Chapter 8 Book II Of Justice and Mercy

Part II On Justice and Mercy Chapter I A Comparison of the Two Virtues For only those acts which have a certain inclination to benevolence and which proceed from just motives are recognized objects of gratitude, or only such acts excite the sympathy of the spectator Gratitude, so it seems only the behavior needs to be rewarded in some way. Since only those actions which have some injurious tendency and arise from improper motives are the recognized objects of resentment, or which alone excite the sympathetic resentment of the spectator, it seems that only such actions need to be punished. Kindness is always free, it cannot be forced upon.Mere lack of kindness is not punished; for it does not lead to true evil.It may justly excite dislike and disapproval by discouraging good deeds which might reasonably be expected; but it cannot excite any feeling of resentment which one would approve of.If a man is in a position to repay his benefactor, or if his benefactor needs his help, and he fails to do so, he is undoubtedly guilty of the most ignominious ingratitude.Every impartial spectator inwardly refuses any sympathy for his selfish motives, and he is the least fitting object of sympathy.However, he still did no actual harm to anyone.He just didn't do the act of kindness that was supposed to.

He is the object of a hatred which is a passion naturally aroused by inappropriate sentiments and actions; A passion that has never been properly aroused outside of the injuryTherefore, his lack of gratitude will not be punished.If it were possible, it would seem more inappropriate than that he should not do it, by exerting pressure on him to do what he should be grateful to do and which every impartial spectator would approve of him doing.If his benefactor attempted to compel him by force to express his gratitude, it would tarnish his own name, and it would be inappropriate for any third person not superior in rank to interfere with them.Gratitude, however, brings the duties of every kind of charity which we are willing to assume the closest to what may be called ideal and perfect duties.Friendship, generosity, and tolerance impel us to do what is generally agreed upon, more unchecked, less by compulsion than by a duty of gratitude.We speak of gratitude, not of charity or generosity, nor of friendship even when friendship is merely honorable and not strengthened and mixed with gratitude for good deeds.

Resentment seems to be endowed to us by the instinct of self-preservation, and only for the sake of self-defense.This is the guarantee of justice and innocence.It prompts us to repel the injury that is attempted to inflict upon ourselves, to repay the injury already received, to make the perpetrator feel remorse for his injustice, and make others terrified of committing the same crime, out of fear of the same punishment.Resentment, therefore, is employed only for these purposes, and when it is used for other purposes, the spectator can never sympathize with it.But the mere absence of the virtue of benevolence, though it may disappoint us with good deeds which we could reasonably have expected, neither does nor seeks to do any harm—for which we must defend ourselves.

There is, however, another virtue, the observance of which does not depend on our own will, which can be compelled to be observed by pressure, and whoever violates it will be punished by resentment.This virtue is justice, and to violate it is to injure; the action, from motives which necessarily disapproves, does injure certain persons indeed.It is therefore the proper object of resentment, and of the punishment which is its natural consequence.As men agree and approve of violence used to avenge injury caused by injustice, so they agree and approve more of violence used to prevent and repel injury, and more agree and approve of violence used to prevent criminals from injuring their neighbors. violence used.The man who plots an injustice feels this himself, and feels the power which the one whom he has injured and others will use with great propriety in order to prevent him from committing a crime, or to punish him after he has committed it.From this arises the stark distinction between justice and all other social virtues, a distinction which has lately been emphasized by a very great and original genius, namely, that we feel ourselves to act in justice more than in friendship, benevolence, or justice. Generosity is more strictly restrained; the method of exercising the above-mentioned virtues seems to be somewhat left to our own choice, but, somehow, we feel that the observance of justice is bound in some peculiar way. , limits and constraints.That is to say, we feel that power may most properly and agreeably be employed to compel us to obey the laws of justice, but not to compel us to obey the maxims of other social virtues.

We must always, therefore, be careful to distinguish between what is only to be blamed, or a proper object of blame, and what can be punished or prevented by external force.What seems to be to blame is the lack of that general degree of proper benevolence, which experience teaches us may be expected of every man;An average degree of benevolence in itself seems neither blameworthy nor commendable.A father, son, or brother who behaves towards his kindred neither better nor worse than most people usually do, seems quite undeserving of praise or blame.He who astonishes us with an uncharacteristic and unexpected, but fitting and proper friendliness, or, conversely, with an uncharacteristic and unexpected, and inappropriate cruelty, On the former occasion it seems praiseworthy, on the latter it is blameworthy.

