Chapter 24 Part IV: Of the ways in which various authors have expounded on the principles of moral practice

Book IV: On the Ways in Which Different Authors Treated the Rules of Moral Practice In Volume 3 of this book, I said: The maxim of justice is the only clear and exact moral maxim; all other virtues are indefinite and vague and uncertain.The former may be likened to the rules of grammar; the latter to the canons laid down by critics for the beauty and elegance of writing, which give us only a general idea of ​​the perfection we should strive for, but not of how to achieve it. This point provides any unambiguous guidance. Because the degrees of accuracy of different codes of ethics may vary widely, authors who have endeavored to collect and organize them in a system have done it in two different ways.The one clings to the indeterminate ways in which considerations of a certain virtue naturally lead them; the other generally endeavors to adopt precepts of which only some may be definite.The former write like a critic, the latter like a grammarian. I. Of the former we may count all the moralists of antiquity, who content themselves with describing vices and virtues in a general way, and pointing out the defects and misfortunes of some tendencies as well as others but dislikes to lay down many definite maxims which apply irreproachably to every particular case.They first endeavored to ascertain, as far as language could tell, the affections of the heart, that is, the affections of the heart upon which every virtue is founded; The essence of justice, of justice, of nobility, and of all other virtues, constitutes also the essence of vices opposed to it; next, try to determine what is the general method of action; what is the ordinary The norms and general tendencies of conduct determine what a friendly man, a generous man, a brave man, a just man, and a reasonable man would like to do in ordinary situations.

To characterize the inner feelings upon which each particular virtue is established requires a fine and exact pen, yet it is a task which may be done with considerable accuracy.It is, indeed, impossible to represent all the changes which every emotion experiences, or ought to undergo, in terms of the changes which may occur in various circumstances.They are endless and beyond words.For example, we have different feelings of friendliness towards old people than we have towards young people; , and different from the sentiments we have for cheerful, vivacious and exuberant people.The friendship we have for a man is not the same as that which a woman gives us, even if there is no sensual passion involved.What author can enumerate and account for these and all the other innumerable variations through which this passion may undergo?But the general feeling of friendship, and the affectionate attachment which is common to them, can still be ascertained with great accuracy.The picture of this emotion, though always incomplete in many respects, may have many similarities when we come across it, so that we can know its origins, and may even associate it with emotions such as kindness, concern, , respect, admiration, and other emotions with which it has a great similarity.

It is easier to picture in general terms what are the ordinary ways in which virtues may prompt us to act.Indeed, without such things being done, it is almost impossible to describe the inner feelings or moods upon which the various virtues are founded.It is impossible, if I may say so, to express in words the invisible characteristics of all the variations of the different passions, as they express themselves in the mind.Without the facial changes they cause, without the changes of attitude and behavior they cause, without the resolutions they imply, without the actions they cause, there is no way of doing this except by describing the results they produce. Draw their boundaries and distinguish them from each other.Thus Cicero, in the first book of the Descrites, endeavors to lead us to practice the four cardinal virtues; Habits of one's own conduct, such as generosity, nobility, magnanimity, even humor and good-natured sarcasm--qualities which the loose philosopher should have had a place in the rank of virtues, though we naturally give them the honor of approval Seems like they shouldn't have such a venerable name.

Such writings give us comfortable and vivid pictorial narratives.By their lively descriptions, they arouse our natural love of virtue, and strengthen our abhorrence of vice; emotion, and by providing deliberate and thoughtful consideration, leads us to behave more rightly than we might think in the absence of such guidance.In the inquiry into moral principles, in this way constitutes the science which is rightly called ethics, which, though not as highly precise as it has been criticized, is nonetheless a system of great utility and commandment. The science of human delight.Ethics, above all, is so easily adorned with eloquence, whereby, if possible, new importance can be given to the most trivial maxims of duty.Its teachings, so modified, can have a very sublime and lasting influence on young men of great plasticity; and as they are in harmony with the natural noble sentiments of the prime of life, they inspire, at least temporarily, great resolutions. , thus helping to establish and reinforce the best and most beneficial habits that people can easily adopt.Whatever precepts and exhortations may motivate us to practice virtue, is done through this science, and is expressed in this way. II. With respect to the second class of moralists, we may count all the orators of the middle and late Christian Church, and all those who have dealt with the so-called natural jurisprudence in this and the preceding century, They are not content to characterize in this general manner the general tendencies of conduct which they may introduce to us, but endeavor to point us in the direction of various actions, and to prescribe correct and subtle maxims.Since justice is the only virtue for which one can conveniently formulate correct maxims, it has mainly been considered by those two kinds of writers.However, they approach it in two distinct ways.

