Chapter 9 Book III, Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of men, as regards the virtue or defect of conduct

PART THREE Concerning the Merit or Demerit of Actions, and of the Influence of Fate on the Feelings of Man Introduction Whatever praise or blame an action may receive, it is directed, first, to the heart or sentiment which produced it; For the external behavior or movement caused by this emotion; Finally, for the actual good or bad consequences of this behavior.These three distinct aspects constitute the whole nature and condition of the action, and they must be grounds for whatever quality may correspond to the action. Of the three cases, it is clear that the latter two cannot be grounds for any praise or blame; nor is anyone insisting on the contrary.In the most innocent acts and in the most blameworthy, the external acts or movements of the body are often the same.A man who shoots at a bird and a man who shoots at a man both perform the same external action, that is, both pull the trigger of a gun.The actual consequences of an action are even more independent of praise or blame than external actions of the body.As consequences depend not on the actor but on fate, they cannot be a proper ground for any affection which has as its object the qualities and actions of the actor.

The only consequences for which the actor may be responsible, or for which he may obtain some kind of approval or disapproval, are those which in one way or another are expected, or at least those which show some of the inner intentions from which his actions have arisen. Consequences of pleasant or unpleasant qualities.Hence all praise or blame, all approval or disapproval, which is just due to an action, must at last be directed to the intention or sentiment of the heart, to the propriety of the action, to benevolent or evil intentions. When the maxim is presented so abstractly and in such general terms, no one can object to it.Its self-evident truth is recognized by the world, and no one can dispute it.Everyone agrees that: However different the accidental, accidental, and unforeseen consequences of different actions may be, if, on the one hand, the intentions or sentiments from which these actions spring are equally propitious and benevolent, or If, on the other hand, it is equally unseemly and vicious, then the merit or demerit of the action remains the same, and the doer is likewise the proper object of gratitude or resentment.

But however much we may be subdued by this correct maxim when we think abstractly, the exact practical consequences of an action, once confronted with a particular situation, still have a very large influence on our feelings as to its merit or demerit. and almost always intensifies or weakens our feelings about both. A closer examination will show that, in a particular case, our emotions are seldom entirely governed by that law--though we all admit that our emotions should be entirely governed by it. Now, I shall go on to explain this inconsistency of sentiments, which is felt by all, and which few are fully aware of and willing to admit; Consider the path by which sex passes; secondly consider the degree of its influence; lastly consider its corresponding effect, or the purpose that the Creator intends to express through it.

CHAPTER I. Of the Causes of the Effects of This Fate Whatever may be the causes of pain and pleasure, or how they may arise, they excite at once the two passions of gratitude and resentment in all animals.Both inanimate and animate things arouse both passions.Even at the moment of being touched by a rock, we get angry with it.Children will knock on this stone, dogs will growl at it, and irascible people will curse at it.Indeed, a little reflection will correct the sentiment, and it will soon be realized that what has no feeling is not a fitting object of vengeance.When the harm is great, however, the object of the harm is a constant displeasure to us, and we take pleasure in burning it and destroying it.So should we be with the instrument which accidentally causes the death of a friend, that if we forget to wreak such absurd vengeance upon it, we should often think of ourselves as guilty of such inhuman crimes.

Likewise, we feel a certain gratitude for those inanimate things which give us great or frequent pleasure.It seemed an inhuman act for a seaman who had just escaped from a wrecked ship by means of a plank, to use it to fuel a fire as soon as he landed.We probably all hoped that he would preserve the board with the same care and affection as some sort of memorial to him that was more or less beloved.A man grows fond of his long-used snuff-box, pen-knife, crutch, and feels something like a real love and affection for them.If he damages or loses them, the annoyance it causes will be out of proportion to the value lost.We all have a certain respect for the house we have long lived in, and the tree for which we have long enjoyed its shade, as if it were due to the benefactor of the act.The decay of the one, and the ruin of the other, will make us melancholy, though we shall not suffer loss.The ancient nymphs and house-gods, the gods of trees and houses, were probably first proposed by authors who were still in awe of such objects.If such objects were inanimate, this sentiment would seem irrational.

