Chapter 7 Book Two: On Merits and Demerits; or, Objects of Reward and Punishment

Book Two On Merits and Demerits; or, Objects of Reward and Punishment (Three Parts in this Volume) Part One: On the Feelings of Merits and Demerits Introduction There is another quality arising in human manners, which refers neither to their propriety, nor to their propriety, nor to their vulgarity, but to their being the object of a definite approval or disapproval.These are strengths and weaknesses, qualities that should be rewarded or punished. It has already been said, that the affections or passions of the heart, which produce every action, and which determine all good and evil, may be studied from two different sides, or in two different relations; secondly, in relation to the result it intends to produce or tends to produce; Properness, propriety, determines propriety, decency, or vulgarity of the corresponding action; Advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment.In the preceding part of this treatise we have stated what constitutes our sense of the propriety of conduct.We now set out to examine what constitutes our feeling that our actions should be rewarded or punished.

CHAPTER I. It is evident that anything that appears as a proper object of gratitude should be rewarded; likewise, that any act that appears as a proper object of resentment should be punished. It is therefore evident to us that the following acts should be rewarded— It appears as the proper and accepted object of that affection which most immediately and most directly prompts us to repay or serve another.In the same way it is evident that the following action is punishable—it also appears as the proper and recognized object of some emotion which also immediately and directly prompts us to punish others, or to inflict punishment.

The emotion that prompts us immediately and directly to repay is gratitude; the emotion that immediately and directly prompts us to punish is resentment. It is, therefore, evident to us that there is to be rewarded—that it appears as a proper and recognized object of gratitude; . To repay means to repay, repay, and repay with virtue for the benefits obtained.Punishment is also reward and repayment, though it is done in a different way; it is evil for evil. There are other passions, besides gratitude and resentment, which arouse our concern for the happiness and misery of others; but none so directly arouse us to concern for their happiness or misery.The love and esteem which spring from acquaintance and ordinary rapport must make us glad in the fortune of someone, who is such a pleasant object of affection, that we should be willing to do our part in its bringing about it.However, even if he gets this luck without our help, our love will be fully satisfied.All this passion desires is to see his happiness, regardless of who is the creator of his fortune.Gratitude, however, is not satisfied in this way.If the one who has done us many good things should be happy without our help, then, though our love is satisfied, our gratitude is not.Until we repay him, until we have played a part in his happiness, we feel still indebted to him for the services he has rendered us in the past.

In the same way, the hatred and disgust that arise in ordinary discontent often lead us to take pleasure in the misfortune of someone whose conduct and qualities have excited our passions so painfully and unpleasantly.But while disgust and unhappiness suppress our sympathy, and sometimes even cause us to gloat over other people's sorrows, if in this case there is no resentment, if neither we nor our friends are seriously attacked personally, then These passions naturally do not lead us to wish to bring him misfortune.While we may not be afraid of being punished for having a hand in his misfortune, we'd rather it happen the other way.To a man who is governed by an intense hatred, it may be pleasant to hear that a man whom he loathed and hated died by an accident.But if he still had a sense of justice, this passion, though contrary to virtue, would have been the cause of this misfortune, even if he had no design, would have grieved him.

It is this idea of ​​automatically acting on the misfortunes of others that torments us all the more monstrously.He refuses even with horror to conceive such an abominable plot; and, if it is possible to conceive of himself committing such a heinous deed, he begins to see himself in the abominable light of those whom he detests.But resentment is quite the opposite: if someone has done us great harm, for example, if he murdered our father or our brother, and died of a fever shortly afterwards, or even been guillotined for some other crime, then the Although our hatred can be appeased, it will not completely eliminate our resentment.Resentment makes us long not only for his punishment, but for the particular injury he has done to us, to dispose of him with our own hands.Resentment cannot be completely eliminated unless the criminal not only suffers in his own turn, but also grieves over the particular crime through which we suffer.He should regret and repent of this act, so that others, for fear of the same punishment, will be frightened away from committing the same crime.The natural satisfaction of this passion produces automatically all the political consequences of punishment: the punishment of the criminal and the reprimand of the public.

