Chapter 22 -3

Therefore, as our pleasures and pains are mainly determined by our inner feelings, if this part of us is naturally in a good disposition, if our thoughts and opinions are not affected in any way, then, whatever happens to our bodies Influence is a secondary matter.If our reason and judgment retain their dominance, we may, in spite of great physical pains, enjoy a great deal of pleasure.We can entertain ourselves by thinking about past pleasures and looking forward to future ones; the intensity of your pain.It was a mere physical sensation, a mere momentary pain, not very intense in itself.Any great pain we suffer because of our fear of continual pain is the result of something in our minds.This inner thought may be modified by some more appropriate sentiments, by the consideration that, if our sufferings are great, they may be of short duration; long, the pain may be moderate, and there may be many periods of relief; in short, death is always at hand, and at its beck and call.According to Epicurus, death is the cessation of all feeling, whether pain or pleasure, and cannot be regarded as a sin.He said that if we live, death will not come; if death comes, we will no longer live.Therefore, death means nothing to us.

If the actual sensation of immediate pain is too small in itself to be feared, the actual sensation of immediate pleasure is still less worth pursuing.Pleasant sensations are naturally much less stimulating than painful ones.Therefore, if the feeling of pain can only slightly diminish the pleasantness of a good mood, the feeling of pleasure can hardly add anything to it.If the body is free from pain, and the mind is free from fear and apprehension, the added pleasure of the body may be a very insignificant matter, and though it may be otherwise, it cannot properly be said to add to the above-mentioned situation. Happiness.

Therefore, according to Epicurus, the most ideal state of human nature, the most perfect happiness that people can enjoy, exists in the comfort of the body and in the stability or peace of the heart. . The attainment of this great end, to which human nature aspires, is the sole end of all virtue.According to Epicurus, all virtues are not sought for their own sake, but because they have a tendency to attain them. For example, prudence, according to this philosophy, though it is the root and essential element of all virtue, is not sought for itself.That carefulness, industry, and deliberation of the heart, that constant attention and concern for the most far-reaching effects of every action, is a matter of pleasure and delight, not for its own sake, but because it has the effect of The greatest good and the tendency to eliminate the greatest evil.

The shunning of pleasure, the suppression and limitation of our natural passions for pleasure—the duty of self-denial—can never be pursued for its own sake.The whole value of this virtue derives from its utility, from its ability to enable us to postpone present pleasures for greater future ones, or to avoid some greater pain which might follow them.In short, self-denial is but a prudence in relation to pleasure. To persevere, to endure pain, to face danger or death bravely, the situations to which we so often persevere, are indeed the less desirable goals of human nature.These situations are chosen only to avoid greater misfortune.We go to such lengths to avoid the greater shame and pain that poverty brings.We face danger and death with courage to protect our liberty and our property, the ways and means of joy and happiness; or to protect our country.Our own security is necessarily included in the security of the nation.

Perseverance enables us to do all this willingly, to act the best we can in our current situation.Fortitude is in fact nothing but that which is manifested in the proper evaluation of pain, toil, and danger—always choosing lesser pain, toil, and danger in favor of greater pain, toil, and danger. Prudence, good judgment and poise. So is justice.Giving up what belongs to others is not something that is sought after because of doing so.Surely it is no better for you that I have what is mine than that you have it.In any case, you should give up anything that is mine, because not doing so will arouse people's hatred and anger.

Your inner stability and peace will be gone.When you think of the punishment you will imagine, which men are always ready to inflict on you, and from which no power, art, or concealment in your own imagination will ever be sufficient to protect yourself, you will be filled with joy. Worry and panic.The other kind of justice, which consists in doing good to our neighbours, relatives, friends, benefactors, superiors, or peers according to their relations with us, arises from the same reason. loved by us.Our propriety, in all these various relations, excites respect and affection among those with us;By the one action we necessarily secure our own comfort and tranquility, the greatest and most fundamental objects of all our desires, which the latter necessarily endanger.The whole virtue of justice, therefore, the most important of all virtues, is nothing but a deliberate and circumspect conduct towards those around us.

This is Epicurus' doctrine of the nature of virtue.It seems a little strange that the philosopher, described as being extremely genial, failed to notice that, whatever tendencies these virtues, or their opposite vices, may have on our physical comfort and safety, they may be found in others. The affection which naturally arises is a stronger object of desire or aversion than any other result; to be amiable, to be respected, to be the proper object of esteem, than all these affections, esteems, and the comfort and safety of our bodies which respect can lead to, are things which every good soul values ​​more highly; Nothing is more dreadful than all the pains our bodies suffer from being hated, despised, and resented; and it follows that our desire for one quality and our aversion for another do not come from either. One such consideration is the consideration of the consequences these qualities can have on our bodies.

