Chapter 23 The third treatises the various systems which have been formed in relation to the instinct of assent

Part Three: On the Systems of Approval Instincts Which Have Been Formed Introduction Following the inquiry into the nature of virtue, the next important problem in moral philosophy is that of the assenting instinct; strength or ability.It causes us to prefer one action to another, to speak of one as right and the rest as wrong; The rest are regarded as objects of reproach, censure, and punishment. There are three different interpretations of the assent instinct.According to some, we approve and disapprove of our own actions, and those of others, only on the basis of self-love, or some predisposed opinion of others about our own happiness or loss; according to others, reason, That is, the same faculty by which we distinguish truth from falsity enables us to distinguish, in our actions and feelings, what is proper from what is not; An effect that arises out of the feelings of satisfaction or disgust aroused by the perception of an action or feeling.Self-love, intellect, and emotion are thus regarded as three distinct sources of the assent instinct.

Before I begin to describe the three different systems, I must point out that the discussion of this second question, though extremely important in speculation, is not important in practice.Discussions about the nature of virtue must have had some influence on our ideas of right and wrong on many particular occasions.Discussing the question of assent to the instinct may not have such implications.It is only a question that arouses the curiosity of philosophers to examine the internal design or structure from which those different opinions or emotions arise. CHAPTER I. Of those systems inferred from self-love to the assent to the instinct. Those who explain the assent to the instinct by self-love do so in different ways, and there is a great deal of confusion and error in their various systems.According to Mr. Hobbes and many of his followers, man is compelled to take refuge in society, not because he has a natural love for his fellow man, but because, without the help of others, he cannot likely to survive comfortably or safely.For this reason society is necessary to him, and anything which tends to its maintenance and happiness he regards as having an indirect tendency to further his own interest; He thinks that everything has a certain degree of harm and harm to him.Virtue is the greatest defender of human society, and vice is the greatest disruptor.The former is therefore pleasant, the latter unpleasant; as from the former he foresees prosperity, so from the latter he foresees the destruction and disturbance of that which is indispensable to the comfort and security of his life.

When we coolly and wisely consider the disposition to virtue which promotes the social order, and the disposition to vice which disturbs it, to give the former a most great beauty, and the latter to reveal a most great ugliness, As I said on a previous occasion, there is no problem.When we contemplate human society in a certain abstract and philosophical light, she appears to be a wonderful, gigantic machine, whose regular and coordinated operation produces thousands of delightful the result of.For in all other machines, beautiful and magnificent, which are the product of the art of man, anything that helps to make its work smoother and more light, will derive some beauty from the result; Everything in its motion is disagreeable for that reason; so that virtue, being a fine lubricant to the wheels of society, must seem necessarily agreeable; When the wheels of the car collide and rub against each other, it is bound to cause disgust.This account, therefore, of the origin of assent and disapproval, insofar as it infers it from respect for the social order, is inseparable from that principle which endows utility with beauty, as I have said on a previous occasion. explanation; and it is from there that the possibilities of the system are fully revealed.When those writers describe the innumerable advantages of a cultivated and sociable life over a brutish and solitary one; How the transgression of the law would surely bring about the restoration of the latter, the reader reveled in the new and grandiose insights which they explained to him: he clearly saw a new beauty in virtue, and a new beauty in vice. he saw a new ugliness in his life, which he had never noticed before; and was generally so delighted with this discovery that he took little time to think of such political opinions as he had never thought of in his former life, It could not be a ground of approval or disapproval on which he was accustomed to study the various qualities.

On the other hand, when those writers infer from self-love our interest in the welfare of society, and the respect we attach to virtue for that reason, they do not mean that, when we praise Cato's virtue in this day and age In rejecting the evil of Catiline, our affections are affected by the belief that we benefit from the former, or suffer from the latter.It is not, according to those philosophers, that we honor virtue and condemn lawlessness, because the prosperity or subversion of society in distant ages and countries has any effect on our present happiness or unhappiness.They never imagined that our emotions would be affected by the benefit or harm we actually conceived of them; but that, had we lived in those remote ages and countries, our emotions would or, in our own time, if we come into contact with persons of like quality, our sentiments are affected by the gains or losses they might bring.In short, the idea which those writers are exploring, and which can never be clearly revealed, is our indirect sympathy with those who benefit from or suffer from two diametrically opposite qualities; And when they say that it is not the thought that we have benefited or been harmed that motivates us to applaud or outrage, but the assumption that we might benefit or be harmed if we were in a society with such people, they vaguely indicate that It is this indirect sympathy that is most important.