Gratitude and resentment are therefore emotions which immediately and directly evoke rewards and punishments.It is evident to us, therefore, that whoever presents a proper and recognized object of gratitude deserves reward; CHAPTER TWO ON PROPER OBJECTS OF GRAVE AND PROPER OBJECTS OF GRATEFUL As proper and recognized objects of gratitude or resentment, it is impossible to do so except as those which seem necessarily proper and recognized objects of gratitude and resentment. means something else. But these passions, like all other passions in human nature, are only proper and useful to others when they have the full sympathy of every impartial spectator, the full understanding and approval of every disinterested spectator. agree with.

It is evident, therefore, that he should be rewarded who is the natural object of gratitude to every one, who agrees with what is in his heart; He who is the object of that resentment which every reasonable man is willing to accept and sympathize with, is equally evidently deserving of punishment.Indeed, it seems obvious to us that that act should be rewarded, and everyone who understands it expects to be rewarded.Therefore, they are happy to see this reward.Of course, that kind of behavior clearly deserves to be punished, and everyone who hears about it is outraged.Therefore, they are also happy to see this punishment. 1. As we sympathize with the pleasure of our companions in their good fortune, we share in their pride and satisfaction in whatever they naturally attribute to it.We understand the love and affection they have for it and have grown to love it too.If it is destroyed, or even placed too far from them, beyond their care and protection, then, in this case, there is nothing to lose but the pleasure of seeing it. loss, and we shall also regret it for their sake.This is still the case if it is someone who brings happiness to his fellows.

When we see a person being helped, protected, and comforted by others, our sympathy with the beneficiary's happiness only helps to excite our sympathy with the beneficiary's gratitude for those who make him happy.His benefactor presents himself to us in a very charming and gracious figure, if we regard him with the eyes with which we imagine the beneficiary must view the person who brings him pleasure.We are therefore ready to sympathize with the agreeable affection which the beneficiary has for the one to whom he is most grateful; and we therefore agree with his intention to repay the favor received.Since we fully understand the affections which produce them, they are in all respects proportionate to their object.

2. In the same way, as we sympathize with our fellow's sorrow whenever we see his sorrow, so we likewise understand his abhorrence of whatever causes it; unanimously, so that it would likewise be animated by the same spirit with which he endeavored to undo the cause of this grief.The indolent and passive sympathy which would cause us to suffer with him, we gladly replace it by another, more active and active, and thus we approve of his efforts to relieve this sorrow, and Sympathize with his disgust at what caused this grief.This is especially true when it is someone who is causing the pain.When we see a man oppressed and injured by another, our sympathy with the suffering of the victim seems only to serve to excite our sympathy with the victim to resentment against the aggressor.We are happy to see him fight back his enemies, and we are eager and willing to help him whenever he defends himself to some degree, or even takes revenge.If the victim should die in the struggle, we sympathize not only with the sincere resentment of his friends and relations, but with the resentment we imagine for him in our own imagination, though he has no sense or any other kind. a human emotion.

However, because we imagine ourselves to be a part of his body, and imaginatively resurrect this mutilated, bloody body that was killed by others, so when we deeply understand his situation in our hearts in this way— —Here, as on so many other occasions, we feel an emotion which the person concerned cannot feel, but through an imaginary sympathy for him.The tears of sympathy that we imagine we shed for the great and irreparable loss he suffered seemed only a small part of our responsibility to him.We believe that the injuries he suffered require more of our attention.We felt the resentment we imagined he should have felt, the resentment he would have felt if his cold, lifeless body had not lost consciousness.We imagine him chanting blood for blood.The body of the dead seemed disturbed at the thought of the unrevenge of the wounds he had suffered.The ghastly images that people imagine often appear at the murderer's bedside, and the superstitiously imagined ghosts that run from the grave to demand vengeance on those who prematurely ended their lives, are the natural outgrowth of this imaginary resentment of the dead. sympathy.For this most dreadful of crimes, at least until we have fully considered the utility of punishment, God has in this way imprinted forcefully and indelibly on the human mind the law of divine and necessary vengeance.

