Chapter 4 volume four

Chapter One There is a science that studies "what is what is what is" and "what is because of the endowments of nature".This is different from any so-called special science; none of those special sciences generally study why reality is reality.They cut out a section of reality and study the quality of this section; mathematics, for example, is doing this. Now since we are looking for the fundamentals of the highest cause, clearly these must be things of nature.If those who search for the elements of existing things are also searching for fundamental principles, these elements must be the elements that make them what they are, and not the elements that lead to their properties.Therefore, we must recognize that the first reason should also be based on reality.

Chapter Two A thing called "is" has many meanings, but all "is" is related to a central point, a definite thing, and this so-called "is" is not ambiguous at all.Everything that belongs to health is related to health, one is to maintain health, another is to produce health, another is to be a sign of health, and another is to have the potential of health.All things belonging to medical treatment are related to medicine. One thing is called a medical thing because it has medical knowledge, another thing is naturally suitable for medical treatment, and another thing is called a medical thing because it has been used in medicine.We should be able to detect other similar application nouns.Thus, a thing in many senses is concerned with a principle (starting point); some things are called "is" because they are substances, some because they are the evolution of the substance, and some because they are the process of completing the substance, Either the destruction or absence or quality of the noumenon, or the manufacture or creation of the noumenon, or the things related to the noumenon, or the negation of these things, and the negation of the noumenon itself. (For this reason, even if we say "not-is", we must "is" a "not-is").Thus, as there may be one science for all matters of health, there may be other special sciences for other things.Not only the study of things that belong to a name should be classified as a discipline, but also all things that involve a property can be classified as a discipline; things with similar properties should have similar names.Then it becomes clear that the study of why things become things should also be a branch of academic work. ——Academics are always seeking the basics on which things are based, and things get their names based on these basic properties.Therefore, since it is said that this is the science of noumenon, philosophers have to try to understand the principles and reasons of noumenon.

Every class of things comes out of a class of senses, for which a science is established, such as grammar, which studies all speech.Therefore, the task of researching all kinds of realities, and discussing the reasons and principles of their being realities in the family and genus, is classified as a comprehensive academic, while the task of each specialized academic study is to study each variety of realities separately. . "Reality" and "Yuanyi", as principles and causes, if <if> belong to the same thing, they are actually the same and united things, although they are not explained by the same formula (they are set as different formulas, but there is no actual formula) different—and this can mutually reinforce their explanations); for example, "a person" and "person" are the same thing, "existing (exactly) person" is the same as "person", and the language is doubled as "an existing There is no difference between "person" and "one person" (because the "one" added to the original thing does not affect the original thing in terms of birth and death); similarly, "existing person" is actually different from "existing person" Nothing is added; therefore it is clear that the added "one" is the same as the "existing man", and the "one" is not different from the "reality"; and, if (if) the substance of each thing is not accidental And being one, similarly does it be by nature: if so, then (if all the above suppositions are true) there is as much reality as there is monadic oneness.Those who study these meanings belong to the same science in the genus—for example, those who discuss the ideas of "same", "similar", and the like; and almost all "pairs" can also be traced from this sense. ; These we have studied in the "Selected Records of Pairing", so we won't go into details.

Furthermore, there are as many branches of philosophy as there are categories of noumenon, so that in this science there must be a first sense and its subordinate senses.In fact, it belongs to all families and genera together with Yuan; therefore, all academic disciplines also belong to corresponding families and genera. The word "philosopher" is in the same category as "mathematician" in idiomatic usage; mathematics is divided into several parts, there are main <first level mathematics> and secondary <second level mathematics>, and other levels within the scope of mathematics. .

Now, since the task of every science should be to study "opposite" and "many" is opposite to "one", so the study of "negation" and "absence" of one also belongs to the same science. Yuan Yi is studied together with its negation or omission. (We either say that something does not exist, or that something does not exist in a particular class of things; The former statement refers specifically to the negation of a certain thing, and the negation of Yuanyi means that Yuanyi does not exist. As for the missing part, it is only argued because of the missing part:) After seeing these facts, our academic The scope should also include the above-mentioned concepts of "pair", "difference" and "dissimilarity" and "inequality" and other items derived from these or from "many and one". "Antagonism" is one of these ideas; for antithesis is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of "difference."For what is called one has many meanings, and these terms will also have many meanings, but all these terms are still under the study of one science;--the division of nouns belongs to different scholars not only because it is different. But because it is not one and its definitions cannot be attributed to a central meaning, it cannot be attributed to an academic discipline.All things should be based on their basic meanings. For example, what we call one must be compared with one of the basics. This should also be the case when we talk about "sameness", "difference", and "pairing"; therefore, in Having identified the various predicates referred to by each thing, we must determine which of the predicates is fundamental, and how the others are related to this fundamental precept; The name is based on what it makes, and some are named in other ways, "but the reference must conform to the basic meaning of things."

