The subject of this treatise is not so-called freedom of the will, which is unfortunately contrary to the doctrine that has been wrongly called philosophical necessity.What is to be discussed here is civil liberty or social liberty, that is, to explore the nature and limits of the power that society can legally exercise over individuals.The question, which is seldom raised, still less discussed, in general terms, has secretly and profoundly influenced some contemporary practical debates, and it appears that it will soon be accepted that major issues for the future.It is far from being a new problem, in the sense that it has divided mankind almost from the remotest epochs; but at the stage of progress into which the more civilized parts of the Presented, people are required to give a different and more fundamental treatment.

The struggle between liberty and authority has been the most prominent feature of far the earliest parts of history with which we are familiar, especially that of Greece, Rome, and England.But in old days the struggle was between the subjects, or certain classes of subjects, and the government.Freedom at that time meant defense against the tyranny of political rulers.In people's expectation (except in some popular governments in the Greek era), the ruler must be in a position of hostility to the people he rules. So-called rulers include the ruling "husband", or the ruling family or hereditary class, whose authority is derived from inheritance or conquest; No; its supremacy has never dared to be disputed, or perhaps it is not intended to be disputed, no matter what measures may be taken to prevent its oppressive use.Their power was seen as necessary, but also highly dangerous; as a weapon that rulers would try to use against their subjects as much as against foreign enemies.In a flock, in order to protect the weaker members from the innumerable hawks of prey, it is necessary that a hawk stronger than the rest be entrusted with subduing them.But the Eagle King likes to kill his group no less than those lesser greedy animals, so this group cannot help being constantly in a state of defense against the Eagle King's minions.It is the object of the patriots, therefore, to delineate some limits to the ruler's power over a crowd; and this limit is what they call liberty.There are two ways to achieve this limitation.

The first way is to obtain the recognition of certain privileges, certain so-called political liberties or rights, which, to violate on the part of the ruler, it is a breach of duty, and when he does violate, then Individual resistance or general rebellion may be called justification.The second route, generally speaking a later one, consists in the establishment of constitutional checks by which some of the more important measures of governing power must be conditioned by The idea of ​​some kind of group is the agreement on behalf of its interests.Of the two aforementioned restraints, the first has compelled the governing powers to yield more or less in most European countries; Degrees, and still more completeness, are everywhere the chief object of liberty-loving people.Historically, as long as mankind has been content to fight one enemy with another, and to be governed by one master with some effective assurance against his tyranny, they have not Take your desire beyond this point.

But a time has come in the progress of human affairs when men no longer regard it as a natural necessity for the ruler to be an independent power whose interests are opposed to their own.They saw that it would be much better for the various magistrates of the state to be their tenants or representatives, to be withdrawn at their pleasure.Only then, they saw, could they enjoy a complete security that the power of government should never be misused against them. This new demand for rulers to be elected and to serve only for a short period of time gradually became the obvious object of popular parties—wherever there were such parties—and replaced to a considerable extent the former mere An effort to limit the power of a ruler.

As this struggle for governing power to flow from the periodic choice of the governed, some began to think that too much emphasis had been given to the limitation of power itself.That (it seems probable) was a means of warding off rulers whose interests were accustomed to oppose the people.What is desired now is that the ruler should be united with the people, and that the interest and will of the ruler should be the interest and will of the nation.A nation has no defense against its own will.Don't be afraid it will wreak havoc on itself.As long as the rulers are effectively responsible to the nation and can be replaced by the nation in a timely manner, the nation will not be afraid to entrust to them the power it can use to control its use.The power of the ruler is really the power of the nation itself, but concentrated, and placed in a form which is convenient for its use.This form of thought, or perhaps rather of feeling, was common among European liberalism of the previous generation, and still clearly predominates among the Continental ones.Whoever, on the Continent at present, thinks there can be any limit to what government can do--that is another word for government which they think should not exist at all--is a glorious exception among political thinkers up.In our own country, the same sentiments might prevail today, if the circumstances which at one time encouraged them remained unchanged.

