Chapter 3 volume three

volume three Chapter One We should list the topics we intend to discuss first in the academic studies we have studied.These include the principles of various philosophies and any point of view that no one has examined before.Anyone who is willing to solve doubts should first have a good doubt; from doubt to thinking, this leads to the answer to the question.If people do not see the "knot", there is no way to get rid of the "knot".But the difficulty of thinking is the crux of the problem; when we feel blocked in thinking, it is like being bound by chains; the bound thoughts are also like a bound person, making it difficult to move forward.

Therefore, we should anticipate difficulties as estimates; for wanting to do research without asking questions first is like a person who wants to travel but does not know where he is going.Without an explanation first, each person has no way of guessing whether he can find the answer he seeks within a certain period of time; although the truth of the problem is clear to those who have studied it before, it is not clear to those who doubt it.Also, for a case, those who have heard the arguments from both sides are of course better at distinguishing right from wrong. The first question was covered in our "Introduction".this is--

(1) The exploration of causes belongs to one or several disciplines, (2) Such a discipline only needs to study the first principle of noumenon, or it should also study other principles on which people rely as the basis of reasoning (for example, whether it is possible to simultaneously admit and deny the same (Things and other such general principles); (3) If this academic study is dedicated to noumenon, whether all noumenon can be summarized by one academic or several departments need to be discussed; if there are several departments, whether each department is closely related, and among If some should be called wisdom, others should be given other names. (4) This is also a question that must be discussed-whether only the sensible substance actually exists, or there are other things that exist together with it; and these other "non-sensible substances" have only one type, or several types, such as belief and communication. Between the sensible things and these substances there are substances which are conjectured by man who has formulas and mathematical objects.

Regarding the above question, we must examine in detail, (5) whether our research is limited to noumenon, or whether it also involves the main attributes of noumenon.There are also "same" and "difference", "similar" and "dissimilar" and "opposite", as well as "before" (nature) and "after" (nurture) and others—dialecticians use the popular premise These terms are often tried for examination at the beginning of a debate—whose business will it be to scrutinize them?Again, we must discuss the main properties of these nouns, not only to ask what they are, but also to inquire whether each thing must have a "pair".

Also, (6) The principles and elements of things are the genus or its parts, that is, the various parts that things are composed of and can also be separated; if it is a genus, whether it should be the highest genus to which each individual thing belongs The genus, such as "animal" or "human", is based on the principle that the farther it is from the species, the wider it belongs to. (7) We must study and discuss whether there is any "self" cause and effect other than matter, and whether there is only one kind of cause and effect of this kind, or whether there can be multiple kinds; Substance means matter with what it represents), or in some cases there may be other things than the composite substance, and in others there is not, and what of these cases.Also, (eight)

Let us ask whether the principle has a limit to its number or class in definition and at the bottom level; (9) whether the principles of perishable things and indestructible things are the same; The principle of things is also perishable.And (10) the most difficult and most puzzling question: whether "unity" and "reality" are indistinguishable, as the Pythagoreans and Plato maintained, are indeed the essence of existing things; or are these not the essence of things? Noumenon, but the "friend" mentioned by Empedocles, or the "fire" mentioned by others, and the "water" and "qi" mentioned by others are the bottom layer of things?Also, (11) we ask whether the first principles are universal, or whether they belong to individual things, and (12) whether they are "potential" or "realization", and their so-called potentiality and realization are the opposites of dynamics. Whether it is said differently, or has another meaning; these questions will also reveal a lot of confusion.And (13) Do "numbers" and "lines" and "points" and "planes" have ontological meanings?If being substances, are they united in sensible things, or separated from them?Not only is it difficult to reach a true conclusion about the above-mentioned ends, but it is also not easy to clearly state all the difficulties.