Sympathy, however, cannot be regarded in any sense as a selfish nature.Indeed, when I sympathize with your pain or anger, it can be mistaken for my emotions stemming from self-love, since it arises from my understanding of your situation, from putting myself in your shoes, and thereby cherishing the same the emotions that should arise in it. But although sympathy is most aptly said to arise out of some supposed change of situation in relation to the principal parties, yet this supposed change is not supposed to happen to us by chance, but to happen to us all. sympathetic to the person.When I express my condolences for the loss of your only son, in order to sympathize with your grief, I need not consider that if I had a son and this son died, I - a man of this quality and position - would suffer What; but to consider what would happen to me if I were you (with whom I had not only exchanged circumstances, but my own identity and position).Therefore, my sorrow is entirely because of you, and not at all because of myself.So, it's not selfish at all.This grief, which I feel in my own right, does not even spring from the imagination of anything that has befallen me, or anything to do with me, but entirely from the same How can this be seen as a selfish passion in your affairs?A man may sympathize with a woman in childbirth, even though it is impossible for him to imagine himself bearing that woman's pain.However, as far as I know, the deduction of all emotions and feelings from self-love, that is, the sensational whole account of human nature, has never been fully and clearly explained. Confused misunderstanding.

CHAPTER II Of those systems which regard reason as the source of assent to instinct. Mr. Hobbes's doctrine, as we all know, holds that the state of nature is a state of war; and that there can be no safe or peaceful society among men until civil government has been established.According to him, therefore, to protect society is to support civil government, and to overthrow civil government is to collapse society.But the existence of civil government depends on obedience to the supreme magistrate.Once he loses his authority, all governments come to an end.Therefore, as self-defense teaches men to praise anything that is conducive to the welfare of society, and to condemn anything that may be harmful to it; so, if they are able to think and express consistently, the same principle should teach them to be The occasion praises obedience to government officials and condemns all disobedience and defiance.

This notion of what is to be praised and what is to be blamed should be the same as the notion of obedience and disobedience. The laws of government officials should therefore be regarded as the only fundamental standard of what is just and unjust, right and wrong. It was Mr. Hobbes' avowed intention, by advocating these views, to subordinate the conscience of the people directly to the civil government, and not to the power of the Christian Church, and the examples of his time taught him that Christian riots and ambition should be as the root cause of social unrest.For this reason his teachings especially offended the theologians—who, of course, did not forget to vent their wrath upon him with the utmost severity and bitterness.Likewise, his doctrine has offended all orthodox moralists because it holds that there is no inherent distinction between right and wrong; Depends on the arbitrary will of the Chief Executive.So this description of things is attacked from all sides by all weapons, by serious reason, and by fierce eloquence.

In order to refute a theory so abominable, it must be shown that, before the existence of any legal or real institution, the human mind is naturally endowed with a certain function by which it distinguishes in certain actions and feelings the right and praiseworthy and in other actions and feelings the wrong, reprehensible, and evil qualities. Dr. Cudworth justly says that the law cannot be the source of those distinctions, because, on the assumption of the law, either it must be right to obey it and wrong to disobey it, or it does not matter whether we obey it or not.Laws, to which it does not matter whether we obey or not, obviously cannot be the cause of those distinctions; nor can it be right to obey and wrong to disobey, for this is still the same as before about right and wrong. Obedience to the law is consistent with the correct concept, and violation of the law is consistent with the wrong concept.