But something must be not only a cause of pleasure or pain, but equally capable of feeling them, to be the proper object of gratitude or resentment.Without this other quality, those passions cannot express themselves freely in it.As these passions are excited by causes of pleasure and pain, their satisfaction consists in the return of those passions which arouse them; and it is futile to attempt a return on objects which are incapable of feeling.Animals, therefore, are more proper objects of gratitude and resentment than inanimate things.A dog that bit a man and an ox that used its horns were punished.If they were the cause of someone's death, neither the public nor the deceased's relatives would be satisfied except to kill them.This is not only for the safety of the living, but more or less for the revenge of the injured dead.

Those animals, on the contrary, which are especially useful to their masters, become the objects of their deepest gratitude.We were appalled at the brutality of the officer mentioned in "The Turkish Detective"--he stabbed the horse that had carried him across the Channel, lest it should in the future make others famous by the same adventure. Although animals are not only causes of pleasure and pain but also feel those passions, they are not yet perfect objects of gratitude and resentment; the passions still feel that something is lacking for their full satisfaction.Gratitude desires not only to make the benefactor happy, but also to make him know that he has received this reward for his past actions, to give him pleasure in performing them, to give him some satisfaction. Man is worth doing good for.What fascinates us most in our benefactor is his sympathy with us, his regard for our qualities as much as we do, his respect for us.We are delighted to find that someone judges us as we judge ourselves, and distinguishes us from others as we ourselves.One of the chief objects which are intended to be accomplished by voluntary rewards to him is to maintain in him these agreeable and satisfying emotions.Generosity often despises the selfish idea of ​​demanding new favors from its benefactors through persistent expressions of gratitude.But to preserve and increase his respect for us is an interest which very noble minds do not think unworthy of attention.The grounds for the above statement are that if we fail to appreciate the motives of our benefactor, if his conduct and character appear unworthy of our approbation, our gratitude, notwithstanding the great help he has previously given us, always visibly weakened.We shall not rejoice in his grace; and it seems an unworthy pursuit to maintain respect for such a poor or worthless benefactor.

Resentment, on the contrary, chiefly serves, not so much to make our enemies suffer in their turn, as to make them realize that their pain stems from his past conduct, to make him repent of it, to make him He knew the people he hurt didn't deserve that.The main factors that make us furious against someone who hurts and insults us are his contemptuous attitude towards us, his irrational partiality and absurd selfishness, from which he seems to think that others Sacrifice may be made for his convenience or whim.The conspicuous inappropriateness of such conduct, the brutishness and injustice with which it is mixed, is often more outrageous and exasperating than all the misfortunes that have befallen us.To restore him to the more correct awareness of what he should do to others, and to make him feel the loss he has caused us and the wrong things he has done is often the main purpose of our revenge. When this purpose is not achieved, it is always insufficient.When it is evident that our enemy has done us no harm, when we consider his conduct to be perfectly just—that we would have done the same in his situation, and should therefore deserve all the wretched retribution from him— — On that occasion, if we have the least sense of fairness and justice, there will be no feeling of resentment.

Therefore, anything must meet the following three different conditions before it can be a perfect and proper object of gratitude or resentment.First, it must be a cause of pleasure on one occasion and of pain on another.Second, it must have the ability to feel those emotions.Finally, it not only produces those passions, but must produce them according to a will which on one occasion approves and on another disapproves.By virtue of the first condition, every object excites those passions; by virtue of the second, it satisfies them in every way; and by the third condition not only is necessary for the complete satisfaction of those passions. and as the pleasure or pain it causes is so intense and peculiar, it is likewise the cause of those passions.