Chapter Two (1) Our first question is whether the study of all causes belongs to one or several disciplines?How can the principles be recognized by a science if they are not opposites? There are many things that do not have all four causes.How can a principle of change or goodness be applied to things that do not change?Every thing, if it is good in itself or in its own nature, is itself an end, and becomes the cause of the being of other things; for some end or purpose, this will do something; It can be seen that it changes; thus, in things that are unchanging or inherently good, change can do nothing, and the principle of change cannot be applied.Therefore, mathematics never uses this kind of reason to prove, and no one uses-"because this is better or that is worse"-to answer mathematical problems; in fact, no one mentions in mathematics This kind of problem.For this reason, Sophists, such as Aristipus, often ridicule mathematics. He believes that in terms of art, nothing is as humble as carpenter and shoemaker, and it must be compared with "well done" or "badly done", but Mathematicians do not know what is good and what is evil in the universe.

However, if there are several disciplines for various reasons, and one kind of reason belongs to one science, then we will ask which one is the most suitable for us to study, or which one has the most noble scholars?The same thing can have all causes, for example, a house whose agent is architecture or the builder, its ultimate cause is the function that the house fulfills, its physical cause is earth and stone, and its original cause is the definition of the house.Judging from our previous discussion on this issue, the four causes can all be called the learning of wisdom.As for the noblest and most authoritative among them, it should be regarded as the study of the ultimate cause and the good cause, the ultimate and the original goodness have wisdom,——

All things return to the ultimate and return to the original good, and other academics are just its handmaidens, and must be attached to it so as not to violate it.However, according to the previous discussion about noumenon, how things are is the most knowable principle, and the cause of form should be the closest to knowing wisdom.Because one can perceive the same thing in many ways, whoever perceives a thing in its "so-and-so" will know it more fully than one who perceives it in its "not-so-not-so" ; the class of people who recognize things as they are, must make a distinction. Those who know the "how" of things know things most fully. He who perceives a thing in terms of its other aspects will not have the fullest understanding.

Also, in all other cases, we mean that for every thing, even if it is something that can be proved, it must be known how it is before it can be recognized. ", the answer is, "Find an appropriate median <side as a square> on the long and short sides of the <rectangular>"; all other cases are similar.Knowing the source of motion, we also know action and change, and the development of each motion; and this is different from and contrary to the ultimate.So, it seems that there should be several academic disciplines to study several types of reasons. (2) But as to the principles and causes of positive evidence, it is a matter of debate whether they belong to one or several sciences.What I mean by positive principles are general principles on which everyone proves, such as "everything must be affirmed or denied", and "things cannot simultaneously be and not be"; and similar premises.The question is whether the science of positivism and the science of ontology should belong to the same academic discipline, or different academic disciplines. If they are not the same academic discipline, which academic discipline should we pursue.It is not plausible that these subjects should belong to a science; for what reason should they be made to belong to geometry or any other science in order to clarify them?If it cannot belong to all sciences, but can belong to any one, then what is known in ontology about these subjects is not different from what is known in other sciences.At the same time, how can there be an academic study of first principles?Of course we now know what these general principles actually are (at least they are being used as familiar theorems in various academic disciplines); Some are provable, some are not provable generalizations (because it is impossible to obtain all generalizations first); proof must start with certain given premises as evidence, and prove a certain topic for a certain subject. some things.Therefore, everything that is proved by this will be assigned to the class of demonstrability; for all positive sciences are proved by general rules.

