正如凡曾试图从那里演绎出什么实际的行为的体系的人们不曾对它有多大触犯一样。但是，与此毫不矛盾，我也相信基督本人的教义和训条只包有而且也只想包有真理的一部分；还有许多构成最高道德的基本因素则存在于另一些东西之中，未具见也不曾想具见于基督教创始人的有纪录的讲话，在后来在教会以那些讲话为基础所建立的伦理体系中却完全被抛到九霄云外去了。情况既是如此，所以我认为，若硬要从基督教教义当中找出一套完整规则作为我们的指导，而这种规则在教义作者却是欲使其裁准实施而只有一部分是提供作为规则的，那便是很大的错误。这个狭隘的学说正在变成一个严重的实际祸患，大大损毁着道德训练和道德教导的价值，而这种价值终于是多少有头脑的人今天所力求增进的。我很担心，象人们这样力图在单纯宗教模型上铸造人的心灵和情感，而弃置那些一向与基督教伦理并存并为之补充的世俗标准（因无更好的名字姑用此称）于不睬，接受它的一些精神，又把自己的精神注入一些，结果将会产生，甚至现在已在产生，一种低贱卑屈而富于奴性的品性，善自屈于它所估定的“最高意志”，却不能升高到或共感于“最高善”的概念。我深信必定另有一种不是单从基督教源泉引发出来的伦理与基督教伦理并存，才能产生人类道德的中兴；我深信基督教体系也不能独外于这样一条规律，就是说：在人类心灵未臻完善的状态下，真理的利益需要有意见的分歧。当然，在不复抹杀基督教所不包含的真理时并不必然要抹杀它所包含的真理。若竟发生这样的偏见或忽视，那就完全是一种祸患；但这确是我们不能希望永远免除的祸患，我们应该把它看作为着一种无可估计的好处而支付的代价。部分真理而排他性地冒称为全部真理，这是必须也应当予以抗议的；但假如这反激的动力又使得抗议者也失其公正，那么，对于这个片面性和对于那个片面性一样，是可悲叹的，但必须予以宽容。如果基督徒要教导非教徒对于基督教应当公正，他们自己对于不信教这件事就应当公正。凡是对于以文字记载的历史有最普通的认识的人都知道，在最高尚最宝贵的道德教训中，有很大一部分不仅是不知道基督教信条的人的作品，而且是知道它但排斥了它的人的作品；我们若闭眼不看这个事实，那是不能对真理有什么帮助的。 我也不想硬说，只要最无限制地使用发表一切意见的自由就能制止宗教上或哲学上宗派主义的祸害。凡是容量狭隘的人对于一个真理认真起来时，必定要把它竭力主张，反复教导，甚至以许多办法付诸行动，仿佛世界上再无其他真理，或者不论如何也无一条真理能够约制或者规限那第一条真理。我承认，一切意见都要变成宗派性之趋势不会因展开即使是最自由的讨论而获得挽救，反倒往往因此而增高和加剧，因为那个应当被看到但没有被看到的真理会因其出自被认作反对者之口而愈加遭到猛烈的排斥。但是要知道，这种意见冲突的有益效果本不发生在情绪愤激的偏党者身上，而是发生在比较冷静比较超然的旁观者身上。可怕的祸患不在部分真理之间的猛烈冲突，而在半部真理的平静压熄。这就是说，只要人们还被迫兼听双方，情况就总有希望；而一到人们只偏注一方的时候，错误就会硬化为偏见，而真理本身由于被夸大变成谬误也就不复具有真理的效用。我们知道，象这样一种强于判断的能力，居于一个问题的两面之间，面对仅仅一方辩护士的发言，而能得出聪明无蔽的判断，这在人类精神属性中是极其罕见的；既然如此，那么涉及真理时，除非其各有比例的各个方面，除非体现任何部分真理的每一意见，不仅都找到自己的辩护人，而且都得到被人倾听的辩护——除非这样，真理是没有机会的。 讲到这里，我们已经从很清楚的四点根据上认识到意见自由和发表意见自由对于人类精神福祉的必要性了（人类一切其他福祉是有赖于精神福祉的）；现在再把那四点根据简单扼要地重述一下。 第一点，若有什么意见被迫缄默下去，据我们所能确知，那个意见却可能是真确的。 否认这一点，就是假定了我们自己的不可能错误性。 第二点，纵使被迫缄默的意见是一个错误，它也可能，而且通常总是，含有部分真理；而另一方面，任何题目上的普遍意见亦即得势意见也难得是或者从不是全部真理：既然如此，所以只有借敌对意见的冲突才能使所遗真理有机会得到补足。 第三点，即使公认的意见不仅是真理而且是全部真理，若不容它去遭受而且实际遭受到猛烈而认真的争议，那么接受者多数之抱持这个意见就象抱持一个偏见那样，对于它的理性根据就很少领会或感认。