It is evident, then, that the same science should elucidate the noumenon as well as the enumerated ideas, (and this is one of our questions in the Debate), and that the philosopher's enterprise should be able to examine all things.If this were not the business of philosophers, who would study these questions: Are Socrates the same as the seated Socrates?Or does every thing have a pair?Or what is antithesis, or how much meaning does this have?and other similar questions.These concepts are different from the evolution of the unitary and the real as numbers or lines, or fire, but the main endowments of the unitary as the unitary and the real as the real. Therefore, this academic study should examine these concepts The essence and their nature.Studying this kind of problem is not considered to be outside the scope of philosophy. It is just that people who lack the correct concept of noumenon forget that noumenon should be prior to these things. This is a mistake.The reason why numbers are numbers has special properties, such as "odd and even", "measurable" and "equal", "exceeding and missing", these are either directly related to numbers, or have mutual relations.Similarly, entities, immovable and moving, weightless and weighted, each have specific properties.Each of the facts has the special properties listed above, and philosophers have to study the truth contained in them.

This example may be mentioned: Dialecticians and Sophists wear the same clothes as philosophers; for Sophistry, wisdom is only appearance, while Dialecticians include everything in their dialectics, and "what is" is also common to them. of a topic; thus dialectics also embraces these subjects which originally belonged to philosophy.Sophistry and dialectics talk about the same things in philosophy, but philosophy is different from dialectics because of different talents, and philosophy is different from sophists because of different ends of academic life.When philosophy seeks true knowledge, dialectics is dedicated to criticism; as for sophistry, although it looks like philosophy, it is not philosophy.

Also, in the sequence of pairings, one of the two lines is "queuing", and all pairings can be simplified as "truth and non-truth", and "one and many", for example, static belongs to one and dynamic belongs to many.Reality and noumenon are combined by antithesis, which is agreed by almost all thinkers; at least they have all mentioned their antithesis as the first principle—some cited parity, some cited hot and cold, and some cited certainty. Limited and unlimited, some cite friendship and fighting ⑤.All of these and other pairings can obviously be simplified as "one and many" (we can admit this simplification ⑥), and the principles described by other thinkers can also be summarized as genus.After these considerations, it becomes clear that the study of what is what is is an academic discipline.Because all things are or are combined by pairs, and "one and many" is actually the starting point of all pairs.Regardless of the simplicity of these precepts, they must always belong to a science.Maybe they actually have more than one meaning; but even if "one" has multiple meanings, these multiple meanings must be related to one basic meaning (the pairs are similar), even if it is true or not as a general rule, Each example is not identical, or is still combined with individual things (in fact, "one" is sometimes a public reference standard, and sometimes it is a continuous series of one by one), which have to be connected to a starting point.For this reason, as a geometer, he does not study what is "pair" or "perfect" and "monadic" or "real", and "same" or "different", he just admits These are taken for granted, and based on this assumption as a starting point, he deduces his own thesis.

Obviously, the task of this academic (philosophy) is to investigate the qualities of what is what is and what is as what is. Observe the above items and the following concepts, such as "before", "after", "genus", "species", "whole part" and other such items. Chapter three We must raise the question whether the study of ontology and the study of axioms (general rules) in mathematics belong to an academic discipline.Obviously, the search for general principles belongs to a philosopher's study; for these truths are common to all things, and do not belong to some independent departments.Each family has its own truth, and these truths are accurate and infallible, so they are recognized and used by the world.But men apply them to suit their own requirements; and they take care of these general rules wherever it is fit to testify for the families they study.Since these general principles are obvious and infallible to all reality, if one wants to ask the reality of all things, those who study the reality as they are will naturally study these general principles.No one who is engaged in a specialized study—such as a geometer or an arithmetician—does not ask whether these generalities are true or false.Some natural philosophers (physicists) are doing research in this way, and their research process can be understood by everyone. They also mean that they are the only ones who are studying the whole of nature and reality.But there is another class of thinkers, beyond the natural philosophers ("nature" is only a special category of "reality"), what they investigate are universal truths and original noumenon, so the research of these truths will also belong to the them.Physics is also a kind of intelligence, but it is not the first degree of intelligence.There are also some people who try to debate the truths that should be admitted. These people often lack "analytical ability".

Therefore, it is obvious that the philosopher who studies all ontology must also study the method of synthesis (syllogism).He who is most skilled in the things of a genus must be able to state the most certain principles of that subject, so he who is most skilled in existing things must also be able to state the most certain principles of all things.Only philosophers can do this, and the most certain principles are those that are infallible (because ordinary people are always mistaken by what they don't know).Such principles should be non-existent and should be well known. A principle which is understood by everyone who has some understanding is not a hypothesis; a principle which must be known to anyone who has some knowledge is a principle that should be foreknown before special investigation.