Therefore, because it is only the cause that excites gratitude and resentment that causes pleasure or pain in one way or another; propriety and malice; but if it fails to produce the good and the vice that he expects, it is because some exciting cause is wanting on both occasions, so that in the former he gets little gratitude, and In the latter case there is little resentment.On the contrary, though there is no praiseworthy benevolence in a man's will on the one hand, and no condemnable malice on the other, if his actions produce great good or great evil, then, as between the two Each occasion produces the cause which excites the affections, and it is easy to feel some gratitude towards him in the one case, and some resentment towards him in the other.In the former case, his good qualities loomed; in the latter, his shortcomings.And, since the consequences of such actions are entirely in the absolute control of fate, fate has an influence on human sentiments as to merit and demerit.

CHAPTER TWO OF THE EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THIS FATE In the first place, the consequence of this influence of fate is that, if those actions, which are caused by the most laudable or most blameworthy inclinations, do not produce the desired effects, they lessen our respect for them. the sense of merits and demerits; and, secondly, that, if extreme pleasures or pains happen to be occasioned by those actions, our sense of their merits and demerits is enhanced more than we should be of the motives and affections from which they arose. . 1. In the first place, I think that though a man's wills are so proper and good on the one hand, or so unseemly and vicious on the other, yet if they fail to produce their effect, then, on the former occasion, his The strengths do not seem to be perfect, nor, on the latter occasion, his flaws.These irregular changes of sentiment are not only imperceptible to those who are directly affected by the consequences of an action, but are only more or less felt by the impartial spectator.A person who seeks a certain official position for others but fails to do so is considered a friend of others, and seems to deserve the love and affection of others.However, a person who not only helps others to obtain but also achieves their wishes should be considered as the protector and benefactor of others, and deserves his respect and gratitude.We tend to think, and may do so with some justice, that the person who is appreciated conceives himself the same.But if he does not feel that he is inferior to the latter, we cannot sympathize with his emotions.Indeed, it is often said that we feel as much gratitude to those who try to help us as to those who actually help.This is the version we often take of every such unsuccessful endeavor; but, like every other valid statement, it must be fully understood.A generous man feels almost the same affection for a friend who helps him unsuccessfully, as he feels for a friend who helps him successfully; and the more generous the man is, the closer the two sentiments are to be precise.Since this sincere magnanimity is loved and respected by those whom they themselves consider worthy of respect, it produces more pleasure, and thus excites more gratitude, than they can expect from the full benefits of those affections. So if they lose those benefits, they seem to lose only something insignificant.However, they lost something after all.So their happiness and consequent gratitude is certainly not perfect.Suppose, therefore, between a friend who fails to help and a friend who succeeds—all other things being equal—that there would exist, even among the noblest and best minds, some emotional nuance in favor of friends who succeed .Not only that, but in this point human beings are so unjust that, though they may get what they wish, if it is not at the mercy of a particular benefactor, they may think that it is best for the benefactor of the world. Those who have not been able to help further due to