However, even the most common kindness or charity among equals cannot be forced by force.Among men of equal rank, every man was naturally supposed, and long before the establishment of civil government, to have a certain right to protect himself from harm, and to demand some degree of punishment from those who harm him.When he did so, every generous spectator not only approved of his conduct, but sympathized with his feelings so deeply that he was often willing to help him.When someone attacks, or robs, or attempts to murder another, all the neighbors are terrified, and think they are right to rush to avenge the victim, or to protect him in such a critical situation.But when a father lacks the usual degree of paternal love for his son, when a son seems to lack in his father the respect that children can be expected to have, when brothers lack the usual degree of brotherhood, when a man lacks sympathy, and refusing to do so when it is so easy to relieve the suffering of a fellow man, on all these occasions, though everyone condemned the conduct, no one thought that those who might have reason to expect a kinder action had any right to forcefully.Victims can only complain, and bystanders have no other way to intervene except for persuasion and persuasion.On all these occasions it would have been considered the height of rudeness and presumptuousness for persons of equal rank to fight each other violently.

On this point a magistrate may indeed sometimes enforce a certain degree of decorum among those under his jurisdiction.This compulsion is generally approved of.The laws of all civilized countries oblige parents to support their children, and children to support their parents, and impose upon men many other benevolent duties.The magistrates are empowered not only to preserve the peace of society by stopping injustice, but also to promote the prosperity of the country by establishing good discipline and preventing all kinds of immoral and inappropriate behavior.He can thus make statutes which not only forbid the public from harming each other, but require us to do mutual good to a certain degree.Once the prince orders things that are quite inconsequential, things that can be forgotten with impunity until he gives his orders, disobedience is not only reproachable but punishable.Wherefore, when he gives orders to do things which he neglects before issuing any such order, he is very severely reprimanded, and disobedience is indeed more punished.It may, however, be the whole duty of the legislator to carry out the statutes properly and justly, with the utmost care and caution.The total repudiation of such laws would expose the whole nation to many serious disturbances and appalling acts of violence, and, if carried too far, would endanger liberty, security, and justice.

And though to persons of equal rank the mere lack of benevolence may seem unpunished, yet it is evident that they should be most rewarded for their great efforts to practice that virtue.For the greatest benevolence they are the natural and agreeable objects of the strongest gratitude.Conversely, while there is punishment for violating justice, there seems to be no reward for obeying that code of virtue.There is no doubt that there is a propriety in the practice of justice, and it therefore deserves all the assent due to propriety.But since it is not a real and actual good, it is hardly to be appreciated.In the vast majority of cases, justice is a negative virtue that merely prevents us from harming our neighbors.A man who merely does not infringe upon his neighbor's person, property, or reputation has, indeed, but the slightest practical advantage.Yet he fulfilled all the laws which are especially called justice, and did everything that his equals might properly compel him to do, or they might punish him for not doing.We can often obey the whole code of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.

Retaliation and retaliation seem to be the main rules that the Creator has enjoined upon us.We believe that acts of kindness and generosity should be bestowed upon those who are kind and generous.We hold that those who have never had room in their hearts for the affections of kindness cannot have the affections of their fellows, but can live as in a vast desert in a society where no one cares or greets them.The transgressor of the laws of justice should be made to feel for himself the crime he has committed against others; and, as no concern for the suffering of his fellow man can restrain him, he should use his own fears to frightened him.Only the innocent man, who observes the laws of justice towards others, who does no harm to his neighbors, can command the respect due to his innocence, and observe the same rules strictly to him. .

CHAPTER TWO ON THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTATION, AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF VITALITY There can be no proper motives for injuring our neighbor, nor Any provocation that causes us to inflict misfortune upon others will have their consent.To destroy the happiness of others simply because it interferes with our own, to take away what is really useful from others just because it may be as useful or more useful to us, likewise, or to satisfy everyone's needs at the expense of others. Any other natural preference for one's own happiness over others cannot be approved of by the impartial spectator.There is no doubt that every man is born to care first and chiefly for himself; and, as he is more fitted than any other to care for himself, it is fitting and right for him to do so.