Let us now proceed to explain what such a most certain principle is.The principle is: "The same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time in the same case"; we must anticipate the additional conditions in order to close the gap that the dialectician exploits.For this corresponds to the above definition, and is the surest of all principles.It is rumored that Heraclitus once said that "the same thing can be both true and false", which is unbelievable to anyone.One's utterance need not be believed, of course; if opposite properties should not belong to the same subject at the same time (often the condition must be added as a rule), if a law contradicts (contradicts) only one law, then this It is obviously impossible: "The same person, at the same time, regarding the same thing, believes both yes and no." If someone makes such a mistake, he will hold two opposite opinions at the same time.For this reason, those who pursue proofs verse by verse always come to the last law; and the ultimate law naturally becomes the starting-point of all other principles. Chapter Four We have mentioned that some people not only claim that "the same thing can be and not be", but also say that this can be judged by the world, and it is true.Others, such as natural science writers, also commonly use such acronyms.But we now hold that it is impossible for anything to be and not be at the same time, and that this principle is self-evident as the most indisputable of all principles.Some people even demand that this principle be proved, in fact, because they lack education; those who cannot distinguish which ones should seek proof and which ones do not need to be proved are because they are uneducated, so you are arguable.It is impossible to prove everything (because it would be endlessly traced back, and in the end there would still be something unproved); Now this principle (Law of Contradiction) is even more self-evident. But with regard to this argument (the same thing is and is not) as long as the other party puts forward some coherence, we shall use the method of contradiction to show that it cannot be established; answer.Such a person is basically no smarter than Herb.Now I will distinguish between counter-evidence and proof. In proof, if a certain assumption is regarded as a given argument, it is considered a truth, but if someone else puts forward an argument; then this argument is his responsibility. What we do is not to prove it. But to prove it.The starting point of all the debates here is not to ask the other party to say whether something is true or not (because this may be regarded as a truth), what we ask the other party is to say something that can be said by both parties. Get the gist; if he's trying to speak, that's how it should be.If he can't express his ideas, because he doesn't understand both himself and others, such a person doesn't have enough comprehension ability.If anyone admits these, then we have something definite, and the proof can go; but it is not he who gives the proof, but he who hears it, that is responsible; for while he is explaining a theory, He listened to another theory.Again, if one admits this, one also admits that some things can be shown to be true without proof [and therefore everything should not be and is not as good as it is]. Here, it is obviously true that "is" or "is not" should each have a definite meaning, so that everything would not be "as it is and not as it is."Also, assuming that "person" has only one meaning, we call it "biped animal"; after limiting one meaning: if the meaning of "man" is "X", and A is a person, then X will be A's The meaning of "so be a human being". (If someone says that a noun has several meanings, as long as it has a limited number of meanings, the reasoning is still the same; because each definition has to propose a different word. For example, we can say that "person" has more than one meaning but has several meanings, then Every decree must have a definition like "biped", and there are only a few decrees, the number of which is limited; each definition must be attached to a special name. However, it is obviously impossible to understand if it is said that there is no need to have a definite limit to the meaning of fate, but that one word can have infinite meanings of fate; Because not being sure of a meaning means that there is no meaning. If words have no meaning, people will not be able to understand each other. In this way, rationality is cancelled.We can only think about one thing, and thinking about anything without belonging