There is no doubt that such a system is completely at odds with the one I have been trying to establish.However, IMHO, it is not difficult to see where this system arose, from what view or point of view of nature.Virtue, in all ordinary cases, even for the world, is practical wisdom, the surest and most ingenious means of security and profit, according to the wise arrangement of the Creator.The success or failure of our careers depends largely on the good or bad opinion of us, on the general tendency of those with us to support or oppose us.But the best, surest, easiest, and most ingenious means of gaining advantage, and of avoiding unfavorable judgment by others, is undoubtedly to make ourselves the proper object of the former, and not of the latter.Socrates said: "Do you want a reputation as a good musician? The only sure way to get that reputation is to be a good musician. Likewise, you want to be thought capable of being a general or a statesman Do you do your best for your country? In this case, the best way is really to acquire the art and experience of conducting war and governing a country, and become a really competent general or statesman. Likewise, if you want people to treat you Seen as a reasonable, self-controlled, just and fair person, the best way to gain these reputations is to be a reasonable, self-controlled, just and fair person. If you can really make yourself an amiable, respectable, and lovable propriety, there is no need to fear that you will not soon gain the love, respect, and respect of those with whom you associate." So much good is usually to be gained, and so much harm to us by wrongdoing, that the consideration of these two opposite tendencies no doubt impresses upon the former a certain added stamp of beauty and propriety, and on the latter Some new ugly and unseemly stamp.

Self-denial, magnanimity, adherence to justice, and benevolence, are thus approved not only as inherent qualities, but as an added quality of the highest degree of wisdom and the truest prudence.Likewise, the opposite vices, namely, intemperance, cowardice, injustice, and malice, or base selfishness, not only because of their inherent qualities, but because of their most unsightly stupidity and weakness. This additional quality has been criticized.Epicurus seems to have noticed only this propriety of all virtues.This is the propriety most readily conceived of by those who are trying to persuade others to guide their actions by virtue.How can it be possible to impress the hearts of men by merely demonstrating the folly of their actions, when they have clearly demonstrated, by their practice, or by the maxims circulated among them, that the natural virtues which virtue possesses cannot exert great influence on themselves? ?And how many people are likely to suffer for their own stupid behavior in the end?

By reducing all virtues to a single propriety, Epicurus indulged a proclivity which is natural to all men, but which some philosophers especially love to cultivate, as An important means of displaying one's ingenuity, that is, a habit of explaining all appearances in terms of as few principles as possible.There can be no doubt that Epicurus was still more indulging in this inclination when he reduced the basic objects of natural desires and aversions to physical pleasures and pains.The great proponent of this atomistic philosophy, the man who took such pleasure in deriving all the powers and faculties of the human body from the shapes, motions, and arrangements of the most obvious and common parts of matter, when he used the same method No doubt a similar pleasure is felt in explaining all the passions and passions of the heart in terms of the most obvious and common of the above.