If the study of ontology and the study of general principles are different, which of the two studies should be given priority and which should be the main one?A general is the most general axiom of all things.If this is not the business of philosophers, who will ask whether they are true or false? (3) Generally speaking, do all beings belong to one science or to several? If it is necessary to belong to the category of numbers, then which category of noumenon should belong to philosophy?On the other hand, it is not really possible for a science to deal with everything; for then a positive science would have to deal with all attributes.The business of every science examines the principal properties of certain things according to some generally accepted principles.Therefore, if there are things and attributes of various levels, there are general principles and academics of various levels.The subject belongs to a kind of knowledge, and the premise is also a kind of knowledge, no matter whether the two can be normalized or can only be separated; attributes are also a kind of knowledge, no matter they are studied separately by various academic disciplines or combined with each other for comprehensive research. (5) Also, do we only study ontologies and their properties?Let me give an example to illustrate my point. If a solid is a body, so is a line and a surface. Should the same science be aware of these and its properties at all levels (mathematics is the proof for these properties), or let The latter belongs to another academic? If it belongs to the same discipline, the science of ontology will also be the science of positivism; but how things are supposed to be is unverifiable.If it is another discipline, then what kind of academic discipline will it be to study the attributes of the ontology?This is a difficult question. (4) Again, are there only sensible things or are there other things? There is only one type of ontology, or there may be several types. For example, some people think that the general formulas and intermediates studied by mathematics are also ontology?The general formula is a cause and an independent ontology. We have mentioned this meaning when we first mentioned this term. There are many difficulties in the general formula theory, and the most incomprehensible point is that there are certain things other than the material world. Sensible things are the same, but they are eternal, whereas sensible things perish.Without explanation, they say that there is a "people-oriented", a "horse-based", and a "health-based" - this kind of achievement is like people saying that there is a god, which looks like a person.In other words, the reality of God is an eternal person, and the reality of the general form mentioned by Platonism is just some eternal sensible things. Again, if the intermediate between the general formula and the sensible things is involved, we will encounter many difficulties.Obviously, according to the same reason, there will be "intermediate lines" besides "lines" and "sensible lines", and the same is true for other things; thus, since astronomy is a branch of mathematics, this There will be another heaven and earth outside the sensible heaven and earth, and there will be no sun and moon outside the sensible sun and moon (and other celestial bodies).But how can we believe these things?It is very unreasonable to suppose such a body to be immobile, but it is also impossible to suppose that it is moving. —The things studied by optics and temperament are similar; for the same reason, these cannot be separated from sensible things.If there are sensible things and intermediates between general formulas and individual things, there must obviously be animals between the animal essence and the perishable animals.The question may also be asked—in what class of existing things must we look for interbody science?If the only difference between geometry and topographical measurement is that the latter measures visible things and the former measures invisible things, then obviously there must be another academic discipline besides medicine, which is "the foundation of medicine" and "individual medical knowledge". "The intermediary between; other academic disciplines can be deduced by analogy.But how could this be so?In this way, there is another "health" between the visible "healthy things" and "the foundation of health".At the same time, topographical surveying is measuring the visible and perishable measurement, so when perishable things perish, science must also perish.This cannot be true either. But, on the other hand, astronomy deals neither with visible measurements nor with the firmament above us.All visible lines cannot be just like geometric lines (visible straight lines or visible circles cannot be like "straight" and "circle" in geometry); Protagoras often said that "a circle and a straight line can only touch at one point", while a general circle and a straight rod cannot only touch at one point, and he often denied surveyors based on this.The motions and orbits of celestial bodies will not be exactly as astronomy imagined, and the stars will not be exactly like the symbols made by astrologers.Now it is said that the so-called intermediate between the general formula and the visible thing exists in the visible thing, and is not separated and independent; this argument is impossible in many respects, but it is sufficient to enumerate the following: It is unreasonable to say that the general formula is not included in the visible things, and the general formula and the time are actually two parts of the same theory.According to this theory, there