to one thing means thinking about nothing.Anything that can be thought of has a name attached to it. ) Then, as mentioned above, let this name have a meaning, and refer specifically to a thing; It is tantamount to "not being a person", which is impossible. (It should be clear here that "limited to expressing one meaning" is not the same as "expressing something about its subject". If it is vague here, misunderstandings may arise, such as "educated" and "white" and "people", Although the three refer to a certain thing, they do not have the same meaning.) It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, except by synonyms, as in the case of what we call "man" and others call "not-man"; but the question is not its What is called "human" or "non-human" is what it actually is.Now, if there is no difference in the meaning of the words "human" and "non-human", there is no difference between calling it "is human" and calling it "not human" when it is obvious that they refer to one thing, because although they belong to Different words refer to the same thing.For example, what we wear is called "clothes" or "clothes". Clothes and clothes refer to only one thing with one definition.If "is a person" and "is a non-person" are to be synonymous, they must refer to the same thing.But having said that, such names should refer to different things.Therefore anything that is called a man must be a "biped"; for this is what is meant for "man".The meaning of the so-called "must be" means that it cannot become "not". It must be a human being and cannot be a "two-legged animal".So at the same time, referring to the same thing as "being human and not being human" cannot be true. The same principle is also applicable to "not a person", "is a non-person" is different from "is a person", "is white" and "is a person" have different purposes; <"not a person" and "is a person" "Man"> The former has the opposite purpose, and has a stronger difference than the latter, which must refer to different creatures.If someone says that "white" and "person" are the same thing, as we have said above, if different expressions of the same thing are confused into the same meaning, not only the opposite things will be mixed, but everything will be mixed.If it is admitted that this is impossible, as long as the other party answers our questions one by one, the conclusion will be revealed by these answers. When we ask a simple question and Gou contains some opposites (contradictions) in his answer, he is not answering the question.If he answers the same thing, saying that it is both man and white and everything else, no one will object to it: but if the subject is this: It is "a man," is this true or not? ?Our opponent should choose between "is a person" and "is not a person", and should not add that "it is white again" or "it is big again".The accidental properties of things are innumerable and too numerous to enumerate; let him enumerate them all or let him not enumerate them.Similarly, even though the same thing has been "human" a thousand times and "non-human" a thousand times, our counterpart, when asked whether it is a person, can never say If he is a person and at the same time is not a person, then he has to enumerate all the accidental properties of this thing that have been "is" and "not" before and after; if he answers in this way, he violates the argument. rules. Generally speaking, answering this way actually cancels both the noumenon and how it is. Because he enumerates all the attributes that are accidental, so that the main quality of everything that makes it a "man" or "animal" is gone.If it possesses the main qualitative nature of what makes it human, it is by no means "non-human" or "not human" (these are the negation of what makes it human); Those> means only one point, which is the "noumenon" of things.After citing how things are, and naming the noumenon, the meaning has already been specifically referred to, and no other things can be arbitrarily referred to.But if "what makes it a human" is essentially the same as "what makes it a non-human" or "what makes it a non-human", then we have to look elsewhere Looking for "how is".Then our counterparts will have to say that nothing can be defined, and that all properties are accidental; However, there is a difference between noumenon and contingent attributes——"white" is contingent to "human being", because although he is white, white is not what he is.If all explanations were to be derived from attributes, and a subject were predicated on accident, things would have no