Epicurus' system is the same as that of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno in that virtue consists in the act of attaining in the most proper way the fundamental objects of natural desire. among.It differs from other systems in two further respects: first, in the account given of the elementary objects of those natural desires; among. According to Epicurus, the fundamental objects of natural desires are physical pleasures and pains, and nothing else; while according to the other three philosophers, there are many other objects, such as knowledge, e.g. Our relatives, friends, the happiness of the country, etc., these things are the basic needs of people for their own sake. Epicurus also believed that virtue is not worth pursuing for its own sake, nor is virtue itself the ultimate goal of natural desires, but only desirable because of its tendency to prevent pain and promote comfort and pleasure.On the contrary, according to the other three philosophers, virtue is worthwhile not only because it is a means to some other basic ends of natural desires, but because it is in itself more important than all other ends. something more important.They hold that since man is made for action, his happiness must consist not only in the pleasures of his passive sensations, but also in the propriety of his active efforts. CHAPTER THREE Of those systems in which virtue resides in benevolence The system in which virtue resides in benevolence is, though I do not think so old as all the others I have already dealt with, yet a very old one. system.It seems to have been the system of most philosophers in the time of Augustus and since.These philosophers were self-proclaimed eclectics who professed to adhere primarily to the views of Plato and Pythagoras, and for this reason they became known as Late Platonists. According to these authors, in the nature of God, kindness or benevolence is the only rule of conduct, and directs the exercise of all other qualities.God uses her intellect to discover the means to those ends set forth by her good nature, in order to use her infinite power to carry them out.Still, benevolence is a supreme and dominating quality, to which all other qualities are subordinate, and all virtue or all morality, if I may express it, in the act of God derives ultimately from this quality.The perfection and beauty of the human heart consist in some resemblance or partial identity with the divine virtues, and therefore in the same principles of benevolence and benevolence which affect all the actions of the divine. middle.Man's actions from this motive are indeed unique and praiseworthy, or, in the eyes of God, may be called some kind of merit.It is only by acts of love and benevolence that we can imitate God's actions, and imitate them as our own; The principle of cultivating our feelings to be more like the qualities of the highest good, so that they become more suitable objects of God's love and esteem; we can finally reach the point where we can talk and exchange thoughts directly with God. The main goal that philosophy seeks to evoke in us. This system, as highly esteemed by many priests of the ancient Christian Church, has, after the Reformation, been adopted by some of the most pious and learned and most genial theologians, especially Dr. Ralph Cudworth, Henry Accepted by Dr. Moore, Mr. John Smith of Cambridge.But of all the ancient and contemporary proponents of this philosophical system, the late Dr. Hutcheson, undoubtedly, is unrivaled, the most observant, the most eminent, the most philosophic, And above all, he was a most sane and knowledgeable man. Virtue consists in benevolence, a view attested by many surface phenomena of human nature. It has already been said: Proper kindness is the most graceful and agreeable of all affections; a certain double sympathy prompts us to welcome it; and as it necessarily tends to do good, it is the proper object of gratitude and reward. From these reasons above, kindness seems to occupy a higher place among our natural affections than any other.We have also said that even the inclinations of beneficence do not seem to us very disagreeable, while the inclinations of other passions always strike us with great aversion.Who doesn't hate too much viciousness, too much selfishness, or too much hatred?But the most excessive indulgence, even partial friendship, is not so objectionable.It is only the passion of benevolence, which can be given full expression without care or attention to its propriety, and still retain some charm.There is something pleasing even in an instinctive goodness which goes on doing good, never caring whether the action is the proper object of reproach or approval.This is not the case with other passions, which cease to be agreeable passions as soon as they are abandoned, and as soon as they leave their sense of