the intention of this work need no thanks. On such occasions, different people who bring them pleasure share their gratitude, so that they seem to be obliged to show only a little gratitude to anyone.We hear it commonly said that there is no doubt that this person wants to help us, and we do believe that he is doing all he can to that end.We do not, however, thank him for this, since no one else has consented to it, and nothing he can do will lead to this benefit.Such considerations, they think, lessen, even in the eyes of impartial spectators, the gratitude they owe their benefactors.The man who endeavors to do good without success does not himself trust in the gratitude of those he intends to do, nor generates in himself the feeling of being useful to others that would have occurred in his success. The sense of merit.Even to those who fully believe in their power to do good, the merit of their talents and abilities seems somewhat imperfect if some accident prevents it from producing its effect. The general who had been envied by the court ministers and failed to achieve great victories against the enemies of his country always regretted the loss of his opportunity afterwards.His remorse was not just for the people, but for the failure to carry out an act that would have magnified his reputation not only in his eyes but in the eyes of others.The thought did not satisfy him, nor did it satisfy anyone else, that a plan or stratagem depended entirely on his talent; To accomplish it in every possible way, to allow him to go on, success is unquestionable.After all, he failed to carry out his plans and stratagems; and though he may have received all the credit for drawing up a magnanimous and great plan of war, he still wanted to show the virtues which actually manifest in the execution of a great operation.It is considered the most heinous injustice to curtail a man's authority to do something which is of public interest, when he is nearly on the verge of success.We felt that since he had put in so much effort, he should be given credit for getting this done.Pompey was elected consul at the time of Lucullus' victory, and was disapproved of by accumulating to himself the honors of luck and valor which were due to others.It is said that when Lucullus was not permitted to complete that conquest, even his friends thought his honor seemed imperfect.Lukulus' actions and courage have pushed this war to the point where almost anyone can end it.An architect is humiliated if his designs are not carried out at all, or if they are altered so slightly as to detract from the building.Design, however, is entirely the architect's business.For the connoisseur, his genius is as much in the design as in the actual construction.But even to the most intelligent mind, designing does not give him the same pleasure as building a splendid building.In both cases they can display the same taste and genius.But the effect is very different: the pleasure derived from the former is sometimes less than the surprise and admiration evoked by the latter.We believe that there are many men of greater talent than Caesar and Alexander; that they would have acted greater in the same circumstances.However, we do not view them with wonder and admiration.In all ages and countries the two aforementioned heroes have been viewed in this light, and a heartfelt, sober appraisal may have made us appreciate them more, but they lacked the brilliance of great deeds to excite it.Excellence of character and ability does not produce the same effect as excellence of performance, even in those who recognize such excellence.Just as the merits of the man who tries to do good and fails to succeed seem to diminish in the eyes of the ungrateful, so the faults of the man who seeks to do evil but fails do likewise diminish.An attempt to commit a crime, however clearly proven, is never punished as severely as the actual crime.Perhaps treason is the only exception.That crime directly affects the very existence of