Each is therefore more deeply concerned with what concerns himself directly than with any other man; perhaps hearing of the death of another with whom we have no special relation may cause us some concern, but it does not affect us. The influence of daily life is far less than the small disasters and disasters that befall us.But though a neighbor's bankruptcy may affect us far less than our own small misfortune, yet we must not prevent our own small misfortune by the neighbor's bankruptcy, or even prevent our own bankruptcy.Here, as in everything else, we should look at ourselves through the light with which we naturally see others, and not with the light with which we naturally see ourselves.As the saying goes, although everyone can be a whole world to himself, it is just a drop in the ocean to others.While his own happiness may be more important to him than that of all other people in the world, it is not more important to any one other than that of anyone else.Therefore, although it is true that every man in his heart prefers himself to others, he dares not take this attitude before people, and openly admit that he acts on this principle.He will find that other people will never approve of his preference, and however natural it may be to him, it always appears excessive and presumptuous to others.When he sees himself as he realizes others see him, he understands that to them he is but one of many, and that no one is better than the other.If he would act on the principle that the impartial spectator can sympathize with his own conduct--which of all things he longs to do--he must, on this occasion as on every other, restrain himself. a self-loving arrogance, and repress it to such an extent that others can approve of it.They will indulge the pride of self-love, so as to allow him to be more interested in his own happiness than that of others, and to pursue his own happiness more earnestly.So far, whenever they put themselves in his position, they readily agreed with him.In the contest for wealth, fame, and eminence, he may exert all his strength and all his energy to outdo all his rivals, but if he were to crowd out or overthrow his rival, the indulgence of the spectators would cease altogether.They do not allow unscrupulous behavior.To them, the man was in every way like them: they would not sympathize with that self-love which made him love himself more than anyone else; motivation.Therefore, they are happy to sympathize with the natural resentment of the injured person, and the injured person becomes the object of their hatred and anger.He was conscious of what he would become, and felt those emotions burst out against him on all sides at any moment. Just as the greater and more irreparable the crime committed, the more naturally the indignation of the victim increases, so does the sympathetic indignation of the spectator, and the feeling of the perpetrator of his crime.The killing of human life is the greatest misfortune that one man can inflict on another, and it excites the most violent indignation among those who are directly connected with the dead.Murder, therefore, is regarded in the minds of both men and criminals as one of the worst crimes against the individual.It is worse to deprive us of what we already have than to disappoint us with what we only hoped for.So trespassing on property, stealing and robbing what we have, is a greater evil than breaking a bond that merely disappoints us with what we expect.So, those who break the law seem to receive the most severe retaliation and punishment.The most sacred laws of justice are those which protect the life and safety of our neighbours; next are those which protect the property and property of an individual; The man who violates the very sacred laws of justice never considers the feelings others must have towards him, and feels no pain from shame, fear, and terror.When his passions are satisfied and he begins to consider his past actions dispassionately, he can no longer forgive the motives which influenced them.These motives seemed to him now, as they often seemed to others, extremely repulsive.By sympathizing with the loathing and hatred that other people necessarily feel for him, he becomes to some extent the object of his own loathing and hatred.The situation of the man who had been the victim of his injustice now aroused his pity.Thinking of this, he grieves; regrets the unfortunate consequences of his actions, and feels that he has become a proper object of resentment and condemnation, of the inevitable consequences of resentment, vengeance, and punishment. The thought kept haunting him, filling him with fear and terror.He no longer dares to confront society, but imagines himself rejected and abandoned by all human feelings.In the midst of this great and most dreadful suffering he could look to no one for consolation.The memory of his crimes made his countrymen deny him any sympathy.The emotions people felt for him were the very things he feared most.Everything around him seemed hostile, and he would gladly have fled to some desolate desert where he could no longer see a human face, and perceive in their expressions the guilt of his crimes. blame.But loneliness is scarier than society.His own concerns can only bring him darkness, misfortune, and disaster, and