Those who write the principles of jurisprudence consider only what the right-man should think he has a right to force by violence; what every impartial spectator would agree with him to force, or the judge or arbitrator who he appeals to arbitrate and agrees to do him justice, should To force the other party to accept or perform something.On the other hand, the rhetoricians think more, not what can be forced by using violence, but what obligations the obligor should think he must perform. The most sacred and strict respect for the principles of justice is partly due to a deep-seated fear of injuring one's neighbor, and of discrediting one's own character.It is the purpose of jurisprudence to prescribe criteria for decisions by judges and arbitrators.To prescribe rules of conduct for a good man is the object of rhetoric.By obeying all the canons of jurisprudence, assuming they have always been so perfect, the result is only to avoid external punishment.By adhering to the maxims of rhetoric, assuming they should be, we may be worthy of high praise for our right and prudent conduct.

It may often happen that a good man, devoutly and conscientiously respecting the general rules of justice, would think of himself as being bound to do many things which he might have been compelled to do with great injustice, or which he had been compelled to do by violence by a judge or arbitrator. things.Take a trivial example.A highwayman coerces a traveler with the promise of money by threatening to kill him.Whether such a promise, made under unjust, violent coercion, should be regarded as obligatory is a much debated question. If we regard it as a legal problem, the conclusion may be beyond doubt.It would perhaps be absurd to think that the highwayman had a right to force others to fulfill their promises.To compel another to make a promise is a highly punishable sin, and to compel another to fulfill it is an aggravated sin.The highwayman can't complain of being hurt, he's just been tricked by the man who could have justly killed him.To think that judges should enforce such promises, or that magistrates should recognize them as legally sanctioned acts, is perhaps the greatest laughing stock of all absurdities.Therefore, if we regard the question as a jurisprudential one, we can decide without confusion.

But we cannot decide so easily if we regard it as a matter of eloquence.It is at least doubtful whether a good man, from his sincere respect for the sacred maxim of justice, which requires keeping all solemn promises, would not think of himself as being bound to keep his promises.Indisputably, the disappointment of the villain who landed him in this situation should not be respected.Breaking the promise does no harm to the robber, so that nothing can be blackmailed by violence.But it may well be questioned whether in this case his own dignity and honor should not be respected, whether that part of his character which is inviolable and sacred, which made him respect the laws of truth and abhor every something bordering on treachery and deceit).On this point, of course, rhetoricians are greatly divided.In one school we may count the ancient writer Cicero, the modern writer Pufendorf with his commentator Babilek, and especially the later Dr. Hutcheson, a man who in most cases decided Not counting unbridled rhetoricians, this school decided without hesitation that such promises should never be respected, and that it would be sheer weakness and superstition to think otherwise.In the other school, we may count the ancient priests of certain churches, and also some eminent modern rhetoricians, and this school has another point of view, affirming that all such promises must be fulfilled.