fundamental cause at all; such predicates would then have to be endlessly accumulated.But this is impossible; because in the attribute cloud predicate, as long as there are more than two items of attribute nouns, it is not convenient to compound.Because (1) one accident is not the other accident's accident, and the two accidents can be called consecutive predicates only because they belong to the same subject.For example, we can say that the "white" is "literate" and "the literate is white" because both belong to people.However, (2) if Socrates is said to be "literate", the two words are not different attributes of another thing.The predicates here clearly have two types of usage: (a) "educated" is an attribute of Socrates like "white", and this type of predicate cannot be said endlessly; Socrates" cannot add another attribute; for it is impossible to find another word to show what the two words refer to. <If "educated" can be one with Socrates, it cannot be one with "white Socrates". 〉Also, (b) It is also not possible to use another noun, such as "educated", as the predicate of "white".Because the two are attributes, neither one can be said to contain or surpass the other; even if the two are connected because of the same theme, they seem to belong to each other but they do not.With "educated" as Socrates's ("that white") attribute, this type of predicate is different from the previous one. In this type of predicate series, this accident is an accidental accident, but this cannot be said for all predicates. All by chance.There must be some predicates in it that indicate the noumenon.If so, this shows that the opposite (contradiction) cannot be used as the predicate of a thing at the same time. Again, if all contradictory statements are true at the same time on the same subject, it is evident that all things must be one.If anything can be affirmed or denied arbitrarily, the same thing will be a building ship, a wall and a person. This theory must be accepted by anyone who agrees with Protagoras' thought.If people think that man is not a building boat, he is clearly not a building boat; if Gou says that the opposite shows that both are true, then he is also a building boat.Thus we fall into the teaching of Anaxagoras on the mixing of all things; then there would be no single entity at all.They seem to be talking about "unfixed things", but when they think about "reality", they say "nothing";But they must allow any predicate on any subject to be affirmed or denied.For this is absurd: to say that every subject can be denied in itself, while other subjects have something which cannot be denied, is not negated.For example, if you say "a person" but says that he is "not a person", you think it is not wrong, so obviously, it is not wrong to say that he is "a building boat" or "not a building boat".Similarly, if the positive affirmation (is Lou Chuan) can be used as his predicate, the negative negation (not Lou Chuan) must also be his predicate; Compared with the negation of the subject itself, it can be used as a predicate casually.In this way, you can negate the theme of "person" as "not a person", and of course it is also possible to negate "louchuan" as "not a building boat"; These negations can be casual, so affirmative words should also be casual. Therefore, those who insist on this point of view are forced to make such a conclusion that there is no need to affirm or deny a thing.If a thing is "both human and non-human" and both are real, obviously this thing can also be "neither human nor non-human".Two heads correspond to two tails.The former proposition composed of positive and negative words does correspond to the latter proposition composed of positive and negative words, and the two propositions before and after are just the opposite. Also, (A) or this theory is completely true, a thing can be "both white and not white", "both exist and not exist", and other pros and cons are also possible, (B) or this theory is only Some are true, others are not.If it is not completely true, (b) then only one side of the contradiction is true, and the other side must be false.However, if this theory is completely true, (A) then (a) when the front is true, the reverse should also be true, and when the reverse is true, the front should also be true; (ugly) or where the front is true, the reverse must be true, Whereas the negative is true, the positive is not necessarily true.In the latter case, (ugly) an opposite is established, which would be an indisputable creed; Since "nothing is" is knowable and undisputed, its