should be two solids at the same position. If the intermediate body is in the visible three-dimensional body that changes, it cannot be said that the intermediate body is immutable.For what purpose, one must assume that there is an intermediate in the visible, and a paradox of the same kind as we have already mentioned will follow; is not separated; it is even more impossible. Chapter three (6) It is difficult to make proper statements on these topics, and it is also difficult to say whether the genus of a thing should be taken as its element and principle, or not its original composition.For example, all kinds of languages ​​are composed of letters. Usually, the generic name of "language" is not used, but letters are used as the elements and principles.Some propositions in geometry are self-evident, but the proof of all or most of the other propositions depends on these propositions. We call these propositions the elements of geometry.Also, those who say that a body is composed of several elements or of one element also mean the principle that the constituent parts are the body; for example, when Empedocles said that fire and water and other elements are the constituent elements of things, he did not Do not take these as genus of existing things.Besides, if we want to examine the qualities of any thing, we examine its parts, for example a bed, and when we understand its parts and their composition, we understand the nature of the bed.Judging from these arguments, the principles of things should not belong to families. " However, if we are to know everything by definition, then the genus, being the foundation of definitions, must also be the principle of all definable things.Things are named according to their species, and people can recognize the species even if they know the thing, and knowing the species must start with knowing the family and genus.As for those who regard "one" and "is", or "big and small" as the elements of things, their intention is to regard principles as categories. But the principle cannot be stated in two different ways.For noumenon can only be a formula; and to define things in terms of genus is different from explaining things in terms of their constituent parts. Furthermore, if the family and genus are used as the principle, should the highest family and genus be used as the principle, or should the lowest species be the principle?This too is debatable.If it is thought that the more general is always the nearer to principles, it is evident that the highest genus should be principles; for these may be predicates of all things.Therefore, if all things can be divided into as many basic categories as possible, there will be as many principles in the world.In this way, reality and elemental unity will both be principles and noumenon, because these are the most basic predicates of all things.But neither "one" nor "is" can become an independent genus of things; because each difference in the genus must form "one" and "is"; but the genus is separated from the varieties it contains. , should not contain the predicates of differences; then if "one" or "is" is taken as a family and genus, all the differences will not become "one" but "is".However, if the principle is regarded as a genus, if one and yes are not a genus, they cannot be a principle.In addition, all intermediates, including their differences until the last ones that cannot be distinguished again, should theoretically belong to the family and genus; but in fact, some of these may be considered to be families and genus, while others may not be.Besides, differences are not less than genera, and may even be said to be closer to principles; if differences are also called principles, the number of principles will actually become infinite, especially for the families and genera that we assume to be principles. The higher the value, the more differences are included. However, if one is closer to the principle, and "indivisible" is one, the so-called indivisible means that everything is indivisible in quantity and variety, so all indivisible varieties It should precede the family and genus, and the family and genus can be divided into several varieties ("human" is not the family and genus of individual people), then this should be an indivisible thing as the lowest variety, which is closer to the unity.Also, all things that have a distinction between innate and acquired must be related to the things that came before them (for example, if "two" is the first "number" in the number, there cannot be a family and genus other than the number of each variety. similarly there is no genus "figure" besides the "figure" of species; if the genera of these things exists without separation from their species, so should the genera of other things; if there are separable and Independent families and genera should be "numbers" and "graphics").But among the individuals one is neither prior nor the other necessarily subsequent.Again, where one thing is superior and the other inferior, the superior always precedes; and therefore no genus can exist in these cases either. After considering these problems, it seems that the species that explain individual things should be the principle, and it is not appropriate to use the family and genus as the principle.But it's still hard to say what kind of meaning the species is based on.Principles and causes must be capable of subsisting with those things to which they refer, and independently of them; but what principles can we suppose to subsist with indivisible things, but universal principles which govern all things?If this reason is sufficient, the more general