But in political and philosophical theory, as in men, success exposes errors and weaknesses that failure would conceal.The notion that the people need not limit themselves to the power they exercise over themselves, sounded rather axiomatic when popular government was but a dream, or a written record of antiquity. .Temporary aberrations, like the French Revolution, do not necessarily shake that idea, for at worst they are the employment of a few usurpers, and in no way belong to the constant employment of the populace, It was only a sudden and tumultuous outburst against absolute monarchy and aristocracy.However, time passed, and at last a democratic republic emerged, occupying a large part of the top of the earth, and appearing as one of the most powerful members of the national group; Electoral and accountable government has become an object of observation and criticism.It was then perceived that expressions such as "self-government" and "the power of the people over themselves" did not express the true state of affairs.The "people" who wield power

The people are not always the same as the people over whom the power is imposed; and what is called "self-government" is not a government in which each governs himself, but a government in which each is governed by all the rest.As for the so-called will of the people, it is actually only the will of the largest or most active part of the people, that is, the majority or those who can make themselves recognized as the majority.It follows, then, that the people will oppress a portion of their own number; and such abuses of power need to be guarded against no less than any other.Thus it appears that the limitation of the power of government over individuals remains in no way of its importance when it makes those in power normally accountable to the crowd, that is, to the most powerful party in the crowd.This view, since it appeals to the prudence of thinkers as well as to the dispositions of those important classes in European society whose real or supposed interests are anti-democratic, is naturally not difficult to establish; In thinking, the "tyranny of the majority" has generally been included among the various disasters that society must guard against.

Like other tyrannies, this tyranny of the majority was at first seen, and is still commonly held to be common opinion, chiefly in the fact that it would work through the measures of public authority.But thoughtful people have seen that when society itself is a tyrant, that is to say, when society as a whole rises above the individual individuals of which it is composed, its means of tyranny are not limited to measures through its political institutions. .Society can and does execute its own edict.And if its edicts are wrong instead of right, or in matters which it should not intervene, then it is practicing a social tyranny; and this social tyranny is more terrible than many kinds of political oppression. , for although it is not always backed by extreme punishments, it makes people have fewer means of escape, because it penetrates much deeper into the details of life, because it enslaves the soul itself.Therefore, it is not enough to just defend against the tyranny of the government; for the tyranny of powerful public opinion and feelings, for the society to use methods other than administrative punishment to impose its own concepts and behaviors as codes of conduct on people who see different To restrain the development of any individuality out of harmony with its ways, or even, if possible, to prevent the formation of this individuality, thereby forcing all characters to tailor themselves to its own model--of these, Both also need to be defended.There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with the independence of individuals; the finding of this limit, and its maintenance against encroachment, are as necessary to the attainment of the good state of human affairs as to the defense of political despotism.

Although this proposition may not be controversial in general terms, the problem in practice is where should this limit be drawn?In other words, how should we make an appropriate adjustment between individual independence and social control? This is a subject on which almost all work remains to be done.Everything that makes existence worthwhile to man is bound to restrain the actions of others.There must, therefore, be some rules of conduct, some things to be imposed by the law first, and public opinion to do many things where it is not proper for the law to act.What those maxims should be is the first question in human affairs; and, apart from a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which has least advanced in its solution.No two ages, and seldom two nations, have agreed on this question; the decisions of one age or one nation seem astonishing to another.But the people of any given age or country feel no doubt about this question, just as they do about a subject that all mankind sees consistently the same.The rules they have acquired in themselves seem to them self-evident and self-righteous.This common delusion may be said to be an instance of the magical power of custom.Customs are not only second nature as the old saying goes, but they have always been misunderstood as first nature.Custom is all the more fully effective in preventing any doubts about the rules of conduct imposed upon one another by human beings, since no reason is generally considered necessary on this subject, either one to another, or each to himself. .Men are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged to believe, by some who are ardently inclined to the temperament of philosophers, that on subjects of this nature their feeling is superior to reason, and thus renders reason unnecessary.A practical principle which led them to their opinions concerning the regulation of human conduct was the feeling in each individual's mind that all men should be required to do as he and those with whom he felt like would have them do. do it.No one, it is true, admits to himself that the standard of his judgment is his own inclination; but in matters of conduct an opinion which is not grounded in reason is really but a man's choice; Appealing to others for the same reasons of choice is still the preference of many but not one.But in the eyes of an ordinary man, this preference, which is his own and has the likeness of others, is not only a perfectly satisfactory justification for the notions he holds in morals, taste, or manners, but Generally speaking, the only reasons he has; those ideas are not expressly written in his religious creeds, but even in religious creeds it is chiefly his own interpretations which guide his views.It follows that men's opinions on what to praise and what to blame are influenced by all the variety of causes which affect their will in regard to the conduct of others.The causes which affect men's will on this point, as on any other subject, are as numerous.Sometimes it is their reason, sometimes their prejudices or superstitions; often their social, sometimes antisocial; their jealousy or envy, their arrogance or contempt for others; and most commonly their desires or fears for themselves, their legitimate or illegitimate vital interests.In particular, it should be pointed out that if there is a dominant class in any country, then the morality of a country must mostly come from the class interests and class superiority of that class.For example, the morality between Spartans and their Helots, the morality between colonists and blacks, the morality between monarchs and subjects, the morality between nobles and commoners, and the morality between men and women. The morality among men is largely the creation of those class interests and class superiority; and the sentiments thus produced act in turn on the moral sentiments of the members of the dominant class in their own relations to one another.On the other hand, when the formerly dominant class has lost its predominance, or its predominance has become unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments often have a tinge of abhorrence of superiority.In addition, regarding the code of conduct supported by law or public opinion, no matter whether it is allowed or not, there is another important and decisive reason, which is the slavishness of human beings in the hypothetical likes and dislikes of their current masters or gods. obey.This slavish obedience, though selfish in its nature, is not hypocritical; it breeds a hatred so pure and innocent that it makes people burn dazzlers and heretics.As to the many other lesser forces of influence, of course the general and manifest interests of society play a part, and a considerable part, in the guidance of moral sentiments.But this is not so much out of reason, or because of the interests of the society itself, as it is more out of the love and hatred born from the interests of the society.