the regime itself, and it is certainly more carefully guarded against by the authorities than against any other crime.In punishing treason, what the prince resents is that it directly endangers himself; in punishing other crimes, what the prince resents is that it endangers others.In the one case it is his own indignation which he vents; in the second his indignation arises only from sympathy and thus into consideration of the indignation of his subjects.On the former occasion, therefore, as he punished the criminal for his own sake, he was apt to pass a sentence more severe and cruel than the impartial spectator could have consented to.Here, too, in the lesser cases of treason, he is angry, and as in other cases he cannot always wait until the crime is committed, or even to make an attempt to commit it.A treasonous deliberation, or even just an attempt at treason, just a treacherous talk, without any action, is punishable in many countries as is the actual crime of treason.As for all other crimes that were merely contrived but not tried, there was no punishment at all, let alone severe punishment.It may be said that there is really no need to suppose that the attempt to commit a crime and the act of committing a crime are the same evil, and that they should therefore not be subject to the same punishment.It can also be said that, when the heat of the moment comes to the fore, we can do many things that we feel utterly impossible to accomplish, and we can even take steps to accomplish them.But this reason cannot be justified when treasonous plots have advanced to the point of making a last-ditch attempt.Though hardly any country has the law that a man who shoots his enemy with a pistol and fails to hit him is condemned to death; death, the former should not be sentenced to death.But so great is the resentment against the crime, and so great is the dread of the man who declares that he will commit it, that in all countries the mere attempt to commit it will Sentenced to death.Those who attempt to commit minor crimes are almost always given light sentences, sometimes not punished at all.The thief was caught red-handed before he put his hand into a neighbor's pocket to steal, and his punishment was merely to humiliate him.If he had time to steal a handkerchief, he would be sentenced to death.A person who breaks into another person's house illegally, puts a ladder in front of the neighbor's window, and is discovered before entering, will not be executed.People who attempt to rape women are not punished like rapists.While seducing a woman was severely punished, there was hardly any punishment for attempting to seduce a married woman.Our resentment against a man who merely intends to do harm is seldom so strong that we testify against him to receive the same punishment as the man who actually did harm.If he did do that bad thing, we just think he deserves that kind of punishment.In the former case, our feeling of his brutality is lessened by the joy that follows the sentence; .But in both cases, since his intentions are equally evil, his actual faults are no doubt the same.In this respect, therefore, there is an irregularity in the sentiments of all men, and, I believe, the laws of all the most civilized nations, as well as those of the most savage, have a necessary mitigating statute. Wherever the natural indignation of civilized men is not strengthened by the consequences of crimes, they seek from benevolence to absolve or mitigate punishment.On the other hand, the savage is often insensitive or inquisitive about the motives of an action when it has no actual consequences. The man who decides to commit a crime from passion or from the influence of a bad company, who has perhaps taken some steps towards the commission of a crime, but is fortunately prevented by some accident beyond his power, will indeed, if his conscience survive, in the For the rest of his life he regarded this accident as a great and obvious salvation for himself.He will be thankful