Hence, as the mind has its perceptions of those distinctions prior to all laws, it seems necessarily to follow that it derives this perception from reason, which points out the difference between right and wrong as it points out truth and error. the difference between the two; and this assertion, though true in some respects and rather hasty in others, is easily dismissed when the esoteric science of human nature is only in its infancy, and in the human heart The distinct roles and abilities of the different faculties were accepted until they were carefully examined and distinguished from one another.While the dispute with Mr. Hobbes was going on with the utmost heat and intensity, it did not occur to one that any other faculty could produce ideas of right and wrong.The prevailing doctrine, therefore, was that the essence of virtue and vice consisted not in the conformity or inconsistency of men's conduct with some superior law, but in the concordance or inconsistency with reason, and reason was thus regarded as approving Or the primordial source and origin of disapproval.

Virtue consists in being in agreement with reason, and in some respects being right; and in a sense, this faculty is rightly regarded as the cause and source of assent and disapproval, as the reliable source of all things right and wrong. Reasons and sources of judgment.By reason we discover those general maxims of justice by which we ought to govern our conduct; by reason we also form more vague and indeterminate notions of what is prudent, what is fair, what is generous or noble, namely We always carry those ideas with us from time to time, and according to them we try as best we can to design the general tendencies of our conduct.The general maxims of morality, like other general maxims, are formed from experience and inductive reasoning.In particular occasions which vary widely, we observe what pleases or displeases our moral faculties, what these faculties approve or disapprove; and by inductive reasoning from this experience we establish those general maxims.But inductive reasoning has always been regarded as some function of reason.We are therefore quite well told to deduce all those general maxims and ideas from reason.It is by these, however, that we regulate a great part of our moral judgments, which may be extremely uncertain and ill-founded, if they rest entirely upon something which is subject to as many variations as immediate sentiments and affections, concerning health. Various conditions of life and emotion may fundamentally alter this judgment.Virtue, therefore, may well be said to consist in agreement with reason, when our most reliable judgments of right and wrong are tempered by maxims and ideas arising from inductive inferences to reason; This faculty is seen as the cause and source of assent and disapproval.