This feeling of love and hatred has little or no influence on the interests of society, and is shown to be a great force in establishing morals. The likes and dislikes of society, or of some powerful part of it, then appear to be the chief thing which in practice determines the rules of conduct which are to be observed, under the punishment of laws or the support of public opinion.In this case, generally speaking, even those who are ahead of society in thought and feeling never attack it on principle, though they may conflict with it in some of its details.They would rather be engaged in inquiring about what is right and wrong in society than in asking whether the likes and dislikes of society should be law to the individual.They preferred to work to change the sentiments of mankind on certain points of their own heresies, rather than to defend liberty and safeguard all heresies as a general proposition.There is only one case, and here and there a few individuals have taken a principled, higher position, and have consistently maintained it, and that is in religion.This incident is instructive in many ways, but it is the most obvious example of what is called the infallibility of moral feelings; Indeed one of the clearest examples of moral emotion.Those who first broke the yoke of the so-called Unitarian Church were generally as unwilling as the Church to allow differences of religious opinion.But when the heat of the conflict had passed, and the parties were not completely victorious, and each church or sect had reduced itself to wishing only to hold the ground it had gained, these minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming a majority, They have to appeal to the people they cannot change to allow differences.In this field, and almost alone, then, the right of the individual against society is asserted on principled broad grounds, and the claims of society to exercise authority over its advocates are openly contested.Most of the great writers who have created for the world the religious liberty it enjoys have maintained that liberty of conscience is an irrevocable right, and absolutely denied that a man should be accountable to others for his own religious beliefs.