melancholy portends unimaginable torment and destruction.The fear of being alone forced him back into society, and he went before people again, astonishingly ashamed and tormented by fear, in order to get a little from the real judges. protection, knowing that the judges had already unanimously delivered their sentence against him.This is that natural emotion which is justly called remorse; that is, all those emotions which arouse fear in men.The shame that comes from the awareness of the inappropriateness of one's past actions; the grief that comes from the awareness of the consequences of one's actions; the compassion for those injured by one's actions; The dread of punishment, the dread of punishment, the dread of punishment from the resentment which is rightly excited in man, all these make up that natural emotion. Opposite actions necessarily produce opposite sentiments.The man who has performed a certain act of generosity, not from idle fancies, but from right motives, feels himself bound to be the object of love and gratitude to those whom he has served, and By sympathizing with them, I feel that I must be the object of respect and approval of all.When he recalls the motive from which he acted, and examines it with the eyes with which an impartial spectator would examine it, he understands it still further, and boasts of having the approval of this imaginary impartial judge.In all these regards, his own conduct seemed in every way agreeable.The thought of this filled him with joy, peace, and composure.He lived in friendly harmony with all, and looked upon them with confidence and satisfaction, convinced that he had become the most worthy of the respect of his fellow-men.The combination of these feelings constitutes the sense of merit or of deserving reward. The third chapter discusses the function of this natural constitution. The fact is that man can only exist in society, and nature adapts him to the environment in which he grows.All members of human society are in a situation where they need to help each other and at the same time face mutual harm.Where such necessary assistance is afforded to one another out of love, gratitude, friendship, and respect, society is prosperous and agreeable.All the different members of society are united by the delightful bond of love and affection, and are brought, as it were, to a common center of mutual good. But though this necessary help does not spring from generosity and disinterested motives, though there is a lack of mutual love and affection among the different members of society, and though this society does not bring much happiness and pleasure, It must not disappear.By virtue of the public perception of its function, society can exist among different men as it exists among different businessmen, without love or affection for one another; and, though in this society no one There is no obligation, or obligation, to show gratitude to others, but society can still be sustained by reciprocal behavior with a purely utilitarian focus on a common valuation. However, society cannot exist among those who are always hurting and hurting each other.Whenever that injury begins, whenever resentment and hostility arise between each other, all social ties are torn, and the different members which it holds together seem to become incompatible or even antagonistic in their affections. estranged.According to the general opinion, if there is any association between robber and murderer, they must at least not rob and kill each other.Therefore, rather than saying that benevolence is the basis of social existence, it is better to say that justice is this basis. Though society may exist in an unpleasant state without benevolence, the prevalence of injustice is sure to ruin it utterly. Therefore, although the Creator exhorts people to do good deeds by using the pleasant consciousness of people's desire to be rewarded, she does not think that it is necessary to use people's fear of punishment to ensure peace when such good deeds are neglected. Force people to do good.Doing good deeds is like an ornament that beautifies a building, not a foundation that supports it, so exhortation is enough, and there is no need to impose it.On the contrary, justice is like the main pillar supporting the whole edifice.If this pillar were to loosen, the majestic and colossal edifice of human society, which in this world, if I may say so, seems to have been given special and precious attention by the Creator to its construction and maintenance .Therefore, in order to force people to uphold justice, the Creator cultivated in people the awareness that evil will be rewarded with evil and the psychology of fear of punishment for violating justice. They are like the great guardians of human unity, protecting the weak, restraining violence and violence. punish criminals. Though men are naturally sympathetic, they have little sympathy for those with whom they have no special relation compared with themselves; than it matters not at all; they are very tempted to injure a man, and perhaps have many temptations to do so, so that if this principle of justice is not established among victims in their self-defense, and is not used If they are subdued and feel a certain awe of the innocence of their victim, they are as ready as