propriety. As benevolent sentiments give those actions which spring from it a beauty above all others, so the absence of benevolent sentiments, and more the tendency to be opposite to them, often brings with it any sign of similar tendencies. A special kind of moral deficiency.Harmful actions are often punished only because they show a lack of regard for the well-being of one's neighbour. In addition to these remarks, Dr. Hutcheson also said that as soon as other motives are found in any action that is supposed to be caused by benevolent feelings, our feeling of the merits of this action will be influenced by the supposed motives. The extent of this behavior diminishes.For example, if an action supposed to be due to gratitude is found to have arisen from the expectation of some new favor; The discovery that a pecuniary reward is expected completely dispels all idea that such actions are meritorious or laudable.The admixture, therefore, of any selfish motive, as with impure alloys, lessens, or quite annihilates, that virtue which would belong to any kind of action in the absence of which it is admixed.So, Hutchison argues: it is clear that virtue must exist only in pure and selfless benevolence. On the contrary, our perception of the merit of these actions, which are commonly thought to have arisen from some selfish motive, is found to proceed from some benevolent one.We should only love and respect this man the more if we believed that any man who so endeavored to improve his own happiness had no other intention than to do something useful and to do due repayment to his benefactor. people.This consideration seems to confirm more fully the conclusion that only benevolence can stamp the quality of virtue on any action. At last it occurred to him: In all the disputes between casuists about the justification of actions, what is the unmistakable evidence that justifies virtue?The public interest, he said, was the criterion that was repeatedly mentioned by all those involved in the debate.They generally admit, therefore, that any action which tends to promote the happiness of mankind is right, laudable, and virtuous; and that any action contrary to it is wrong, blameworthy, and evil.In the ensuing debate about the validity of passive obedience and resistance, the only point on which opinions differ widely is whether common submission, in cases of special interests violated, is likely to bring about greater consequences than brief resistance. sin?In general, it has never been a question, he argues, whether the actions most conducive to human happiness are not also morally good. As, therefore, benevolence is the only motive which can give any action a virtuous character, the more benevolent an act is manifested, the more must it be praised. Those acts aimed at the happiness of some large body, are correspondingly more virtuous, as they show greater benevolence than those aimed at the happiness of some smaller organization.The most virtuous of all passions, therefore, is that which has as its object the happiness of all sane beings.On the contrary, among those affections which in some respect may belong to the quality of virtue, the least virtuous are those which have as their object only the happiness of an individual, such as that of a son, a brother, or a friend. Perfect virtue consists in directing all our actions to promote the greatest possible good, in subordinating all the lower passions to the pursuit of the general happiness of mankind, in looking only at the individual Cheng is one of the many who believe that individual happiness can only be pursued when it does not violate or contribute to the happiness of the whole. Self-love is a virtue that has never been a virtue in one way or another.Once it harms the interests of all, it becomes a crime.When it has no consequences other than to make the individual concerned about his own happiness, it is a harmless quality, and though it is not to be praised, it is not to be blamed either.Those acts of kindness that people perform, although they have strong motives rooted in selfishness, are all the more virtuous for this reason.These actions demonstrate the power and vitality of the principle of benevolence. Not only does Dr. Hutchison deny that self-love is a motive for virtuous conduct, but, in his