to think that God has so graciously rescued him from the sin into which he was sinking, and spared his life from being filled with fear, self-reproach, and remorse.Although he hadn't committed the crime, he also felt guilty, as if he had actually committed the crime that he was so determined to commit.Although he knew that it was not because he was good that he did not commit the crime, it was a great comfort to him to think that it had not happened.He still didn't think he deserved much punishment, much resentment.This luck either lessened or eliminated all guilt in him.In retrospect he had made such a resolution to this crime, and he felt that no other result had made him regard his freedom from crime more as a great and extraordinary miracle.For he still imagines that he has been exonerated, and looks back to his peaceful mind with that fear (with which a man in safety may sometimes recall himself being in such a perilous position on the verge of catastrophe) The thought of the dangers he had faced terrified him. 2. A second consequence of this fateful influence is that, when the conduct of the agent happens to cause us undue pleasure or pain, it increases our sense of the merits and demerits of the action, in addition to the consequences arising from the motives or feelings of the action. feel.But the pleasing or unpleasant result of that action often gives the actor, although in the intention of the actor nothing to be commended or blamed, or at least not to the extent that we should praise or blame it. Pros and cons cast a certain image.Thus even the messenger who brings bad news displeases us; conversely, we feel a certain gratitude for the person who brings good news. For a moment we see both as the source of our fortunes, good or bad, and view them more or less as if they had really caused the result when in fact they were only reporting it.The first to bring us happy news is naturally the temporary object of gratitude: we embrace him warmly and affectionately, and in the moment we feel lucky, repay with joy as if we had received some great favor.According to the custom of various courts, the officer who brought the news of victory was entitled to a distinguished promotion, so that the general in war always chose one of his favorites to fill this errand.On the contrary, the person who first brought us the sad news just happens to be a temporary object of resentment.Inevitably we looked at him with annoyance and uneasiness; rough and unreasonable people tended to vent to him the wrath his news aroused. King Tigran of Armenia beheaded the man who had first reported to him that a formidable enemy was approaching.It seems barbaric and inhuman to punish in this way the bearers of bad news; yet it does not displease us to reward those who bring good news; is suitable.But since there is nothing wrong with the former and no merit in the latter, why should we do it so differently?For any kind of reason seems to be sufficient to allow us to allow the discharge of friendly and benevolent feelings; but it requires a very strong and fertile reason to sympathize with the discharge of unfriendly and vicious feelings. Though we are generally unwilling to condone unfriendly, vicious feelings, arguing that they should never be allowed to vent, unless the intention of the wicked and unjust individual is directly directed at their proper object, we will, on certain occasions, relent. such harsh requirements.When a man has inadvertently done some unintentional injury to another, we usually have only to excuse the victim's resentment, and applaud the punishment he inflicts upon the offender, far above that which did not result in such unfortunate consequences. Those who may have deserved punishment. There is a degree of negligence which, while causing no one any harm, also seems to warrant some kind of punishment. Thus, whoever, without warning passers-by beforehand, throws a boulder over a wall and onto the road, without noticing where it may fall, is