But while reason is undoubtedly the source of the general maxims of morality, and the source from which we form all moral judgments, it is difficult to think that the first senses of right and wrong may arise from reason, and even in those particular cases from experience forming the general maxims. It's ridiculous and incomprehensible.These first sensations, like other experiences forming general maxims, cannot be objects of reason, but of immediate senses and sensations.It is by finding, in widely varying situations, that one tendency of action is always agreeable in a certain way, and that of another always disagreeable, that we form general maxims of morality.But it is impossible for reason to make any particular object agree with or disapprove of the mind for its own sake.Reason can show that such an object is a means of obtaining some other thing, which is naturally pleasant or displeasing, and can in this way cause it to be approved or disapproved for the sake of some other thing. But nothing can be approved of or disapproved of for its own sake, unless it is directly affected by the senses or feelings.If, therefore, in particular cases, virtue must, for its own sake, make men happy, and vice must make them unhappy, it is not reason but immediate senses and feelings that bring us into agreement with the former. And not in harmony with the latter. Pleasure and pain are both principal objects of desire and aversion, but these are distinguished not by reason, but by immediate senses and sensations.If, therefore, virtue is desired for its own sake, and vice in like manner the object of aversion, it cannot be reason that distinguishes these different qualities in the first place, but sense and feeling. Yet, as reason may rightly be regarded in a certain sense as the source of the natures of assent and disapproval, it has long been neglected to suppose that these passions originally arose from the operation of this faculty.It is Dr. Hutchison's merit to be the first to discern, with some degree of precision, the respect in which all moral distinctions may be said to arise from reason, and the respect in which they are based on immediate senses and feelings.His account of the moral sentiments explains this sufficiently, and his explanation is irrefutable, that if people continue to debate the subject, I can only attribute it to the failure to notice What Mr. Hutcheson has written is due to a superstitious attachment to certain forms of expression, a defect which is common among scholars, especially when discussing subjects of such intense interest as the present one, In discussing such subjects the virtuous man is often unwilling to forsake even a single convenient and simple expression to which he is accustomed. CHAPTER III ON THE SYSTEMS THAT TAKE THE EFFECTS AS THE SOURCE OF THE ASSOCIATION INSTITUTION Those systems which regard the affection as the source of the assent to the instinct may be divided into two distinct types. 1. The instinct of approval, according to some, is founded on a particular emotion, on a special faculty of feeling within the mind for certain actions or feelings; some of these affect this faculty in the manner of approval, while others Influencing this faculty in opposing ways, the former are called right, praiseworthy, and moral qualities, and the latter wrong, reprehensible, and wicked qualities.This sentiment has a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from all other sentiments, and is the result of the operation of special sensuous faculties, and they have given it a special name, and call it the moral sentiment. II. According to others, it is not necessary to postulate some new and unheard-of faculty of perception in order to account for the instinct of assent, according to others; they suppose that the Creator acts here with the utmost jurisprudence as in every other case. , and from exactly the same causes a multitude of effects; and sympathy, they think, a faculty always conspicuous and manifestly endowed with the heart, is sufficient to account for all the operations of this peculiar faculty. I. Dr. Hutcheson has made great efforts to show that the instinct of approval is not based on self-love. He also demonstrated that this principle cannot arise from any rational action.He thinks that it can only be conceived as a special faculty, which the Creator has endowed in the human mind to perform this special and important function.If self-love and reason were excluded, he could think of no other known inner faculty that could do this. He called this new faculty of feeling the Moral Sentiment, and saw some analogy in it with the external senses. Just as the objects around us affect these external senses in a certain way, and seem to have different qualities of sound, taste, smell and color, so the emotions of the human heart, which affect this special faculty in a certain way, seem to have different qualities. Different qualities like kind and hateful, virtue and vice, right and wrong. According to this system, the various senses or faculties of perception by which the mind acquires all its simple ideas "are divided into two distinct types, one is called the immediate or antecedent senses, the other is called the reflex or antecedent senses. Acquired senses. Immediate senses are those senses by which the mind acquires perceptions of things without first having perceptions of other things. Sound and color, for example, are objects of the immediate senses. Hearing certain sounds Or seeing a certain color does not require first feeling any other quality or object. Reflexive or acquired senses, on the other hand, are those faculties by which the inward perception of things is presupposed by the prior perception of other things.Harmony and beauty, for example, are objects of the reflexive senses.In order to perceive the harmony of a certain sound, or the beauty of a certain color, we must first be aware of the sound or the color.Moral sentiment is regarded as such a faculty.According to Dr. Hutchison, the faculty which Mr. Locke calls reflexes, and from which simple ideas of the different passions and emotions of the mind are derived, is an immediate inner sense.The