ones should be preferred to principles; then principles should be the highest genus. Chapter Four (7) Connected with these, there is a problem waiting for our discussion, which is the most difficult to solve and the most worthy of examination.On the one hand, apart from the individual, nothing can exist, and the individual is infinite, so how can this be known in the infinite individual?In fact, it is always because things have some common and universal properties that we can know all things. If it is necessary to keep something out of the individual, then the genus— Whether it is the lowest or the highest genus—it should exist apart from the individual; but we have just discussed that this is impossible.And when we speak of things called matter, if it is fully admitted that there are other abstract things besides the composite substance, then, besides the series of individuals, it must be (b) that each individual in the series is There is another thing, or a part exists and another part does not, or (a) does not exist at all. (a) If there is no other abstract thing outside each individual, then all things are only objects of perception and there will be no objects of understanding in the world. The so-called knowledge is only sensation, and there is no knowledge outside of sensation.Again, there can be no eternal and immutable things; for all sensible things are in flux and perish.But if there were no eternal things, there would be no process of creation; one thing must be produced by another, and in this endless series of creations there must be an original uncreated thing; nothing can ever come into being, Therefore, there must be an initial limit for the development of creation and change.Every movement must have a purpose, and there is no endless movement.Where creation fails to achieve a purpose and complete a thing, such creation will not take place; the moment a movement is achieved is the time when a thing is completed.Moreover, because "matter" always exists without creation and change, what the material is based on as its noumenon, that is, "how is", also exists, which can be regarded as reasonable; if "how is" and "matter" If the two do not exist, all things will not exist at all, and this is impossible; therefore, there must be something else besides the synthetic entity, that is, "shape or general formula". But (b) assuming that we admit that there are abstract things besides synthetic substances, it is hard to decide which things have and which do not, since obviously it is not possible for all things to have abstract existence; we cannot say that in In addition to several individual houses, there is another house. Furthermore, how is it that there is only one of all individuals, such as each individual in the entire human race?This is also paradoxical, since all things, being the same as they are, will become one.So why should there be many?This is also unreasonable.Furthermore, how does matter become each individual?How can the comprehensive object contain the two elements of <substance and general formula>? (8) Again, with regard to first principles, one may ask the following question. If the principles are only one in kind, then their number cannot be one, even though they are inherently one and intrinsically one, they cannot be one.How would this be known if there were nothing in common among a whole series of individuals? But if there is one common element, which is one in number, the principles are also one in each, unlike visible things, which have different principles for different things (for example, a syllable is everywhere the same in kind, and the spelling of this The letters of the syllables are also everywhere the same in kind; but the number of syllables and letters differs in the various books), if the principle is one in number and not in kind, then there is nothing other than the elements Principle (for to be one in number is exactly the same as what we call individual, and what we call "universal" is a common term for all individuals).If the principle is the same as that of pinyin letters, the number is limited; the language of the world will be limited to WXS, because more letters and syllables of the same type cannot exist. (9) There is a problem as important as any other that is often ignored by ancient and modern philosophers——the principles of indestructible things and indestructible things are the same or different?If it is the same, why are some things perishing and others not? What is the reason?The thoughts of the Heschott school and all theologians are quite self-satisfied, but they do not necessarily meet our doubts.They put the first principles to the gods, and were born of the gods, and they said that in the beginning of all things, whoever drank the wine of the gods and tasted the anointing of the gods lived forever; They have learned from each other and have a tacit understanding, but if we want to explain the cause and effect of the universe for us based on the myths passed on by them, it is always difficult for us to understand the purpose.If the gods rejoice and drink and feed on the God of Dionysus, the supply of wine and food is not the source of the gods' survival. If the gods still have to rely on wine and food to maintain their survival, how can such gods be called eternal life? ?We need not study seriously the wit of the mythologists.But for those who speak in positive terms, it is necessary to examine critically and finally to ask how, of things composed of the same elements, some perish and others acquire the quality of permanence.These thinkers can neither explain here, nor explain, as they say, the