Chapter III Disapproval of the benefactor's actions leaves little sympathy with the beneficiary's gratitude; conversely, approval of the injurer's motives leaves little sympathy with the victim's resentment. or intentions, however beneficial or detrimental, if I may say so, to those affected by them, in the former case if the motives of the actor appear inappropriate and we cannot understand the circumstances influencing his conduct We can scarcely sympathize with the gratitude of the beneficiary if there are no sentiments; or, in the latter case, if the motives of the actor do not appear inappropriate, but, on the contrary, the sentiments which affect his conduct are as we necessarily understand them, We would have no sympathy for the resentment of the victims.In the former case, a little gratitude seems due; in the latter, a lot of resentment seems wrong.The former behavior seems to deserve a little reward, the latter behavior seems to deserve no punishment. 1. Let me begin by saying that so long as we cannot sympathize with the sentiments of the actor, and so long as the motives which influence his action appear inappropriate, we cannot sympathize with the gratitude of the beneficiary for the benefits of his action.To confer great favors on others from the most common motives, and to bestow a property upon them merely because their family and titles happen to be the same as those of those who make them, Foolish and excessive generosity seems to be only slightly rewarded.This help does not seem to require any corresponding repayment.Our contempt for the folly of the doer prevents us from fully sympathizing with the gratitude of the one who has been helped.His benefactor seemed unworthy of gratitude.Since, when we are in the position of the benefactor, we feel that such a benefactor cannot be held in high esteem, it is likely to eliminate to a great extent the respectful respect and respect which we feel should be owed to him. to the more venerable); if he had always been kind and humane to his cowardly friend, we would not have paid him too much esteem and homage--we would have given it to the more venerable benefactor.Princes who spend wealth, power, and honor unrestrainedly upon those they please seldom arouse that degree of attachment to themselves.This attachment is often experienced by those who are more restrained in their good deeds.The well-meaning but indiscreet generosity of James I of Great Britain does not seem to have been liked by any; and, notwithstanding his kind and gentle disposition, he does not seem to have lived or died without a single friend.Yet all the gentlemen and nobles of England gave their lives and fortunes for his thrifty and distinguished son, though he was of a cruel and indifferent nature. 2. Next, I will show that, so long as the conduct of the actor appears to be governed entirely by motives and sentiments which we fully sympathize with and approve of, we show no indignation against the victim, however great the misfortune may be. pity.When two persons quarrel, it is impossible to be considerate of the resentment of the other, if we take sides with the one and fully share his resentment.We sympathize with the man whose motives are for our own, and therefore regard him as right; and necessarily relentlessly against another--who we consider sure to be wrong--feel no sympathy for him.Whatever pain the latter may suffer, therefore, is neither greater than that which we ought to wish him to suffer, nor that our sympathetic indignation would prompt us to inflict on him. Doesn't make us unhappy and doesn't annoy us.Though we somewhat pity the misfortune of a cruel murderer when he is led to the guillotine, we have no sympathy for his resentment if he should be so arrogant as to show any resistance to his accuser or judge. . This natural tendency of men to feel just indignation against a criminal so heinous is indeed fatal and ruinous to the criminal.While we are not displeased with this tendency of feeling, if we put ourselves in our shoes, we feel that we cannot help but agree with it. CHAPTER 4 A brief recapitulation of the preceding chapters 1. We do not, therefore, fully and sincerely sympathize with a man who is grateful merely for the good fortune brought to him by another, unless the latter is of a kind which we Totally agree with the motivation.We must accept at heart the principles of the actor, and assent to all the sentiments which affect his conduct, before we can fully sympathize with and agree with the gratitude of those who benefit from it.If the benefactor's actions appear to be inappropriate, no commensurate repayment, however beneficial the consequences, may seem to be required or necessarily warranted. But when the benevolent disposition of the action is united with the proper affection which produced it, when we fully sympathize with and assent to the motives of the actor, the love we thus feel for him strengthens and encourages our love for him. Sympathized with the gratitude of those who attributed their good fortune to his acts of kindness.His behavior, then, seems to require and demand - if I may say so - a corresponding reward.We shall then fully sympathize with the gratitude that arouses a reciprocal heart.If we thus fully sympathize with and approve of the affection from which the action is produced, we must approve of the reward, and regard the person being rewarded as a proper and proper object of reward. 