doubtless bound to deserve some kind of punishment. Even if it did no harm, a conscientious policeman would punish such absurdity.The man who has committed such a wicked thing shows an outrageous and unreasonable contempt for the happiness and safety of others.What he did was a violation of others.He unscrupulously exposes others to a danger that no sane man would want to face, and he obviously lacks the sense of what is right to treat his fellows-which is the basis of justice and society.From a legal point of view, therefore, gross negligence is almost equal to malicious conspiracy.When such carelessness produced some unfortunate consequences, the man who did it was often punished as if he had really intended those consequences; Behavior is regarded as cruel and should be severely punished.If, therefore, he accidentally crushes a man to death by the said indiscretion, he is punished by the laws of many countries, especially the old law of Scotland. While this treatment is undoubtedly too severe, it is not entirely contrary to our natural sensibilities.Sympathy for the unfortunate victim arouses our just indignation at his foolish and inhuman conduct, but it is better than any other to guillotine a man who has only inadvertently thrown a stone into the road and has done no harm. Things hit our natural sense of justice all the more heavily.In this case, however, his stupid and inhuman behavior has not changed; our emotions have been very different.Such different considerations would lead us to believe that even the bystanders would be aroused to great indignation by the practical consequences of that act.Severe penalties for this are to be found in the laws of almost all countries, if I am not mistaken; and, as has been said, in the reverse case, the laws are generally lenient. Another degree of negligence does not involve any act of injustice.A person who commits this error treats others as himself, has no intention of hurting others, and has no rude contempt for the safety and happiness of others.However, his conduct was not as careful and prudent as it should have been, and for this he deserves a measure of blame and censure, but no punishment whatsoever.But if this negligence of his has caused some injury to another, the laws of all countries, I believe, oblige him to make compensation.No one would have thought of imposing upon him, though it was doubtless a real punishment; and though it had not been brought about by an unfortunate accident caused by his conduct, yet the natural sentiments of men were in favor of such a law. ruling.We think it most reasonable that no one should be injured by the carelessness of another; and that the damage caused by such negligence should be compensated by the person who caused it. There is another kind of negligence, which consists only in a deeply disturbing lack of suspicion and caution as to the possible consequences of our actions.The want of this high degree of prudence is far from being blameworthy, but rather the quality, when no bad result ensues.To be timid and cautious about everything has never been regarded as a virtue, but as a quality less conducive to action and business than other things.When, however, a man, through want of this undue care, happens to injure another, he is often compelled by the law to pay for the damage.For example, under the laws of Aquilia, a man who happened to trample over a neighbor's slave because he was unable to handle a suddenly frightened galloping horse had to pay damages.When such accidents occur, we are apt to think that he should not have ridden such a horse, and that his attempt to do so was unforgivably rash.Though without this accident, not only would we not have reacted in this way, but we would have regarded his refusal to ride the horse as a sign of cowardice, of doubts about something that is only possible but requires little care.He who, by some accident of this kind, accidentally injures another, seems himself to feel that his fault is to be punished.He