If we consider the matter according to the common sentiments of mankind, we shall find that even such promises are supposed to be respected; but we shall find it impossible to determine from any general maxim how far this applies to all without exception. occasion.We ought not to choose for our friends and companions those who make such promises with such frankness and ease, and those who break them at will, that a gentleman who promises a highwayman five pounds and fails to keep that promise, will incur some kind of accusation.If, however, the sum promised is considerable, it may well be doubted as to what to do, for example, if the payment of the sum would utterly destroy the family of the man who made the promise; Realize, then, that throwing this money into such mean hands for the sake of pettiness seems somehow criminal, or at least highly inappropriate.If a man makes himself a beggar, or gives a thief £100,000, in order to keep his promise to a thief, then, to the common sense of mankind, this person will appear extremely absurd and extravagant.This generosity seems to be contrary to his duty, which he owes to himself and to others, so that such respect for the promises he is compelled to make can never be recognized.It is evidently impossible, however, to determine by some definite maxim the degree of deference to which this should be accorded, or the maximum sum which may be accorded thereby.It will vary with the character of the men, with their situation, with the seriousness of the promise, and even with the circumstances of the conflict; It is seen among people of extremely dissolute qualities—it seems more just to the one who makes the promise than it would otherwise be.In short.Right propriety, so to speak, requires the keeping of all promises, so long as this does not violate some other, more sacred duty, such as a duty to the public good, to those whom we, from gratitude, kinship, or benevolence, maintain and maintain. people's responsibility.But, as has been said, we have no definite maxims for determining which outward actions are motivated by respect for such motives, and therefore cannot determine when those virtues are inconsistent with keeping such promises.

It may be said, however, that whenever such promises, even for the most necessary reasons, are broken, there is always a degree of dishonor on the one who made them.Having made such promises, we may be sure that it would be inappropriate to keep them.But there is still a certain error in making such promises.At least it is contrary to the most important and noblest maxims of magnanimity and honour.A brave man should rather die than keep a promise which he can neither keep without foolishness nor break with shamelessness.For there is always a certain degree of shame associated with such a situation.Treachery and deceit are so dangerous, so terrible crimes, and crimes so easily and in many cases so safely committed, that we are more vigilant against them than almost everything else.So, in every case and in every situation, our imagination carries with it the idea of ​​being ashamed to break all vows.In this respect they are analogous to the violation of female chastity, a virtue which, for the same reason, is dear to us; and we are no more sensitive to the former than to the latter.Breach of faith will be irreparably stigmatized.No entreaty in any case can excuse it; no grief, no repentance can atone for this disgrace.We are so cautious in this respect that in our imagination even a rape dishonors us, and not even the innocence of the heart can wash away the stain of the body.If one ever solemnly swears it, it is the same as breaking a promise, even to the most insignificant of mankind.Loyalty is such a desirable virtue that we generally take it for granted even to those who have nothing else, and to whom we think it lawful to kill and destroy.It is inappropriate that the person guilty of perfidy should insist on the fulfillment of a promise in order to save his life, nor would it be proper to break a promise because it is inconsistent with maintaining some other respectable duty.These situations can be mitigated but not all to wash away one's stigma.He appeared, in the imagination, to have committed some crime which was inseparably connected with a certain degree of disgrace.He had broken some promise which he had solemnly declared he would keep; and, if his character had not been irretrievably degenerate and corrupt, at least there had been attached to his character an irony which was exceedingly indelible; I don't think anyone who has had such an adventure would like to tell about it.

This example may serve to show where eloquence and jurisprudence differ even when they both deal with the duties of general maxims of justice. But while this difference is real and fundamental, and though the two sciences propose quite different ends, the same subject matter has produced so many similarities between them that most writers who claim to have dealt with jurisprudence, sometimes on the basis of The principles of jurisprudence, sometimes according to those of sophistry, indiscriminately, perhaps unconsciously in doing so and in doing so, determine indiscriminately the different questions they examine.