2. In the same way, we can scarcely sympathize with the resentment of one man against another, simply because one has caused misfortune to another, unless the misfortune of the former is from a motive which we cannot excuse.Until we can enter into the resentment of the victim, we must disapprove of the motives of the doer, and inwardly deny any sympathy with those feelings which affected his conduct.If these sentiments and motives do not appear inappropriate, then, however injurious their inclination may be to those acts committed by those sufferers, they do not appear to deserve any punishment, or to be the object of any proper resentment. But when the injury of such an action is combined with the unseemly affection which arises from it, when we refuse with hatred any sympathy with the motives of the actor, we sincerely and completely sympathize with the victim. resentment.These acts, then, seem to deserve and demand--if I may say so--the corresponding punishment; and we fully pardon and approve of the resentment which demands such punishment.When we so fully sympathize with the affections which demand punishment, the sinner must seem a proper object of punishment.In such a case, when we approve and sympathize with the affections from which the action arose, we must also approve of it, and regard the punished as the proper and proper object of punishment. CHAPTER V. ANALYSIS OF THE SENSE OF ADVANTAGES AND FEATURES 1. Since, therefore, our sense of the propriety of an action arises from something which I shall call immediate sympathy with the feelings and motives of the actor, if I may say In the case of an action, our sense of its merit arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy for the gratitude of the person affected by the action. Since it is true that we cannot fully appreciate the gratitude of the beneficiary unless we agree in advance with the motives of the benefactor, the feeling of merit seems to be a mixed emotion.It consists of two distinct sentiments: a direct sympathy with the emotion of the actor; and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude expressed by those who benefit from his action. We may, on many different occasions, distinctly distinguish between these two different sentiments mixed and mixed with our own feeling of the deserved reward of a particular quality or action.When we read about an appropriate, benevolent and noble act, are we not very eager to understand this intention?Are you not deeply moved by the spirit of extreme generosity that led to these acts?Don't you want them to succeed?Isn't it how sad they are for their disappointment?In imagination we make ourselves the one who acts to us; in fantasy we place ourselves in those remote and forgotten adventures and imagine ourselves playing Scipio or Cammy. Luce, Timoleon, or Aristides-style characters.Our emotions are thus based on direct sympathy for the actor.There is also a palpable sense of indirect sympathy for those who benefit from such behavior.Whenever we put ourselves in the shoes of these beneficiaries, with what warm and genuine sympathy we experience their gratitude to those who so sincerely served them!We will embrace their benefactors as they did.Our heartfelt sympathy is with their strongest gratitude.We do not think that any honor or reward can be too much for them to bestow upon their benefactor.We heartily applaud and assent to their doings when they give him such a proper return for his favors; and we are horrified when they act as if they seemed to take little notice of their favors.In short, our whole sense of the merit and worthiness of the action, of its proper and proper reward and of its pleasure in the actor, arises from a sympathetic sense of gratitude and love. mood.When we feel deeply with this emotion the situation of those involved, we must be overwhelmed by the fact that that person was able to perform such a proper and noble act of kindness. 