view, even a preoccupation with the pleasure of self-admiration is an applause that comforts one's conscience. , which diminishes the virtue of benevolent acts.He regarded it as a selfish motive, which, so far as it played upon any action, showed the weakness of pure and disinterested benevolence.Only pure and unselfish benevolent affection can stamp a man's actions with the stamp of virtue.This attention to one's own inner admiration, however, is far from being regarded as something that somehow diminishes the virtue of an action, as it is often regarded as deserving of the name of virtue. sole motive. Such is the account of the nature of virtue in this mild system, which has a peculiar tendency, by describing self-love as never bringing any honor to those affected by it, in people's The noblest and most pleasing of all passions are cultivated and nourished in the heart, so as not only to control unjust self-love, but to neutralize, to a certain extent, the influence of this temper. Just as some of the other systems I have shown fail to explain adequately whence arise the peculiar virtues of this noblest quality of benevolence, so this system of doctrine seems to suffer from the opposite defect: it fails adequately to explain our sense of prudence, vigilance, Whence comes the assent of the lower virtues of self-control, prudence, self-denial, perseverance, steadfastness, etc.The intent and purpose of our affections, the beneficent or injurious results which they tend to produce, are the only points with which such a system is most concerned.The propriety or inappropriateness, propriety or disproportionation of the reasons which arouse these feelings are entirely ignored. Concern for our own personal happiness and interest appears on many occasions also to be a very admirable principle of conduct.The habits of thrift, industry, concentration, and concentration of thought, which are generally supposed to be formed from selfish motives, are at the same time considered to be very admirable qualities, deserving of the respect and approval of every one.Indeed, selfish motives often seem to be mixed with the beauty of those actions which ought to spring from some benevolent sentiment.The reason for this, however, is not that self-love has never been a virtuous motive for action, but that the principle of benevolence in this particular case appears to lack the intensity it should have, Totally out of proportion.This quality is therefore manifestly defective, and on the whole more to blame than to praise.Indeed, it is not so easy to confuse benevolent motives in an action which mere self-love would suffice to induce us to do, to weaken our sense of its propriety, or our sense of its propriety. A sense of virtue in the person who comes.We are not prone to suspect that someone is defective in selfishness.It is by no means a weakness in human nature or a weakness in which we are prone to suspect.However, if we really believe that a person does not care about his family and friends, and does not therefore properly care for his health, life, or property-things that would have been enough to make him do it simply by the instinct of self-preservation, it is undoubtedly true. A defect, though a lovely one, which makes a man an object of pity rather than of contempt or hatred.But this shortcoming somewhat detracted from his dignity and respectable aspects of his character.Indifference and lack of frugality are generally frowned upon, not from want of kindness, but from want of due regard for one's own interests. Although some sophists often use the criterion of right or wrong for human conduct to be that such conduct has a tendency to promote social welfare or social disorder, it does not follow from this that concern for social welfare should be the only virtuous aspect of conduct. motive, but it can only be said that in any competition it should seek a balance with all other motives. Mercy is perhaps the only principle of God's conduct.Moreover, there are some not flimsy reasons in the act of God that help convince us of it.It is inconceivable that an omnipotent and omnipotent deity—who has nothing to ask from the outside world, whose happiness is entirely her own—could act from any other motive.But, notwithstanding this in the case of God, man, an