But man is so naturally intolerable in the matters in which he is really concerned, that religious liberty is seldom actually achieved anywhere, unless the aversion to theological quarrels disturbing the peace is added to religious indifference. In terms of counting.Even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is recognized with implicit reservations in the minds of almost all religious persons.This one tolerates with dissent in matters of ecclesiastical government, but not in matters of dogma; another tolerates all but a Catholic or a Unitarian; yet another, Tolerance is only shown to all people who believe in revealed religions; there are still a few who push tolerance a little further, but they are intolerant when it comes to believing in God and believing in the other world.In a word, it may be said that where the feeling of the majority is really strong, the claim of obedience to the majority will not be seen to be much weakened. In England, from peculiar circumstances of our political history, the bondage of opinion, though perhaps heavier, than that of most other countries of Europe, is less of that of law; There is no small amount of envy at this direct interference with private conduct; and this envy has less to do with any right conception of the independence of the individual than with the habit of thinking of government as An institution that represents interests contrary to those of the public.Most people have not learned to realize that the power of the government is their power, and that the opinion of the government is their opinion.Once they learn this, individual liberty may be violated on the part of government as it has been violated on the part of public opinion.But, for the present moment, there is here a considerable weight of sentiment, ready to be aroused against any attempt to use laws to control individuals in matters to which men have hitherto been accustomed to be regulated; Whether things should be within the legitimate sphere of the law's control or not is not much judged; it is therefore highly healthy on the whole, but in particular cases it may often be Misused, just as it is often well founded.In fact, we have no generally accepted principles by which we customarily measure the propriety and inappropriateness of government intervention.People's decisions about this are based on their own choices.There are some who, seeing that there is some good to be done, or some evil to be saved, are willing to instigate the government into this task; Let the government control this one.In every given event men place themselves on one side or the other.They decide according to this general direction of their sentiments, or according to the degree of pros and cons they feel for the particular thing proposed to be done by the government, or according to how they believe the government will or will not They will do it as they like; it is very rare for them to say that they have always had any opinion on why the government should do it.The result, it seems to me, of this absence of maxim or principle, is that, as far as the present is concerned, one side is as often wrong as the other; and people are almost equally either inappropriately invoking government interference or inappropriately condemning it. The purpose of this paper is to assert a very simple principle, that all coercion and control by society against individuals, whether by material force in the form of legal punishment or moral pressure in the form of public opinion, must be strictly followed. It is the yardstick.The principle is that human beings are justly entitled, individually or collectively, to interfere with the freedom of action of any of them for the sole purpose of self-defense.That is to say, the sole purpose of being justified in exercising a power against any member of a civilized community is to prevent harm to others.If it is for the person's own benefit, whether material or spiritual, that is not a sufficient reason.One cannot compel a man to do or refrain from doing a thing, because it is better for him, because it makes him happier, because it is wise or even right in the opinion of others; This cannot be considered justified.All these reasons are good if they are to persuade him, or to reason with him, or to persuade him, or even to entreat him; but they cannot be used to compel him, or, If he did the opposite, something would happen to him.For coercion to be justified it must be that the very act which is to be deterred from him will be harmful to others.Only the part of anyone's behavior that concerns others is responsible to society.In that part which concerns only himself, his independence is absolute in right.The individual is sovereign over himself, over his own body and mind. Perhaps it goes without saying that this doctrine applies only to human beings who have reached the maturity of their faculties.We are not talking of young children, or of youth under the legal age of men and women.Those who are still in need of the care of others must be defended against their own actions, as against external harm.For the same reason we may leave aside some backwardness in societies in which the race itself may be regarded as a minor. In the course of spontaneous progress, the early difficulties are so severe that little choice is permitted as to the means of overcoming them; so that a ruler with an ameliorating spirit is justified in employing any cheap means by which he can achieve A purpose that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.Despotism is a legitimate form in dealing with savages, provided the end is their betterment and the means are justified by the manifestation of that end.Liberty, as a principle, has no application in any state of mankind before it has reached a stage where it can be improved by free and reciprocal discussion.Till that time, people would obey without question an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they were lucky enough to find such a great emperor.But when mankind acquires this ability to lead them to improve themselves by persuasion or persuasion (this period has long been reached by all nations, and we must also be mentioned here), coercive methods, regardless of origin In the direct form or in the form of severe punishment for disobedience, it can no longer be a means to be used for their own benefit, and can only be justified on the grounds of ensuring the safety of others. It should be noted that in this essay I have discarded all points which could be deduced in favor of my argument from the conception of abstract right as a thing independent of utility.Indeed, on all moral issues, I always resort to utilitarianism in the end; but the so-called utilitarianism here must be in the broadest sense, and must be based on the permanent interests of man as a progressive existence.I would argue that such interests are authoritative to subject individual spontaneity to external control, of course only on that part of each individual's actions which concern the interests of others.If a man commits an action harmful to others, it is said to be an event which, at the sight of him, punishes him, either by law, or by general condemnation when the legal punishment cannot be properly applied.There are also many positive acts of benefit to others which are justified in being compelled to: to testify in a court of law; To undertake his fair share in any joint work which the interest of the community requires; and also in certain individual beneficial actions, such as doing his part to save a man's life, to stand up