The doctrines of the orators, however, are by no means limited to examining what sincere respect for the general maxims of justice requires of us.It encompasses many other aspects of Christian and moral responsibility.It seems that what led men to study this science was chiefly the custom of secret confession, introduced in barbarous and savage times by the superstition of Roman Catholicism, by which the most secret deeds, and even every possible Doubt the mind of anyone who slightly offends the code of Christian purity, tell the confessor.The penitent priest tells his penitents if and in what respect they have violated their duty, and tells them what austerities they must undergo before he can pardon them in the name of the offended god. A sense of wrongdoing, or even suspicion, is a burden on every heart, and anxieties and fears that accompany all those who have not been hardened by long habits of injustice.In this distress, as in all others, there is a natural desire to relieve the pressure of the mind by revealing the anguish of the heart to a prudent person whom one trusts will not reveal the secret. The shame they suffer by this confession is fully compensated by their confidence that they must arouse sympathy and allay uneasiness.To discover that one is not wholly unworthy of respect, and that although one's past conduct will be reproached, one's present conduct will at least be approved of, and perhaps sufficiently compensated for, at least still commanding some degree of respect from friends, This will relieve his pain.In those superstitious ages, the numerous and cunning clergymen came to gain the confidence of nearly every private family.They had as little learning as those times might afford, and their ways, though clumsy and disorderly in many respects, were perfect and regular in comparison with those of their time.They are therefore regarded as the great guides not only of the faithful of all religions, but of all moral duties.Those who are fortunate enough to be close to them will gain a good reputation, and those who are unfortunate enough to be accused by them will suffer great shame.Considered the greatest judges of right and wrong, men naturally turn to them in all their doubts; and it is honorable for any man to know that he has made those who have consecrated themselves to God Knowing all such secrets; and without their advice and approval, he takes no important and difficult step in his conduct.It is not difficult, therefore, for clergymen to establish it as a general maxim according to which they should be trusted, which has become popular in polite society, and which they are generally credited with, though no such maxim has been established. of.Qualifying themselves for priesthood thus became a necessary part of the studies of Christians and clergy, and from that time they too were led to collect examples of so-called conscience, of good and of difficult situations, in which it is difficult Decide where the propriety of conduct may exist.These writings, they thought, might be useful to directors of conscience and to those who were guided; and thus began the books on eloquence. The moral responsibilities that the rhetorician thinks are chiefly those which can be confined, at least to some extent, to general maxims, and the violation of which is naturally accompanied by a certain degree of remorse and a certain fear of punishment.It is the orator's intention in writing such books to assuage the fears that arise from violating this duty. Not every virtue, however, is wanting to be subject to this gravest censure of conscience; and no one asks his pardon for failing to perform an act of the greatest generosity, kindness, or magnanimity, which his circumstances might have done.Because of this deficiency, the maxim violated is usually very vague, and is generally of such a nature that, while honor and rewards may be obtained for its observance, no real reproach for its violation appears. Criticism and punishment.The rhetoricians seem to regard the practice of such virtues as a superfluous task, which cannot be very strictly enforced, so that their discussion is unnecessary. The violations of moral duty which are committed to priestly sanction, and thus come under the observation of orators, are chiefly of three distinct types. The first, and foremost, is the violation of the rules of justice.Here the maxims are perfectly definite and certain; their violation is naturally accompanied by a sense of deserving punishment from gods