2. Likewise, as our feeling of the impropriety of an action arises from a lack of some kind of sympathy, or from an immediate aversion to the feelings and motives of the actor, so our feeling of its faults arises from what I shall here also call Something that expresses indirect sympathy for the resentment of the victim. Since it is indeed impossible to sympathize with the resentment of the victim unless we originally disapprove of the motives of the actor and refuse any sympathy for them, the sense of the defect appears to be as compounded as the sense of the virtue. emotion.It also consists of two distinct sentiments: the one of immediate dislike for the feelings of the actor; the other of indirect sympathy for the resentment of the victim. Here, too, we can clearly distinguish, on many different occasions, these two different sentiments, mingled and compounded in our own feeling of the deserved evil of a particular quality and action.When we read some account of the insolence and cruelty of Borgia or Nero, we have in our minds an aversion to the abominable feelings which influenced their conduct, and we reject it with terror and disgust. No sympathy for bad motives.Our feelings are thus based on an immediate aversion to the feelings of the actor.At the same time, the indirect sympathy expressed with the resentment of the victim has a more pronounced feel.If we put ourselves in the shoes of those who have been insulted, murdered, or betrayed, should we not feel any righteous indignation against the oppressors of the world who are so brutal and brutal?Our sympathy with the inevitable sufferings of the innocent victims is as sincere and strong as our sympathy with their just and natural resentment.The former emotion only strengthens the latter, and the thought of their sufferings only serves to excite and increase our hatred of those who caused them.If we think of the anguish of the victims, we shall join them more sincerely against their oppressors; social law people.Sympathetic resentment tells us that punishment was caused by their crime.Our sense of this monstrous outrage, our excitement at hearing it deserved punishment, our righteous indignation when it escaped its just reward, in short, our sense of the evil retribution, All the feelings and feelings of the calamity that rightly and fittingly fell on the man who committed the above-mentioned atrocities, and that pained him also, spring from the naturally aroused, sympathetic indignation in the mind of the spectator. —At all times, the bystanders know the victim's condition well. * * To attribute in this way our natural feeling of retribution for evil to some kind of sympathy with the resentment of the victim may seem to most people to belittle the sentiment.Resentment is generally regarded as such an abominable passion that it is often thought that such a laudable principle as the feeling that evil is rewarded is not wholly founded on resentment.Perhaps it will be preferred to admit that our sense of the reward of good is based on a certain sympathy for the gratitude of those who benefit from it; for like all other benevolent passions In the same way, gratitude is considered a principle of benevolence, and it is impossible to impair the spiritual value of any affection based on gratitude.It is clear, however, that gratitude and resentment are in all respects opposed to each other; and if our feeling of merit derives from sympathy with the former, it is hardly possible that our feeling of defect does not arise from sympathy with the latter. Let us consider the case, that, though the various degrees of indignation which we so often see are one of the most admirable of all passions, if it is properly subdued and brought down entirely to that of the sympathetic indignation of the spectator, degree, there will be no criticism.If, as a spectator, we felt our hatred to be in complete harmony with that of the sufferer; if the latter's resentment was not in every way superior to our own; The sentiments with which we can assent are stronger; and if he never wishes to inflict any punishment beyond our pleasure, or if we ourselves are even tempted to punish him for it, it is impossible for us not to agree fully with his sentiments.In our opinion, our own sentiments on this occasion undoubtedly vindicated his.Moreover, experience teaches us how incapable of tempering this emotion is in a large part of the human population, and how much effort is required to repress strong, uncultivated, and involuntary resentment, and make it the proper emotion.It is inevitable, therefore, that we should have considerable respect and admiration for the man who seems able to exert himself to control the most intractable passions of his nature.When the hatred of the victim does, as almost always happens, exceed our assent, we must not, as it is impossible for us to forgive it.We disapprove of this hatred even more than we disapprove of any other almost equally excessive passion born of the imagination.We not only disapprove of this excessively strong resentment, but make it the object of our resentment and rage.We condone the opposite resentment of the person who is the object of this unjust resentment, and is thereby threatened with harm.Of all the passions, therefore, vengeance, excessive hatred, seems the most abhorrent, and is the object of aversion and resentment.When this passion is commonly expressed among men in this way--a hundred times over a hundred times and abstained once--we are very apt to regard it as wholly abominable and abominable, as it is in its most common