opposite "rightness" should be even more knowable.However, if it is said that everything that can be denied can be affirmed, then can we separate the two predicates of "yes and no" and let him give a definite answer (for example, don't say "white and not white?" "And say "this thing is white", and then say "this thing is not white").If (1) it is said that the two clouds are inseparable, it shows that our opponent wants to use the "undetermined things" of "but not" to prevaricate. None of these undecided things should exist in reality; How could things talk or walk like him?According to this argument, as has been said above, all things will become one, as man and god and ship and their opposites will all become one and the same thing.On the contrary, being co-predicated to each subject, there is no difference between one thing and another; for if there were any difference between them, this difference would be some real and distinct quality. (2) If the two opposite predicates are answered separately, in addition to the confusion of the above-mentioned things, it will also lead to the conclusion that everything can be <true> right or <false> wrong. and our counterpart admits that he is on the wrong side. ——Our interrogation with him is obviously in vain; for saying a lot is equal to saying nothing.He neither said "yes" nor "no," he always said "yes and no"; and he went on to deny these, saying "neither yes nor no"; The wording of the book also contains some elusive "certain things". If this principle is formulated: "When the front is true, the reverse should be false, and when the reverse is true, the front should be false", so that it will be impossible to affirm and deny the same thing at the same time.Yet they might even say that was the problem. Also, when someone judges a thing, they say "it is so" or "it is not as good as it is", while others judge a thing as "it is not as it is"; whose judgment is right and whose judgment is wrong?If those ambiguous people are right, where can they refer to existing things with such a nature?If he is not right, he is still more appropriate than a man who distinguishes things as both "yes" and "no." Even if he cannot be right, you can't count him wrong.But everything is the same, true and false are mixed together, and a person who falls into this state cannot actually say and will not say anything that can be understood; Judgment is just chaotic, thoughtful but not thoughtful, how is such a person different from grass and trees? It should then be quite clear that whoever advocates such a theory (contradictory), and whoever else does not actually take this position.Why does a person, when he thinks of going to Megara, stop staying at home and go to Megara?Why didn't he step into a well, or step up a precipice, when he set out on the road one morning?We see him pay attention to every step, and of course we can know that he does not mean to fall into the abyss or fall off the cliff, is "good and bad", or "necessary".Obviously he judged which way to go is better and which way to go is not good.If everyone does not take this kind of judgment as false, he will also determine that one thing is "human" and another thing is "non-human". One thing is sweet, and the other is not sweet. .Because he does not measure everything equally, when he wants to drink water, he goes to the water, and when he wants to visit people, he goes to people.Assuming that the same thing is both human and not human, he would have to equate everything.However, as mentioned above, there is no action of everyone that is not seeking good luck (towards certain things) and avoiding evil (avoiding other things).It seems that people all over the world, even if they cannot judge everything in the world, they will always judge the benefits, benefits, good and evil of certain things.If these are not considered knowledge, but just opinions (guessing), they should still be people who are eager for the truth, just like a sick person’s desire for health is more urgent than a person who is not sick; A person who can guess is certainly not healthy compared to a person who really knows something. In addition, all things can be "as it is or as it is", but in the nature of things, there is still a difference between excess and insufficiency. We should never say that two and three are equally even numbers, nor can we say that a mistake of four is five A person who makes mistakes is equal to a person who makes eight mistakes.If it is said that their mistakes are not equal, then the one with the smaller error should be closer