common sense of things; the principles and causes of all things are evidently not all the same.Even Empedocles, who is recognized as the most thoughtful, is not immune to this error; he maintains that the cause of destruction lies in fighting, but "fighting" seems to be able to produce anything except "one"; All things, except the main god, arise from the fight.At least he said: Everything past, present and future begins here. From which man and woman were conceived, and the flowering grass, and birds and beasts and fish in the water, And immortal gods. Even between the lines, the truth is clear; according to him, if "dou" is not seen in things, things will converge; when things are gathering, dou will stand outside. According to his theory, the most blessed god is still less intelligent; he does not know all the elements; he has no struggle himself; and knowledge is the induction of like things.He said: Because we have the earth, we can see the earth, and we can see the water because of the water, Seeing Qi because of clear Qi, seeing blazing fire because of fire, I saw love because of love, and I also saw Dou because of dark Dou. But—and this is our starting point—struggle, according to him, is as much a cause of division and destruction as a cause of survival.Similarly, friendship is not the sole cause of existence; for the gathering of things into oneness destroys all other things.At the same time, Empedocles did not mention the cause of the change itself, he only said that things are as they are, out of nature. Yet when the struggle finally grew in the limbs of Sfabit <ball>. He rose to claim the glory due, and the time had come when, by a solemn oath, his order of duty was laid down. The last line of the poem implies that change is inevitable; but he does not say why it is necessary to change.Here, however, he alone speaks most thoroughly; for he does not say that some things are perishable and some things are never perishable, but only that all things are perishable except the elements.But our present problem is, if things are governed by the same principle, why some are perishable and some are indestructible.There must be two different principles concerning perishable and indestructible things, and our explanation stops here. But if the principle is really different, the problem arises again, the principle of destruction also follows the destruction of things, and the principle of indestructibility follows the indestructibility?If they were perishable, they would still be things composed of elements, for the perishing of all things is the dissolution of the bodies and their return to the elements of which they are composed; There are other principles.But again this is impossible.Will this retracing end at a certain limit, or will it go on to infinity? Also, if the destructible principle disappears, how can destructible things still exist?If it is said that principles are indestructible, why do some things formed according to this principle still perish, whereas things formed according to other principles do not perish?These may not be true, but they are true or not, and it takes a lot of effort to prove them.No one actually insists on the claim that "destroyable and indestructible things arise from separate principles"; everyone thinks that the same principle applies to everything. They swallowed the problems we mentioned above as crumbs. (10) The truth that is most difficult to understand and needs to be researched most is whether "is and one" is the essence of things, whether each has its own origin, one is one, is for yes, and has no other meaning, or "one and one" "is" also contains other dependent properties.Some Lords speak before, and some Lords speak after.Plato and the Pythagoreans believed that "is and one" have no different meanings, this is their nature, they are just "is and one".But natural philosophers lead to another line of thought; for example Empedocles— It seems that he is trying to make it easier for people to understand "one"-or ask what is one?He replied that one is friendship (love): all things are made one only for the sake of friendship (love).Others say that this "one and being" of which all things are composed is fire, and others say it is air.There are also those who state that there is more than one element; these still hold a similar point of view, that "one and is" is exactly what they say about the principles. (a) If we do not take "oneness and reality" as substance, none of the other universals will be substance; for both are the most universal of all universals.If there is no "one" and "this is", then in any other case there can be nothing that is separate from the individual.Also, if "one" is not the ontology, "number" obviously cannot be regarded as an independent thing; because number is a number of units, "unit" is a certain kind of "one". (b) If it is admitted that there is the One and the Being, then the Oneness and the Reality must be their noumenon; for it is generally stated that what makes things become and become One is nothing but the Oneness and the Reality.But assuming that there is a "this is" and "this one", it is very difficult to bring up various other things. —How can the number of things exceed one.According to Parmenides' argument, everything is one, and one is the reality of the world, so things that are different from reality, that is, different from one, cannot exist. Both arguments have fallacies.Whether it is said that Yuan Yi is not a noumenon, or that there is indeed a so-called "Ben Yi", number is not a noumenon.Assuming that yuan-yi is not a noumenon, we have already mentioned the necessary