and men and the fear of punishment. The second is a violation of the eloquence maxim.In all obvious instances there is an actual violation of the canons of justice which cannot be committed without inflicting the most inexcusable injury upon another.Indeed, in lesser cases, when it amounted only to a violation of those strict decencies which should be observed in the intercourse of men and women, it cannot properly be regarded as a violation of the maxims of justice.However, they generally violate some fairly clear code, and at least one of them tends to shame the person who violates them, and serious people are of course also inclined to generate a certain degree of shame and shame in themselves. remorse. The third is the violation of the code of honesty.Violations of fact, so to speak, are not always violations of justice, though on many occasions they are, and so are often not subject to any exogenous punishment.Common crimes, even of a very vile one, may very often harm no one; and in such cases there should be no claim of vengeance or compensation from the deceived or from others.But though a violation of fact is not always a violation of justice, it is always a violation of some definite maxim, and that which naturally tends to shame the man who is guilty of it. In young children there seems to be an instinctive disposition to believe whatever people tell them. The Creator, in order to protect them, seems to think (at least some of the time) that they should absolutely trust those who care about their childhood, and are entrusted with their education as an integral part of their infancy.They therefore believe too much; it would require a long experience of many of the vain things of man, to cause them to doubt and suspect to any reasonable degree.Among adults, no doubt, there are very different degrees of credulity.The wisest and most experienced people are generally the least credulous.But a man who is no more credulous than he should be, and in many cases disbelieves gossip - which not only turns out to be false, but very ordinary reflection and attention can teach him that they cannot People who are completely real—almost nonexistent.The natural inclination is always to believe.To teach doubt is only to gain wisdom and experience, and they are extremely difficult to teach doubt.The wisest and most prudent among us have all frequently believed his tales, which he was afterwards ashamed and astonished that he had always believed to be true. If we trust someone in something, then that person we trust must be our leader and mentor, and we respect him with a certain degree of respect and respect.But just as by admiring others we come to want others to admire us, so by being led and directed by others we learn to make ourselves leaders and directors.And, just as we cannot always be simply content to be admired unless we also believe ourselves to be truly admirable, we cannot always be simply content to be trusted unless we also realize that we are truly to be trusted .Just as the desire to be praised and the desire to be commendable, though very similar, are still distinct and separate desires, so the desire to be trusted and to be worthy of trust, though very similar, are equally distinct and separate. desire to separate. The desire to be trusted, to be believed, to lead and direct others, seems to be the strongest of all our innate desires.Perhaps it is an instinct upon which the peculiarly human faculty of speech arises.No other animal possesses this faculty, nor do we find in any other animal the desire to lead and direct the judgment and action of its fellows.The great ambition to lead and direct, the desire to achieve real superiority, appears to be entirely human, and language is an important means of realizing that ambition, of achieving real superiority, of leading and directing the judgment and actions of others. important means. Being untrustworthy is always humiliating, and even more so when we suspect it is because people don't think we're trustworthy and can be grossly and intentionally deceitful.Telling someone he is lying is the most unforgivable public insult.But whoever is serious and willful in deceit must be aware that he deserves this indignity, that he is unworthy of confidence, and that he has forfeited his right to that confidence, according to which He can find every kind of ease, consolation, or satisfaction in intercourse with his equals.The man who has the misfortune to think that no one will believe a certain truth