to the truth.If a thing has more of the nature of a certain thing, it should always be closer to that thing.If such differences are not enough signs of the truth, yet by recognizing them we always find something more certain and nearer to the truth, and we would rather abandon the muddy dogma, lest it hinder the usual judgment of our minds. Chapter five Protagoras' teachings also developed from the same opinion, and if true they are both true, and if false they are both false.On the one hand, if all opinions and phenomena are admitted to be true, all speech will be both true and false at the same time. For the beliefs of many are in conflict, and it is common for a man to think wrong that he disagrees with him; so the same thing must both be and not be.On the other hand, the so-called "some people think it is right, and some people think it is wrong", the opposite is just everyone's opinion; the same thing can indeed be "yes and not"; up.Evidently, this teaching also comes from the same way of thinking. However, it is not appropriate to use the same defense method for different opponents; some people need to reason with them, and some people can only force them.Because some people accept debate with the aim of penetrating their own thoughts, so as long as the confused points are enlightened and he is gradually guided into a bright place, he will suddenly become enlightened and heal his ignorance.However, for those who rely on words and nouns to argue for the sake of argument, there is no way to diagnose and cure him except to deny his argument. Those who do feel that they have such an opinion, are probably inspired by the observation of sensible things. (i) They think opposites or correspondences to be true at the same time, because they see opposites emerging from the same thing.If the non-being of things cannot be realized by things, then if something is realized, it must be something that already exists in the pair of things. As Anaxagoras said, "all things are mixed with all things"; Democrius The same is true of Teli's theory, because he said that emptiness and reality are equal and coexist everywhere, one of which is true and the other is not true.To those whose beliefs are thus aroused we shall regard them as being right in a certain sense and wrong in a certain sense.There are two meanings of becoming a real thing, one is that there was no "is" in the past, and there is "is" today, and the other is that "nothing" cannot become a "true", and the same thing can become a real thing or not become a real thing— — but in a different way.For the same thing can contain a pair of two opposite ends at the same time in potentiality, but in actuality, it can no longer contain two ends.Furthermore, we would ask them to believe that in all existing things there is a sub-substance to which neither change nor birth and death belong. (2) Similarly, there are others who arouse these opinions from such observations as the reality of the appearance of sensible things.Because they think that the truth is not determined by the number of people who hold beliefs; the same thing, some people like it sweet, others like it bitter; Madness, during which the second and third sons are alone healthy or awake, the world will definitely regard the second and third sons as sick and crazy, and do not call themselves sick and crazy. Also, they say that the impressions that many animals get from their senses are different from ours;谁的印象真实，谁的印象虚假这并不明白；这一组人或动物的印象未必胜于另一组，然而两者同属某一事物之印象。为此故，德谟克利特要这样说，或者真理是没有的，或者至少我们于真理还没有明白。 这些思想家一般假定知识就是感觉，感觉的差异则出于身体的差异，一切出现在我们感觉中的事物必然是真实的；这样，恩培多克勒与德谟克利特，几乎也可以说所有其他的思想家，都成了这一类意见的俘虏。恩培多克勒曾说人的思想随人身体而为变；人之于智度因滋养而日增，在别篇中，他又说： 他们的体质怎样的改变， 思想也常发生怎样的改变。 巴门尼德也有同样的讲法： 许多关节巧妙地组成人体。 也这样组成人的思心； 各人的思想皆由此多关节的肢体发生。 而思想竟是那么繁富。 阿那克萨哥拉致其友人的一句箴言也与此攸关——"事物就有如所意想那样的事物"。而且他们说荷马也有这样的讲法，因为他叙述赫克笃被打失了知觉以后躺着胡思乱想——照这讲法一个受伤而失去思想力的身体仍还有所思想，只是他那伤体的思想已异于先前未伤体的思想了。于是明显地，倘这两类都算是思想，而此刻的胡思乱想与先前的思想所寄，恰又同属某一实物，则此实物该可说"既如是而又不如是"了。就在这一方向，开展讨论最为困难。假如那些见到了这些事例的人认为这样的真理是可能的，而且认为这样的真理正是他们所最喜爱而乐于追求的，——假如那些具有这样意见的人来宣扬这样的真理，初进于哲学研究的人不将自然地失望吗？因为这样的寻求真理何异于追逐空中的飞鸟。 思想家们所以要执持这样意见，其缘由就在实是中求其所是的时候，他们将感觉当作了实是；可是在可感觉世界中，存在有许多未定性质——那些未定物所存在的特殊意义，我们上已述及；所以他们说得相当高明，但所说并不真实—— 与其象爱比卡尔谟那样的批评齐诺芬尼，毋宁作这样的批评。因为在动变中的事物无可为之作成真实的叙述，他们看到了自然界全在动变之中，就说"既然没一时刻没一角落不在动变，所以没一事物可得确实地予以肯定"。就是这一信念发展成上面提及的理论，如那个闻名已久的赫拉克利特学派克拉底鲁所执持的学说，可算其中最极端的代表，他认为事物既如此动变不已，瞬息已逝，吾人才一出言，便已事过境迁，失之幻消，所以他最后，凡意有所诣，只能微扣手指，以示其踪迹而已；他评议赫拉克利特所云"人没有可能再度涉足同一条河流"一语说："在他想来，人们就是涉足一次也未成功"。 可是，我们将答复这辩论说，他们关于动变的想法是有些道理在内的，然而总是可訾议的，虽说在变动中的事物尚非实在的事物，可是事物之有所消失者必先有此可消失者在，事物之今兹变现者，必先有某些事物在。