imperfect creature whose maintenance of existence requires a great deal of recourse to the outside world, must often act from many other motives.The external circumstances of human nature are especially difficult if those sentiments which by human nature should always affect our actions do not appear as a virtue, or deserve no one's esteem and admiration. Those three systems—the system that places virtue in propriety, the system that places virtue in prudence, and the system that holds virtue in benevolence—are the principal accounts of the nature of virtue hitherto .All other descriptions of virtue, however different they may appear, are not difficult to reduce to one or the other of the three. The system which places virtue in obedience to the will of God may be subsumed under that system which places it in prudence, as well as in that which places it in propriety.If anyone were to ask why we submit to the will of God—and it would be a very disrespectful and absurd question to ask because of doubts about whether we should obey God—it could only be answered in two different ways. Or answer this way: we should obey the will of God, because she is a god with infinite power, if we obey her, she will reward us endlessly, if we don't obey her, she will punish us endlessly We; or: Leaving aside considerations of our own happiness or of reward or punishment of any kind, a being should obey its Maker, a finite and imperfect man, should obey infinite and perfect Most beautiful God, there is a certain harmony and propriety in this.It is inconceivable that any other answer to this question can be given than one or the other of these two answers.If the former answer is correct, then virtue consists in prudence, or in the proper pursuit of one's own fundamental interest and happiness, because we are compelled to submit to the will of God.If the second answer is appropriate, then virtue consists in propriety, since the fundamental cause of our obligation to obey is propriety or harmony in human emotions, the superiority over the objects that arouse those emotions. obedience. A system that places virtue in utility is also consistent with a system that holds virtue in propriety.According to this system, all qualities that are pleasant or useful to oneself or others are admired as virtues, and all qualities contrary to this are opposed as vices.But the propriety or utility of any affection depends upon the degree to which it is allowed to exist.Every passion is useful if it is restrained to a certain degree; every passion is harmful if it exceeds this convenient limit.Virtue, therefore, according to this system, consists not in any one affection, but in the propriety of all affections.The only difference between this system and that of doctrine which I have been endeavoring to establish is that it takes utility, and not the sympathy or corresponding affection of the spectator, as the natural and essential measure of this propriety. CHAPTER IV OF THE LIFETIME SYSTEMS All the systems I have expounded so far have held that, in whatever things may be in which virtue and vice may reside, there is a real and essential relationship between these qualities. the difference.Between the propriety and impropriety of a certain affection, between benevolence and other principles of conduct, between real prudence and short-sighted folly or recklessness.There is a real and essential difference.Again, they generally endeavor to encourage laudable tendencies and discourage culpable tendencies. Some of these systems, perhaps, do tend somewhat to upset the balance of the passions, to tend the mind to favor certain principles of conduct more than they should.Those ancient systems of morality which place virtue in propriety seem to have chiefly introduced those noble, dignified, and respectable virtues, the virtues of self-control and self-denial: fortitude, magnanimity, not for money belittled the physical misfortunes of pain, poverty, exile, and death.The noblest propriety of conduct is exhibited in these great endeavors.These ancient systems, by contrast, place little emphasis on the virtues of amiability, kindness, gentleness, and all those virtues of generosity and love.On the contrary, especially the Stoics often regard these virtues as merely faults, which a reasonable man