不仅如此，而且，第四点，教义的意义本身也会有丧失或减弱并且失去其对品性行为的重大作用的危险，因为教条已变成仅仅在形式上宣称的东西，对于致善是无效力的，它妨碍着去寻求根据，并且还阻挡着任何真实的、有感于衷的信念从理性或亲身经验中生长出来。 在撇开意见自由这个题目以前，还宜再注视一下有人谈到的这样一说：一切意见是应当许其自由发表的，但条件是方式上须有节制，不要越出公平讨论的界限。说到怎样不可能规定应把所设想的这些界限摆在哪里，这有许多话可讲。如果说测验之法是看对于意见受到攻击的人有无触犯，我想经验会告诉我们，凡攻击是有力而动听时都可算有了触犯；这就是说，只要反对者在这题目上表现了任何强烈情感，把对方逼得很紧，使对方感到难于作答，那么，他在对方看来就是一个无节制的反对者。这一点，虽然从实践观点看来是一个重要的考虑，但在一种更加基本的反对意见面前就不算什么了。无疑，主张一个意见（即使这个意见是真实的）的方式会是非常惹人反感的，招致严厉谴责也是当然的。但是最主要的一些触犯还不在这一类，而在那种除非借着偶然自欺便不可能把论断弄得妥贴的某些错误做法。其中最严重的一些是：似是而非地进行论证、对事实或论据予以压制、把案情的各项因素举陈错误、或者把反对方面的意见表述错误。尽管如此，但是所有这些事情，甚至在最大的程度上，却是一些并不被认为而且在许多其他方面也不应被认为无知或无能的人们在完全良好的自信中连续不断地做出来的，因此我们竟不大可能以恰当的根据从良心上把这种错误的表述鉴定为在道德上可加责难的事；至于法律，当然更不能擅行干涉这种论战上的错误行为了。再看一般所谓无节制的讨论的意思，那是指谩骂、讥刺、人身攻击以及诸如此类之事而言的。关于这一点，可以说，谴责这些武器时若曾同等地建议双方都停止使用它们，那就值得予以较多的同情了；但人们却是只在对待得势意见时要限制它们的使用，至于使用它们去对待不得势的意见，则不仅不见一般的不赞成，而且还会让使用者博得所谓真挚的热情和正义的愤怒等类的称誉。但是从这些武器的使用中不论生出什么祸害，最大的总是在把它们用于对待比较无防卫的一方的时候；从这种主张意见的方式中不论会找出什么不公平的便宜，这便宜总是差不多独归公认意见这一方。在这一类触犯当中论战者所能犯的最坏的一种乃是把持见相反的人诋毁为坏的和不道德的人。在这样一种诽谤面前，特别突出而易受击的乃是抱持着不通行的意见的人们，因为他们一般地总是少数，又没有势力，而且除他们自己外就没有人怎样关心要看见他们受到公正的对待；可是若有人要用这件武器去攻击一个得势的意见，那在情事的性质上是用不得的：一则，他不能自身确保安全地来使用它，二则，即使他能够，这样做也只会使自己的论据萎退。一般地说来，与公认意见相反的意见若想求得一听，只有使用经过研究的中和谦逊的语言，只有最小心地避免不必要的对人触犯——只要一有哪怕是很小的触犯，就很难不丧失阵地；而得势的意见一方面若使用没有分寸的辱骂，那就真能吓住人们不敢宣说相反的意见，也不敢对宣说相反意见的人予以倾听。这样看来，为了真理和正谊的利益，限制使用辱骂性的语言实比限制使用其他武器还重要得多；而假如说限制还必须有所区别的话，那么，作为举例来说，挫折对于不信教的触犯性的攻击就比挫折对于宗教的触犯性的攻击更需要得多。但是无论说要限制哪一方，法律和权威显然总是都无分的；至于意见，则应在每一审判中视各别案件的情况来定其裁断；总之，对于每一个人，不论他自居于辩论的哪一方面，只要在其声辩方式中或是缺乏公正或是表现出情绪上的恶意，执迷和不宽容，那就要予以谴责，但是却不可由其在问题上所选定的方面，纵使是与我们自己相反的方面，来推断出那些败德；而另一方面，对于每一个人，也不论他抱持什么意见，只要他能够冷静地去看也能够诚实地来说他的反对者以及他们的意见真正是什么，既不夸大足以损害他们的信用的东西，也不掩藏足以为他们辩护或者想来足以为他们辩护的东西，那就要给以应得的尊敬。这就是公众讨论的真正的道德；假如说还常常有人违犯它的话，那么我却乐于想到，也已经有很多争辩家在很大程度上注意遵守它，而且还有更多的人从良心上朝着这方面努力。