wild beasts to attack him; and a man who attends a meeting of men is like entering a lion's den. All over the world we see instruments adjusted with the utmost ingenuity to the purpose for which they were produced; and marvel at how ingeniously everything in the body of a plant or animal is arranged to bring about the two great acts of nature. The purpose is to maintain the survival of the individual and the reproduction of the species.But in these and all such objects we still have to distinguish utility from the final cause of their respective motion and structure.The digestion of food, the circulation of the blood, and the consequent secretion of the various humors, are processes necessary for the great purpose of maintaining the existence of animals, but we never seem to explain them in terms of the causes of their effects. In that way, efforts are made to account for these processes in light of the above-mentioned ends; no speculation is ever made as to the automatic operation of the circulation of the blood or the digestion of food, nor is there any idea or idea of ​​the purpose of circulation and digestion.The gears of clocks are all cleverly aligned to suit the purpose for which they were made, which is to tell time.All the different movements of the various gears cooperate with each other in the most delicate way to produce this effect.They would not necessarily work better if they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce this effect.We never, however, attribute any such wish or intention to them, but to the watchmaker, who we know to be moved by a mainspring, which shows that the effect produced by the mainspring is as insignificant as that of the cogwheels. .Though in explaining bodily processes by this we are never unable to distinguish effect from final cause, yet we are apt to confuse these two distinct things in explaining those processes of psychic action.When innate principles lead us to those ends which a pure and enlightened reason would suggest to us, we are as apt to ascribe it to that reason, as we attribute it to the causes by which these principles operate and to the ends which we promote. and it is easy to think that reason is of human intelligence when it is of divine wisdom.On the face of it, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects it causes, and the system of human nature seems quite simple and agreeable when all its different operations are thus deduced from a simple principle. Just as social intercourse is impossible among persons who do not ordinarily abstain from injuring each other, so society can exist only through better observance of the laws of justice; so a consideration of the necessity of this Those who justify the law come to strictly enforce its grounds.Man, it is said, is endowed with a love of society, a desire for humanity to remain united for his own sake, even if he himself does not benefit from it.An orderly, flourishing social condition is pleasing to him.He is happy to see such a society.On the contrary, social disorder and disorder became the object of his aversion, and he was annoyed by anything that caused it.He also realizes that his own interests are closely related to the prosperity of the society, and his happiness or life depends on whether the order and prosperity of this society can be maintained.Therefore, for various reasons, he has a hatred for anything that is harmful to society, and is willing to use all methods to prevent such a hateful and terrible thing from happening.Injustice must be detrimental to this society.He is therefore terrified at the appearance of every injustice, and, if I may say so, he does his best to prevent its further development, which, if allowed to proceed, would soon destroy the everything of.If he cannot restrain it by gentle and reasonable means, he must resort to violence to suppress it, in short, to prevent its further development.Hence the strict enforcement of the laws of justice, and even the death penalty for punishing those who violate them, are often favored.Therefore, the person who destroys the stability of the society is expelled from the world, and other people will not dare to follow his fate when they see his end. This is what we usually say about our approval of punishing injustice.This is undoubtedly true, so that it is often necessary, according to considerations of the necessity of maintaining social order, to maintain our natural sense of propriety and propriety in punishment.When the criminal is about to suffer for a just vengeance, the natural indignation of men tells him that he deserves it; When he was again the object of fear, he began to be the object of generous and benevolent pity.The thought of the pain he was about to suffer assuages ​​the resentment at the pain he caused others.They were inclined to pardon and forgive him, and to spare him that punishment which, at the height of their indifference, had been considered justly deserved.Here, therefore, it is necessary to arouse them to maintain this consideration of the interests of society as a whole.Driven by their more generous and well-rounded humanity, they counteract the impulses of this weak and prejudiced humanity.They think that the forgiveness of the criminal is cruelty to the innocent, and counter to their own