should not have in his own heart. On the other hand, the system that values ​​benevolence, while it cultivates and encourages with the utmost zeal all those milder virtues, seems to completely neglect the more dignified and more respectable qualities of the mind.It doesn't even call them virtues.It calls them moral faculties, and holds that they should be respected and admired as much as those qualities which are rightly called virtues.It regards, if possible, as something worse, all those principles of conduct which serve only one's own self-interest.Far from being good qualities in themselves, it asserts, they weaken the sentiment of benevolence when they act with it.It also asserts that prudence can never even be considered a virtue when it is used only to advance self-interest. Again, the system which holds that virtue consists only in prudence, seems to belittle to the same degree the mild and respectable virtue, and negates all the beauty of the former and all the sublime of the latter. In spite of these defects, the basic tendency of each of those three systems is to encourage the noblest and most admirable habits of the human mind.A moral philosophy is useful to society if mankind in general, or even a few who profess to live by the rules of a moral philosophy, want to direct their actions in accordance with the precepts of any such system.We can learn something both valuable and unique from each system.If fortitude and magnanimity in the mind can be inspired by admonition and exhortation, the ancient system of propriety seems to suffice to do so.Or, if in the same way it is possible to humanize the mind, to inspire in us benevolent feelings and fraternal love for those with whom we are associated, then some of the situations which systems emphasizing benevolent feelings present to us seem to produce such effect.We can also learn from the system of Epicurus—though it is undoubtedly the most imperfect of the three mentioned above—how the practice of the virtues of mildness and respectability helps to improve us. , even our interests, comfort, security and peace in this world.Since Epicurus places happiness in the acquisition of comfort and security, he endeavors in some peculiar way to show that virtue is not merely the highest and surest quality, but the acquisition of these inestimable possessions. the only means.美德给我们内心的平静和安定带来的良好效果，是其他一些哲学家着重称赞过的东西。伊壁鸠鲁没有忽视这个问题，他曾经极力强调那种温和的品质对我们外部处境的顺利和安全所产生的影响。正是因为这个原因，古代世界各种不同的哲学派别的人们才研究他的著作。西塞罗这个伊壁鸠鲁学说体系的最大敌人，也正是从他那儿引用了最为人所赞赏的论证：只有美德才足以保证你获得幸福。塞内加虽然是一个斯多葛学派（该派是最反对伊壁鸠鲁的学说体系的）的哲学家，但是，他也比任何人更经常地引用这个哲学家的论述。 然而，还有另外一个似乎要完全抹杀罪恶和美德之间区别的道德学说体系， 这个学说体系的倾向因此就十分有害。我指的是孟德维尔博士的学说体系。虽然这位作者的见解几乎在每一方面都是错误的，然而，以一定的方式观察到的人类天性的某些表现，乍看起来似乎有利于他的这些见解。这些表现被孟德维尔博士以虽则粗鲁和朴素然而却是活泼和诙谐的那种辩才加以描述和夸张之后，给他的学说加上了某种真理或可能是真理的外观，这种外观非常容易欺骗那些不老练的人。 孟德维尔博士把任何根据某种合宜感、根据对于什么是值得表扬和值得称赞的这个问题的某种考虑所做出来的行为，看成是出自对称赞和表彰的爱好，或者出自像他所说的那种爱好虚荣的行为。他说，人更加关心的自然是自己的幸福而不是他人的幸福，他不可能在自己的心中真正地把他人的成功看得比自己更重。 他一显示出自己是在这样做，我们就可以确信他是在欺骗我们，也可以确信，他接下去就会同在其它一切时候一样，根据同一种自私自利的动机行事。在他身上的其它一些自私自利的激情中，虚荣心是最强有力的一种，因而他动辄对在他周围的那些人的赞赏感到荣幸和极大的振奋。当他看来是为了同伴的利益而牺牲自己的利益时，他知道，这种行为将大大地满足同伴们的自爱之心，而且，同伴们肯定会通过给予他绝非寻常的称赞来表示他们的满足。在他看来，他预期从这种行为中得到的快乐，将超过他为得到这种快乐而放弃的利益。因此，他的行为实际上正是一种自私自利的行为，恰如在其它任何场合那样，出自某种自私的动机。 可是，他感到满意，而且他以这种信念来使自己感到高兴，那就是，自己的这种行为完全是无私的，因为，如果不是这样想的话，在他自己或他人看来，这种行为似乎就不值得提倡。因此，根据他的体系，一切公益精神，所有把公众利益放在个人利益前面的做法，只是一种对人类的欺诈和哄骗，因而，这种被大肆夸耀的人类美德，这种被人们争相仿效的人类美德，只是自尊心和奉承的产物。 我现在不准备考察，最慷慨大方和富有公益精神的那些行为是否有可能在某种意义上不被看成是来自自爱之心。我认为，这个问题的回答对于确定美德的实质并不具有重大的意义，因为，自爱之心常常会成为具有美德这种品质的行为的动机。我只准备努力说明，那种想做出光荣和崇高行为的欲望，那种想使自己成为尊敬和赞同的合宜对象的欲望，不能恰当地叫做虚荣。甚至那种对于名副其实的声望和名誉的爱好，那种想获得人们对于自己身上真正可贵的品质的尊敬的欲望，也不应该称为虚荣。前一种是对于美德的爱好，是人类天性中最高尚的和最美好的激情。后一种是对真实的荣誉的爱好，这无疑是一种比前者低一级的激情， 但它的高尚程度似乎次于前者。渴望自己身上的那些既不配获得任何程度的称赞，本人也并不期待会获得某种程度称赞的品质，能够获得人们的称赞；想用服装和饰物的浮华装饰，或用平时行为中的那种同样轻浮的做作，来表现自己的品质，这样的人，才说得上是犯有虚荣毛病的人。渴望得到某种品质真正应该得到的称赞，但完全知道自己的品质不配得到这种称赞，这样的人，才说得上是犯有虚荣毛病的人。那种经常摆出一副自己根本配不上的那种显赫气派的腹中空空的纨绔子弟；那种经常假装自己具有实际上并不存在的惊险活动的功绩的无聊的说谎者；那种经常把自己打扮成实际上没有权利去染指的某一作品的作者的愚蠢的抄袭者，对这样的人，才能恰当地指责为具有这种激情。据说，这样的人也犯有虚荣毛病：他不满足于那些未明言的尊敬和赞赏的感情；他更喜欢的似乎是人们那种喧闹的表示和喝采，而不是人们无声的尊敬和赞赏的情感；他除了亲耳听到对自己的赞赏之外从不感到满足，他迫不及待地强求硬讨在他周围的人们的一切尊敬的表示；他喜欢头衔、赞美、被人拜访、有人伴随、在公共场合受到带着敬意和关注表情的人们的注意。虚荣这种轻浮的激情完全不同于前面两种激情，前两种是人类最高尚和最伟大的激情，而它却是人类最浅薄和最低级的激情。 但是，虽然这三种激情——使自己成为荣誉和尊敬的合宜对象的欲望，或使自己成为有资格得到这些荣誉和尊敬的那种人的欲望；凭借真正应该得到这种荣誉和尊敬的感情，去博得这些感情的欲望；至少是想得到称赞的轻浮的欲望—— 是大不相同的；虽然前两种激情总是为人们所赞成，而后一种激情总是为人们所藐视，然而，它们之间有着某种细微的雷同之处，这种雷同被那个灵活的作者以幽默而又迷人的口才加以夸大后，已使他能够欺骗他的读者。