manifestation. passion.Yet, even in the present case of the fall of man, the Creator does not seem to have dealt with us so cruelly as to endow us with a nature which is evil in all and in all respects, or to have nothing and no aspect of us to be The nature of the proper object of praise and approbation.On some occasions we feel that this passion, which is usually too strong, may also be very feeble.We sometimes complain of a man who appears to have little courage and too much indifference to his wounds; and as we despise him for the excess of this passion, we despise him for its lowness. . Had inspired writers considered that passions in all degrees were evil and sinful even among such weak and imperfect beings as man, surely they would not have spoken so often or so violently of the Creator's indignation and furious. Let us consider again that the present inquiry is not a question of rightness--if I may say so--but a question of fact.We are now not examining on what principles a perfect man would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but on what principles a being so weak and imperfect as man would really approve of the punishment of bad actions.It is clear that the principles I now mention had a great influence on his sentiments; and, "Evil deeds should be punished" Seems like a sensible arrangement.It is the existence of society that needs to limit undeserved and unjust resentment with appropriate punishment.So it would be seen as a proper and admirable thing to punish those who hold grudges.Therefore, although human beings are naturally endowed with a desire to pursue social happiness and protect society, the Creator has not entrusted human reason to discover that the use of certain punishments is an appropriate means to achieve the above-mentioned ends; but has endowed human beings with an intuition and instinct, agree that the application of certain punishments is the most proper means of attaining the above object.The delicacy of the Creator in this respect is indeed consistent with her delicacy in many other cases.As to all those ends, they may be considered, by reason of their special importance, to be the end of the Creator's favor—if such expression may be permitted.The Creator thus consistently makes men desire not only the end she has fixed, but also, for their own sake, the means by which the end can only be attained, and this It has nothing to do with the tendency of people to produce it. Therefore, self-defense and the reproduction of species have become important purposes that the Creator seems to have determined in the process of constructing all animals.Man is endowed with a desire for those two ends and an aversion for their opposites; with a love of life and a fear of death; with a continuation of the species and a A desire to perpetuate and an aversion to the idea of ​​species extinction.But though the Creator has thus endowed us with a very strong desire for these ends, he has not entrusted to the slow and uncertain resolutions of our reason the discovery of the proper means of attaining them.The Creator leads us by primitive and immediate instincts to discover most of the means to these ends, and hunger, thirst, the passions of the union of the sexes, the liking of pleasure, the fear of pain, impel us to employ these means for ourselves, without any regard for them. Whether the means will lead to those beneficial ends, which the great Creator intended by them to attain. Before concluding this note, I must mention a difference between the assent to the propriety of conduct and the assent to merit or benevolence.Before we can assent to any man's affections which are proper and proper to the object upon which he is being acted upon, we must not only be moved as he is, but be aware of an emotional sympathy between him and us.Thus, although upon hearing of some misfortune that befell a friend, I would rightly imagine his excessive apprehension; Can't say I share the sentiments that influenced his behaviour.Appropriate approval, therefore, requires not only our complete sympathy for the actor, but our discovery of a complete emotional agreement between him and us.On the other hand, when we hear of another man being touched by some kind of favor which he pleases, I must agree with him if, because I know his case well, I feel that his affection comes from the heart. the deeds of his benefactor, and consider his deeds to be commendable and proper objects of reward.Apparently, the idea of ​​gratitude in the beneficiary does not in any way alter our sentiments about the benefactor's merit.So there is no need for actual agreement of sentiment here.It suffices to say that, if he has gratitudes, they are consistent; and that our sense of merit is usually founded on those illusory sympathies.Thus, when we are clearly aware of another's condition, we are often moved in a way that the person concerned was not.There is a similar difference between our disapproval of defects and our disapproval of impropriety.