for a man who has been ill-treated and rendered defenseless, etc. .In short, it is justified to hold a man accountable to society when he does not do what is apparently his duty to do.Know that a man not only injures others by his actions, but also by his inaction, and that in both cases he is justly accountable to them for the injury.Of course, the enforcement of coercion in the latter case requires more caution than in the former case.To make a man responsible for what he does to harm others is the rule; to make him responsible for not preventing it is, comparatively speaking, the exception.Although exceptional, it is justified in many sufficiently obvious and sufficiently significant cases.In all matters in which a man has foreign relations, he is legally responsible to those in whose interest he is concerned, and, if necessary, to society as their protector.There are often good reasons for not holding him accountable; but those reasons must arise from special expediency: simply because the case itself is of such a class that if society, by whatever means in its power, He would have done better, on the whole, if he had tried to control it, rather than let him think of punishment;It should be pointed out that since such reasons exonerate the prior responsibility, at this time the person in charge should make his conscience stand in the vacant judge's seat to protect the interests of others that have no external protection; judge more strictly It is precisely because of this that he is not allowed to explain in front of the referees of his compatriots. But there is also a class of actions which, in so far as it differs from the individual, have only, if any, an indirect interest to society.The scope of such actions includes the whole of a person's life and conduct affecting only himself, or if it affects others, it must be with their free and undeceived consent and participation.It must be explained that when I say here that it only affects the person, I mean that the effect is direct and initial: otherwise, since everything that affects the person will affect others through the person, and it is unknown, then, whoever can Objections based on this unknown must also be considered.This, then, is the proper domain of human liberty. This field includes, first, the introverted state of consciousness, requiring freedom of conscience in the widest sense; freedom of thought and feeling; Absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects.Freedom to express and publish opinions, as it belongs to that part of the conduct of the individual in relation to others, seems to come under another principle; The same, so in practice it is inseparable from freedom of thought.Secondly, this principle requires freedom of taste and inclination; freedom to plan one's life to suit one's character; freedom to do as one pleases, without, of course, avoiding the consequences that follow.This liberty should not be hindered by our fellow-creatures, even if they think our actions foolish, absurd, or wrong, so long as they do no harm to them.Thirdly, With this freedom of individuals comes, within the same limits, the freedom of individual association with one another; Union, as long as the people who join the union are of age and are not forced or deceived. No society is free, whatever its form of government, where these liberties mentioned above are generally not respected; and any society where these liberties are not absolute and unlimited, That's not completely free.The only liberty that really deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good, in our own way, so long as we do not seek to deprive others of this liberty, or hinder their efforts to acquire it.Every man is the proper guardian of his own health, whether of body, of mind, or of spirit.Human beings will gain more by tolerating each other to live as they think is good than by forcing each to live as the rest of the world thinks good. This doctrine, though by no means novel, and may seem self-evident to some, is, however, more directly contrary to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice than any other .Society has done all it can to try (as it sees it) to force people to adapt to its idea of ​​superiority over man as well as superiority over society. The ancient republics considered themselves entitled to exercise, and the ancient philosophers patronized, the use of public authority to regulate every part of private conduct; on the grounds that the state had a deep interest in the whole physical and mental training of each citizen. of.Small republics, surrounded by powerful enemies, are constantly in danger of being overthrown by foreign attack or internal disturbance, and the relaxation of energy and self-control in even a short time can be fatal damage, so they are not allowed to wait. Healthy perpetual effects of liberty—in such small republics the idea was once permissible.In the modern world, the size of political groups is larger, and the most important point is that the authority of the spiritual world and the secular world are separated (this puts the right to guide people's conscience in another uncontrolled hands of people's secular affairs), these circumstances prevent the law from interfering so much with the details of private life.Yet the machinery of moral oppression is more vigorously wielded against disagreement with the ruling party on personal matters than it is on social matters.That is to say, religion, which is the most powerful factor in the formation of moral sentiments, is almost always governed either by the ambitions of the clergy—which seeks to control every branch of human conduct—or by the puritanical ambitions. The mind is in control.Even some of the modern innovators who have been most vocal in their opposition to the old religions have not been behind some churches or sects in asserting the right of spiritual dominion.Among them, Comte should be especially pointed out. His social ideology, as shown in his book "On Real Politics", aims to establish a kind of social tyranny over the individual (although it uses many moral tools). to use the instruments of law) beyond anything that the strictest disciplined philosophers of antiquity ever conceived in their political ideals. Apart from the particular doctrines of the individual thinkers, there is a growing tendency in the world at large to unduly extend the power of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by the force of legislation.Since all the changes that are going on in the world tend to strengthen the power of society and weaken the power of individuals, this erosion is not a evil that tends to disappear by itself, but grows more and more terrible.The tendency of human beings, whether as rulers or fellow citizens, to impose their opinions and inclinations as rules of conduct on others, is part of some of the best and some of the worst emotions inherent in human nature. so strong a support that it can hardly ever be restrained, except in want of power; and power, instead of diminishing, increases, unless a strong wall of moral conviction can be raised against this evil: thus, in the world Under the current situation, we can only see it growing. 为了便于论列，本文不打算一下子就进入这一般的论题，而在开头只限于这论题的一个分枝，在这一分枝上，这里所举陈的原则，假如不是全部也是在某一点上为流行意见所承认的。这一个分枝是思想自由，还有不可能与它分开的与它同源的言论自由和写作自由。这些自由，虽然在一切宣称宗教宽容和自由制度的国度里已经在相当分量上形成了政治道德的一部分，可是它们所倚靠的哲学上的和实践上的根据，在一般人心中恐怕还不大熟习，甚至有些舆论领导者也未必认识透彻，象可以期待的那样。那些根据，一经受到正确的理解，就不只适用于这总题的一个部分，而可以有宽广得多的应用；这也就是说，对于这个问题的这一部分的彻底考虑乃是对于其余部分的最好的导言。当然，我这里所要讲的，对于某些人说来并不是新的东西；因此，如果说关于这一个三个世纪以来已时常经过讨论的题目我还敢再作一番讨论，那么我只有希望他们原谅了。