当虚荣心和对于名副其实的荣誉的爱好这两种激情都旨在获得尊敬和赞美时，它们之间有着某种雷同。但是，两者之间存在这样一些区别：前者是一种正义的、合理的和公正的激情，而后者则是一种不义的、荒唐的和可笑的激情。渴望以某种真正值得尊敬的品质获得尊敬的人，只不过是在渴望他当然有资格获得的东西，以及那种不做出某种伤害公理的事情就不能拒绝给他的东西。相反，在任何别的条件下渴望获得尊敬的人，是在要求他没有正当权利去要求的东西。前者很容易得到满足，不太会猜疑或怀疑我们是不是没有给予它足够的尊敬，也并不那么渴望看到我们表示重视的许多外部迹象。相反，后者则从来不会感到满足，它充满着这样一种猜疑和怀疑，即，我们并没有给予他自己所希望的那么多的尊敬，因为他内心有这样一种意识：他所渴望得到的尊敬大于他应该得到的尊敬。对于礼仪的最小疏忽， 他认为是一种不能宽恕的当众侮辱，是一种极其轻视的表现。他焦躁而又不耐烦， 并且始终在害怕失去我们对他的一切敬意。为此他总是急切地想得到一些新的尊敬的表示，并且只有不断地得到奉承和谄媚，才能保持自己正常的性情。 在使自己成为应当得到荣誉和尊敬的人的欲望和只是想得到荣誉和尊敬的欲望之间、在对美德的热爱和对真正荣誉的热爱之间，也有某种雷同之处。不仅在它们都旨在真正成为光荣的和高尚的人这个方面彼此相像，甚至还在以下方面彼此相像，即两者对真正荣誉的热爱都类似那种被恰当地叫做虚荣心的品质，即某些涉及他人感情的品质。然而，即使是最宽宏大量的人，即使是因美德本身而渴望具有美德的人，即使是漠不关心世人对自己的实际看法的人，也仍会高兴地想到世人应对他抱有什么看法，高兴地意识到虽然他可能既没有真的得到荣誉也没有真的得到赞赏，但是，他仍然是荣誉和赞赏的合宜对象；并意识到如果人们冷静、公正、切实和恰当地了解他那行为的动机和详情，他们肯定会给予他荣誉和赞赏。虽然他藐视人们实际上对他抱有的看法，但他高度重视人们对他所应当持有的看法。他的行为中最崇高和最高尚的动机是：他可能认为，不管别人对他的品质会抱有什么想法，自己应该具有那些高尚的情感；如果他把自己放到他人的地位上，并且不是考虑他人的看法是什么，而是考虑他人的看法应当是什么的话，他总是会获得有关自己的最高的评价。因此，由于在对美德的热爱中，也多少要考虑他人的观点，虽然不是考虑这种观点是什么而是考虑在理智和合宜性看来这种观点应当是什么，所以，即使在这一方面，对美德的热爱和对真正荣誉的热爱之间也有某些雷同之处。但是，两者之间同时也存在某种非常重大的区别。 那个只是根据什么是正确的和适宜去做的这种考虑、根据什么是尊敬和赞赏（虽然他决不会得到这些感情）的合宜对象这种考虑行事的人，总是在根据人类天性所能想象的那种最崇高的和最神圣的动机采取行动。另一方面，一个人如果在要求得到自己应该得到的赞赏的同时，还急切地想获得这种赞赏，虽然他基本上也是一个值得称赞的人，但他的动机中较多地混杂着人类天性中的弱点。他有可能由于人们的无知和不义感到屈辱，他自己的幸福有可能由于对手们的妒忌和公众的愚蠢而遭到破坏。相反，另外一种人的幸福却相当有保障，不受命运的摆布， 不受同他相处的那些人的古怪想法的影响。在他看来，因为人们无知而有可能落到他身上来的那些轻视和仇恨，并不适合于他，他一点也不为此感到屈辱。人们是根据有关他的品质和行为的一种错误观念来轻视和仇恨他的。如果他们更好地了解了他，他们就会尊敬和热爱他。确切地说，他们所仇恨和轻视的不是他，而是另一个被他们误认为是他的人。他们在化装舞会上遇到装扮成我们敌人的那个友人，如果我们因为他的乔装打扮而真的对他发泄愤恨之情，他所感到的是高兴而不是屈辱。这就是一个真正宽宏大量的人在受到不正确的责备时产生的一种感情。然而，人类天性很少达到这种坚定的地步。虽然除了意志最薄弱的和最卑劣的人之外，人类之中没有什么人会对虚假的荣誉感到很高兴，但与此相矛盾而叫人感到奇怪的是，虚假的屈辱却常常会使那些表面看来是最坚定和最有主见的人感到屈辱。 孟德维尔博士并不满足于把虚荣心这种肤浅的动机说成是所有那些被公认为具有美德的行为的根源。他尽力从其它许多方面指出人类美德的不完善。他声称，在一切场合，美德总是没有达到它自称达到的那种完全无私的地步，并且， 不是征服了我们的激情，通常只不过是暗中纵容了我们的激情。无论什么地方我们对于快乐的节制没有达到那种极端苦行那样的节制程度，他就把它看成是严重的奢侈和淫荡。在他看来，每件东西都豪华到超出了人类天性认为绝对必需的正常程度，所以，即使在一件干净衬衫或一座合宜的住宅的使用中，也有罪恶。他认为，在最为合法的结合之中，对于性交这种欲望的纵容，也是以最有害的方式来满足这种激情，因而同样也是淫荡。他还嘲笑那种很容易做到的自我克制和贞洁。像在其它许多场合一样，他那巧妙的似是而非的推理，在这里也是被模棱两可的语言掩盖着的。有些人类激情，除了表示令人不快的或令人作呕的程度的那些名称之外，没有别的什么名称。旁观者更容易在这种程度上而不是在别的什么程度上注意到那些激情。如果这些激情震动了旁观者自己的感情，如果它们使他产生某种反感和不舒服，他就必然身不由己地注意到它们，因此也必然会给它们一个名称。如果它们符合他那心情的自然状态，他就容易完全忽略它们，或者根本不给它们以名称，或者，如果给了它们什么名称的话，由于它们处在这样一种受到限制和约束的情况中，所以，这些名称与其说是表示它们还能被允许存在的程度，不如说是表示这种激情的征服和抑制。于是，关于喜欢快乐和喜欢性交的普通名称，标志着这些激情的邪恶和令人作呕的程度。另一方面，自我克制和贞节这两个词似乎表示的，与其说是这些激情还能被允许存在的程度，不如说是它们受到的抑制和征服。所以，当他能显示出这些激情还在若干程度上存在时，他就认为自己已经完全否定了那些自我克制和贞节的美德的真实性，已经完全揭示出这些美德仅仅是对人类的疏忽和天真的欺骗。然而，对于美德试图抑制的那些激情的对象来说，这些美德并不要求它们处于完全麻木不仁的状态。美德只是旨在限制这些激情的狂热性，使其保持在不伤害个人，既不扰乱也不冒犯社会的范围内。 把每种激情，不管其程度如何以及作用对象是什么，统统说成是邪恶的，这是孟德维尔那本书的大谬所在。他就这样把每样东西都说成是虚荣心，即关系到他人的情感是什么或者他人的情感应当是什么的那种虚荣心；依靠这种诡辩，他作出了自己最喜爱的结论：个人劣行即公共利益。如果对于富丽豪华的喜欢，对于优雅的艺术和人类生活中一切先进东西的爱好，对于衣服、家具或设施中一切令人感到愉快的东西的爱好，对建筑物、雕塑、图画和音乐的爱好，都被说成是奢侈、淫荡和出风头，甚至对情况许可他们无所不便地纵容上述激情的那些人来说也是如此，那么，这种奢侈、淫荡和出风头必然是对公众有利的。因为，如果没有这些品质——他认为可以适当地给这些品质套上这种可耻的名称——优雅的艺术就决不会得到鼓励，并必然因为没有用处可派而枯萎凋零。在他的时代之前流行的、认为美德是人们全部激情的彻底根绝和消除这样一些流传于民间的制欲学说，是这种放荡不羁的体系的真正基础。孟德维尔博士很容易地论证了：第一，实际上人们从未完全征服自己的激情；第二，如果人们普遍地做到了这一点， 那么，这对社会是有害的，因为这将葬送一切产业和商业，并且在某种意义上会葬送人类生活中的一切行业。通过这两个命题中的第一个，他似乎证明了真正的美德并不存在，而且也证明了，自以为是美德的东西，只是一种对于人类的欺诈和哄骗；通过第二个命题，他似乎证明了，个人劣行即公共利益，因为，如果没有这种个人劣行，就没有一个社会能够繁荣或兴旺。 这就是孟德维尔博士的体系。它一度在世界上引起很大的反响。虽然同没有这种体系时相比，它或许并未引起更多的罪恶，但是，它起码唆使那种因为别的什么原因而产生的罪恶，表现得更加厚颜无耻，并且抱着过去闻所未闻的肆无忌惮的态度公开承认它那动机的腐坏。 但是，无论这个体系显得如何有害，如果它不在某些方面接近真理，它就决不能欺骗那么多的人，也决不会在信奉更好的体系的人们中间引起那么普遍的惊慌。某个自然哲学体系，表面看来也许非常有理，可以在好长一段时期为世人所普遍接受，但实际上却没有什么基础，同真理也毫无相似之处。笛卡儿旋风就被一个富有智慧的民族在总共将近一个世纪的时间内看成是天体演化的一个最成功的说明。但是，有人已证明——这种证明为一切人所信服——有关那些奇妙结果的这些虚假的原因，不仅实际上不存在，而且根本不可能有，如果它们存在的话，也不可能产生这种归结于它们的结果。但是对道德哲学体系来说却不是这样。 一个声称要解释人类道德情感起源的作者，不可能如此严重地欺骗我们，也不可能如此严重地背离真理以致毫无相似之处。当一个旅行者叙述某一遥远国度的情况时，他可能利用我们轻信别人的心理，把毫无根据的、极其荒唐的虚构说成是非常可靠的事实。但是，当一个人自称要告诉我们邻居那儿发生了什么事情，告诉我们正是在我们居住的这一教区发生的一些事情时，虽然我们住在这里，如果我们过于粗心而不用自己的眼睛去察看一下事情的真相，他就可能从许多方面欺骗我们，然而，他的最大谎言必须同真情有些相像，甚至其中必须有相当多的事实。一个研究自然哲学的作者——他声称要指出宇宙间许多重大现象的起因—— 声称要对一个相隔很远的国家里所发生的一些事情作出说明，对于这些问题，他可以随心所欲地告诉我们一些事，而且只要他的叙述保持在似乎有可能这个界限之内，他就必然会赢得我们的信任。但是，当他打算解释我们感情和欲望产生的原因，我们赞同和不赞同的情感产生的原因时，他自称不仅要说明我们居住的这个教区中的事情，而且要说明我们自己内部的各种事情。虽然我们在这里也像把一切托付给某个欺骗他们的佣人的那些懒惰的主人一样，很可能受骗，然而，我们不可能忽略任何同事实完全不沾边的说明。一些文章起码必须是有充分根据的，甚至那些夸张过度的文章也必须以某些事实为依据。否则，欺骗会被识破， 甚至会被我们粗枝大叶的察看所识破。在最无判断力和最无经验的读者看来，一个作者，如果想把某种本性作为任何天然情感产生的原因，而这种本性既同这个原因没有任何联系，也不同有这种联系的别的本性相类似，那么，他就像是一个荒唐和可笑的人。