naturally ran to the victim, expressed his concern for what had happened, and expressed his apology in various ways.If he is rational, he must want to pay for the loss and do everything in his power to assuage the intense anger of the victim.He realized that such resentment is easy to develop in the hearts of victims, and that no apology and no compensation would be considered an extremely barbaric act.However, why should he apologize when others should not?Why should he be responsible for other people's misfortunes, since he is as innocent as all other bystanders?The difficulty should certainly not be imposed on him, nor would even the impartial spectator show some tolerance for other resentments which might be regarded as unjust. CHAPTER THREE Of the final cause of this inconsistency of sentiments, the effects of good or bad conduct, upon the sentiments of those who cause them, and of others; The place of action exerts her influence, and to some extent makes people feel about their own and other people's qualities and behavior.People have always complained that the world has basically lost faith in virtue by judging by results rather than by motives.People agree with the common maxim that since the outcome is not dependent on the actor, it should not affect our feelings about the merit and propriety of the actor's actions.但是，当我们成为特殊的当事人时，在任何一种情况下都会发现自己的情感实际上很难与这一公正的格言相符。任何行为愉快的和不幸的结果不仅会使我们对谨慎的行为给予一种或好或坏的评价，而且几乎总是极其强烈地激起我们的感激或愤恨之情以及对动机的优缺点的感觉。 然而，当造物主在人们心中撒下这种情感变化无常的种子时.像在其它一切场合一样，她似乎已经想到了人类的幸福和完美。如果单单伤人的动机，狠毒的感情便是激起我们愤恨的原因，那么，如果我们怀疑某人有这种动机和感情，即使他没有将其付诸于行动，我们也会感觉到对他的全部愤怒之情。情感、想法和打算都将成为惩罚的对象；而且，如果人类对它们的愤怒达到同对行为的愤怒一样强烈的程度，如果没有产生任何行为的卑鄙想法在世人心中同卑鄙行为一样会唤起复仇之心，那么每个法庭使将成为真正的审理之所。毫无恶意和小心谨慎的行为，也将无安全可言。人们仍然会猜疑它们出自不良的意愿、不良的目的和不良的动机；并且，当它们激起同不良的行为所激起的一样的愤怒时，在不良的意图和不良的行为一样遭人愤恨时，人们同样会面临惩罚和愤恨。因此，造物主把实际犯罪和企图犯罪的行为以及使我们对它产生直觉的恐惧心理的行为，都变成了人们惩罚和愤恨的唯一合宜和赞同的对象。虽然情感、动机和感情来自人们根据冷静的理性而获得全部优点或缺点的行为之中，但是内心的伟大法官还是把它们置于人类的各种法律限制之外，并把它们留给自己那不会误判的法庭来审理。 因此，在最初看来是荒唐的和不可解释的人类有关优点或缺点的这个有益而有用的感情变化的基础上产生了有关正义的必要法则，即在这个世界上，人们不应为他们所具有的动机和打算而受到惩罚，而只应为他们的行为而受到惩罚。但是， 如果我们仔细观察，就可以看到，每一种人性都同样地证实了造物主的深谋远虑； 即使在人们的弱点和愚行方面，我们也会钦佩神的智慧和仁慈。 情感的不规则变化不是完全没有作用的。由于这种变化，帮助别人而未成功的企图中的优点和纯粹良好而又仁慈的意愿中的优点显得并不完美。人是倾向于行动的，并且尽其所能地促进自己和别人所处的外部环境的如下变化，即，它似乎能够最有利于一切人的幸福。他必定不满足于消极的善行，也不把自己想象成人们的朋友，因为他在内心深处更希望有助于世界的繁荣。造物主教导他：为了达到他欲促其实现的目的，可能要全力以赴，除非他实际上达到这些目的，否则自己和别人都不会对他的行为感到十分满意，也都不会对他的行为给予最高度的赞扬。造物主使他明白：赞扬缺乏善行优点的好意，几乎不能激起世人最大的、 甚或他自己的最高度的赞扬声。那个除其全部谈吐举止表现出最正直、最高尚和最慷慨的感情以外，没有完成一次重要行为的人，即使他的无用或许只是因为缺少帮助别人的某个机会，也可能没有资格得到很大的报答。我们还可以拒绝给他这种报答而不受谴责。我们还可以问他：你干了些什么呢？你干了些什么实实在在的好事使你有资格获得这么大的回报呢？我们尊敬你，爱戴你；但是并不对你欠下什么。真的去报答具有只是由于缺少助人机会而没有发挥作用的那种潜在美德的人，并给予荣誉和晋升，虽然这在某种意义上可以说是应该的，但不能说一定是合宜的，荣誉和晋升是非凡善行的结果。相反，在没有犯罪的情况下，仅仅因为内心的感情而施加惩罚，这是最粗野和残忍的暴行。如果仁慈的感情在几乎成为罪过之前就付诸行动，那似乎应该得到最高度的赞扬。相反，狠毒的感情化为行动几乎不会过分迟缓或多加考虑。 值得注意的是：对肇事者和受害者来说，无意之中干下的坏事都应被看成是一种不幸。因此，造物主教导人类：要尊重自己同胞的幸福，唯恐自己会做出任何可能伤害他们的事情，哪怕这是无意的；如果他无意中不幸地给自己的同胞带来了灾难，他就会担心自己所感到的那种强烈愤恨会冲自己突然爆发出来。在古代未开化的人的家教中，献奉给某神的圣地，只是在一些庄重和必要的场合才准予踩踏，而且，即使出于无知而违反上述规定的人，从践踏圣地时起就成了一个赎罪者，在他完成合适的赎罪行为之前，他将遭到执行这一规定的法力无边而肉眼看不见的神的报复。所以，为了每个清白无辜者的幸运，可以借助于造物主的智慧，同样地划出神圣的供祭神用的圣地，并用树篱围起来防止人们接近。这样， 在没有索取同这个无意违反者的地位相应的补偿和赎罪物的情况下，也不会发生任意践踏的现象，也不会发生任何出于无知而不是出于本意的违反规定的现象。 富于人性的人在无可责备的疏忽中意外地造成了别人的死亡，虽然没有犯罪，他还是感到自己是一个赎罪者。在一生中，他把这一事故看成是可能落到自己身上的最大不幸。如果受害者的家境贫困而他自己尚过得去，他就会立即把赡养受害者家属的责任承担起来，并认为他们无需什么优点就有资格得到一切恩惠和良好的待遇。如果受害者的家境尚可，他就会以各种认过之举，以各种悲伤的表示， 以为他们做自己所能想到的或他们所接受的各种好事，来补偿他所造成的损失并尽可能地安抚那些家属。对因他的过错而产生的愤恨之情来说，这种过错虽然是偶然的，然而是巨大的；这种愤恨或许是自然的，却无疑是极不公正的。 某个清白无辜者由于某一偶然事件造成了一些过失，如果这是他自觉地和有意地造成的，他就会公正地受到最严厉的指责。此人所感到的痛苦曾引出古代和当代戏剧中最精采和最吸引人的几幕。正是这种虚构的罪行场面——如果我可以这样称呼的话——构成了希腊戏剧中的俄狄浦斯和裘卡斯塔的全部不幸，构成了英国戏剧中的蒙尼米亚和伊莎贝拉的全部不幸。虽然他们之中没有人犯下极轻微的罪行，却成了最大的赎罪者。 然而，尽管这一切看来是情感的不规则变化，但是如果一个人不幸地犯下了那些他无意犯的罪行，或未能成功地实现他有意做的好事，造物主也不会让他的清白无辜得不到一点安慰，也不会让他的美德全然得不到什么报答。那时，他会求助于那正确而又公平的格言，即：那些不依我们的行为而定的结果，不应减少我们该得到的尊敬。他唤起心中全部的高尚感情和坚定意志，尽量注意自己不要以现在的面貌而以应有的样子出现在人们的眼前，他要人们看到他那慷慨的意愿最后得到成功，即使人们的感情都很正直和公正，甚或同自己全然一致。一部分很正直和富于人性的人，完全赞成他如是按自己的观点来激励自己所作的努力。 他们以心灵中的全部高尚而又伟大的情感去矫正自己心中的人性的不规则变化， 并努力以相同的眼光来看待自己那没有获得成功的高尚行为，即使在没有作出任何这样大的努力的情况下获得成功，他们也会自然而然地倾向于用这种眼光来思考问题。