he says, feels himself an outcast from human society, and fears the thought of being in this state, or of exposing himself before then, is, I think, almost unavoidable. The earth will die of despair.Perhaps no one, however, has ever had a valid reason to accept such self-deprecating views.I am inclined to believe that the worst liar told the truth at least twenty times in order to lie once gravely and willfully; Like the inclinations of men, the natural inclination to tell the truth will, in most cases, overcome that inclination to deceive or to alter or conceal the truth in some respect, among those who have the least respect for the facts. Even when we accidentally and unintentionally deceive others, we feel ashamed and ashamed that we have deceived others.Though this involuntary error does not always signify dishonesty, nor lack of absolute devotion to truth, yet it always signifies in some degree lack of judgment, lack of memory, unseemly credulity, A certain level of recklessness and impatience.It always reduces our prestige to persuade and always casts some degree of doubt on our ability to lead and guide others.Yet the man who sometimes leads astray through wrong thinking is quite different from the man who may be deceitful.The former are bound to be trusted in many cases; the latter are hardly ever trusted. Sincerity and candor earn trust.We trust people who appear willing to trust us.We think we see clearly the path he wants us to take and are willing to follow his lead and guidance.On the contrary, withholding and concealment cause discord.We are afraid to follow someone we don't know where he is going.Moreover, the greatest joy in conversation and society comes from a certain unity of feeling and opinion, from a certain harmony of heart, all as many musical instruments are in harmony and time with each other.But this pleasing harmony cannot be attained unless there is a free exchange of sentiments and opinions.For this reason, we all want to know how each other is affected, we both want to look inside each other, we both want to see the emotions and feelings that are really there.The one who plunges us into this natural passion, who sinks us into it, who seems to open the door to us, seems to be playing a more pleasing way than anything else. Sincerely.A man of generally good disposition, if he has the courage to express his true emotions as he feels them, and because he feels them, will not be disagreeable.It is this unreserved sincerity that makes even childish nonsense delightful.However shallow and imperfect our candid views may be, we gladly excuse them, and endeavor, as far as possible, to reduce our own understanding to the level of their intelligence, with the special eyes with which they seem to have looked at various problems. to look at such issues.This passion to see other people's true feelings is naturally so strong that it often degenerates into a nasty and inappropriate curiosity to pry into those secrets of our neighbours, which they keep with very good reason. heart; and this requires in many cases prudence, and a strong sense of propriety, to control this passion, and all the other natural passions of man, and reduce it to a level which any impartial spectator would approve of.It is equally unpleasant, however, not to satisfy one's curiosity, if it is kept within proper bounds, and not directed at things which have good reason to be concealed.The man who avoids our simplest questions, who expresses disapproval at our innocuous inquiries, who hides himself in unfathomable remoteness, seems to have erected a high wall in his heart. .We tried to open his heart with an eager but innocent curiosity, but immediately felt pushed back with the utmost rudeness. The man who withdrew and withheld lacked an amiable quality, yet he was not disrespected or despised.He seems to be indifferent to us, and we are equally indifferent to him; he is not praised or loved, but rarely hated or condemned.In any case, he has little reason to regret his prudence, and is generally more apt to boast of his prudence in the reservations he has made.So, though his actions may be very wrong, and sometimes harmful, he will hardly be willing to make a statement before the eloquents, or think it necessary for him to ask their acquittal or obtain their assent. This is not always the case with those who have accidentally deceived others through misinformation, through negligence, through recklessness and haste.For example, telling someone a piece of ordinary