一般说来，一物灭坏，必将因此而变现有某物；一物生成，必有所从而生成之物在前，亦必有为彼而有此生成之物在后，而这一过程不能无尽已的进行。——但暂且不管这些问题，让我们坚持这一点，同一事物，所变的不在量与质。既便事物在量上并非恒等；我们总是其它的形式认识每一事物。——又，我们这样批评执持那些意见的人应可算是公正的：他们就是对可感觉事物也仅见极小部分，却要将自己的意见应用于全宇宙；因为这只有紧绕于我们周遭的可感觉世界才是常在生灭的不息过程之中；但这世界——就这么说吧——只是全宇宙中的一个小小的分数而已，所以这才较为公正，应该为着那另一部分而放弃这世界小小的可感觉部分，不宜凭这一部分去评判那另一部分。 于是，我们正要将我们所早已有的结论告知他们：我们必须向他们证明，要他们认识：宇宙间必有全无动变性质的事物存在。实际那些主张事物同时"既是而又不是"的人，如欲由此而有所引伸，则与其说一切均在动变，毋宁说一切皆归安定；因为一切属性均已备于一切主题，天地万物，各如位育，殊已无所需于动变了。 关于真实的性质，我们必须认定每一呈现的物象，并不都属真实；第一即使感觉不错，——至少感觉与感觉对象互相符合——印象也并不一定与感觉符合。又，这应当是公正的，我们于对方提出那些问题表示诧异；事物在远距离与在近处所呈现于人眼前时是否尺度相同，是否颜色相同；其所呈现于病人与健康人眼前时是否相同；事物的重量呈现于强壮的人与衰弱的人手中时是否相同；事物的虚实呈现于入睡的人与醒着的人是否相同。明显地，他们并未想到这些都是问题。至少没有人当他身在里比亚时，却幻想自己在雅典，正出门去参加奥第雄的晚会。又，关于未来的事物，如柏拉图所说，例如一个病人是否会得痊愈，一个医师的意见与一个普通人的意见，分量不是一样的。再者，对于一个陌生对象与相当熟悉的对象，或是对于一个亲近的对象与官感相应的对象之间，各官感本身就不是同等可靠的；对于色，只有视觉可靠，味觉就不可靠；对于味，只有味觉可靠，视觉就不可靠；每一种官感永不会在同时说同一对象这"既如是又不如是"。就是不在同时，这一官感有时前后不符，其所示异，也不是事物之性质，而只是那同一性质的异感。试举例以明吾意，同样的酒，或因酒变了质，似乎可以一时为美酒一时为不美；但是至少当酒之为美酒时，彼所为美固确乎存在，这酒美是不变的，饮酒的人对那一刻的酒美也是领会得不错的，于那一刻之所以为酒美，其性质必然是"如是而又如是"〈"如彼而又如彼"〉。可是那些观点〈错觉〉破坏了这个必然，他们舍弃了任何事物的怎是，也使世上不再有必然的事物；因为所谓必然就不能又是这样又是那样，所以任何事物若有所必然，就不会"又如是又不如是"了。 一般说来，假如只有可感觉事物存在，那么若无动物〈活物〉就没有这世界，因为没有动物，也就没有感觉器官。 现在说是可感觉性与感觉两不存在，这样的论点无疑是真实的，因为两者都只是在感觉者身上所产生的感应。但是，若说那感觉所由发生的原因，那个底层也不应存在，这就不可能。因为感觉决不只是感觉自身，而必有某些外于感觉者先感觉而存在；主动的总是先于被动的，这两个相关名词也可适用于感觉问题。 Chapter Six 在笃信这观点的人以及仅是侈谈这些理论的人之间，有人提出这样一个难题，将是谁来断定人的健康与否，又将是谁来断定每一类问题的虚实。但这一类问题与考查我们现在是睡眠抑是醒着一样。所有这些问题都属同一性质。这些人们为每一事情举一理由；因为他们要找一个起点，由这起点来作别的证明，而他们又想要用证明来找起点，从他们的方法上看来，能否找到，他们也并无自信；但他们的情调恰如我们以前曾说过的：实证的起点原本不是另一个实证，他们却要为说不出理由的事物找寻理由。 这些，要旨并不难于领会；然而那些专求辩论必胜的人老是寻找那些不可能的事物；他们主张容许大家互反〈自相矛盾〉——这种要求本身一开始就是一个矛盾。但事物若并不尽属"关系"范畴，有些事物可以自在而独存，这就不必是每一呈现于感觉者都属真实；惟有见此事物之呈现的某些人明白这些现象；所以谁若以现象为尽属真实，他就使一切事物均成"关系"。所以依照他们的论点，同时要求在辩论中可以有所必胜，那么他们就必须时时检点自己，不要说真实存在于其所呈现，只是说真理存在于向他呈现的，在那时候，在那官感上，与那情况中呈现的现象。他们提出任何论题若不是这样讲法，他们很快就会发现自己在否定自己了。因为这可能，同样一物看来是蜜，嗜来却不是。又因为我们具有两眼，如果两眼视觉不一，一事物就可以呈显两现象。对于那些执持着我们先前说过的那些理由的人们以现象为真实，也认为一切事物无须以真假相诤，因为事物之呈现于各人，所得现象原不一致，既便呈现于同一人时，前后也不一致，甚且常常同时发生相反的现象，（当一物置于我们交叉的两手指间，触觉则谓二，视觉则为一）——对于这些人们，我们将说是的，但这不在同一官感上，不在同一时间内，不在同一情况下，如果这些条件具备，所呈现的将属真实。但彼不为决疑解惑、仅为辩论而辩论的人，于此又将说，依你所论，也只是于那一感受的人是真实，并不能说这于一切人均属真实。如上曾述及，他必使一切尽成"关系"——使一切相关于意见与感觉而后已，这样就没有一个已存在或将生成的事物能脱离某些人的意想之如是或如彼而自行存立。但事物之已存在或将生成者，显然并不一律有赖于人们的意想。 又，事物之为一者，应与一事物或与某些决定性事物为关系；如一事物成为两半而相等，其为"等"，与为"倍"并无直接关系。于是，思想于事物的人与被思想着的事物如果相同，人将不是那思想者而将合一于那被思想着的事物。每一事物如果必须相关于思想此事物的人，则此思想的人将累累地相关于无尽相关的各别事物。 这些当已足够说明（一）一切信条中最无可争议的就是"相反叙述不能同时两都真实"，（二）如认为两都真实，这引出什么些后果，以及（三）为什么人们会得误认相反者两都真实。"相反"既不应在同时，于同一事物两都真实，"相对"亦应是这样。相对的两端之一是另一端的对成，也是它的"阙失"，而且阙失了的必是主要的质性；阙失是对于一个确定了的科属取消其应有的云谓。于是，假如不可能同时肯定与否定，相对的两端也不可能同时属之于一个主题（除了两端都以变称关系，或一端为原称，一端以变称关系来属之于那一主题）。 Chapter seven 另一方面，在相反叙述之间也不能有间体，于一个主题我们必须肯定或否定一个云谓。首先我们若将"真与假"解释清楚，这就可明白，凡以不是为是、是为不是者这就是假的，凡以实为实、以假为假者，这就是真的；所以人们以任何事物为是或为不是，就得说这是真的或是假的；若说这"既非是又非不是"，则事物将在真假之间。——又，相反之间的间体将类似黑与白之间的灰色，或如人与马之间的"非人非马"。（甲）如果间体是象后一类的，那么它是不能变向相对两端的（因为"变"，是从不好变好，或从好变不好），而间体总得变向两端，或两端变向间体。至于相反〈矛盾〉这就无可互变。（乙）如果〈象前一类〉这确实是一间体，这也就会得变白，但这不是从非白变出来的；这是从灰色中未为人见的白变出来的。——又，理知亦得肯定或否定每一个理知或思想的对象，——这由定义上看来就该明白了。定义总是说怎么是真实，怎么是虚假。事物以肯定或否定之一式为联结则成真实，以另一式为联结便成虚假。 又，如果人不仅为辩论而辩论，这就必须在一切相反之间，都设立一个间体，惟有这样他才能说世上毕竟有了"既非真实又非虚假"的事物，而在那些"是与不是"的事物之间将可得成立一"中性"事物，在生成灭坏之间也造为一类变化间体。 又，有些事物，凡否定一个属性就等于肯定其相对的另一端，竟说是在这样一类事物中也有一个间体；例如，在数理范围内据称有既非"奇"又非"非奇"的一种数。但这从定义上看来显然是不可能的。 又，这过程将无尽地进行，实是的数目不仅将增加总数一半，而且将增加得更多。这也将可能有人再否定这间体为正反两端的比照，因而别立新间体，这些新间体既另有其怎是，也就将另成一套事物。 又，当一个人被询问一物是否为"白"时，他说"不"，他所否定就只在"是"〈白〉；它的"不是白"是一个负反。 有些人获得这些观念同他们获得其它悖理一样；当他们不能否定一个诡辩谲词时，就承认那个论点，同意那些结论为真确。有些人就因此表现这些想法；另有些人因为要求每一事物必须举一理由，也表现这样的想法。应付所有这些人们就当以建立"定义"为起点。定义之所以为人所重就在于它必有所指明；由名词组成的公式将所解释的事物划出了界限，赫拉克利特学说以一切事物为既是而又不是，似乎使一切事物悉成真实；而阿那克萨哥拉在两项相反之间设立间体，又似乎使一切事物悉成虚假；因为当事物全是混合物时，混合既不是好也非不好，这样谁都不能明确指出一件真实的事物。 Chapter eight 经过这些分析，这该明白，有些人所宣扬的那些片面理论是站不住的。——理论的一方面说没有一样事物是真实的（因为，他们说世上并无规律限止人们不使所有的陈述都作成"正方形的对角线可以用它的边为计量"这样一类的叙述），另一方面的理论则说一切事物尽属真实。这些观念实际与赫拉克利特的观念相同；他说"一切皆真，一切尽伪"这一句话的两节应是可以分开来说的，分成单条，其所说既属不可能，合成双联后其说也必不可能。两个相反显然不能同时都真，——另一方面，也不能一切叙述都是假的，虽则照我们以前所曾说过的道理，这似乎比较的可能。但，为要撇清所有这些议论，我们必须要求，如前所述及，不说某事物"是或不是"，应明确某事物有何含义，这样，我们就必须依据一个定义来进行论辩，例如所谓真假就得先确定什么是真，什么是假。所要肯定是真的若与所要否定是假的事物并无异致，这就不可能一切叙述都是假的；因为照这情形，那两相反中必有一个是真的。又，假如关于每一事物必须承认或否定它，这就不可能都是错的；这两相反中，只有一个是错的。所有这些观念常是自相刺谬，戳破自己的理论。因为他在说"一切皆实"这一叙述时，他已对反了自己下联的叙述，（因为它的相对叙述就在否定这真实），所以他自己这叙述就成为不真实的了。他在说一切皆虚，引出的结论也相似，使他自己也成为一个撒谎者。如果前一位〈说"一切皆实"的〉除外了那相对的一个条例〈一切皆虚〉，说世上惟有那一条不实；而后一位〈说一切皆虚的〉则除外了他自己，说世上只有他不虚；这样，他们已经被逼到替真实与虚假作出无限止的假设了。若要为他的真实理论注明所由称为真实的境界，这过程将无休止地进行。 又，那些人说"一切皆在静定"显然是不正确的，那些人说"一切皆在动变"也不正确。假如一切皆在静定，则同一叙述将永是真的，同一叙述也将永是虚的——但这明显地在动变；因为那作此叙述的人〈自己就在动变〉，先前他未在世上，过一会儿他又将不在世上了。假如一切皆在动变，世上又将没有一件实在的事物；于是一切尽假。但我们曾已说明这是不可能的。又，凡是变化的必须原是一事物，因为变化是由某些事物变为某些事物。再者，若说"一切事物咸有时而静定或咸有时而动变"，没有一样事物是"永静"或"永动"，这样说法也不切实；宇宙间总该有一原动者，自己不动，而使一切动变事物入于动变。