conclusions; if it is a noumenon, the same difficulties as in realism will arise again. How can there be "another" besides "this one"?This must be a "non-one"; but everything can only be "one" or "many", and "many" is formed by accumulating "one", <not "non-one">. Also, according to Zeno's theorem, if the One is indivisible, it will become nothingness. He believes that things that increase without increasing, and that decrease without decreasing, are not real. In this way, what he calls real must obviously be measured.If measured, this would again be an object; In fact, those who have objects have various dimensions <length, width, depth>; other mathematical objects, such as a surface or a line, can be added or lost in two or one dimension, but not in other dimensions. Gain or loss; while a point or a unit has no dimension at all.But his theory is not sound, (inseparable things, when combined, do not increase their measure, but increase their number).And the existence of such indivisibles negates his theory—how can a measure be composed of such one or more inseparables?This is like saying that a line is made of dots. Even assuming that, according to some, the number comes from "the one" and "something else that is not one", we have to ask the question: if this "not one" is "not equal", It is the same principle of number and measurement as "oneness", so why the product of "oneness and inequality" is sometimes number and sometimes measurement.It is not clear how measurement can be obtained from "one" and "this principle", or from some "number and this" principle. Chapter five (13) A related question is whether "number" and "body, surface and point" belong to the category of noumenon.If it is not, it confuses us as to what things are and what they are.Evolution, movement, relation, tendency, proportion do not seem to be sufficient to indicate the substance of anything; for these are all descriptions of the subject, but none of them are "this" (that which the thing becomes).Nothing can best indicate the substance of things than water and fire, earth and air, the four of which all things are composed, and heat and cold and the like are their evolution, not their substance; Evolving objects are some constant and real things, that is, noumenon.But on the other hand, compared with planes, planes are compared with lines, and lines are compared with points and units, it is indeed inferior to the body, because the body is surrounded by the surface, without the surface, there cannot be a body, and without the body. But the surface is still self-established, "the surface is in the line, and the line is also in the point".Therefore, most philosophers, especially the early sages, think that noumenon and reality should be the substance of things, while others are only the evolution of substances, so that the basic principles of reality are the basic principles of objects; Philosophers who are generally considered to be smarter have thought that numbers should be the basic principle.We have already said that if these are not the essence, there will be no essence and no reality in the world; as for the attributes of these essences, they should not pretend to be reality. But if it is admitted that lines and points are more ontological than bodies, we cannot see what substance they will belong to (they cannot exist in visible bodies), and this is nowhere to find ontology.Again, these are obviously the decomposition of body—one is width and narrowness, the other is depth, and the other is length.In addition, there is no shape in the three-dimensional; the image of Herme <Artisan> cannot be found in the stone, and there is no semi-cube in the square solid; so the surface is not in the body; if the face is in the body, the surface of the semi-square three-dimensional It will also be in the cube.The same is true for lines and points and units.Therefore, on the one hand, three-dimensional is the most advanced noumenon, and on the other hand, "surface line points and units" are examples that are superior to three-dimensional, but cannot be regarded as noumenon; this is really confusing, what is it? In fact, what is the noumenon of things. In addition to the above-mentioned sections, the problem of becoming and passing away also confronts us with many difficulties.If the body does not exist before but now exists, or if it existed before and then does not exist, such a change is considered to have experienced a process of birth and death; but the temporary existence of points, lines and planes cannot be said to have experienced A process of birth and death. 因为当各体相接触或被分割，它们的界面在合时则两界成一界，在分时则一界成两界；这样，在合并时一界不复存在，归于消失，而当分离时则先所不存在的一界却出现了（这不能说那不可分的点被区分成为两）。如果界面生成或消失了，这从何生成〈或消失〉？相似的讲法也可用之于时间的当前一瞬； 这也不能说时间是在一个生灭过程之中，却又似乎没有一刻它不在变异；这显示时间不是一个本体。明显地这在点线面也是如此；因为它们的定限或区分都与时间相同，可以应用同样的论点。 Chapter Six （十四）我们最后可以提出这一问题，在可感觉事物与间体之间，何以我们必得觅取另一级事物，即我们所谓通式。 数理对象与可感觉事物虽有些方面不同，至于同级事物可以为数甚多，这于两者却是一样的，所以它们的基本原理为数不能有定限（正如世上全部言语的字母，品种类虽有定限，为数则无可为之定限，除非你指定了某一个音节，或一句言语，那为之拼音的字母才有定数；间体也如此；同类间体为数是无定限的）。若说可感觉事物与数理对象之外，并没有象所主张的一套通式存在，则其数为一而其类亦为一的本体将不存在，而事物之基本原理也就只有定类，不能有定数了：若然如此，这也就必须让通式存在。支持这样论点的人往往执持其旨而不能明晰其义，他们总是说通式之为本体就因为每一个通式都是本体，没有那一个通式是由属性来成立的。 但，我们若进而假定通式存在，并假定原理为数则一，为类不一，我们又得接触到那些必然引致的不可能的结论。 （十二）与此密切相联的问题，元素是潜在，抑以其它状态存在？如果以其它状态存在，那么世界应还有先于第一原理〈诸元素〉的事物。作为原因而论，潜能先于实现，而每一潜在事物并不必需都成现实事物。但，若以元素为潜在，则现存各事物就可能全不实现。有实现可能的也许现时尚未存在，但，现未存在的却可能在后实现其存在，至于原无实现可能的，那你就不能望其出现。 （十一）我们不应仅以提出第一原理为已足，还得询问原理的"普遍性与特殊性"。它们倘是普遍的，便不该是本体； 凡是共通的云谓只指说"如此"，不能指示"这个"，但本体是"这个"。倘以其共通云谓来指示"这个"，指示某一个体，则苏格拉底将是几种动物——"他自己"，"人"，"动物"，这些都各指一体，各自为一"这个"了。若以原理为"普遍"，所得结果就该是这样。 若说原理的性质不是"普遍"而是"个别的"，它们将是不可知的；任何事物的认识均凭其普遍性。那么，若说有诸原理的知识，必将有其它原理先于这些个别性原理为它们作普遍的说明。