news, although this matter will hardly produce any consequences, but if he is a true lover of truth, he will be ashamed of his carelessness, and he will never fail to seize the first time. Opportunity to fully admit mistakes.If the incident had some consequence, his remorse would be all the more intense, and he would be scarcely able to forgive himself if some unfortunate or fatal consequence had arisen from his giving incorrect information.Although he did not sin, he felt very deeply that he had become what the ancients called a guilty man.At the same time anxiously and eagerly performing various acts of atonement within his reach.Such a man will often be willing to state his case before orators, who are generally fond of him, and who, though they sometimes rightly condemn him for his haste, generally declare that he need not be disgraced for his errors. . But the man who often consults an orator is one who is dubious and remorseful, one who is serious about deceiving others, but who at the same time thinks he is telling the truth.Orators treat such people in various ways.They sometimes absolve him of guilt when they are so much in favor of his deceitful motives.But to be fair, they generally condemn him. The subjects of the orator's writings, therefore, are: the sincere respect for the maxims of justice; how we ought to respect the life and property of our neighbors; the duty of reparation; chastity and virtuousness, what they call sins of lust; the maxim of honesty , and the obligations of oaths, promises, and contracts of all kinds. In general it may be said that the writings of the orators are vainly trying to direct by definite maxims what can only be judged by feeling and feeling.How, in each case, can a criterion be used to determine the point at which a delicate sense of justice begins to degenerate into a meaningless and impotent scruple of conscience?At what point do secrecy and reservations start to become cover-ups?How far can the delightful feigning of ignorance go?At what point does it begin to degenerate into a distasteful deception?To what extent can liberty of conduct be considered decent and proportionate behaviour?When does it begin to become indiscreet and indiscreet debauchery?In all these matters, what is true in one case is scarcely true in any other, and what makes the conduct successful and fortunate in each case varies with the slightest variation of the situation.Hence the writings of orators are generally as useless as they are usually tiresome.它们对于某个间或向其请教，甚至认为雄辩家们所作的决断是正确的人，几乎不会有用处；因为尽管这些书中收集了大量事例，然而，由于情况千变万化，要从所有这些事例中找到与自己完全相同的事例，那是极其偶然的。一个真正渴望尽到自己责任的人， 如果他会认为自己有很多理由去向它们请教，他就必定是一个非常软弱的人；而对一个忽视这一点的人来说，那些著述的写作风格不可能引起他的注意。其中没有一本能激发我们慷慨和高尚之心。其中没有一本能使我们的心地温和，产生和善而仁慈的感情。相反，许多这类著作能使我们学会欺骗自己的良心，用它们所作的那些无益的精细区分，来为自己推脱最基本的责任找出无数精巧的理由。那种毫无意义的精确——他们试图把它用在不可能加以采用的一些论题上——几乎必然会诱引他们犯那些危险的错误，同时也必然使他们的著作变得枯燥乏味， 具有费解和玄奥等许多特点，不可能在人们内心激起道德学书籍主要应激发的那些感情。 因此，道德哲学的两个有用部分，是伦理学和法学。雄辩学应该被完全否定； 古代的道德学家们看来也作出了较好的评判，他们在研究同样的论题时，并不喜爱任何这种微妙的精确，而满足于以某种一般的方法，描述什么是正义、节制和诚实得以产生的情感，以及什么是那些美德通常会指点我们采取的一般行为方式。 确实，有些哲学家似乎曾经试图考察同雄辩学家的学说相似的东西。在西塞罗所著《论责任》第三册中就载有这类内容，同雄辩家一样，他在那里尽力以许多精巧的例证为我们提供行动的准则，在这些例证中要确定合宜之点在什么地方是困难的。同一本书的许多段落也表明，其他一些哲学家曾经在他之前试图考察同类内容。然而，他和他们似乎都不指望提供一种完整的体系，只是想说明为什么在各种各样的具体情况下，最大的行为合宜性是否存在于遵守或背弃在一般情况下作为责任准则的东西之中，是有疑问的。 每个成文法体系都可以看作试图建立自然法学体系或试图列举各条正义准则的一种颇不完善的尝试。当对正义的违反成为人们相互之间决不会容忍的事情时，地方行政官就会运用国家的权力来强行实践这种美德。没有这种预防措施， 市民社会就会变成杀戮和骚乱的舞台，任何人一认为自己受到伤害，就会亲手为自己复仇。为了防止可能随同每个人为自己伸张正义而产生的混乱，在具有相当权力的一切政府中，地方行政长官同意为所有的人主持正义，并保证听取和处理有关伤害的一切控告。在所有治理良好的国家里，不仅指定法官来了结个人之间的争论，而且规定一些准则来调整那些法官的判决，并通常力图使这些准则同天然的正义准则相一致。当然，它们并非在一切情况下都同天然的正义准则相一致。 有时所谓国家的体制，即政府的利益，有时左右政府的特殊阶层的利益，会使国家的成文法偏离自然的正义准则。在某些国家里，人民的粗野和野蛮妨碍天然的正义情感达到在比较文明的国家里它们自然达到的那种准确和精确的程度。他们的法律像他们的生活方式一样，是粗俗、粗野和紊乱的。在其它一些国家里，虽然人民的已改善的生活方式或许会使他们承认精确的法律，但是他们不恰当的法院制度总是妨碍一切正式的法律体系得以确立。在任何国家中，根据成文法所作的判决，都不会个个完全同天然的正义感所要求的准则相一致。因此，成文法体系，虽然作为对不同时代和国家人类情感的记录，应当具有极大的权威性，但是决不能看作天然的正义准则的精确体系。 人们或许以为，法学家就不同国家法律的缺点和改进所作的论证，会促使人们探讨同一切实际法律无关的天然的正义准则。人们或许认为，这些论证会使他们努力建立一个可以合宜地称为自然法学的体系，或建立一种应该贯串所有国家的法律，或成为所有国家法律的基础的一般准则的理论。不过，虽然法学家的论证确实产生了某种这类东西，虽然无论谁系统论述某一国家的法律时，都会在其著作的许多地方谈到天然的正义法则，但是，人们一直到很晚才想到要建立有关天然正义准则的一般体系，才开始单独讨论法律哲学，而不牵涉任何国家的具体法律制度。我们没有在古代的道德学家中看到有人试图对正义准则进行特别详细的论述。西塞罗在他的《论责任》中，亚里士多德在他的《伦理学》中，都像探讨所有其它美德那样探讨正义。在西塞罗和柏拉图的法学中，我们自然而然地期望看到他们详细论述应由每一个国家的成文法推行的那些天然平等准则，然而， 却没有看到这类论述。他们的法学是警察的法学，而不是正义的法学。格劳秀斯似乎是第一个试图向世人提供某种这类体系的人，这种体系应该贯串所有国家的法律，并成为所有国家法律的基础；他那带有各种不足的关于战争与和平法则的论文，或许是现今描述这一论题的最全面的著作。我将在另一篇论文中，不仅就有关正义的问题，而且就有关警察、国家岁入和军备以及其它成为法律对象的各种问题，努力阐明法律和政府的一般原理，以及它们在不同的年代和不同的社会时期经历过的各种剧烈变革。因此，现在就不进一步对法学史作详细的叙述。