faculty by which we again perceive beauty or ugliness, virtue or vice, in those different passions and emotions, is a reflexive, inner sense. Dr. Hutcheson endeavors to do this by showing that this theory fits the analogy of nature, and by showing the endowment of various other reflexive sensations in the heart which do resemble moral sentiments—for example, a certain sense of beauty and ugliness in external objects, or as we The public-spirited sense with which one sympathizes with the happiness or misfortune of one's fellow-creatures, a certain sense of shame and honor, and a certain feeling of ridicule--further confirm this doctrine. Although this gifted philosopher devoted all his energy to proving that the instinct of assent rests on a special faculty of perception, something analogous to the external senses, he admitted that certain contradictory conclusions could be drawn from his theory. , and many may think these conclusions are sufficient to refute his theory.He admits the absurdity of ascribing to this sense itself those properties which belong to any object of sense.Has anyone ever thought about calling vision black or white?Has anyone ever thought of calling hearing high or low?And who would have thought to call taste sweet or bitter?And, according to him, it is as absurd as calling our moral faculties virtue or vice, that is, morally good or evil.These properties which belong to the objects of those faculties do not belong to the faculties themselves.Thus, if someone's character is so absurd that he approves of cruelty and injustice as the highest virtues, and rejects justice and humanity as the most despicable vices, we may indeed regard this structure of the mind as It is injurious to the individual or society, and is regarded in itself as inconceivable, marvelous, unnatural; but it would be utterly absurd to call it evil or morally evil. It is true, however, that if we see someone applaud with admiration and admiration for some outrageous and improper deed ordered by some tyrannical tyrant, we shall not think that we call such an act very evil. and moral evil, is utterly absurd, though we mean only that such a man whose moral faculties are depraved, absurdly approves of such horrific acts, as if they were sublime, magnanimous, and great.I think that, seeing such a bystander, we sometimes forget to feel sympathy for the victim, and feel nothing but horror and loathing at the thought of such a hideous wretch.We loathe him even more than we loathe the tyrant, who may be motivated by such strong passions as envy, fear, and anger, and is therefore more lenient.But the emotion of the spectator appeared irrational, and therefore utterly odious.Such perverted sentiments are the last thing our minds forgive, hate, and outrage; evil or morally evil, preferring to see it as the final and most terrible stage of moral corruption. On the contrary, right moral sentiments appear naturally to some degree in praiseworthy, morally good deeds. A man may even seem to deserve some measure of moral assent if his censures and praises correspond in all cases to the merits and demerits of those evaluated with the utmost precision.We admire the delicacy and precision of his moral sentiments; they guide our own judgments; and, by their extraordinary and uncanny correctness, even arouse our wonder and admiration.Indeed, we cannot always trust that the conduct of such a man will in all respects correspond with the precision of judgments of the conduct of others.Virtue requires habit and resolution of mind as much as precision of feeling; and, regrettably, where the latter is so perfect, the former is sometimes lacking.This disposition of the heart, however, though sometimes imperfect, is incompatible with any savage crime, and is the most proper foundation on which the superstructure of perfect virtue is built.There are many others who are well-intentioned and do well in what they consider to be their duty, but are unpleasant because of the vulgarity of their moral sensibilities. It may be said that, though the instinct of approval is not founded on faculties of sensation which in every respect resemble the external senses, it may nonetheless be founded on a particular emotion, which is suited to this particular purpose and not to others. over emotion.Approval and disapproval, according to observations of different qualities and actions, may be called certain feelings or emotions arising in the heart; and as resentment may be called a feeling of injury, or gratitude a feeling of favor. Feelings, so approval and disapproval may also be properly called the sense of right and wrong, or the sense of morality. But this statement, though not subject to the foregoing objection, is subject to other equally irrefutable objections. In the first place, whatever changes a mood may undergo, it still retains the general features that distinguish itself as such, and these general features are always more pronounced and noticeable than the changes it undergoes in particular cases .Anger, for example, is a particular emotion; and its general features are always correspondingly more prominent than all the changes it undergoes in particular cases.Being angry with a man is no doubt a little different from being angry with a woman, or being angry with a child.In each of these three cases, as it may be readily seen by the attentive mind, the general passion of anger is modified differently by the particular nature of its object.On all these occasions, however, the general character of the passion remains dominant.Careful observation is not required to recognize these features; on the contrary, a very precise attention is required to detect their changes.Everyone pays attention to the former; hardly anyone sees the latter.If, therefore, assent and disapproval, like gratitude and resentment, were a peculiar emotion, distinct from any other, we would hope that, through all the changes they both might undergo, it would remain so as to make it such an emotion. General characteristics of a particular emotion, that is, characteristics that are clear, intelligible, and easily recognizable.But, in fact, it's not like that at all.If we pay attention