sympathy with a particular person by some wider sympathy with humanity. It is also sometimes necessary to justify the expediency of obeying the general laws of justice by examining their necessity for the maintenance of society.We often hear the youth and the libertines mock the most sacred laws of morality, and hear them, sometimes from immorality, and more often from their own vanity, admit the most heinous rules of conduct.We are outraged by this, and are eager to refute and expose this hateful principle. But although this principle is the inherent abomination in them that first aroused us against them, we are not willing to regard it as the only reason for condemning them, or to claim that it is the only reason why we hate and dislike them. reason.In our view, this reason does not appear to be conclusive.But if we hate and hate them because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and loathing, why should this not be the decisive reason?It is just that when someone asks why we should not behave in this way or in this way, the question means to those who ask that this way of behaving does not seem in itself the natural and proper object of those sentiments. .So we have to tell them it's for some other reason.For this, we usually look for other reasons, and the first reason that comes to our mind is that the prevalence of this practice will lead to disorder in the social order.So we almost always succeed in sticking to this principle. Though good discernment is usually not required to see the tendency of all dissolute conduct to be injurious to the happiness of society, it is hardly this consideration which first arouses us against them.All men, even the most stupid and most incapable of thinking, abhor fraud, treachery, and transgression of justice, and are glad to see them punished.But however obvious the necessity of justice for the existence of society may appear, it is seldom considered. It is not some concern for the protection of society that first draws our attention to the punishment of crimes against the individual, as can be shown for many obvious reasons.Our concern for the fate and happiness of individuals is not usually caused by our concern for the fate and happiness of the community.We do not care to lose a guinea because it is a part of a thousand guineas, and because we ought to be concerned with the whole sum.Likewise, we do not care about the destruction or loss of an individual because he is a member or part of society, and because we should care about the destruction of society.In neither case is our concern for the individual motivated by concern for the public; but in both cases our concern for the public is compounded by a special concern which Special concern again consists of the sympathy we feel for different individuals.For when a small sum of money has been unjustly taken from us, we report the injury not so much out of concern for the sum already lost as out of a desire to protect our entire estate. concern.In the same way, when a person is injured or crippled, we demand that the person who committed the crime be punished not so much out of concern for the person who was injured as in the general interest of society. care.It must be seen, however, that this concern does not necessarily include in some degree those fine affections, which are commonly called affection, respect, and affection, and by which we distinguish our peculiar friends and acquaintances.Just because he is our fellow man, the care required in this respect is no more than the sympathy we have for every human being.We even condone the resentment of a detestable person when he is hurt by those whom he has not provoked.In this case, our dissatisfaction with his original character and conduct does not quite prevent us from sympathizing with his natural resentments; People who control their natural emotions can easily pour cold water on this kind of sympathy. It is true that we punish, or approve of punishment, on some occasions only from some consideration of the general interest of society which, we think, would not be secured otherwise.It is a punishment for all kinds of violations of internal security or violation of military discipline.Such crimes do not harm any individual immediately and directly; but it is believed that their long-term effects do cause or may cause considerable trouble or great confusion in society.例如，一个哨兵在他警戒时睡大觉从而被军法处死，这是因为这种疏忽可能使整个军队遭到危险。在许多情况下，这种严厉的惩罚可能显得十分必要，从而显得正确和合适。当对某一个人的保护与大众的安全发生矛盾时，偏重多数最为正确。然而这种惩罚无论怎样必要，总显得过分严厉。这个自然地犯下的罪行是如此之小，而惩罚是如此之重，以致要我们内心同它保持一致是极为困难的。虽然这样的疏忽看来极应受到责备，然而关于这个罪行的想法并不必然会激起如此强烈的愤恨，致使我们要实行如此可怕的报复。一个仁慈的人必须使自己冷静下来，作出某种努力，并充分运用自己的坚定意志和决心，才能亲自实行、或者赞同别人实行这种惩罚。然而，他并不以这种方式来看待对某个忘恩负义的凶手或杀害自己父母的人实行的公正的惩罚。在这种情况下，他热切地、甚至喜不自胜地赞成这个看来是由这种可恶的罪行引起的正义的报复，如果这种罪行偶然地避免惩罚，他就会感到极大的愤怒和失望。旁观者看待那些不同的惩罚所怀有的这种不同的感情，证明他对前一种惩罚的赞同和对后一种惩罚的赞同并不是建立在同一原则基础上的。他把那个哨兵看成是一个不幸的牺牲者，确实，这个哨兵必须和应该为了众人的安全而献出自己的生命，但旁观者在心里仍然乐于保全他的生命；并仅仅为众人的利益与此相悖而感到遗憾。但是，如果凶手逃脱惩罚，就会激起他极为强烈的愤怒，他将祈求神在另一个世界报复那个罪行——它因人类不公平的做法而未在人间受到惩罚。 值得很好注意的是：我们绝非只是为了维持社会秩序而认为那个不义行为一定要在今生今世受到惩罚，不这样，社会秩序就很难维持，我以为，造物主是使我们希望、宗教也准许我们期待这种罪行甚至在来世受到惩罚。虽然这种罪行受到惩罚的例子不足以阻止其他人成为同样的罪犯——他们没有看到、也不知道这种惩罚，但是如果我可以这样说的话，我们感到这种惩罚将尾随其后，直到死后。 因而，我们认为，公正的神还是需要的，今后他会为受到伤害的寡妇和丧失父亲的人复仇，在这个世界上，他们经常受到侮辱而无人对此加以惩罚。因此，在每一种宗教和世人见过的每一种迷信中，都有一个地狱和一个天堂，前者是为惩罚邪恶者而提供的地方，后者是为报答正义者而提供的地方。