to how we actually feel when we express our approval or disapproval on different occasions, we will find that our emotions on one occasion are often quite different from those on another, and that it is impossible to distinguish between them. found common features.For instance, we look upon sentiments that are gentle, graceful, and humane with quite a different sympathy than we are moved by sentiments that appear great, gracious, and noble.Our assent to both may, under different circumstances, be perfect and pure; but the one mildens us, the other ennobles us, and excites no likeness in us.However, according to the system I have been trying to establish, it must be true.Since the moods of the person we approve of are in the two cases quite opposite to each other, and since our approval springs from sympathy with those opposite sentiments, what we feel in a given situation is the same. There can be no resemblance to what we feel in another situation.If, however, assent resides in a particular emotion, this emotion has nothing in common with our assent, but, like every other passion in observing its proper object, arises from the observation of those emotions. Among them, this situation cannot occur.The same can be said for disapproval.Our fear of cruelty bears no resemblance to our contempt for baseness. It is precisely the great inconsistency which we feel in observing those two different vices, between our own mood and that of those whose sentiments and conduct we are studying. In the second place, it has already been mentioned that not only are the passions or feelings of the human heart, with which one approves or disapproves, expressed as morally good or evil, to our natural affections, but that proper and improper assent is also marked with the same nature.So, I ask, how do we approve or disapprove of proper or inappropriate assent under this system?There is, I think, only one possible reasonable answer to this question.It must be said that when the approval expressed by our neighbor to the conduct of some third person coincides with our own, we applaud his approval, and regard it as a moral good in a way; On the contrary, when it is inconsistent with our own feelings, we disapprove of it and regard it as a moral evil to some extent.Therefore, it must be admitted that, at least in this case, the emotional agreement or opposition between the observer and the observed constitutes moral agreement or disapproval.And, I ask, if it is so in this case, why should it not be so in any other case?For what purpose should a new faculty of perception be conceived to account for those sentiments? I shall present an objection to the various explanations which base the approval of the instinct on some particular emotion as distinct from the others; and this emotion, which it is certainly intended to make it the guiding principle of human nature, has hitherto been as if absent. It is strange that it should receive so little attention by any technical term.The word moral sense is a recent coinage, and cannot yet be regarded as an integral part of the English language.It is only in recent years that the word agree has been used to designate something of this kind.We applaud in appropriate technical terms what we are wholly satisfied with, the shape of a building, the design of a machine, the taste of a plate of meat.The word conscience is not directly applied to some moral faculty by which we express our approval or disapproval.Conscience, indeed, signifies the existence of some such faculty, and conveniently expresses our perception of the agreement or opposition of what has been done to its inclination.When love, hatred, joy, sorrow, gratitude, resentment, and many other passions, which are regarded as the subject of this instinct, have achieved their own importance enough to be given various names to distinguish them, what is the proportion of them? Is it not surprising that the sentiment of dominance has hitherto received so little attention that no one, except a few philosophers, thinks it worth the trouble to name it? When we approve of a certain quality or action, the affections we feel, according to the foregoing system, arise from four causes, all of which differ in some respects from each other.First, we sympathize with the motives of the actor; second, we understand the gratitude of those who benefit from his actions; third, we note that his actions conform to the general maxims by which both sympathies are manifested; and finally , when we regard such actions as parts of a system of actions which contribute to the furtherance of individual or social happiness, they seem to derive from this utility a beauty not unlike that which we ascribe to devises. The beauty of a good machine.In any particular case, after excluding all actions which must have been attributed to some one of these four instincts, we would like to know what remained; Whatever remains, I will bluntly attribute it to some moral sense, or to some other special faculty.It might be thought that, if there were such a moral sense, or such a peculiar instinct, we should be able to feel it under certain circumstances, as distinct and separate from other instincts, as we can often be. Feel the joy, the sadness, the hope and the fear, and feel that they are pure, without any other emotion.But, I don't think it's even possible to think about it.I have never heard of an instance where this instinct could be described as trying to detach itself from pity or disgust, gratitude or resentment, The sense of conformity or inconsistency of an action with a given maxim, or, finally, unmixed with the sense of beauty or order evoked by inanimate and animate objects. II. There is another system, different from the one which I have hitherto endeavored to establish, which attempts to account for the origin of our moral sentiments from sympathy.It places virtue in utility, and gives the reason why the spectator looks at the pleasure conceived by utility of a certain nature from his sympathy with the happiness of those affected by it.这种同情既不同于我们据以理解行为者的动机的那种同情，也不同于我们据以赞同因其行为而受益的人们的感激的那种同情。这正是我们据以赞许某一设计良好的机器的同一原则。但是，任何一架机器都不可能成为最后提及的那两种同情的对象。在本书第4 卷，我已经对这一体系作了某些说明。